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PREFACE
The present work has two main objects. One of these, the v
proof that all pure mathematics deals exclusively with con-
cepts definable in terms of a very small number of fundamen-
tal logical concepts, and that all its propositions are deducible
from a very small number of fundamental logical principles, is
undertaken in Parts II–VII of this Volume, and will be estab-
lished by strict symbolic reasoning in Volume II. The demon-
stration of this thesis has, if I am not mistaken, all the cer-
tainty and precision of which mathematical demonstrations
are capable. As the thesis is very recent among mathemati-
cians, and is almost universally denied by philosophers, I have
undertaken, in this volume, to defend its various parts, as oc-
casion arose, against such adverse theories as appeared most
widely held or most difficult to disprove. I have also endeav-
oured to present, in language as untechnical as possible, the
more important stages in the deductions by which the thesis
is established.
The other object of this work, which occupies Part I, is the
explanation of the fundamental concepts which mathemat-
ics accepts as indefinable. This is a purely philosophical task,
and I cannot flatter myself that I have done more than indi-
cate a vast field of inquiry, and give a sample of the meth-
ods by which the inquiry may be conducted. The discussion
of indefinables—which forms the chief part of philosophical
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logic—is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see
clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may
have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with
redness or the taste of a pineapple. Where, as in the present
case, the indefinables are obtained primarily as the necessary
residue in a process of analysis, it is often easier to know that
there must be such entities than actually to perceive them;
there is a process analogous to that which resulted in the dis-
covery of Neptune, with the difference that the final stage—
the search with a mental telescope for the entity which has
been inferred—is often the most difficult part of the under-
taking. In the case of classes, I must confess, I have failed to
perceive any concept fulfilling the conditions requisite for the vi
notion of class. And the contradiction discussed inChapter x
proves that something is amiss, butwhat this is I have hitherto
failed to discover.
The second volume, in which I have had the great good for-
tune to secure the collaboration of Mr A.N. Whitehead, will
be addressed exclusively to mathematicians; it will contain
chains of deductions, from the premisses of symbolic logic
through Arithmetic, finite and infinite, to Geometry, in an or-
der similar to that adopted in the present volume; it will also
contain various original developments, in which the method
of Professor Peano, as supplemented by the Logic ofRelations,
has shown itself a powerful instrument ofmathematical inves-
tigation.
Thepresent volume,whichmaybe regarded either as a com-
mentary upon, or as an introduction to, the second volume,
is addressed in equal measure to the philosopher and to the
mathematician; but some parts will be more interesting to the
one, others to the other. I should advise mathematicians, un-
less they are specially interested in Symbolic Logic, to begin
with Part IV, and only refer to earlier parts as occasion arises.
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The following portions are more specially philosophical: Part
I (omitting Chapter ii); Part II, Chapters xi, xv, xvi, xvii; Part
III; Part IV, §207, Chapters xxvi, xxvii, xxxi; PartV,Chapters
xli, xlii, xliii; Part VI, Chapters l, li, lii; Part VII, Chapters liii,
liv, lv, lvii, lviii; and the twoAppendices, which belong to Part
I, and should be read in connection with it. Professor Frege’s
work, which largely anticipates my own, was for the most part
unknown tomewhen the printing of the present work began;
I had seen his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, but, owing to the
great difficulty of his symbolism, I had failed to grasp its im-
portance or to understand its contents. The only method, at
so late a stage, of doing justice to his work, was to devote an
Appendix to it; and in some points the views contained in the
Appendix differ from those in Chapter vi, especially in §§71,
73, 74. On questions discussed in these sections, I discovered
errors after passing the sheets for the press; these errors, of
which the chief are the denial of the null-class, and the identi-
fication of a term with the class whose only member it is, are
rectified in the Appendices. The subjects treated are so dif-
ficult that I feel little confidence in my present opinions, and
regard any conclusions whichmay be advocated as essentially
hypotheses.
A few words as to the origin of the present work may serve
to show the importance of the questions discussed. About six
years ago, I began an investigation into the philosophy of Dy-
namics. I was met by the difficulty that, when a particle is sub-
ject to several forces, no one of the component accelerations vii
actually occurs, but only the resultant acceleration, of which
they are not parts; this fact rendered illusory such causation
of particulars by particulars as is affirmed, at first sight, by the
law of gravitation. It appeared also that the difficulty in re-
gard to absolute motion is insoluble on a relational theory of
space. From these two questions I was led to a re-examination
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of the principles of Geometry, thence to the philosophy of
continuity and infinity, and thence, with a view to discover-
ing themeaning of the word any, to Symbolic Logic. The final
outcome, as regards the philosophy of Dynamics, is perhaps
rather slender; the reason of this is, that almost all the prob-
lems of Dynamics appear to me empirical, and therefore out-
side the scope of such a work as the present. Many very in-
teresting questions have had to be omitted, especially in Parts
VI and VII, as not relevant to my purpose, which, for fear of
misunderstandings, it may be well to explain at this stage.
When actual objects are counted, or when Geometry and
Dynamics are applied to actual spaceor actualmatter, orwhen,
in any other way, mathematical reasoning is applied to what
exists, the reasoning employed has a form not dependent
upon the objects to which it is applied being just those objects
that they are, but only upon their having certain general prop-
erties. In puremathematics, actual objects in theworld of exis-
tence will never be in question, but only hypothetical objects
having those general properties upon which depends what-
ever deduction is being considered; and these general proper-
tieswill alwaysbe expressible in termsof the fundamental con-
cepts which I have called logical constants. Thus when space
or motion is spoken of in pure mathematics, it is not actual
space or actual motion, as we know them in experience, that
are spoken of, but any entity possessing those abstract general
properties of space or motion that are employed in the reason-
ings of geometry or dynamics. The question whether these
properties belong, as a matter of fact, to actual space or ac-
tual motion, is irrelevant to pure mathematics, and therefore
to the present work, being, in my opinion, a purely empirical
question, to be investigated in the laboratory or the observa-
tory. Indirectly, it is true, the discussions connectedwith pure
mathematics have a very important bearing upon such empir-
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ical questions, since mathematical space and motion are held
by many, perhaps most, philosophers to be self-contradictory,
and therefore necessarily different from actual space and mo-
tion, whereas, if the views advocated in the following pages
be valid, no such self-contradictions are to be found inmathe-
matical space and motion. But extra-mathematical considera-
tions of this kind have been almost wholly excluded from the
present work.
On fundamental questions of philosophy, my position, in viii
all its chief features, is derived from Mr G. E. Moore. I have
accepted from him the non-existential nature of propositions
(except such as happen to assert existence) and their indepen-
dence of any knowing mind; also the pluralism which regards
the world, both that of existents and that of entities, as com-
posed of an infinite number of mutually independent enti-
ties, with relations which are ultimate, and not reducible to
adjectives of their terms or of the whole which these com-
pose. Before learning these views from him, I found myself
completely unable to construct any philosophy of arithmetic,
whereas their acceptance brought about an immediate liber-
ation from a large number of difficulties which I believe to
be otherwise insuperable. The doctrines just mentioned are,
in my opinion, quite indispensable to any even tolerably sat-
isfactory philosophy of mathematics, as I hope the following
pages will show. But Imust leave it tomy readers to judge how
far the reasoning assumes these doctrines, and how far it sup-
ports them. Formally, my premisses are simply assumed; but
the fact that they allow mathematics to be true, which most
current philosophies do not, is surely a powerful argument in
their favour.
In Mathematics, my chief obligations, as is indeed evident,
are to Georg Cantor and Professor Peano. If I had become ac-
quainted sooner with the work of Professor Frege, I should
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have owed a great deal to him, but as it is I arrived indepen-
dently at many results which he had already established. At
every stage of my work, I have been assisted more than I can
express by the suggestions, the criticisms, and the generous
encouragement of Mr A.N. Whitehead; he also has kindly
read my proofs, and greatly improved the final expression of
a very large number of passages. Many useful hints I owe also
to Mr W.E. Johnson; and in the more philosophical parts of
the book I owe much to Mr G. E. Moore besides the general
position which underlies the whole.
In the endeavour to cover so wide a field, it has been im-
possible to acquire an exhaustive knowledge of the literature.
There are doubtless many important works with which I am
unacquainted; but where the labour of thinking and writing
necessarily absorbs somuch time, such ignorance, however re-
grettable, seems not wholly avoidable.
Manywordswill be found, in the course of discussion, to be
defined in senses apparently departing widely from common
usage. Such departures, I must ask the reader to believe, are
never wanton, but have been made with great reluctance. In
philosophical matters, they have been necessitated mainly by
two causes. First, it often happens that two cognate notions ix
are both to be considered, and that language has two names
for the one, but none for the other. It is then highly conve-
nient to distinguish between the two names commonly used
as synonyms, keeping one for the usual, the other for the hith-
erto nameless sense. The other cause arises from philosoph-
ical disagreement with received views. Where two qualities
are commonly supposed inseparably conjoined, but are here
regarded as separable, the name which has applied to their
combination will usually have to be restricted to one or other.
For example, propositions are commonly regarded as (1) true
or false, (2) mental. Holding, as I do, that what is true or false
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is not in general mental, I require a name for the true or false
as such, and this name can scarcely be other than proposition.
In such a case, the departure from usage is in no degree arbi-
trary. As regards mathematical terms, the necessity for estab-
lishing the existence-theorem in each case—i.e. the proof that
there are entities of the kind in question—has led tomany def-
initions which appear widely different from the notions usu-
ally attached to the terms in question. Instances of this are
the definitions of cardinal, ordinal and complex numbers. In
the two former of these, and in many other cases, the defini-
tion as a class, derived from the principle of abstraction, is
mainly recommended by the fact that it leaves no doubt as to
the existence-theorem. But in many instances of such appar-
entdeparture fromusage, itmaybedoubtedwhethermorehas
been done than to give precision to a notion which had hith-
erto been more or less vague.
For publishing a work containing so many unsolved dif-
ficulties, my apology is, that investigation revealed no near
prospect of adequately resolving the contradiction discussed
inChapter x, or of acquiring a better insight into the nature of
classes. The repeated discovery of errors in solutions which
for a time had satisfied me caused these problems to appear
such as would have been only concealed by any seemingly sat-
isfactory theorieswhich a slightly longer reflectionmight have
produced; it seemed better, therefore, merely to state the diffi-
culties, than towait until I had become persuaded of the truth
of some almost certainly erroneous doctrine.
My thanks are due to the Syndics of the University Press,
and to their Secretary,MrR.T.Wright, for their kindness and
courtesy in regard to the present volume.
London
December, 1902.
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PART I
THE INDEFINABLESOF
MATHEMATICS
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chapter i
DEFINITIONOF PURE
MATHEMATICS
1. Pure Mathematics is the class of all propositions of the 3
form “p implies q,” where p and q are propositions contain-
ing one or more variables, the same in the two propositions,
and neither p nor q contains any constants except logical con-
stants. And logical constants are all notions definable in terms
of the following: Implication, the relation of a term to a class
of which it is a member, the notion of such that, the notion of
relation, and such further notions as may be involved in the
general notion of propositions of the above form. In addition
to these, mathematics uses a notion which is not a constituent
of the propositions which it considers, namely the notion of
truth.
2. The above definition of pure mathematics is, no doubt,
somewhat unusual. Its various parts, nevertheless, appear to
be capable of exact justification—a justification which it will
be the object of the present work to provide. It will be shown
that whatever has, in the past, been regarded as pure mathe-
matics, is included in our definition, and that whatever else is
included possesses thosemarks by whichmathematics is com-
monly though vaguely distinguished from other studies. The
definition professes to be, not an arbitrary decision to use a
commonword in anuncommon signification, but rather a pre-
cise analysis of the ideas which, more or less unconsciously,
are implied in the ordinary employment of the term. Our
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methodwill therefore beoneof analysis, andourproblemmay
be called philosophical—in the sense, that is to say, that we
seek to pass from the complex to the simple, from the demon-
strable to its indemonstrable premisses. But in one respect not
a few of our discussions will differ from those that are usually
calledphilosophical. We shall be able, thanks to the labours of
themathematicians themselves, to arrive at certainty in regard
to most of the questions with which we shall be concerned;
and among those capable of an exact solution we shall find
many of the problems which, in the past, have been involved
in all the traditional uncertainty of philosophical strife. The
nature of number, of infinity, of space, time and motion, and
of mathematical inference itself, are all questions to which, 4
in the present work, an answer professing itself demonstrable
with mathematical certainty will be given—an answer which,
however, consists in reducing the above problems to problems
in pure logic, which last will not be found satisfactorily solved
in what follows.
3. The Philosophy ofMathematics has been hitherto as con-
troversial, obscure and unprogressive as the other branches
of philosophy. Although it was generally agreed that mathe-
matics is in some sense true, philosophers disputed as to what
mathematical propositions really meant: although something
was true, no two people were agreed as to what it was that was
true, and if something was known, no one knew what it was
that was known. So long, however, as this was doubtful, it
could hardly be said that any certain and exact knowledgewas
to be obtained in mathematics. We find, accordingly, that ide-
alists have tended more and more to regard all mathematics
as dealing with mere appearance, while empiricists have held
everything mathematical to be approximation to some exact
truth about which they had nothing to tell us. This state of
things, it must be confessed, was thoroughly unsatisfactory.
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Philosophy asks of Mathematics: What does it mean? Math-
ematics in the past was unable to answer, and Philosophy an-
swered by introducing the totally irrelevant notion of mind.
But nowMathematics is able to answer, so far at least as to re-
duce the whole of its propositions to certain fundamental no-
tions of logic. At this point, the discussion must be resumed
by Philosophy. I shall endeavour to indicate what are the fun-
damental notions involved, to prove at length that no others
occur in mathematics, and to point out briefly the philosoph-
ical difficulties involved in the analysis of these notions. A
complete treatment of these difficulties would involve a trea-
tise on Logic, which will not be found in the following pages.
4. Therewas, until very lately, a special difficulty in the prin-
ciples of mathematics. It seemed plain that mathematics con-
sists of deductions, and yet the orthodox accounts of deduc-
tion were largely or wholly inapplicable to existing mathemat-
ics. Not only the Aristotelian syllogistic theory, but also the
modern doctrines of Symbolic Logic, were either theoretically
inadequate to mathematical reasoning, or at any rate required
such artificial forms of statement that they could not be practi-
cally applied. In this fact lay the strength of the Kantian view,
which asserted that mathematical reasoning is not strictly for-
mal, but always uses intuitions, i.e. the à priori knowledge of
space and time. Thanks to the progress of Symbolic Logic, es-
pecially as treated by Professor Peano, this part of the Kantian
philosophy is nowcapable of a final and irrevocable refutation.
By the help of ten principles of deduction and ten other pre-
misses of a general logical nature (e.g. “implication is a rela-
tion”), all mathematics can be strictly and formally deduced;
and all the entities that occur in mathematics can be defined
in terms of those that occur in the above twenty premisses. In 5
this statement,Mathematics includesnot onlyArithmetic and
Analysis, but also Geometry, Euclidean and non-Euclidean,
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rational Dynamics, and an indefinite number of other studies
still unborn or in their infancy. The fact that all Mathematics
is Symbolic Logic is one of the greatest discoveries of our age;
and when this fact has been established, the remainder of the
principles of mathematics consists in the analysis of Symbolic
Logic itself.
5. The general doctrine that all mathematics is deduction
by logical principles from logical principles was strongly ad-
vocated by Leibniz, who urged constantly that axioms ought
to be proved and that all except a few fundamental notions
ought to be defined. But owing partly to a faulty logic, partly
to belief in the logical necessity of Euclidean Geometry, he
was led into hopeless errors in the endeavour to carry out in
detail a view which, in its general outline, is now known to
be correct*. The actual propositions of Euclid, for example,
do not follow from the principles of logic alone; and the per-
ception of this fact led Kant to his innovations in the theory
of knowledge. But since the growth of non-Euclidean Geom-
etry, it has appeared that pure mathematics has no concern
with the questionwhether the axioms and propositions of Eu-
clid hold of actual space or not: this is a question for applied
mathematics, to be decided, so far as any decision is possible,
by experiment and observation. What pure mathematics as-
serts is merely that the Euclidean propositions follow from
the Euclidean axioms—i.e. it asserts an implication: any space
which has such and such properties has also such and such
other properties. Thus, as dealt with in pure mathematics,
theEuclidean andnon-EuclideanGeometries are equally true:
in each nothing is affirmed except implications. All proposi-
tions as to what actually exists, like the space we live in, be-
long to experimental or empirical science, not tomathematics;
when they belong to appliedmathematics, they arise from giv-
*On this subject, cf. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, Paris, 1901.
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ing to one or more of the variables in a proposition of pure
mathematics some constant value satisfying the hypothesis,
and thus enabling us, for that value of the variable, actually
to assert both hypothesis and consequent instead of asserting
merely the implication. We assert always in mathematics that
if a certain assertion p is true of any entity x, or of any set of
entities x; y; z; : : : ; then some other assertion q is true of those
entities; but we do not assert either p or q separately of our
entities. We assert a relation between the assertions p and q,
which I shall call formal implication.
6. Mathematical propositions are not only characterized by
the fact that they assert implications, but also by the fact that
they contain variables. The notion of the variable is one of
the most difficult with which Logic has to deal, and in the
present work a satisfactory theory as to its nature, in spite of 6
much discussion, will hardly be found. For the present, I only
wish to make it plain that there are variables in all mathemat-
ical propositions, even where at first sight they might seem to
be absent. Elementary Arithmetic might be thought to form
an exception: 1 + 1 = 2 appears neither to contain variables
nor to assert an implication. But as a matter of fact, as will be
shown in Part II, the true meaning of this proposition is: “If x
is one and y is one, and x differs from y, then x and y are two.”
And this proposition both contains variables and asserts an
implication. We shall find always, in all mathematical propo-
sitions, that the words any or some occur; and these words are
the marks of a variable and a formal implication. Thus the
above proposition may be expressed in the form: “Any unit
and any other unit are two units.” The typical proposition of
mathematics is of the form “φ(x; y; z; : : :) implies ψ(x; y; z; : : :),
whatever values x; y; z; : : : may have”; where φ(x; y; z; : : :) and
ψ(x; y; z; : : :), for every set of values of x; y; z; : : :, are proposi-
tions. It is not asserted that φ is always true, nor yet that ψ
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is always true, but merely that, in all cases, when φ is false as
much as when φ is true, ψ follows from it.
The distinction between a variable and a constant is some-
what obscured by mathematical usage. It is customary, for ex-
ample, to speak of parameters as in some sense constants, but
this is a usagewhichwe shall have to reject. A constant is to be
something absolutely definite, concerning which there is no
ambiguity whatever. Thus 1, 2, 3, e, π, Socrates, are constants;
and so areman, and the human race, past, present and future,
considered collectively. Proposition, implication, class, etc.
are constants; but a proposition, any proposition, somepropo-
sition, are not constants, for these phrases do not denote one
definite object. And thus what are called parameters are sim-
ply variables. Take, for example, the equation ax+ by+ c = 0,
considered as the equation to a straight line in a plane. Here
we say that x and y are variables, while a, b, c are constants. But
unless we are dealing with one absolutely particular line, say
the line fromaparticular point in London to a particular point
in Cambridge, our a, b, c are not definite numbers, but stand
for any numbers, and are thus also variables. And in Geom-
etry nobody does deal with actual particular lines; we always
discuss any line. The point is that we collect the various cou-
ples x; y into classes of classes, each class beingdefined as those
couples that have a certain fixed relation to one triad (a; b; c).
But from class to class, a; b; c also vary, and are therefore prop-
erly variables.
7. It is customary in mathematics to regard our variables as
restricted to certain classes: in Arithmetic, for instance, they
are supposed to stand for numbers. But this only means that
if they stand for numbers, they satisfy some formula, i.e. the
hypothesis that they are numbers implies the formula. This,
then, is what is really asserted, and in this proposition it is no 7
longer necessary that our variables should benumbers: the im-
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plication holds equally when they are not so. Thus, for exam-
ple, the proposition “x and y are numbers implies (x + y)2 =
x2+2xy+y2” holds equally if for x and ywe substitute Socrates
and Plato*: both hypothesis and consequent, in this case, will
be false, but the implication will still be true. Thus in every
proposition of pure mathematics, when fully stated, the vari-
ables have an absolutelyunrestrictedfield: any conceivable en-
tity may be substituted for any one of our variables without
impairing the truth of our proposition.
8. We can now understandwhy the constants inmathemat-
ics are to be restricted to logical constants in the sense defined
above. The process of transforming constants in a proposi-
tion into variables leads to what is called generalization, and
gives us, as it were, the formal essence of a proposition. Math-
ematics is interested exclusively in types of propositions; if a
proposition p containing only constants be proposed, and for
a certain one of its terms we imagine others to be successively
substituted, the result will in general be sometimes true and
sometimes false. Thus, for example, we have “Socrates is a
man”; here we turn Socrates into a variable, and consider “x is
a man.” Some hypotheses as to x, for example, “x is a Greek,”
insure the truth of “x is a man”; thus “x is a Greek” implies “x
is aman,” and this holds for all values of x. But the statement is
not oneof puremathematics, because it dependsupon thepar-
ticular nature ofGreek andman. Wemay, however, vary these
too, and obtain: If a and b are classes, and a is contained in b,
then “x is an a” implies “x is a b.” Here at last we have a propo-
sition of puremathematics, containing three variables and the
constants class, contained in, and those involved in the notion
of formal implications with variables. So long as any term in
*It is necessary to suppose arithmetical addition and multiplication de-
fined (as may be easily done) so that the above formula remains significant
when x and y are not numbers.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 9
our proposition can be turned into a variable, our proposition
can be generalized; and so long as this is possible, it is the busi-
ness of mathematics to do it. If there are several chains of de-
duction which differ only as to the meaning of the symbols,
so that propositions symbolically identical become capable of
several interpretations, the proper course, mathematically, is
to form the class of meanings which may attach to the sym-
bols, and to assert that the formula in question follows from
the hypothesis that the symbols belong to the class in ques-
tion. In this way, symbols which stood for constants become
transformed into variables, andnew constants are substituted,
consisting of classes to which the old constants belong. Cases
of such generalization are so frequent that many will occur at
once to every mathematician, and innumerable instances will
be given in the present work. Whenever two sets of terms
have mutual relations of the same type, the same form of de- 8
duction will apply to both. For example, the mutual relations
of points in a Euclidean plane are of the same type as those of
the complex numbers; hence plane geometry, considered as a
branch of pure mathematics, ought not to decide whether its
variables are points or complex numbers or some other set of
entities having the same type of mutual relations. Speaking
generally, we ought to deal, in every branch of mathematics,
with any class of entities whose mutual relations are of a spec-
ified type; thus the class, as well as the particular term consid-
ered, becomes a variable, and the only true constants are the
types of relations andwhat they involve. Nowa typeof relation
is tomean, in this discussion, a class of relations characterized
by the above formal identity of the deductions possible in re-
gard to the various members of the class; and hence a type of
relations, as will appear more fully hereafter, if not already ev-
ident, is always a class definable in terms of logical constants*.
*One-one, many-one, transitive, symmetrical, are instances of types of
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We may therefore define a type of relations as a class of rela-
tions defined by some property definable in terms of logical
constants alone.
9. Thus pure mathematics must contain no indefinables ex-
cept logical constants, and consequently no premisses, or in-
demonstrable propositions, but such as are concerned exclu-
sively with logical constants and with variables. It is precisely
this that distinguishes pure from applied mathematics. In ap-
plied mathematics, results which have been shown by pure
mathematics to follow from somehypothesis as to the variable
are actually asserted of some constant satisfying the hypothe-
sis in question. Thus terms which were variables become con-
stant, and a new premiss is always required, namely: this par-
ticular entity satisfies the hypothesis in question. Thus for ex-
ample Euclidean Geometry, as a branch of pure mathematics,
consists wholly of propositions having the hypothesis “S is a
Euclidean space.” If we go on to: “The space that exists is Eu-
clidean,” this enables us to assert of the space that exists the
consequents of all the hypotheticals constituting Euclidean
Geometry, where now the variable S is replaced by the con-
stantactual space. But by this stepwepass frompure to applied
mathematics.
10. The connection of mathematics with logic, according
to the above account, is exceedingly close. The fact that all
mathematical constants are logical constants, and that all the
premisses ofmathematics are concernedwith these, gives, I be-
lieve, the precise statement of what philosophers have meant
in asserting that mathematics is à priori. The fact is that, when
once the apparatus of logic has been accepted, all mathemat-
ics necessarily follows. The logical constants themselves are
to be defined only by enumeration, for they are so fundamen-
tal that all the properties by which the class of them might be
relations with which we shall be often concerned.
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defined presuppose some terms of the class. But practically, 9
themethod of discovering the logical constants is the analysis
of symbolic logic, which will be the business of the following
chapters. The distinction ofmathematics from logic is very ar-
bitrary, but if a distinction is desired, itmaybemade as follows.
Logic consists of the premisses of mathematics, together with
all other propositions which are concerned exclusively with
logical constants andwith variables but do not fulfil the above
definition ofmathematics (§1). Mathematics consists of all the
consequences of the above premisses which assert formal im-
plications containing variables, together with such of the pre-
misses themselves as have these marks. Thus some of the pre-
misses of mathematics, e.g. the principle of the syllogism, “if
p implies q and q implies r, then p implies r,” will belong to
mathematics, while others, such as “implication is a relation,”
will belong to logic but not to mathematics. But for the desire
to adhere to usage, we might identify mathematics and logic,
and define either as the class of propositions containing only
variables and logical constants; but respect for tradition leads
me rather to adhere to the above distinction, while recogniz-
ing that certain propositions belong to both sciences.
From what has now been said, the reader will perceive that
the present work has to fulfil two objects, first, to show that
all mathematics follows from symbolic logic, and secondly to
discover, as far as possible, what are the principles of symbolic
logic itself. The first of these objects will be pursued in the fol-
lowingParts, while the secondbelongs toPart I.Andfirst of all,
as a preliminary to a critical analysis, itwill benecessary to give
an outline of Symbolic Logic considered simply as a branch of
mathematics. This will occupy the following chapter.
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chapter ii
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
11. Symbolic or Formal Logic—I shall use these terms as 10
synonyms—is the study of the various general types of de-
duction. The word symbolic designates the subject by an ac-
cidental characteristic, for the employment of mathematical
symbols, here as elsewhere, is merely a theoretically irrelevant
convenience. The syllogism in all its figures belongs to Sym-
bolic Logic, and would be the whole subject if all deduction
were syllogistic, as the scholastic tradition supposed. It is from
the recognition of asyllogistic inferences that modern Sym-
bolic Logic, from Leibniz onward, has derived the motive to
progress. Since the publication of Boole’s Laws of Thought
(1854), the subject has been pursued with a certain vigour, and
has attained to a very considerable technical development*.
Nevertheless, the subject achieved almost nothing of utility ei-
ther to philosophy or to other branches of mathematics, until
it was transformed by the new methods of Professor Peano†.
*By far the most complete account of the non-Peanesque methods will
be found in the three volumes of Schröder,Vorlesungen über die Algebra der
Logik, Leipzig, 1890, 1891, 1895.
†See Formulaire de Mathématiques, Turin, 1895, with subsequent edi-
tions in later years; also Revue de Mathématiques, Vol. vii. No. 1 (1900). The
editions of the Formulaire will be quoted as F. 1895 and so on. The Revue
de Mathématiques, which was originally the Rivista di Matematica, will be
referred to as R. d.M.
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Symbolic Logic has now become not only absolutely essential
to every philosophical logician, but also necessary for the com-
prehension of mathematics generally, and even for the suc-
cessful practice of certain branches of mathematics. How use-
ful it is in practice can only be judged by those who have ex-
perienced the increase of power derived from acquiring it; its
theoretical functions must be briefly set forth in the present
chapter‡.
12. Symbolic Logic is essentially concerned with inference 11
in general*, and is distinguished fromvarious special branches
of mathematics mainly by its generality. Neither mathemat-
ics nor symbolic logic will study such special relations as (say)
temporal priority, but mathematics will deal explicitly with
the class of relations possessing the formal properties of tem-
poral priority—propertieswhich are summedup in thenotion
of continuity†. And the formal properties of a relation may
be defined as those that can be expressed in terms of logical
constants, or again as those which, while they are preserved,
permit our relation to be varied without invalidating any in-
ference in which the said relation is regarded in the light of
a variable. But symbolic logic, in the narrower sense which
is convenient, will not investigate what inferences are possi-
ble in respect of continuous relations (i.e. relations generating
continuous series); this investigation belongs to mathematics,
but is still too special for symbolic logic. What symbolic logic
does investigate is the general rules by which inferences are
‡In what follows the main outlines are due to Professor Peano, except
as regards relations; even in those cases where I depart from his views, the
problems considered have been suggested to me by his works.
*I may as well say at once that I, do not distinguish between inference
and deduction. What is called induction appears to me to be either dis-
guised deduction or a mere method of making plausible guesses.
†See below, Part V, Chap. xxxvi.
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made, and it requires a classification of relations or proposi-
tions only in so far as these general rules introduce particular
notions. The particular notions which appear in the propo-
sitions of symbolic logic, and all others definable in terms of
these notions, are the logical constants. The number of inde-
finable logical constants is not great: it appears, in fact, to be
eight or nine. These notions alone form the subject-matter of
the whole of mathematics: no others, except such as are defin-
able in terms of the original eight or nine, occur anywhere in
Arithmetic, Geometry, or rational Dynamics. For the techni-
cal study of Symbolic Logic, it is convenient to take as a sin-
gle indefinable the notion of a formal implication, i.e. of such
propositions as “x is a man implies x is a mortal, for all val-
ues of x”—propositions whose general type is: “φ(x) implies
ψ(x) for all values of x,” where φ(x), ψ(x), for all values of x,
are propositions. The analysis of this notion of formal impli-
cation belongs to the principles of the subject, but is not re-
quired for its formal development. In addition to this notion,
we require as indefinables the following: Implication between
propositions not containing variables, the relation of a term
to a class of which it is a member, the notion of such that, the
notion of relation, and truth. By means of these notions, all
the propositions of symbolic logic can be stated.
13. The subject ofSymbolicLogic consists of threeparts, the
calculus of propositions, the calculus of classes, and the calcu-
lus of relations. Between the first two, there is, within limits, a
certainparallelism,whicharises as follows: In any symbolic ex-
pression, the letters may be interpreted as classes or as propo- 12
sitions, and the relation of inclusion in the one casemay be re-
placed by that of formal implication in the other. Thus, for ex-
ample, in the principle of the syllogism, if a; b; c be classes, and
a is contained in b, b in c, then a is contained in c; but if a; b; c
be propositions, and a implies b, b implies c, then a implies c.
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A great deal has beenmade of this duality, and in the later edi-
tions of theFormulaire, Peano appears tohave sacrificed logical
precision to its preservation*. But, as amatter of fact, there are
many ways in which the calculus of propositions differs from
that of classes. Consider, for example, the following: “If p; q; r
are propositions, and p implies q or r, then p implies q or p im-
plies r.” This proposition is true; but its correlative is false,
namely: “If a; b; c are classes, and a is contained in b or c, then
a is contained in b or a is contained in c.” For example,. En-
glish people are all either men or women, but are not all men
nor yet all women. The fact is that the duality holds for propo-
sitions asserting of a variable term that it belongs to a class, i.e.
such propositions as “x is a man,” provided that the implica-
tion involved be formal, i.e. one which holds for all values of x.
But “x is a man” is itself not a proposition at all, being neither
true nor false; and it is not with such entities that we are con-
cerned in the propositional calculus, but with genuine propo-
sitions. To continue the above illustration: It is true that, for
all values of x, “x is a man or a woman” either implies “x is a
man” or implies “x is a woman.” But it is false that “x is a man
or woman” either implies “x is a man” for all values of x, or im-
plies “x is a woman” for all values of x. Thus the implication
involved, which is always one of the two, is not formal, since
it does not hold for all values of x, being not always the same
one of the two. The symbolic affinity of the propositional and
the class logic is, in fact, something of a snare, and we have to
decide which of the two we are to make fundamental. MrMc-
Coll, in an important series of papers†, has contended for the
*Onthepointswhere the duality breaks down, cf. Schröder, op. cit., Vol.
ii, Lecture 21.
†Cf. “The Calculus of Equivalent Statements,” Proceedings of the Lon-
donMathematical Society, Vol. ix and subsequent volumes; “Symbolic Rea-
soning,” Mind, Jan. 1880, Oct. 1897, and Jan. 1900; “La Logique Symbol-
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view that implication and propositions are more fundamen-
tal than inclusion and classes; and in this opinion I agree with
him. Buthedoesnot appear tome to realize adequately thedis-
tinction between genuine propositions and such as contain a
real variable: thus he is led to speak of propositions as some-
times true and sometimes false, which of course is impossible
with a genuine proposition. As the distinction involved is of
very great importance, I shall dwell on it before proceeding
further. A proposition, we may say, is anything that is true
or that is false. An expression such as “x is a man” is there- 13
fore not a proposition, for it is neither true nor false. If we
give to x any constant valuewhatever, the expression becomes
a proposition: it is thus as it were a schematic form standing
for any one of a whole class of propositions. And when we
say “x is a man implies x is a mortal for all values of x,” we are
not asserting a single implication, but a class of implications;
we have now a genuine proposition, in which, though the let-
ter x appears, there is no real variable: the variable is absorbed
in the same kind of way as the x under the integral sign in a
definite integral, so that the result is no longer a function of
x. Peano distinguishes a variable which appears in this way
as apparent, since the proposition does not depend upon the
variable; whereas in “x is a man” there are different proposi-
tions for different values of the variable, and the variable is
what Peano calls real*. I shall speak of propositions exclusively
where there is no real variable: where there are one or more
real variables, and for all values of the variables the expression
involved is a proposition, I shall call the expression a proposi-
tional function. The study of genuine propositions is, in my
ique et sesApplications,”Bibliothèque duCongrès International dePhilosophie,
Vol. iii (Paris, 1901). I shall in future quote the proceedings of the above
Congress by the titleCongrès.
*F. 1901, p. 2.
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opinion, more fundamental than that of classes; but the study
of propositional functions appears to be strictly on a par with
that of classes, and indeed scarcely distinguishable therefrom.
Peano, likeMcColl, at first regarded propositions as more fun-
damental than classes, but he, even more definitely, consid-
ered propositional functions rather than propositions. From
this criticism, Schröder is exempt: his second volume deals
with genuine propositions, and points out their formal differ-
ences from classes.
A. The Propositional Calculus
14. The propositional calculus is characterized by the fact
that all its propositions have as hypothesis and as consequent
the assertion of a material implication. Usually, the hypothe-
sis is of the form “p implies p,” etc., which (§16) is equivalent
to the assertion that the letters which occur in the consequent
are propositions. Thus the consequents consist of proposi-
tional functions which are true of all propositions. It is impor-
tant to observe that, though the letters employed are symbols
for variables, and the consequents are true when the variables
are given values which are propositions, these values must be
genuine propositions, not propositional functions. The hy-
pothesis “p is a proposition” is not satisfied if for pwe put “x is
a man,” but it is satisfied if we put “Socrates is a man” or if we
put “x is aman implies x is amortal for all values of x.” Shortly,
we may say that the propositions represented by single letters
in this calculus are variables, but do not contain variables—in
the case, that is to say, where the hypotheses of the proposi-
tions which the calculus asserts are satisfied.
15. Our calculus studies the relation of implication between 14
propositions. This relation must be distinguished from the
relation of formal implication, which holds between proposi-
tional functions when the one implies the other for all values
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of the variable. Formal implication is also involved in this cal-
culus, but is not explicitly studied: we do not consider propo-
sitional functions in general, but only certain definite propo-
sitional functions which occur in the propositions of our cal-
culus. How far formal implication is definable in terms of im-
plication simply, or material implication as it may be called,
is a difficult question, which will be discussed in Chapter iii.
What the difference is between the two, an illustrationwill ex-
plain. The fifth proposition of Euclid follows from the fourth:
if the fourth is true, so is the fifth, while if the fifth is false, so
is the fourth. This is a case of material implication, for both
propositions are absolute constants, not dependent for their
meaning upon the assigning of a value to a variable. But each
of them states a formal implication. The fourth states that if x
and y be triangles fulfilling certain conditions, then x and y are
triangles fulfilling certain other conditions, and that this im-
plication holds for all values of x and y; and the fifth states that
if x is an isosceles triangle, x has the angles at the base equal.
The formal implication involved in each of these two propo-
sitions is quite a different thing from the material implication
holding between the propositions as wholes; both notions are
required in thepropositional calculus, but it is the studyofma-
terial implication which specially distinguishes this subject,
for formal implication occurs throughout the whole of math-
ematics.
It has been customary, in treatises on logic, to confound the
two kinds of implication, and often to be really considering
the formal kind where the material kind only was apparently
involved. For example, when it is said that “Socrates is a man,
therefore Socrates is a mortal,” Socrates is felt as a variable: he
is a type of humanity, and one feels that any other man would
have done as well. If, instead of therefore, which implies the
truthof hypothesis and consequent, weput “Socrates is aman
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implies Socrates is a mortal,” it appears at once that we may
substitute not only another man, but any other entity what-
ever, in the place of Socrates. Thus althoughwhat is explicitly
stated, in such a case, is a material implication, what is meant
is a formal implication; and some effort is needed to confine
our imagination to material implication.
16. A definition of implication is quite impossible. If p im-
plies q, then if p is true q is true, i.e. p’s truth implies q’s truth;
also ifq is false p is false, i.e. q’s falsehood implies p’s falsehood*.
Thus truth and falsehoodgiveusmerelynew implications, not
a definition of implication. If p implies q, then both are false 15
or both true, or p is false and q true; it is impossible to have q
false and p true, and it is necessary to have q true or p false*.
In fact, the assertion that q is true or p false turns out to be
strictly equivalent to “p implies q”; but as equivalence means
mutual implication, this still leaves implication fundamental,
and not definable in terms of disjunction. Disjunction, on the
other hand, is definable in terms of implication, as we shall
shortly see. It follows from the above equivalence that of any
two propositions there must be one which implies the other,
that false propositions imply all propositions, and true propo-
sitions are implied by all propositions. But these are results to
be demonstrated; the premisses of our subject deal exclusively
with rules of inference.
Itmay be observed that, although implication is indefinable,
proposition can be defined. Every proposition implies itself,
and whatever is not a proposition implies nothing. Hence to
say “p is a proposition” is equivalent to saying “p implies p”;
*The reader is recommended to observe that the main implications in
these statements are formal, i.e. “p implies q” formally implies “p’s truth
implies q’s truth,” while the subordinate implications are material.
*Imay aswell state once for all that the alternatives of a disjunctionwill
never be considered as mutually exclusive unless expressly said to be so.
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and this equivalence may be used to define propositions. As
the mathematical sense of definition is widely different from
that current among philosophers, it may be well to observe
that, in the mathematical sense, a new propositional function
is said to be defined when it is stated to be equivalent to (i.e.
to imply and be implied by) a propositional function which
has either been accepted as indefinable or has been defined in
terms of indefinables. The definition of entities which are not
propositional functions is derived from such as are in ways
which will be explained in connection with classes and rela-
tions.
17. We require, then, in the propositional calculus, no inde-
finables except the two kinds of implication—remembering,
however, that formal implication is a complex notion, whose
analysis remains tobeundertaken. As regards our two indefin-
ables, we require certain indemonstrable propositions, which
hitherto I have not succeeded in reducing to less than ten.
Some indemonstrables there must be; and some propositions,
such as the syllogism,must be of the number, since no demon-
stration is possible without them. But concerning others, it
may be doubted whether they are indemonstrable or merely
undemonstrated; and it should be observed that the method
of supposing an axiom false, and deducing the consequences
of this assumption, which has been found admirable in such
cases as the axiomof parallels, is here not universally available.
For all our axioms are principles of deduction; and if they are
true, the consequences which appear to follow from the em-
ployment of an opposite principle will not really follow, so
that arguments from the supposition of the falsity of an ax-
iom are here subject to special fallacies. Thus the number of
indemonstrable propositionsmay be capable of further reduc-
tion, and in regard to some of them I know of no grounds for 16
regarding them as indemonstrable except that they have hith-
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erto remained undemonstrated.
18. The ten axioms are the following. (1) If p implies q, then
p implies q*; in other words, whatever p and q may be, “p im-
plies q” is a proposition. (2) If p implies q, then p implies p; in
other words, whatever implies anything is a proposition. (3) If
p implies q, then q implies q; in other words, whatever is im-
plied by anything is a proposition. (4) A true hypothesis in
an implication may be dropped, and the consequent asserted.
This is a principle incapable of formal symbolic statement, and
illustrating the essential limitations of formalism—a point to
which I shall return at a later stage. Before proceeding further,
it is desirable to define the joint assertion of two propositions,
orwhat is called their logical product. This definition is highly
artificial, and illustrates the great distinction between mathe-
matical and philosophical definitions. It is as follows: If p im-
plies p, then, if q implies q, pq (the logical product of p and q)
means that if p implies that q implies r, then r is true. In other
words, if p and q are propositions, their joint assertion is equiv-
alent to saying that every proposition is truewhich is such that
the first implies that the second implies it. We cannot, with
formal correctness, state our definition in this shorter form,
for the hypothesis “p and q are propositions” is already the
logical product of “p is a proposition” and “q is a proposition.”
We can now state the six main principles of inference, to each
of which, owing to its importance, a name is to be given; of
these all except the last will be found in Peano’s accounts of
the subject. (5) If p implies p and q implies q, then pq implies
p. This is called simplification, and asserts merely that the joint
assertion of two propositions implies the assertion of the first
of the two. (6) If p implies q and q implies r, then p implies r.
This will be called the syllogism. (7) If q implies q and r implies
*Note that the implications denoted by if and then, in these axioms, are
formal, while those denoted by implies are material.
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r, and if p implies that q implies r, then pq implies r. This is
the principle of importation. In the hypothesis, we have a prod-
uct of three propositions; but this can of course be defined by
means of the product of two. The principle states that if p im-
plies that q implies r, then r follows from the joint assertion of
p and q. For example: “If I call on so-and-so, then if she is at
home I shall be admitted” implies “If I call on so-and-so and
she is at home, I shall be admitted.” (8) If p implies p and q
implies q, then, if pq implies r, then p implies that q implies r.
This is the converse of the preceding principle, and is called
exportation†. The previous illustration reversed will illustrate
this principle. (9) If p implies q and p implies r, then p implies
qr: in other words, a proposition which implies each of two 17
propositions implies them both. This is called the principle
of composition. (10) If p implies p and q implies q, then “‘p im-
plies q’ implies p” implies p. This is called the principle of re-
duction; it has less self-evidence than the previous principles,
but is equivalent to many propositions that are self-evident. I
prefer it to these, because it is explicitly concerned, like its pre-
decessors, with implication, and has the same kind of logical
character as they have. If we remember that “p implies q” is
equivalent to “q or not-p,” we can easily convince ourselves
that the above principle is true; for “‘p implies q’ implies p” is
equivalent to “p or the denial of ‘q or not-p,’” i.e. to “p or ‘p and
not q,’” i.e. to p. But this way of persuading ourselves that the
principle of reduction is true involves many logical principles
which have not yet been demonstrated, and cannot be demon-
strated except by reduction or some equivalent. The principle
is especially useful in connection with negation. Without its
†(7) and (8) cannot (I think)bededuced fromthedefinitionof the logical
product, because they are required for passing from “If p is a proposition,
then ‘q is a proposition’ implies etc.” to “If p and q are propositions, then
etc.”
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help, by means of the first nine principles, we can prove the
law of contradiction; we can prove, if p and q be propositions,
that p implies not-not-p; that “p implies not-q” is equivalent
to “q implies not-p” and to not-pq; that “p implies q” implies
“not-q implies not-p”; that p implies that not-p implies p; that
not-p is equivalent to “p implies not-p”; and that “p implies
not-q” is equivalent to “not-not-p implies not-q.” But we can-
not provewithout reduction or some equivalent (so far at least
as I have been able to discover) that p or not-p must be true
(the law of excluded middle); that every proposition is equiv-
alent to the negation of some other proposition; that not-not-
p implies p; that “not-q implies not-p” implies “p implies q”;
that “not-p implies p” implies p, or that “p implies q” implies
“q or not-p.” Each of these assumptions is equivalent to the
principle of reduction, and may, if we choose, be substituted
for it. Some of them—especially excluded middle and double
negation—appear to have far more self-evidence. But when
we have seen how to define disjunction and negation in terms
of implication, we shall see that the supposed simplicity van-
ishes, and that, for formal purposes at any rate, reduction is
simpler than any of the possible alternatives. For this reason I
retain it amongmy premisses in preference to more usual and
more superficially obvious propositions.
19. Disjunction or logical addition is defined as follows: “p
or q” is equivalent to “‘p implies q’ implies q.” It is easy to
persuade ourselves of this equivalence, by remembering that
a false proposition implies every other; for if p is false, p does
imply q, and therefore, if “p implies q” implies q, it follows that
q is true. But this argument again uses principles which have
not yet been demonstrated, and is merely designed to eluci-
date the definition by anticipation. From this definition, by
the help of reduction, we can prove that “p or q” is equiva-
lent to “q or p.” An alternative definition, deducible from the
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above, is: “Any proposition implied by p and implied by q is
true,” or, inotherwords, “‘p implies s’ and ‘q implies s’ together 18
imply s, whatever s may be.” Hence we proceed to the defini-
tion of negation: not-p is equivalent to the assertion that p im-
plies all propositions, i.e. that “r implies r” implies “p implies r”
whatever rmay be*. From this point we can prove the laws of
contradiction and excluded middle and double negation, and
establish all the formal properties of logicalmultiplication and
addition—the associative, commutative and distributive laws.
Thus the logic of propositions is now complete.
Philosophers will object to the above definitions of disjunc-
tion and negation on the ground that what we mean by these
notions is something quite distinct from what the definitions
assign as their meanings, and that the equivalences stated in
the definitions are, as amatter of fact, significant propositions,
not mere indications as to the way in which symbols are go-
ing to be used. Such an objection is, I think, well-founded, if
the above account is advocated as giving the true philosophic
analysis of the matter. But where a purely formal purpose is
to be served, any equivalence in which a certain notion ap-
pears on one side but not on the other will do for a definition.
And the advantage of having before our minds a strictly for-
mal development is that it provides the data for philosophi-
*The principle that false propositions imply all propositions solves
Lewis Carroll’s logical paradox inMind, N. S. No. 11 (1894). The assertion
made in that paradox is that, if p, q, r be propositions, and q implies r, while
p implies that q implies not-r, then pmust be false, on the supposed ground
that “q implies r” and “q implies not-r” are incompatible. But in virtue of
our definition of negation, if q be false both these implications will hold:
the two together, in fact, whatever proposition rmay be, are equivalent to
not-q. Thus the only inference warranted by Lewis Carroll’s premisses is
that if p be true, q must be false, i.e. that p implies not-q; and this is the
conclusion, oddly enough, which common sensewould have drawn in the
particular case which he discusses.
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cal analysis in a more definite shape than would be otherwise
possible. Criticism of the procedure of formal logic, therefore,
will bebest postponeduntil thepresent brief accounthasbeen
brought to an end.
B. The Calculus of Classes
20. In this calculus there are very much fewer new primi-
tive propositions—in fact, two seem sufficient—but there are
much greater difficulties in the way of non-symbolic exposi-
tion of the ideas embedded in our symbolism. These difficul-
ties, as far as possible, will be postponed to later chapters. For
the present, I shall try to make an exposition which is to be as
straightforward and simple as possible.
The calculus of classes may be developed by regarding as
fundamental the notion of class, and also the relation of a
member of a class to its class. This method is adopted by Pro-
fessorPeano, and is perhapsmorephilosophically correct than
a different method which, for formal purposes, I have found
more convenient. In this method we still take as fundamental 19
the relation (which, following Peano, I shall denote by ϵ) of
an individual to a class to which it belongs, i.e. the relation
of Socrates to the human race which is expressed by saying
that Socrates is a man. In addition to this, we take as indefin-
ables the notion of a propositional function and the notion of
such that. It is these three notions that characterize the class-
calculus. Something must be said in explanation of each of
them.
21. The insistence on the distinction between ϵ and the rela-
tion of whole and part between classes is due to Peano, and
is of very great importance to the whole technical develop-
ment and thewhole of the applications tomathematics. In the
scholastic doctrine of the syllogism, and in all previous sym-
bolic logic, the two relations are confounded, except in the
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workof Frege*. Thedistinction is the same as that between the
relation of individual to species and that of species to genus,
between the relation of Socrates to the class of Greeks and
the relation of Greeks to men. On the philosophical nature
of this distinction I shall enlarge when I come to deal critically
with the nature of classes; for the present it is enough to ob-
serve that the relation of whole and part is transitive, while
ϵ is not so: we have Socrates is a a man, and men are a class,
but not Socrates is a class. It is to be observed that the class
must be distinguished from the class-concept or predicate by
which it is to be defined: thus men are a class, while man is a
class-concept. The relation ϵ must be regarded as holding be-
tween Socrates and men considered collectively, not between
Socrates and man. I shall return to this point in Chapter vi.
Peano holds that all propositional functions containing only
a single variable are capable of expression in the form “x is an
a,” where a is a constant class; but this view we shall find rea-
son to doubt.
22. The next fundamental notion is that of a propositional
function. Although propositional functions occur in the cal-
culus of propositions, they are there each defined as it occurs,
so that the general notion is not required. But in the class-
calculus it is necessary to introduce the general notion explic-
itly. Peano does not require it, owing to his assumption that
the form “x is an a” is general for one variable, and that exten-
sions of the same form are available for any number of vari-
ables. But wemust avoid this assumption, andmust therefore
introduce the notion of a propositional function. Wemay ex-
plain (but not define) this notion as follows: φx is a propo-
sitional function if, for every value of x, φx is a proposition,
determinate when x is given. Thus “x is a man” is a propo-
*See his Begriffsschrift, Halle, 1879, andGrundgesetze der Arithmetik, Jena,
1893, p. 2.
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sitional function. In any proposition, however complicated,
which contains no real variables, we may imagine one of the
terms, not a verb or adjective, to be replacedbyother terms: in-
stead of “Socrates is a man” wemay put “Plato is a man,” “the
number 2 is aman,” and so on*. Thus we get successive propo- 20
sitions all agreeing except as to the one variable term. Putting
x for the variable term, “x is a man” expresses the type of all
suchpropositions. Apropositional function in generalwill be
true for some values of the variable and false for others. The
instances where it is true for all values of the variable, so far as
they are known to me, all express implications, such as “x is a
man implies x is a mortal”; but I know of no à priori reason for
asserting that no other propositional functions are true for all
values of the variable.
23. This brings me to the notion of such that. The values of
x which render a propositional function φx true are like the
roots of an equation—indeed the latter are a particular case
of the former—and we may consider all the values of xwhich
are such that φx is true. In general, these values form a class,
and in fact a class may be defined as all the terms satisfying
some propositional function. There is, however, some limita-
tion required in this statement, though I have not been able to
discover precisely what the limitation is. This results from a
certain contradiction which I shall discuss at length at a later
stage (Chap. x). The reasons for defining class in this way are,
that we require to provide for the null-class, which prevents
our defining a class as a term to which some other has the rela-
tion ϵ, and thatwewish to be able to define classes by relations,
i.e. all the terms which have to other terms the relation R are
*Verbs and adjectives occurring as such are distinguished by the fact
that, if they be taken as variable, the resulting function is only a proposi-
tion for some values of the variable, i.e. for such as are verbs or adjectives
respectively. See Chap. iv.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 28
to form a class, and such cases require somewhat complicated
propositional functions.
24. With regard to these three fundamental notions, we re-
quire two primitive propositions. The first asserts that if x be-
longs to the class of terms satisfying a propositional function
φx, then φx is true. The second asserts that if φx and ψx are
equivalent propositions for all values of x, then the class of x’s
such that φx is true is identical with the class of x’s such that
ψx is true. Identity, which occurs here, is defined as follows: x
is identical with y if y belongs to every class towhich x belongs,
in other words, if “x is a u” implies “y is a u” for all values of
u. With regard to the primitive proposition itself, it is to be
observed that it decides in favour of an extensional view of
classes. Two class-concepts need not be identical when their
extensions are so: man and featherless biped are by no means
identical, and no more are even prime and integer between 1 and
3. These are class-concepts, and if our axiom is to hold, it must
not be of these thatwe are to speak in dealingwith classes. We
must be concerned with the actual assemblage of terms, not
with any concept denoting that assemblage. For mathemat-
ical purposes, this is quite essential. Consider, for example,
the problem as to how many combinations can be formed of
a given set of terms taken any number at a time, i.e. as to how 21
many classes are contained in a given class. If distinct classes
may have the same extension, this problem becomes utterly
indeterminate. And certainly common usage would regard a
class as determined when all its terms are given. The exten-
sional view of classes, in some form, is thus essential to Sym-
bolic Logic and to mathematics, and its necessity is expressed
in the above axiom. But the axiom itself is not employed un-
til we come to Arithmetic; at least it need not be employed,
if we choose to distinguish the equality of classes, which is
defined as mutual inclusion, from the identity of individuals.
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Formally, the two are totally distinct: identity is defined as
above, equality of a and b is defined by the equivalence of “x is
an a” and “x is a b” for all values of x.
25. Most of the propositions of the class-calculus are easily
deduced from those of the propositional calculus. The logical
product or common part of two classes a and b is the class of
x’s such that the logical product of “x is an a” and “x is a b” is
true. Similarly we define the logical sum of two classes (a or b),
and the negation of a class (not-a). A new idea is introduced
by the logical product and sum of a class of classes. If k is a
class of classes, its logical product is the class of terms belong-
ing to each of the classes of k, i.e. the class of terms x such that
“u is a k” implies “x is a u” for all values of u. The logical sum
is the class which is contained in every class in which every
class of the class k is contained, i.e. the class of terms x such
that, if “u is a k” implies “u is contained in c” for all values of
u, then, for all values of c, x is a c. And we say that a class a is
contained in a class bwhen “x is an a” implies “x is a b” for all
values of x. In like manner with the above we may define the
product and sum of a class of propositions. Another very im-
portant notion is what is called the existence of a class—aword
which must not be supposed to mean what existence means
in philosophy. A class is said to exist when it has at least one
term. A formal definition is as follows: a is an existent class
when and only when any proposition is true provided “x is an
a” always implies it whatever value we may give to x. It must
be understood that the proposition impliedmust be a genuine
proposition, not a propositional function of x. A class a exists
when the logical sum of all propositions of the form “x is an a”
is true, i.e.when not all such propositions are false.
It is important to understand clearly the manner in which
propositions in the class-calculus are obtained from those in
the propositional calculus. Consider, for example, the syllo-
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gism. We have “p implies q” and “q implies r” imply “p implies
r.” Now put “x is an a,” “x is a b,” “x is a c” for p; q; r, where x
must have somedefinite value, but it is not necessary to decide
what value. We then find that if, for the value of x in question,
x is an a implies x is a b, and x is a b implies x is a c, then x is
an a implies x is a c. Since the value of x is irrelevant, we may
vary x, and thus we find that if a is contained in b, and b in 22
c, then a is contained in c. This is the class-syllogism. But in
applying this process it is necessary to employ the utmost cau-
tion, if fallacies are to be successfully avoided. In this connec-
tion it will be instructive to examine a point uponwhich a dis-
pute has arisen between Schröder andMrMcColl*. Schröder
asserts that if p; q; r are propositions, “pq implies r” is equiva-
lent to the disjunction “p implies r or q implies r.” Mr McColl
admits that the disjunction implies the other, but denies the
converse implication. The reason for the divergence is, that
Schröder is thinking of propositions andmaterial implication,
while Mr McColl is thinking of propositional functions and
formal implication. As regards propositions, the truth of the
principle may be easily made plain by the following consider-
ations. If pq implies r, then, if either p or q be false, the one
of themwhich is false implies r, because false propositions im-
ply all propositions. But if both be true, pq is true, and there-
fore r is true, and therefore p implies r and q implies r, because
true propositions are implied by every proposition. Thus in
any case, one at least of the propositions p and q must imply
r. (This is not a proof, but an elucidation.) But Mr McColl
objects: Suppose p and q to be mutually contradictory, and r
to be the null proposition, then pq implies r but neither p nor
q implies r. Here we are dealing with propositional functions
*Schröder, Algebra der Logik, Vol. ii, pp. 258–9; McColl, “Calculus of
Equivalent Statements,” fifth paper, Proc. Lond. Math. Soc. Vol. xxviii, p.
182.
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and formal implication. A propositional function is said to be
null when it is false for all values of x; and the class of x’s satis-
fying the function is called the null-class, being in fact a class
of no terms. Either the function or the class, following Peano,
I shall denote byΛ. Now let our r be replaced byΛ, our p byφx,
and our q by not-φx, where φx is any propositional function.
Then pq is false for all values of x, and therefore impliesΛ. But
it is not in general the case that φx is always false, nor yet that
not-φx is always false; hence neither always implies Λ. Thus
the above formula can only be truly interpreted in the propo-
sitional calculus: in the class-calculus it is false. This may be
easily rendered obvious by the following considerations: Let
φx;ψx; χx be three propositional functions. Then “φx . ψx im-
plies χx” implies, for all values of x, that eitherφx implies χx or
ψx implies χx. But it does not imply that either φx implies χx
for all values of x, or ψx implies χx for all values of x. The dis-
junction is what I shall call a variable disjunction, as opposed
to a constant one: that is, in some cases one alternative is true,
in others the other, whereas in a constant disjunction there is
one of the alternatives (though it is not stated which) that is
always true. Wherever disjunctions occur in regard to propo-
sitional functions, they will only be transformable into state-
ments in the class-calculus in cases where the disjunction is
constant. This is a point which is both important in itself and
instructive in its bearings. Another way of stating the matter
is this: In the proposition: If φx . ψx implies χx, then either 23
φx implies χx or ψx implies χx, the implication indicated by if
and then is formal, while the subordinate implications are ma-
terial; hence the subordinate implications do not lead to the
inclusion of one class in another, which results only from for-
mal implication.
The formal laws of addition, multiplication, tautology and
negation are the same as regards classes andpropositions. The
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law of tautology states that no change is made when a class or
proposition is added to or multiplied by itself. A new feature
of the class-calculus is the null-class, or class having no terms.
This may be defined as the class of terms that belong to every
class, as the class which does not exist (in the sense defined
above), as the class which is contained in every class, as the
classΛwhich is such that the propositional function “x is aΛ”
is false for all values of x, or as the class of x’s satisfying any
propositional function φxwhich is false for all values of x. All
these definitions are easily shown to be equivalent.
26. Some important points arise in connectionwith the the-
ory of identity. We have already defined two terms as identi-
cal when the second belongs to every class to which the first
belongs. It is easy to show that this definition is symmetrical,
and that identity is transitive and reflexive (i.e. if x and y, y and
z are identical, so are x and z; and whatever xmay be, x is iden-
tical with x). Diversity is defined as the negation of identity.
If x be any term, it is necessary to distinguish from x the class
whose only member is x: this may be defined as the class of
terms which are identical with x. The necessity for this dis-
tinction, which results primarily from purely formal consid-
erations, was discovered by Peano; I shall return to it at a later
stage. Thus the class of evenprimes is not to be identifiedwith
the number 2, and the class of numbers which are the sum of
1 and 2 is not to be identified with 3. In what, philosophically
speaking, the difference consists, is a point to be considered
in Chapter vi.
C. The Calculus of Relations
27. The calculus of relations is a more modern subject than
the calculus of classes. Although a few hints for it are to
be found in De Morgan*, the subject was first developed by
*Camb. Phil. Trans.Vol. x, “On the Syllogism, No. iv, and on the Logic
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C. S. Peirce†. A careful analysis of mathematical reasoning
shows (as we shall find in the course of the present work)
that types of relations are the true subject-matter discussed,
however a bad phraseology may disguise this fact; hence the
logic of relations has a more immediate bearing on mathe-
matics than that of classes or propositions, and any theoreti- 24
cally correct and adequate expression of mathematical truths
is only possible by its means. Peirce and Schröder have re-
alized the great importance of the subject, but unfortunately
their methods, being based, not on Peano, but on the older
Symbolic Logic derived (with modifications) from Boole, are
so cumbrous and difficult that most of the applications which
ought to be made are practically not feasible. In addition
to the defects of the old Symbolic Logic, their method suf-
fers technically (whether philosophically or not I do not at
present discuss) from the fact that they regard a relation es-
sentially as a class of couples, thus requiring elaborate formu-
lae of summation for dealing with single relations. This view
is derived, I think, probably unconsciously, from a philosoph-
ical error: it has always been customary to suppose relational
propositions less ultimate than class-propositions (or subject-
predicate propositions, with which class-propositions are ha-
bitually confounded), and this has led to a desire to treat rela-
tions as a kind of classes. However thismay be, it was certainly
from the opposite philosophical belief, which I derived from
my friendMrG. E. Moore*, that I was led to a different formal
treatment of relations. This treatment, whether more philo-
of Relations.” Cf. ib. Vol. ix, p. 104; also his Formal Logic (London, 1847), p.
50.
†See especially his articles on the Algebra of Logic, American Journal
of Mathematics, Vols, iii and vii. The subject is treated at length by C. S.
Peirce’s methods in Schröder, op. cit., Vol. iii.
*See his article “On the Nature of Judgment,”Mind, N. S. No. 30.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 34
sophically correct or not, is certainly far more convenient and
far more powerful as an engine of discovery in actual mathe-
matics†.
28. If R be a relation, we express by xRy the propositional
function “x has the relationR to y.” We require a primitive (i.e.
indemonstrable) proposition to the effect that xRy is a propo-
sition for all values of x and y. We then have to consider the
following classes: The class of terms which have the relation
R to some term or other, which I call the class of referentswith
respect to R; and the class of terms to which some term has
the relation R, which I call the class of relata. Thus if R be
paternity, the referents will be fathers and the relata will be
children. We have also to consider the corresponding classes
with respect toparticular termsor classes of terms: so-and-so’s
children, or the children of Londoners, afford illustrations.
The intensional view of relations here advocated leads to
the result that two relations may have the same extension
without being identical. Two relations R, R0 are said to be
equal or equivalent, or to have the same extension, when xRy
implies and is impliedby xR0y for all valuesof x and y. But there
is no need here of a primitive proposition, as there was in the
case of classes, in order to obtain a relation which is determi-
nate when the extension is determinate. We may replace a re-
lation R by the logical sum or product of the class of relations
equivalent to R, i.e. by the assertion of some or of all such rela-
tions; and this is identical with the logical sum or product of
the class of relations equivalent to R0, if R0 be equivalent to R.
Herewe use the identity of two classes, which results from the 25
primitive proposition as to identity of classes, to establish the
identity of two relations—a procedure which could not have
been applied to classes themselves without a vicious circle.
†See my articles in R. d.M.Vol. vii. No. 2 and subsequent numbers.
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A primitive proposition in regard to relations is that every
relation has a converse, i.e. that, if R be any relation, there is
a relation R0 such that xRy is equivalent to yR0x for all values
of x and y. Following Schröder, I shall denote the converse
of R by R. Greater and less, before and after, implying and im-
plied by, aremutually converse relations. With some relations,
such as identity, diversity, equality, inequality, the converse is
the same as the original relation: such relations are called sym-
metrical. When the converse is incompatible with the original
relation, as in such cases as greater and less, I call the relation
asymmetrical; in intermediate cases, not-symmetrical.
The most important of the primitive propositions in this
subject is that between any two terms there is a relation not
holding between any two other terms. This is analogous to
the principle that any term is the only member of some class;
but whereas that could be proved, owing to the extensional
view of classes, this principle, so far as I can discover, is inca-
pable of proof. In this point, the extensional view of relations
has an advantage; but the advantage appears to me to be out-
weighed by other considerations. When relations are consid-
ered intensionally, it may seem possible to doubt whether the
above principle is true at all. It will, however, be generally ad-
mitted that, of any two terms, some propositional function is
true which is not true of a certain given different pair of terms.
If this be admitted, the above principle follows by considering
the logical product of all the relations that hold between our
first pair of terms. Thus the above principle may be replaced
by the following, which is equivalent to it: If xRy implies x0Ry0,
whatever R may be, so long as R is a relation, then x and x0, y
and y0 are respectively identical. But this principle introduces
a logical difficulty from which we have been hitherto exempt,
namely a variable with a restricted field; for unless R is a rela-
tion, xRy is not a proposition at all, true or false, and thus R,
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it would seem, cannot take all values, but only such as are re-
lations. I shall return to the discussion of this point at a later
stage.
29. Other assumptions required are that the negation of a
relation is a relation, and that the logical product of a class of
relations (i.e. the assertion of all of them simultaneously) is a
relation. Also the relative product of two relations must be a
relation. The relative product of two relations R, S is the rela-
tion which holds between x and z whenever there is a term y
to which x has the relation R and which has to z the relation
S. Thus the relation of amaternal grandfather to his grandson
is the relative product of father andmother; that of a paternal
grandmother toher grandson is the relative product ofmother
and father; that of grandparent to grandchild is the relative 26
product of parent and parent. The relative product, as these
instances show, is not in general commutative, and does not
in general obey the law of tautology. The relative product is
a notion of very great importance. Since it does not obey the
law of tautology, it leads to powers of relations: the square of
the relation of parent and child is the relation of grandparent
and grandchild, and so on. Peirce and Schröder consider also
what they call the relative sum of two relations R and S, which
holds between x and z, when, if y be any other term whatever,
either x has to y the relationR, or y has to z the relation S. This
is a complicated notion, which I have found no occasion to
employ, and which is introduced only in order to preserve the
duality of addition and multiplication. This duality has a cer-
tain technical charm when the subject is considered as an in-
dependent branch of mathematics; but when it is considered
solely in relation to the principles of mathematics, the duality
in question appears devoid of all philosophical importance.
30. Mathematics requires, so far as I know, only two other
primitive propositions, the one that material implication is a
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relation, the other that ϵ (the relation of a term to a class to
which it belongs) is a relation*. We cannowdevelop thewhole
of mathematics without further assumptions or indefinables.
Certain propositions in the logic of relations deserve to be
mentioned, since they are important, and it might be doubted
whether they were capable of formal proof. If u; v be any two
classes, there is a relationR the assertionofwhichbetweenany
two terms x and y is equivalent to the assertion that x belongs
to u and y to v. If u be any class which is not null, there is a rela-
tionwhich all its termshave to it, andwhichholds for noother
pairs of terms. If R be any relation, and u any class contained
in the class of referents with respect to R, there is a relation
which has u for the class of its referents, and is equivalent to
R throughout that class; this relation is the same as R where
it holds, but has a more restricted domain. (I use domain as
synonymous with class of referents.) From this point onwards,
the development of the subject is technical: special types of
relations are considered, and special branches ofmathematics
result.
D. Peano’s Symbolic Logic
31. So much of the above brief outline of Symbolic Logic is
inspired by Peano, that it seems desirable to discuss his work
explicitly, justifying by criticism the points in which I have de-
parted from him.
The question as to which of the notions of symbolic logic
are to be taken as indefinable, andwhichof the propositions as
indemonstrable, is, as Professor Peano has insisted†, to some
extent arbitrary. But it is important to establish all the mu- 27
tual relations of the simpler notions of logic, and to examine
*There is a difficulty in regard to this primitive proposition, discussed
in §§53, 94 below.
†E.g. F. 1901, p. 6; F. 1897, Part I, pp. 62–3.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 38
the consequence of taking various notions as indefinable. It
is necessary to realize that definition, in mathematics, does
not mean, as in philosophy, an analysis of the idea to be de-
fined into constituent ideas. This notion, in any case, is only
applicable to concepts, whereas in mathematics it is possible
to define terms which are not concepts*. Thus also many no-
tions are defined by symbolic logic which are not capable of
philosophical definition, since they are simple and unanalyz-
able. Mathematical definition consists in pointing out a fixed
relation to a fixed term, of which one term only is capable:
this term is then defined by means of the fixed relation and
the fixed term. The point in which this differs from philo-
sophical definition may be elucidated by the remark that the
mathematical definition does not point out the term in ques-
tion, and that only what may be called philosophical insight
reveals which it is among all the terms there are. This is due to
the fact that the term is defined by a concept which denotes it
unambiguously, not by actuallymentioning the term denoted.
What is meant by denoting, as well as the different ways of de-
noting, must be accepted as primitive ideas in any symbolic
logic†: in this respect, the order adopted seems not in any de-
gree arbitrary.
32. For the sake of definiteness, let us now examine some
one of Professor Peano’s expositions of the subject. In his
later expositions‡ he has abandoned the attempt to distin-
guish clearly certain ideas and propositions as primitive, prob-
ably because of the realization that any such distinction is
largely arbitrary. But the distinction appears useful, as intro-
ducing greater definiteness, and as showing that a certain set
of primitive ideas and propositions are sufficient; so far from
*See Chap. iv.
†See Chap. v.
‡F. 1901 and R. d.M.Vol. vii, No. 1 (1900).
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being abandoned, it ought rather to be made in every possible
way. I shall, therefore, in what follows, expound one of his
earlier expositions, that of 1897§.
The primitive notions with which Peano starts are the fol-
lowing: Class, the relation of an individual to a class of which
it is a member, the notion of a term, implication where both
propositions contain the same variables, i.e. formal implica-
tion, the simultaneous affirmationof twopropositions, theno-
tion of definition, and the negation of a proposition. From
these notions, together with the division of a complex propo-
sition into parts, Peano professes to deduce all symbolic logic
by means of certain primitive propositions. Let us examine
the deduction in outline.
We may observe, to begin with, that the simultaneous af-
firmation of two propositions might seem, at first sight, not
enough to take as a primitive idea. For although this can be
extended, by successive steps, to the simultaneous affirmation
of any finite number of propositions, yet this is not all that is 28
wanted; we require to be able to affirm simultaneously all the
propositions of any class, finite or infinite. But the simultane-
ous assertion of a class of propositions, oddly enough, ismuch
easier to define than that of two propositions, (see §34, (3)). If
k be a class of propositions, their simultaneous affirmation is
the assertion that “p is a k” implies p. If this holds, all proposi-
tions of the class are true; if it fails, one at least must be false.
We have seen that the logical product of two propositions can
be defined in a highly artificial manner; but it might almost as
well be taken as indefinable, since no further property can be
proved bymeans of the definition. Wemay observe, also, that
formal and material implication are combined by Peano into
§F. 1897, Part I.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 40
one primitive idea, whereas they ought to be kept separate.
33. Before giving any primitive propositions, Peano pro-
ceeds to some definitions. (1) If a is a class, “x and y are a’s”
is to mean “x is an a and y is an a.” (2) If a and b are classes,
“every a is a b” means “x is an a implies that x is a b.” If we ac-
cept formal implication as a primitive notion, this definition
seems unobjectionable; but it may well be held that the rela-
tion of inclusion between classes is simpler than formal im-
plication, and should not be defined by its means. This is a
difficult question, which I reserve for subsequent discussion.
A formal implication appears to be the assertion of a whole
class of material implications. The complication introduced
at this point arises from the nature of the variable, a point
which Peano, though he has done very much to show its im-
portance, appears not to have himself sufficiently considered.
The notion of one proposition containing a variable implying
another such proposition, which he takes as primitive, is com-
plex, and should therefore be separated into its constituents;
from this separation arises the necessity of considering the si-
multaneous affirmationof awhole class of propositions before
interpreting such a proposition as “x is an a implies that x is a
b.” (3)We comenext to a perfectlyworthless definition, which
has been since abandoned*. This is the definition of such that.
The x’s such that x is an a, we are told, are to mean the class
a. But this only gives themeaning of such thatwhen placed be-
fore a proposition of the type “x is an a.” Now it is often nec-
essary to consider an x such that some proposition is true of
it, where this proposition is not of the form “x is an a.” Peano
holds (though he does not lay it down as an axiom) that every
proposition containing only one variable is reducible to the
form “x is an a†.” But we shall see (Chap. x) that at least one
*In consequence of the criticisms of Padoa, R. d.M.Vol. vi, p. 112.
†R. d.M.Vol. vii, No. 1, p. 25; F. 1901, p. 21, §2, Prop. 4.0, Note.
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suchproposition isnot reducible to this form. And in any case,
the only utility of such that is to effect the reduction, which
cannot therefore be assumed to be already effected without
it. The fact is that such that contains a primitive idea, but one
which it is not easy clearly to disengage from other ideas.
In order to grasp the meaning of such that, it is necessary 29
to observe, first of all, that what Peano and mathematicians
generally call one proposition containing a variable is really, if
the variable is apparent, the conjunction of a certain class of
propositions defined by some constancy of form; while if the
variable is real, so that we have a propositional function, there
is not a proposition at all, but merely a kind of schematic rep-
resentation of any proposition of a certain type. “The sum of
the angles of a triangle is two right angles,” for example, when
stated by means of a variable, becomes: Let x be a triangle;
then the sum of the angles of x is two right angles. This ex-
presses the conjunction of all the propositions in which it is
said of particular definite entities that if they are triangles, the
sum of their angles is two right angles. But a propositional
function, where the variable is real, represents any proposi-
tion of a certain form, not all such propositions (see §§59–
62). There is, for each propositional function, an indefinable
relation between propositions and entities, which may be ex-
pressed by saying that all the propositions have the same form,
but different entities enter into them. It is this that gives rise
to propositional functions. Given, for example, a constant re-
lation and a constant term, there is a one-one correspondence
between the propositions asserting that various terms have
the said relation to the said term, and the various terms which
occur in these propositions. It is this notionwhich is requisite
for the comprehension of such that. Let x be a variable whose
values form the class a, and let f(x) be a one-valued function
of x which is a true proposition for all values of x within the
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class a, and which is false for all other values of x. Then the
terms of a are the class of terms such that f(x) is a true proposi-
tion. This gives an explanation of such that. But itmust always
be remembered that the appearance of having one proposition
f(x) satisfied by a number of values of x is fallacious: f(x) is not
a proposition at all, but a propositional function. What is fun-
damental is the relation of various propositions of given form
to the various terms entering severally into themas arguments
or values of the variable; this relation is equally required for in-
terpreting the propositional function f(x) and the notion such
that, but is itself ultimate and inexplicable. (4) We come next
to the definition of the logical product, or common part, of
two classes. If a and b be two classes, their common part con-
sists of the class of terms x such that x is an a and x is a b. Here
already, as Padoa points out (loc. cit.), it is necessary to extend
the meaning of such that beyond the case where our proposi-
tion asserts membership of a class, since it is only by means of
the definition that the common part is shown to be a class.
34. The remainder of the definitions preceding the primi-
tive propositions are less important, and may be passed over.
Of the primitive propositions, some appear to be merely con-
cernedwith the symbolism, andnot to express any real proper- 30
ties of what is symbolized; others, on the contrary, are of high
logical importance.
(1) The first of Peano’s axioms is “every class is contained in
itself.” This is equivalent to “every proposition implies itself.”
There seems no way of evading this axiom, which is equiva-
lent to the law of identity, except the method adopted above,
of using self-implication to define propositions. (2) Next we
have the axiom that the product of two classes is a class. This
ought to have been stated, as ought also the definition of the
logical product, for a class of classes; for when stated for only
two classes, it cannot be extended to the logical product of an
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infinite class of classes. If class is taken as indefinable, it is a
genuine axiom, which is very necessary to reasoning. But it
might perhaps be somewhat generalized by an axiom concern-
ing the terms satisfying propositions of a given form: e.g. “the
terms having one ormore given relations to one ormore given
terms form a class.” In Section B, above, the axiomwaswholly
evaded by using a generalized form of the axiom as the defini-
tion of class. (3) We have next two axioms which are really
only one, and appear distinct only because Peano defines the
common part of two classes instead of the common part of a
class of classes. These two axioms state that, if a; b be classes,
their logical product, ab, is contained in a and is contained in
b. These appear as different axioms, because, as far as the sym-
bolism shows, ab might be different from ba. It is one of the
defects of most symbolisms that they give an order to terms
which intrinsically have none, or at least none that is relevant.
So in this case: if K be a class of classes, the logical product
ofK consists of all terms belonging to every class that belongs
toK. With this definition, it becomes at once evident that no
order of the terms of K is involved. Hence if K has only two
terms, a and b, it is indifferent whether we represent the logi-
cal product of K by ab or by ba, since the order exists only in
the symbols, not in what is symbolized. It is to be observed
that the corresponding axiom with regard to propositions is,
that the simultaneous assertion of a class of propositions im-
plies any proposition of the class; and this is perhaps the best
form of the axiom. Nevertheless, though an axiom is not re-
quired, it is necessary, here as elsewhere, to have a means of
connecting the case wherewe start from a class of classes or of
propositions or of relations with the case where the class re-
sults from enumeration of its terms. Thus although no order
is involved in the product of a class of propositions, there is an
order in the product of two definite propositions p; q, and it is
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significant to assert that the products pq and qp are equivalent.
But this can be proved bymeans of the axioms with which we
began the calculus of propositions (§18). It is to be observed
that this proof is prior to the proof that the class whose terms
are p and q is identical with the class whose terms are q and
p. (4) We have next two forms of syllogism, both primitive
propositions. The first asserts that, if a; b be classes, and a 31
is contained in b, and x is an a, then x is a b; the second as-
serts that if a; b; c be classes, and a is contained in b, b in c,
then a is contained in c. It is one of the greatest of Peano’s
merits to have clearly distinguished the relation of the individ-
ual to its class from the relation of inclusion between classes.
The difference is exceedingly fundamental: the former rela-
tion is the simplest andmost essential of all relations, the latter
a complicated relation derived from logical implication. It re-
sults from thedistinction that the syllogism inBarbarahas two
forms, usually confounded: the one the time-honoured asser-
tion that Socrates is aman, and thereforemortal, the other the
assertion that Greeks are men, and therefore mortal. These
two forms are stated by Peano’s axioms. It is to be observed
that, in virtue of the definition of what is meant by one class
being contained in another, the first form results from the ax-
iom that, if p; q; r be propositions, and p implies that q implies
r, then the product of p and q implies r. This axiom is now
substituted by Peano for the first form of the syllogism*: it is
more general and cannot be deduced from the said form. The
second form of the syllogism, when applied to propositions
instead of classes, asserts that implication is transitive. This
principle is, of course, the very life of all chains of reasoning.
(5) We have next a principle of reasoning which Peano calls
composition: this asserts that if a is contained in b and also in c,
*See e.g. F. 1901, Part I, §1, Prop. 3.3 (p. 10).
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 45
then it is contained in the common part of both. Stating this
principle with regard to propositions, it asserts that if a propo-
sition implies each of two others, then it implies their joint as-
sertion or logical product; and this is the principle which was
called composition above.
35. From this point, we advance successfully until we re-
quire the idea of negation. This is taken, in the edition of the
Formulairewe are considering, as a newprimitive idea, and dis-
junction is defined by its means. By means of the negation of
a proposition, it is of course easy to define the negation of a
class: for “x is a not-a” is equivalent to “x is not an a.” But we
require an axiom to the effect that not-a is a class, and another
to the effect that not-not-a is a. Peano gives also a third ax-
iom, namely: If a; b; c be classes, and ab is contained in c, and
x is an a but not a c, then x is not a b. This is simpler in the
form: if p; q; r be propositions, and p; q together imply r, and p
is true while r is false, then q is false. This would be still fur-
ther improvedbybeing put in the form: If q; r are propositions,
and q implies r, then not-r implies not-q; a form which Peano
obtains as a deduction. By dealing with propositions before
classes or propositional functions, it is possible, as we saw, to
avoid treating negation as a primitive idea, and to replace all
axioms respecting negation by the principle of reduction.
We come next to the definition of the disjunction or logi-
cal sum of two classes. On this subject Peano has many times
changed his procedure. In the edition we are considering, “a 32
or b” is defined as the negation of the logical product of not-a
and not-b, i.e. as the class of terms which are not both not-a
and not-b. In later editions (e.g. F. 1901, p. 19), we find a some-
what less artificial definition, namely: “a or b” consists of all
termswhichbelong to any classwhich containsa andcontains
b. Either definition seems logically unobjectionable. It is to
be observed that a and b are classes, and that it remains a ques-
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tion for philosophical logic whether there is not a quite dif-
ferent notion of the disjunction of individuals, as e.g. “Brown
or Jones.” I shall consider this question in Chapter v. It will
be remembered that, when we begin by the calculus of propo-
sitions, disjunction is defined before negation; with the above
definition (that of 1897), it is plainly necessary to take negation
first.
36. The connected notions of the null-class and the exis-
tence of a class are next dealt with. In the edition of 1897,
a class is defined as null when it is contained in every class.
When we remember the definition of one class a being con-
tained in another b (“x is an a” implies “a is a b” for all values
of x), we see thatwe are to regard the implication asholding for
all values, and not only for those values forwhich x really is an
a. This is a point uponwhichPeano is not explicit, and I doubt
whether hehasmadeuphismindon it. If the implicationwere
only to holdwhen x really is an a, it would not give a definition
of the null-class, for which this hypothesis is false for all val-
ues of x. I do not knowwhether it is for this reason or for some
other that Peano has since abandoned the definition of the
inclusion of classes by means of formal implication between
propositional functions: the inclusion of classes appears to be
now regarded as indefinable. Another definitionwhich Peano
has sometimes favoured (e.g. F. 1895, Errata, p. 116) is, that the
null-class is the product of any class into its negation—a defi-
nition to which similar remarks apply. In R. d.M. vii, No. 1 (§3,
Prop. 1.0), the null-class is defined as the class of those terms
that belong to every class, i.e. the class of terms x such that “a
is a class” implies “x is an a” for all values of a. There are of
course no such terms x; and there is a grave logical difficulty
in trying to interpret extensionally a class which has no exten-
sion. This point is one to which I shall return in Chapter vi.
From this point onward, Peano’s logic proceeds by a smooth
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development. But in one respect it is still defective: it does
not recognize as ultimate relational propositions not assert-
ing membership of a class. For this reason, the definitions of
a function* and of other essentially relational notions are de-
fective. But this defect is easily remedied by applying, in the
manner explained above, the principles of the Formulaire to
the logic of relations†.
*E.g. F. 1901, Part I, §10, Props. 1.0.01 (p. 33).
†See my article “Sur la logique des relations,” R. d.M.Vol. vii, 2 (1901).
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chapter iii
IMPLICATIONAND FORMAL
IMPLICATION
37. In the preceding chapter I endeavoured to present, 33
briefly and uncritically, all the data, in the shape of formally
fundamental ideas and propositions, that pure mathematics
requires. In subsequent Parts I shall show that these are all
the data by giving definitions of the various mathematical
concepts—number, infinity, continuity, the various spaces of
geometry, and motion. In the remainder of Part I, I shall give
indications, as best I can, of the philosophical problems aris-
ing in the analysis of the data, and of the directions in which I
imagine these problems to be probably soluble. Some logical
notions will be elicited which, though they seem quite funda-
mental to logic, are not commonly discussed in works on the
subject; and thus problems no longer clothed in mathemati-
cal symbolismwill be presented for the consideration of philo-
sophical logicians.
Two kinds of implication, thematerial and the formal, were
found to be essential to every kind of deduction. In the
present chapter I wish to examine and distinguish these two
kinds, and to discuss some methods of attempting to analyze
the second of them.
In the discussion of inference, it is common to permit the
intrusion of a psychological element, and to consider our ac-
quisition of new knowledge by its means. But it is plain that
where we validly infer one proposition from another, we do
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so in virtue of a relation which holds between the two propo-
sitions whether we perceive it or not: the mind, in fact, is as
purely receptive in inference as common sense supposes it to
be in perception of sensible objects. The relation in virtue of
which it is possible for us validly to infer is what I call material
implication. We have already seen that it would be a vicious
circle to define this relation asmeaning that if one proposition
is true, then another is true, for if and then already involve im-
plication. The relation holds, in fact, when it does hold, with-
out any reference to the truth or falsehood of the propositions
involved.
But in developing the consequences of our assumptions
as to implication, we were led to conclusions which do not
by any means agree with what is commonly held concerning 34
implication, for we found that any false proposition implies
every proposition and any true proposition is implied by ev-
ery proposition. Thus propositions are formally like a set of
lengths each of which is one inch or two, and implication is
like the relation “equal to or less than” among such lengths. It
would certainly not be commonlymaintained that “2+ 2 = 4”
can be deduced from “Socrates is a man,” or that both are
implied by “Socrates is a triangle.” But the reluctance to ad-
mit such implications is chiefly due, I think, to preoccupation
with formal implication, which is a much more familiar no-
tion, and is really before the mind, as a rule, even where mate-
rial implication is what is explicitly mentioned. In inferences
from “Socrates is a man,” it is customary not to consider the
philosopher who vexed theAthenians, but to regard Socrates
merely as a symbol, capable of being replaced by any other
man; and only a vulgar prejudice in favour of true proposi-
tions stands in the way of replacing Socrates by a number, a
table, or a plum-pudding. Nevertheless, wherever, as in Eu-
clid, one particular proposition is deduced from another, ma-
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terial implication is involved, though as a rule thematerial im-
plication may be regarded as a particular instance of some for-
mal implication, obtained by giving some constant value to
the variable or variables involved in the said formal implica-
tion. And although, while relations are still regarded with the
awe caused by unfamiliarity, it is natural to doubtwhether any
such relation as implication is to be found, yet, in virtue of
the general principles laid down in SectionCof the preceding
chapter, there must be a relation holding between nothing ex-
cept propositions, and holding between any two propositions
of which either the first is false or the second true. Of the var-
ious equivalent relations satisfying these conditions, one is to
be called implication, and if such a notion seems unfamiliar,
that does not suffice to prove that it is illusory.
38. At this point, it is necessary to consider a very difficult
logical problem, namely, the distinction between a proposi-
tion actually asserted, and a proposition considered merely
as a complex concept. One of our indemonstrable principles
was, it will be remembered, that if the hypothesis in an impli-
cation is true, it may be dropped, and the consequent asserted.
This principle, it was observed, eludes formal statement, and
points to a certain failure of formalism in general. The prin-
ciple is employed whenever a proposition is said to be proved;
for what happens is, in all such cases, that the proposition is
shown to be implied by some true proposition. Another form
in which the principle is constantly employed is the substi-
tution of a constant, satisfying the hypothesis, in the conse-
quent of a formal implication. If φx implies ψx for all values of
x, and if a is a constant satisfying φx, we can assert ψa, drop-
ping the true hypothesis φa. This occurs, for example, when-
ever any of those rules of inference which employ the hypoth-
esis that the variables involved are propositions, are applied
to particular propositions. The principle in question is, there- 35
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fore, quite vital to any kind of demonstration.
The independence of this principle is brought out by a con-
sideration of Lewis Carroll’s puzzle, “What the Tortoise said
to Achilles*.” The principles of inference which we accepted
lead to the proposition that, if p and q be propositions, then
p together with “p implies q” implies q. At first sight, it might
be thought that this would enable us to assert q provided p is
true and implies q. But the puzzle in question shows that this
is not the case, and that, until we have some new principle,
we shall only be led into an endless regress of more and more
complicated implications, without ever arriving at the asser-
tion of q. We need, in fact, the notion of therefore, which is
quite different from the notion of implies, and holds between
different entities. In grammar, the distinction is that between
a verb and a verbal noun, between, say, “A is greater than B”
and “A’s being greater than B.” In the first of these, a propo-
sition is actually asserted, whereas in the second it is merely
considered. But these are psychological terms, whereas the
difference which I desire to express is genuinely logical. It is
plain that, if I may be allowed to use the word assertion in a
non-psychological sense, the proposition “p implies q” asserts
an implication, though it does not assert p or q. The p and the
q which enter into this proposition are not strictly the same
as the p or the q which are separate propositions, at least, if
they are true. The question is: How does a proposition dif-
fer by being actually true from what it would be as an entity
if it were not true? It is plain that true and false propositions
alike are entities of a kind, but that true propositions have a
quality not belonging to false ones, a quality which, in a non-
psychological sense, may be called being asserted. Yet there are
grave difficulties in forming a consistent theory on this point,
for if assertion in any way changed a proposition, no proposi-
*Mind, N. S. Vol. iv, p. 278.
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tionwhich can possibly in any context be unasserted could be
true, since when asserted it would become a different propo-
sition. But this is plainly false; for in “p implies q,” p and q
are not asserted, and yet they may be true. Leaving this puz-
zle to logic, however, we must insist that there is a difference
of some kind between an asserted and an unasserted propo-
sition†. When we say therefore, we state a relation which can
only hold between asserted propositions, and which thus dif-
fers from implication. Wherever therefore occurs, the hypothe-
sismay be dropped, and the conclusion asserted by itself. This
seems to be the first step in answering Lewis Carroll’s puzzle.
39. It is commonly said that an inference must have pre-
misses and a conclusion, and it is held, apparently, that two
or more premisses are necessary, if not to all inferences, yet to
most. This view is borne out, at first sight, by obvious facts: ev-
ery syllogism, for example, is held to have two premisses. Now 36
such a theory greatly complicates the relation of implication,
since it renders it a relation which may have any number of
terms, and is symmetrical with respect to all but one of them,
but not symmetrical with respect to that one (the conclusion).
This complication is, however, unnecessary, first, because ev-
ery simultaneous assertion of a number of propositions is it-
self a single proposition, and secondly, because, by the rule
which we called exportation, it is always possible to exhibit an
implication explicitly as holding between single propositions.
To take the first point first: if k be a class of propositions, all
the propositions of the class k are asserted by the single propo-
sition “for all values of x, if x implies x, then ‘x is a k’ implies
x,” or, in more ordinary language, “every k is true.” And as
regards the second point, which assumes the number of pre-
misses to be finite, “pq implies r” is equivalent, if q be a propo-
†Frege (loc. cit.) has a special symbol to denote assertion.
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sition, to “p implies that q implies r,” in which latter form
the implications hold explicitly between single propositions.
Hencewemay safely hold implication to be a relation between
two propositions, not a relation of an arbitrary number of pre-
misses to a single conclusion.
40. I come now to formal implication, which is a far more
difficult notion than material implication. In order to avoid
the general notion of propositional function, let us begin by
the discussion of a particular instance, say “x is a man implies
x is a mortal for all values of x.” This proposition is equiva-
lent to “all men are mortal” “every man is mortal” and “any
man is mortal.” But it seems highly doubtful whether it is the
same proposition. It is also connected with a purely inten-
sional proposition in which man is asserted to be a complex
notion of whichmortal is a constituent, but this proposition is
quite distinct from the one we are discussing. Indeed, such in-
tensional propositions are not always present where one class
is included in another: in general, either class may be defined
by various different predicates, and it is by nomeans necessary
that every predicate of the smaller class should contain every
predicate of the larger class as a factor. Indeed, itmay verywell
happen that both predicates are philosophically simple: thus
colour and existent appear to be both simple, yet the class of
colours is part of the class of existents. The intensional view,
derived from predicates, is in the main irrelevant to Symbolic
Logic and to Mathematics, and I shall not consider it further
at present.
41. It may be doubted, to begin with, whether “x is a man
implies x is a mortal” is to be regarded as asserted strictly of
all possible terms, or only of such terms as are men. Peano,
though he is not explicit, appears to hold the latter view. But
in this case, the hypothesis ceases to be significant, and be-
comes a mere definition of x: x is to mean any man. The hy-
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pothesis then becomes amere assertion concerning themean-
ing of the symbol x, and thewhole ofwhat is asserted concern-
ing the matter dealt with by our symbol is put into the conclu-
sion. The premiss says: x is tomean anyman. The conclusion 37
says: x is mortal. But the implication is merely concerning the
symbolism: since any man is mortal, if x denotes any man, x
is mortal. Thus formal implication, on this view, has wholly
disappeared, leaving us the proposition “any man is mortal”
as expressing the whole of what is relevant in the proposition
with a variable. It would now only remain to examine the
proposition “anyman ismortal,” and if possible to explain this
propositionwithout reintroducing the variable and formal im-
plication. It must be confessed that some grave difficulties are
avoided by this view. Consider, for example, the simultane-
ous assertion of all the propositions of some class k: this is not
expressed by “‘x is a k’ implies x for all values of x.” For as it
stands, this proposition does not express what is meant, since,
if x be not a proposition, “x is a k” cannot imply x; hence the
range of variability of xmust be confined to propositions, un-
less we prefix (as above, §39) the hypothesis “x implies x.” This
remark applies generally, throughout the propositional calcu-
lus, to all cases where the conclusion is represented by a single
letter: unless the letter does actually represent a proposition,
the implication asserted will be false, since only propositions
can be implied. The point is that, if x be our variable, x itself is
a proposition for all valuesof xwhicharepropositions, butnot
for other values. This makes it plain what the limitations are
to which our variable is subject: it must vary only within the
range of values for which the two sides of the principal impli-
cation are propositions, in other words, the two sides, when
the variable is not replaced by a constant, must be genuine
propositional functions. If this restriction is not observed, fal-
lacies quickly begin to appear. It should be noticed that there
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may be any number of subordinate implications which do not
require that their terms should be propositions: it is only of
the principal implication that this is required. Take, for ex-
ample, the first principle of inference: If p implies q, then p
implies q. This holds equally whether p and q be propositions
or not; for if either is not a proposition, “p implies q” becomes
false, but does not cease to be a proposition. In fact, in virtue
of the definition of a proposition, our principle states that “p
implies q” is a propositional function, i.e. that it is a proposi-
tion for all values of p and q. But if we apply the principle of
importation to this proposition, so as to obtain “‘p implies q,’
together with p, implies q,” we have a formula which is only
true when p and q are propositions: in order to make it true
universally, we must preface it by the hypothesis “p implies p
and q implies q.” In this way, in many cases, if not in all, the
restriction on the variability of the variable can be removed;
thus, in the assertion of the logical product of a class of propo-
sitions, the formula “if x implies x, then ‘x is a k’ implies x”
appears unobjectionable, and allows x to vary without restric-
tion. Here the subordinate implications in the premiss and
the conclusion are material: only the principal implication is
formal.
Returningnow to “x is aman implies x is amortal,” it is plain 38
that no restriction is required in order to insure our having a
genuine proposition, And it is plain that, although we might
restrict the values of x to men, and although this seems to be
done in the proposition “all men are mortal,” yet there is no
reason, so far as the truthofourproposition is concerned,why
we should so restrict our x. Whether x be a man or not, “x is a
man” is always, when a constant is substituted for x, a propo-
sition implying, for that value of x, the proposition “x is amor-
tal.” And unless we admit the hypothesis equally in the cases
where it is false, we shall find it impossible to deal satisfactorily
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with the null-class or with null propositional functions. We
must, therefore, allow our x, wherever the truth of our formal
implication is thereby unimpaired, to take all values without
exception; andwhere any restriction on variability is required,
the implication is not to be regarded as formal until the said
restriction has been removed by being prefixed as hypothesis.
(If ψx be a proposition whenever x satisfies φx, where φx is a
propositional function, and if ψx, whenever it is a proposition,
implies χx, then “ψx implies χx” is not a formal implication, but
“φx implies that ψx implies χx” is a formal implication.)
42. It is to be observed that “x is a man implies x is a mor-
tal” is not a relation of two propositional functions, but is it-
self a single propositional function having the elegant prop-
erty of being always true. For “x is a man” is, as it stands, not a
proposition at all, and does not imply anything; and we must
not first vary our x in “x is a man,” and then independently
vary it in “x is a mortal,” for this would lead to the proposi-
tion that “everything is a man” implies “everything is a mor-
tal,” which, though true, is not what was meant. This propo-
sition would have to be expressed, if the language of variables
were retained, by two variables, as “x is a man implies y is a
mortal.” But this formula too is unsatisfactory, for its natural
meaning would be: “If anything is a man, then everything is
a mortal.” The point to be emphasized is, of course, that our
x, though variable, must be the same on both sides of the im-
plication, and this requires that we should not obtain our for-
mal implication by first varying (say) Socrates in “Socrates is
a man,” and then in “Socrates is a mortal,” but that we should
start from the whole proposition “Socrates is a man implies
Socrates is a mortal,” and vary Socrates in this proposition as
a whole. Thus our formal implication asserts a class of impli-
cations, not a single implication at all. We do not, in a word,
have one implication containing a variable, but rather a vari-
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able implication. We have a class of implications, no one of
which contains a variable, and we assert that every member of
this class is true. This is a first step towards the analysis of the
mathematical notion of the variable.
But, it may be asked, how comes it that Socratesmay be var-
ied in the proposition “Socrates is a man implies Socrates is
mortal”? In virtue of the fact that true propositions are im- 39
plied by all others, wehave “Socrates is aman implies Socrates
is a philosopher”; but in this proposition, alas, the variability
of Socrates is sadly restricted. This seems to show that for-
mal implication involves something over and above the rela-
tion of implication, and that some additional relation must
hold where a term can be varied. In the case in question, it
is natural to say that what is involved is the relation of inclu-
sion between the classes men and mortals—the very relation
which was to be defined and explained by our formal impli-
cation. But this view is too simple to meet all cases, and is
therefore not required in any case. A larger number of cases,
though still not all cases, can be dealt with by the notion of
what I shall call assertions. This notionmust now be briefly ex-
plained, leaving its critical discussion to Chapter vii.
43. It has always been customary to divide propositions into
subject and predicate; but this division has the defect of omit-
ting the verb. It is true that a graceful concession is sometimes
made by loose talk about the copula, but the verb deserves far
more respect than is thus paid to it. Wemay say, broadly, that
every propositionmaybe divided, some in only oneway, some
in several ways, into a term (the subject) and somethingwhich
is said about the subject, which something I shall call the asser-
tion. Thus “Socrates is a man” may be divided into Socrates
and isaman. The verb, which is the distinguishing mark of
propositions, remains with the assertion; but the assertion it-
self, being robbed of its subject, is neither true nor false. In
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logical discussions, the notion of assertion often occurs, but
as the word proposition is used for it, it does not obtain sepa-
rate consideration. Consider, for example, the best statement
of the identity of indiscernibles: “If x and y be any two diverse
entities, some assertion holds of x which does not hold of y.”
But for the word assertion, whichwould ordinarily be replaced
by proposition, this statement is one which would commonly
pass unchallenged. Again, it might be said: “Socrates was a
philosopher, and the same is true of Plato.” Such statements
require the analysis of a proposition into an assertion and a
subject, in order that there may be something identical which
can be said to be affirmed of two subjects.
44. We can now see how, where the analysis into sub-
ject and assertion is legitimate, to distinguish implications in
which there is a termwhich canbevaried fromothers inwhich
this is not the case. Two ways of making the distinction may
be suggested, and we shall have to decide between them. It
may be said that there is a relation between the two assertions
“is a man” and “is a mortal,” in virtue of which, when the one
holds, so does the other. Or again, we may analyze the whole
proposition “Socrates is a man implies Socrates is a mortal”
into Socrates and an assertion about him, and say that the as-
sertion in question holds of all terms. Neither of these theo-
ries replaces the above analysis of “x is aman implies x is amor- 40
tal” into a class of material implications; but whichever of the
two is true carries the analysis one step further. The first the-
ory suffers from the difficulty that it is essential to the relation
of assertions involved that both assertions should be made of
the same subject, though it is otherwise irrelevantwhat subject
we choose. The second theory appears objectionable on the
ground that the suggested analysis of “Socrates is a man im-
plies Socrates is a mortal” seems scarcely possible. The propo-
sition in question consists of two terms and a relation, the
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terms being “Socrates is a man” and “Socrates is a mortal”;
and it would seem that when a relational proposition is ana-
lyzed into a subject and an assertion, the subject must be one
of the terms of the relation which is asserted. This objection
seems graver than that against the former view; I shall there-
fore, at any rate for the present, adopt the former view, and
regard formal implication as derived from a relation between
assertions.
We remarked above that the relation of inclusion between
classes is insufficient. This results from the irreducible nature
of relational propositions. Take e.g. “Socrates is married im-
plies Socrates had a father.” Here it is affirmed that because
Socrates has one relation, he must have another. Or better
still, take “A is before B implies B is after A.” This is a for-
mal implication, in which the assertions are (superficially at
least) concerning different subjects; the only way to avoid this
is to say that both propositions have bothA and B as subjects,
which, by theway, is quite different from saying that they have
the one subject “A and B.” Such instances make it plain that
the notion of a propositional function, and the notion of an
assertion, are more fundamental than the notion of class, and
that the latter is not adequate to explain all cases of formal im-
plication. I shall not enlarge upon this point now, as it will be
abundantly illustrated in subsequent portions of the present
work.
It is important to realize that, according to the above analy-
sis of formal implication, the notion of everyterm is indefinable
and ultimate. A formal implication is one which holds of ev-
ery term, and therefore every cannot be explained bymeans of
formal implication. If a and b be classes, we can explain “ev-
ery a is a b” by means of “x is an a implies x is a b”; but the
everywhich occurs here is a derivative and subsequent notion,
presupposing the notion of every term. It seems to be the very
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essence ofwhatmay be called a formal truth, and of formal rea-
soning generally, that some assertion is affirmed to hold of ev-
ery term; and unless the notion of every term is admitted, for-
mal truths are impossible.
45. The fundamental importance of formal implication is
brought out by the consideration that it is involved in all the
rules of inference. This shows that we cannot hope wholly
to define it in terms of material implication, but that some
further element or elements must be involved. We may ob- 41
serve, however, that, in a particular inference, the rule accord-
ing to which the inference proceeds is not required as a pre-
miss. This point has been emphasized by Mr Bradley*; it is
closely connected with the principle of dropping a true pre-
miss, being again a respect in which formalism breaks down.
In order to apply a rule of inference, it is formally necessary to
have a premiss asserting that the present case is an instance of
the rule; we shall then need to affirm the rule by which we can
go from the rule to an instance, and also to affirm that here we
have an instance of this rule, and so on into an endless process.
The fact is, of course, that any implication warranted by a rule
of inference does actually hold, and is not merely implied by
the rule. This is simply an instance of the non-formal prin-
ciple of dropping a true premiss: if our rule implies a certain
implication, the rule may be dropped and the implication as-
serted. But it remains the case that the fact that our rule does
imply the said implication, if introduced at all, must be sim-
ply perceived, and is not guaranteed by any formal deduction;
and often it is just as easy, and consequently just as legitimate,
to perceive immediately the implication in question as to per-
ceive that it is implied by one ormore of the rules of inference.
To sum up our discussion of formal implication: a formal
*Logic, Book II, Part I, Chap. ii (p. 227).
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implication, we said, is the affirmation of every material im-
plication of a certain class; and the class of material implica-
tions involved is, in simple cases, the class of all propositions
in which a given fixed assertion, made concerning a certain
subject or subjects, is affirmed to imply another given fixed as-
sertion concerning the same subject or subjects. Where a for-
mal implication holds, we agreed to regard it, wherever possi-
ble, as due to some relation between the assertions concerned.
This theory raises many formidable logical problems, and re-
quires, for its defence, a thorough analysis of the constituents
of propositions. To this task we must now address ourselves.
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chapter iv
PROPERNAMES, ADJECTIVES,
ANDVERBS
46. In the present chapter, certain questions are to be dis- 42
cussed belonging to what may be called philosophical gram-
mar. The study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of
throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is
commonly supposed by philosophers. Although a grammat-
ical distinction cannot be uncritically assumed to correspond
to a genuine philosophical difference, yet the one is primâ fa-
cie evidence of the other, and may often be most usefully em-
ployed as a source of discovery. Moreover, it must be admit-
ted, I think, that everywordoccurring in a sentencemust have
somemeaning: a perfectlymeaningless sound could not be em-
ployed in the more or less fixed way in which language em-
ploys words. The correctness of our philosophical analysis of
a proposition may therefore be usefully checked by the exer-
cise of assigning themeaning of each word in the sentence ex-
pressing the proposition. On the whole, grammar seems to
me to bring us much nearer to a correct logic than the cur-
rent opinions of philosophers; and in what follows, grammar,
though not our master, will yet be taken as our guide*.
Of the parts of speech, three are specially important: sub-
stantives, adjectives, and verbs. Among substantives, some
*The excellence of grammar as a guide is proportional to the paucity of
inflexions, i.e. to thedegree of analysis effectedby the language considered.
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are derived fromadjectives or verbs, as humanity fromhuman,
or sequence from follows. (I am not speaking of an etymolog-
ical derivation, but of a logical one.) Others, such as proper
names, or space, time, and matter, are not derivative, but ap-
pear primarily as substantives. What we wish to obtain is a
classification, not of words, but of ideas; I shall therefore call
adjectives or predicates all notions which are capable of being
such, even in a form in which grammar would call them sub-
stantives. The fact is, as we shall see, that human and human-
ity denote precisely the same concept, these words being em-
ployed respectively according to the kind of relation in which
this concept stands to the other constituents of a proposition
in which it occurs. The distinction which we require is not 43
identical with the grammatical distinction between substan-
tive and adjective, since one single concept may, according to
circumstances, be either substantive or adjective: it is the dis-
tinction betweenproper and general names thatwe require, or
rather between the objects indicated by such names. In every
proposition, as we saw in Chapter iii, we may make an anal-
ysis into something asserted and something about which the
assertion ismade. A proper name, when it occurs in a proposi-
tion, is always, at least according to one of the possibleways of
analysis (where there are several), the subject that the propo-
sition or some subordinate constituent proposition is about,
and not what is said about the subject. Adjectives and verbs,
on the other hand, are capable of occurring in propositions
in which they cannot be regarded as subject, but only as parts
of the assertion. Adjectives are distinguished by capacity for
denoting—a term which I intend to use in a technical sense to
be discussed in Chapter v. Verbs are distinguished by a spe-
cial kind of connection, exceedingly hard to define, with truth
and falsehood, in virtue of which they distinguish an asserted
proposition from an unasserted one, e.g. “Caesar died” from
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“the death of Caesar.” These distinctions must now be ampli-
fied, and I shall beginwith thedistinctionbetweengeneral and
proper names.
47. Philosophy is familiar with a certain set of distinctions,
all more or less equivalent: I mean, the distinctions of sub-
ject and predicate, substance and attribute, substantive and
adjective, this and what*. I wish now to point out briefly what
appears to me to be the truth concerning these cognate dis-
tinctions. The subject is important, since the issues between
monism and monadism, between idealism and empiricism,
and between those whomaintain and those who deny that all
truth is concernedwithwhat exists, all depend, in whole or in
part, upon the theory we adopt in regard to the present ques-
tion. But the subject is treated here only because it is essential
to any doctrine of number or of the nature of the variable. Its
bearings on general philosophy, important as they are, will be
left wholly out of account.
Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any
true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term.
This, then, is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary.
I shall use as synonymous with it the words unit, individual,
and entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every term is
one, while the third is derived from the fact that every termhas
being, i.e. is in some sense. Aman, amoment, a number, a class,
a relation, a chimaera, or anything else that can bementioned,
is sure to be a term; and to deny that such and such a thing is
a termmust always be false.
It might perhaps be thought that a word of such extreme
generality could not be of any great use. Such a view, however,
owing to certain wide-spread philosophical doctrines, would 44
be erroneous. A term is, in fact, possessed of all the proper-
*This last pair of terms is due to Mr Bradley.
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ties commonly assigned to substances or substantives. Every
term, to begin with, is a logical subject: it is, for example, the
subject of the proposition that itself is one. Again every term
is immutable and indestructible. What a term is, it is, and
no change can be conceived in it which would not destroy its
identity and make it another term*. Another mark which be-
longs to terms is numerical identity with themselves and nu-
merical diversity from all other terms†. Numerical identity
and diversity are the source of unity and plurality; and thus
the admission of many terms destroys monism. And it seems
undeniable that every constituent of every proposition can be
countedasone, and thatnoproposition contains less than two
constituents. Term is, therefore, a useful word, since it marks
dissent from various philosophies, as well as because, inmany
statements, we wish to speak of any term or some term.
48. Among terms, it is possible to distinguish two kinds,
which I shall call respectively things and concepts. The former
are the terms indicated by proper names, the latter those in-
dicated by all other words. Here proper names are to be un-
derstood in a somewhat wider sense than is usual, and things
also are to be understood as embracing all particular points
and instants, and many other entities not commonly called
things. Among concepts, again, two kinds at least must be
distinguished, namely those indicated by adjectives and those
indicated by verbs. The former kind will often be called pred-
icates or class-concepts; the latter are always or almost always
relations. (In intransitive verbs, the notion expressed by the
*The notion of a term here set forth is a modification of Mr G. E.
Moore’s notion of a concept in his article “On the Nature of Judgment,”
Mind, N. S. No. 30, from which notion, however, it differs in some impor-
tant respects.
†On identity, see Mr G. E. Moore’s article in the Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society, 1900–1901.
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verb is complex, and usually asserts a definite relation to an
indefinite relatum, as in “Smith breathes.”)
In a large class of propositions, we agreed, it is possible, in
one or more ways, to distinguish a subject and an assertion
about the subject. The assertion must always contain a verb,
but except in this respect, assertions appear to have no uni-
versal properties. In a relational proposition, say “A is greater
than B,” we may regard A as the subject, and “is greater than
B” as the assertion, or B as the subject and “A is greater than”
as the assertion. There are thus, in the case proposed, two
ways of analyzing the proposition into subject and assertion.
Where a relation has more than two terms, as in “A is here
now,‡” there will be more than two ways of making the anal-
ysis. But in some propositions, there is only a single way:
these are the subject-predicate propositions, such as “Socrates 45
is human.” The proposition “humanity belongs to Socrates,”
which is equivalent to “Socrates is human,” is an assertion
about humanity; but it is a distinct proposition. In “Socrates
is human,” the notion expressed by human occurs in a differ-
entway from that inwhich it occurswhen it is called humanity,
the difference being that in the latter case, but not in the for-
mer, the proposition is about this notion. This indicates that
humanity is a concept, not a thing. I shall speak of the terms of
a proposition as those terms, however numerous, which occur
in a proposition andmay be regarded as subjects about which
the proposition is. It is a characteristic of the terms of a propo-
sition that any one of them may be replaced by any other en-
tity without our ceasing to have a proposition. Thus we shall
say that “Socrates is human” is a proposition having only one
term; of the remaining components of the proposition, one
‡This proposition means “A is in this place at this time.” It will he
shown in PartVII that the relation expressed is not reducible to a two-term
relation.
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is the verb, the other is a predicate. With the sense which is
has in this proposition, we no longer have a proposition at
all if we replace human by something other than a predicate.
Predicates, then, are concepts, other than verbs, which occur
in propositions having only one term or subject. Socrates is
a thing, because Socrates can never occur otherwise than as
term in a proposition: Socrates is not capable of that curious
twofold use which is involved in human and humanity. Points,
instants, bits of matter, particular states of mind, and partic-
ular existents generally, are things in the above sense, and so
are many terms which do not exist, for example, the points
in a non-Euclidean space and the pseudo-existents of a novel.
All classes, it would seem, as numbers, men, spaces, etc., when
taken as single terms, are things; but this is a point forChapter
vi.
Predicates are distinguished from other terms by a number
of very interesting properties, chief among which is their con-
nection with what I shall call denoting. One predicate always
gives rise to a host of cognate notions: thus in addition to hu-
man and humanity, which only differ grammatically, we have
man, aman, someman, anyman, everyman, allmen*, all ofwhich
appear to be genuinely distinct one from another. The study
of these various notions is absolutely vital to any philosophy
of mathematics; and it is on account of them that the theory
of predicates is important.
49. It might be thought that a distinction ought to be made
between a concept as such and a concept used as a term, be-
tween, e.g., such pairs as is and being, human and humanity, one
in such a proposition as “this is one” and 1 in “1 is a number.”
*I use all men as collective i.e. as nearly synonymous with the human
race, but differing therefrom by beingmany and not one. I shall always use
all collectively, confining myself to every for the distributive sense. Thus I
shall say “every man is mortal,” not “all men are mortal.”
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But inextricable difficulties will envelop us if we allow such a
view. There is, of course, a grammatical difference, and this 46
corresponds to a difference as regards relations. In the first
case, the concept in question is used as a concept, that is, it is
actually predicated of a term or asserted to relate two or more
terms; while in the second case, the concept is itself said to
have a predicate or a relation. There is, therefore, no difficulty
in accounting for the grammatical difference. But what I wish
to urge is, that the difference lies solely in external relations,
and not in the intrinsic nature of the terms. For suppose that
one as adjective differed from 1 as term. In this statement, one
as adjective has been made into a term; hence either it has be-
come 1, in which case the supposition is self-contradictory; or
there is some other difference between one and 1 in addition
to the fact that the first denotes a concept not a termwhile the
second denotes a conceptwhich is a term. But in this latter hy-
pothesis, there must be propositions concerning one as term,
and we shall still have to maintain propositions concerning
one as adjective as opposed to one as term; yet all such propo-
sitions must be false, since a proposition about one as adjec-
tive makes one the subject, and is therefore really about one as
term. In short, if there were any adjectives which could not be
made into substantives without change of meaning, all propo-
sitions concerning such adjectives (since they would necessar-
ily turn them into substantives) would be false, and so would
the proposition that all such propositions are false, since this
itself turns the adjectives into substantives. But this state of
things is self-contradictory.
The above argument proves that we were right in saying
that terms embrace everything that can occur in a proposi-
tion, with the possible exception of complexes of terms of the
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kind denoted by any and cognate words*. For if A occurs in
a proposition, then, in this statement, A is the subject; and
we have just seen that, ifA is ever not the subject, it is exactly
and numerically the sameAwhich is not subject in one propo-
sition and is subject in another. Thus the theory that there
are adjectives or attributes or ideal things, or whatever they
may be called, which are in someway less substantial, less self-
subsistent, less self-identical, than true substantives, appears
to be wholly erroneous, and to be easily reduced to a contra-
diction. Termswhich are concepts differ from thosewhich are
not, not in respect of self-subsistence, but in virtue of the fact
that, in certain true or false propositions, they occur in a man-
ner which is different in an indefinable way from the manner
in which subjects or terms of relations occur.
50. Two concepts have, in addition to the numerical diver-
sity which belongs to them as terms, another special kind of
diversity which may be called conceptual. This may be char-
acterized by the fact that two propositions in which the con-
cepts occur otherwise than as terms, even if, in all other re-
spects, the two propositions are identical, yet differ in virtue 47
of the fact that the concepts which occur in them are concep-
tually diverse. Conceptual diversity implies numerical diver-
sity, but the converse implication does not hold, since not all
terms are concepts. Numerical diversity, as its name implies,
is the source of plurality, and conceptual diversity is less im-
portant to mathematics. But the whole possibility of making
different assertions about a given term or set of terms depends
upon conceptual diversity, which is therefore fundamental in
general logic.
51. It is interesting and not unimportant to examine very
briefly the connection of the above doctrine of adjectives with
*See the next chapter.
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certain traditional views on the nature of propositions. It is
customary to regard all propositions as having a subject and a
predicate, i.e. as having an immediate this, and a general con-
cept attached to it by way of description. This is, of course,
an account of the theory in question which will strike its ad-
herents as extremely crude; but it will serve for a general indi-
cation of the view to be discussed. This doctrine develops by
internal logical necessity into the theory ofMrBradley’s Logic,
that all words stand for ideas having what he calls meaning,
and that in every judgment there is a something, the true sub-
ject of the judgment, which is not an idea and does not have
meaning. To have meaning, it seems to me, is a notion con-
fusedly compounded of logical and psychological elements.
Words all have meaning, in the simple sense that they are sym-
bols which stand for something other than themselves. But
a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not it-
self contain words: it contains the entities indicated by words.
Thus meaning, in the sense in which words have meaning, is
irrelevant to logic. But such concepts as a man have meaning
in another sense: they are, so to speak, symbolic in their own
logical nature, because they have the property which I call de-
noting. That is to say, when a man occurs in a proposition
(e.g. “I met a man in the street”), the proposition is not about
the concept a man, but about something quite different, some
actual biped denoted by the concept. Thus concepts of this
kind have meaning in a non-psychological sense. And in this
sense, when we say “this is a man,” we are making a proposi-
tion inwhicha concept is in some sense attached towhat is not
a concept. But when meaning is thus understood, the entity
indicated by John does not have meaning, as Mr Bradley con-
tends*; and even among concepts, it is only those that denote
that have meaning. The confusion is largely due, I believe, to
*Logic, Book I, Chap. i, §§17, 18 (pp. 58–60).
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the notion that words occur in propositions, which in turn is
due to the notion that propositions are essentially mental and
are to be identified with cognitions. But these topics of gen-
eral philosophy must be pursued no further in this work.
52. It remains todiscuss theverb, and tofindmarksbywhich
it is distinguished from the adjective. In regard to verbs also,
there is a twofold grammatical form corresponding to a differ- 48
ence inmerely external relations. There is the verb in the form
which it has as verb (the various inflexions of this formmay be
left out of account), and there is the verbal noun, indicated
by the infinitive or (in English) the present participle. The
distinction is that between “Felton killed Buckingham” and
“Killing no murder.” By analyzing this difference, the nature
and function of the verb will appear.
It is plain, to begin with, that the concept which occurs
in the verbal noun is the very same as that which occurs
as verb. This results from the previous argument, that ev-
ery constituent of every proposition must, on pain of self-
contradiction, be capable of being made a logical subject. If
we say “kills does not mean the same as to to kill,” we have al-
ready made kills a subject, and we cannot say that the concept
expressed by theword kills cannot bemade a subject. Thus the
very verb which occurs as verb can occur also as subject. The
question is: What logical difference is expressed by the differ-
ence of grammatical form? And it is plain that the difference
must be one in external relations. But in regard to verbs, there
is a further point. By transforming the verb, as it occurs in a
proposition, into a verbal noun, the whole proposition can be
turned into a single logical subject, no longer asserted, and no
longer containing in itself truth or falsehood. But here too,
there seems to be no possibility of maintaining that the logi-
cal subject which results is a different entity from the propo-
sition. “Caesar died” and “the death of Caesar” will illustrate
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this point. Ifwe ask: What is asserted in the proposition “Cae-
sar died”? the answermust be “the death ofCaesar is asserted.”
In that case, it would seem, it is the death of Caesar which is
true or false; and yet neither truthnor falsity belongs to amere
logical subject. The answer here seems to be that the death of
Caesar has an external relation to truth or falsehood (as the
casemay be), whereas “Caesar died” in someway or other con-
tains its own truth or falsehood as an element. But if this is the
correct analysis, it is difficult to see how “Caesar died” differs
from “the truth of Caesar’s death” in the case where it is true,
or “the falsehood of Caesar’s death” in the other case. Yet it
is quite plain that the latter, at any rate, is never equivalent
to “Caesar died.” There appears to be an ultimate notion of
assertion, given by the verb, which is lost as soon as we substi-
tute a verbal noun, and is lost when the proposition in ques-
tion is made the subject of some other proposition. This does
not depend upon grammatical form; for if I say “Caesar died is
a proposition,” I do not assert that Caesar did die, and an ele-
mentwhich is present in “Caesar died” has disappeared. Thus
the contradiction which was to have been avoided, of an en-
tity which cannot be made a logical subject, appears to have
here become inevitable. This difficulty, which seems to be in-
herent in the very nature of truth and falsehood, is one with
which I do not know how to deal satisfactorily. The most ob-
vious course would be to say that the difference between an 49
asserted and an unasserted proposition is not logical, but psy-
chological. In the sense in which false propositions may be
asserted, this is doubtless true. But there is another sense of
assertion, very difficult to bring clearly before the mind, and
yet quite undeniable, in which only true propositions are as-
serted. True and false propositions alike are in some sense en-
tities, and are in some sense capable of being logical subjects;
but when a proposition happens to be true, it has a further
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quality, over and above that which it shares with false propo-
sitions, and it is this further quality which is what I mean by
assertion in a logical as opposed to a psychological sense. The
nature of truth, however, belongs nomore to the principles of
mathematics than to the principles of everything else. I there-
fore leave this question to the logicians with the above brief
indication of a difficulty.
53. It may be asked whether everything that, in the logical
sense we are concerned with, is a verb, expresses a relation
or not. It seems plain that, if we were right in holding that
“Socrates is human” is a proposition having only one term,
the is in this proposition cannot express a relation in the or-
dinary sense. In fact, subject-predicate propositions are dis-
tinguished by just this non-relational character. Nevertheless,
a relation between Socrates and humanity is certainly implied,
and it is very difficult to conceive the proposition as express-
ing no relation at all. We may perhaps say that it is a rela-
tion, although it is distinguished fromother relations in that it
does not permit itself to be regarded as an assertion concern-
ing either of its terms indifferently, but only as an assertion
concerning the referent. A similar remark may apply to the
proposition “A is,” which holds of every term without excep-
tion. The is here is quite different from the is in “Socrates is
human”; it may be regarded as complex, and as really predicat-
ing Being of A. In this way, the true logical verb in a proposi-
tionmay be always regarded as asserting a relation. But it is so
hard to know exactly what is meant by relation that the whole
question is in danger of becoming purely verbal.
54. The twofold nature of the verb, as actual verb and as
verbal noun, may be expressed, if all verbs are held to be re-
lations, as the difference between a relation in itself and a re-
lation actually relating. Consider, for example, the proposi-
tion “A differs from B.” The constituents of this proposition,
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if we analyze it, appear to be only A, difference, B. Yet these
constituents, thus placed side by side, do not reconstitute the
proposition. The difference which occurs in the proposition
actually relates A and B, whereas the difference after analysis
is a notion which has no connection with A and B. It may be
said that we ought, in the analysis, to mention the relations
whichdifference has toA andB, relationswhich are expressed
by is and fromwhen we say “A is different from B.” These rela-
tions consist in the fact that A is referent and B relatum with 50
respect to difference. But “A, referent, difference, relatum,
B” is still merely a list of terms, not a proposition. A propo-
sition, in fact, is essentially a unity, and when analysis has de-
stroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore
the proposition. The verb, when used as a verb, embodies the
unity of the proposition, and is thus distinguishable from the
verb considered as a term, though I do not know how to give
a clear account of the precise nature of the distinction.
55. It may be doubted whether the general concept difference
occurs at all in the proposition “A differs from B,” or whether
there is not rather a specific difference ofA andB, and another
specific difference ofC andD, which are respectively affirmed
in “A differs from B” and “C differs from D.” In this way, dif-
ference becomes a class-concept of which there are as many in-
stances as there are pairs of different terms; and the instances
may be said, in Platonic phrase, to partake of the nature of dif-
ference. As this point is quite vital in the theory of relations, it
may be well to dwell upon it. And first of all, I must point out
that in “A differs from B” I intend to consider the bare numer-
ical difference in virtue of which they are two, not difference
in this or that respect.
Let us first try the hypothesis that a difference is a complex
notion, compounded of difference together with some special
quality distinguishing a particular difference from every other
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particular difference. So far as the relation of difference it-
self is concerned, we are to suppose that no distinction can
be made between different cases; but there are to be different
associated qualities in different cases. But since cases are dis-
tinguished by their terms, the qualitymust be primarily associ-
ated with the terms, not with difference. If the quality be not
a relation, it can have no special connection with the differ-
ence of A and B, which it was to render distinguishable from
bare difference, and if it fails in this it becomes irrelevant. On
the other hand, if it be a new relation between A and B, over
and above difference, we shall have to hold that any two terms
have two relations, difference and a specific difference, the lat-
ter not holding between any other pair of terms. This view is
a combination of two others, of which the first holds that the
abstract general relation of difference itself holds between A
and B, while the second holds that when two terms differ they
have, corresponding to this fact, a specific relation of differ-
ence, unique and unanalyzable and not shared by any other
pair of terms. Either of these views may be held with either
the denial or the affirmation of the other. Let us see what is to
be said for and against them.
Against the notion of specific differences, it may be urged
that, if differences differ, their differences from each other
must also differ, and thus we are led into an endless process.
Those who object to endless processes will see in this a proof
that differences do not differ. But in the present work, it will 51
be maintained that there are no contradictions peculiar to the
notion of infinity, and that an endless process is not to be ob-
jected to unless it arises in the analysis of the actual meaning
of a proposition. In the present case, the process is one of im-
plications, not one of analysis; it must therefore be regarded
as harmless.
Against the notion that the abstract relation of difference
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holds between A and B, we have the argument derived from
the analysis of “A differs from B,” which gave rise to the
present discussion. It is to be observed that the hypothesis
which combines the general and the specific difference must
suppose that there are two distinct propositions, the one af-
firming the general, the other the specific difference. Thus if
there cannot be a general difference betweenA andB, thisme-
diating hypothesis is also impossible. And we saw that the at-
tempt to avoid the failure of analysis by including in themean-
ing of “A differs from B” the relations of difference to A and
B was vain. This attempt, in fact, leads to an endless process
of the inadmissible kind; for we shall have to include the re-
lations of the said relations to A and B and difference, and so
on, and in this continually increasing complexity we are sup-
posed to be only analyzing the meaning of our original propo-
sition. This argument establishes a point of very great impor-
tance, namely, that when a relation holds between two terms,
the relations of the relation to the terms, andof these relations
to the relation and the terms, and so on ad infinitum, though
all implied by the proposition affirming the original relation,
form no part of themeaning of this proposition.
But the above argument does not suffice to prove that the
relation ofA toB cannot be abstract difference: it remains ten-
able that, as was suggested to beginwith, the true solution lies
in regarding every proposition as having a kind of unitywhich
analysis cannot preserve, and which is lost even though it be
mentioned by analysis as an element in the proposition. This
view has doubtless its own difficulties, but the view that no
two pairs of terms can have the same relation both contains
difficulties of its own and fails to solve the difficulty for the
sake of which it was invented. For, even if the difference ofA
and B be absolutely peculiar to A and B, still the three terms
A, B, difference of A from B, do not reconstitute the propo-
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sition “A differs from B,” any more than A and B and differ-
ence did. And it seems plain that, even if differences did dif-
fer, they would still have to have something in common. But
the most general way in which two terms can have something
in common is by both having a given relation to a given term.
Hence if no two pairs of terms can have the same relation, it
follows that no two terms can have anything in common, and
hence different differences will not be in any definable sense
instances of difference*. I conclude, then, that the relation af- 52
firmed betweenA and B in the proposition “A differs from B”
is the general relation of difference, and is precisely and nu-
merically the same as the relation affirmed between C and D
in “C differs fromD.” And this doctrine must be held, for the
same reasons, to be true of all other relations; relations do not
have instances, but are strictly the same in all propositions in
which they occur.
Wemay now sum up the main points elicited in our discus-
sion of the verb. The verb, we saw, is a concept which, like
the adjective, may occur in a proposition without being one
of the terms of the proposition, though it may also be made
into a logical subject. One verb, and one only, must occur as
verb in every proposition; but every proposition, by turning
its verb into a verbal noun, can be changed into a single logi-
cal subject, of a kindwhich I shall call in future a propositional
concept. Every verb, in the logical sense of the word, may be
regarded as a relation; when it occurs as verb, it actually re-
lates, but when it occurs as verbal noun it is the bare relation
considered independently of the termswhich it relates. Verbs
*The above argument appears to prove that Mr Moore’s theory of uni-
versals with numerically diverse instances in his paper on Identity (Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society, 1900–1901) must not be applied to all concepts.
The relation of an instance to its universal, at any rate, must be actually
and numerically the same in all cases where it occurs.
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do not, like adjectives, have instances, but are identical in all
the cases of their occurrence. Owing to the way in which the
verb actually relates the terms of a proposition, every proposi-
tion has a unity which renders it distinct from the sum of its
constituents. All these points lead to logical problems, which,
in a treatise on logic, would deserve to be fully and thoroughly
discussed.
Having now given a general sketch of the nature of verbs
and adjectives, I shall proceed, in the next two chapters, to
discussions arising out of the consideration of adjectives, and
in Chapter vii to topics connected with verbs. Broadly speak-
ing, classes are connectedwith adjectives, while propositional
functions involve verbs. It is for this reason that it has been
necessary to deal at such length with a subject which might
seem, at first sight, to be somewhat remote from the principles
of mathematics.
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chapter v
DENOTING
56. The notion of denoting, like most of the notions of 53
logic, has been obscured hitherto by an undue admixture of
psychology. There is a sense in which we denote, when we
point or describe, or employ words as symbols for concepts;
this, however, is not the sense that I wish to discuss. But the
fact that description is possible—that we are able, by the em-
ployment of concepts, to designate a thing which is not a con-
cept —is due to a logical relation between some concepts and
some terms, in virtue of which such concepts inherently and
logically denote such terms. It is this sense of denoting which
is here in question. This notion lies at the bottom (I think) of
all theories of substance, of the subject-predicate logic, and of
the opposition between things and ideas, discursive thought
and immediate perception. These various developments, in
the main, appear to me mistaken, while the fundamental fact
itself, out of which they have grown, is hardly ever discussed
in its logical purity.
A concept denotes when, if it occurs in a proposition, the
proposition is not about the concept, but about a term con-
nected in a certain peculiar way with the concept. If I say “I
met a man,” the proposition is not about a man: this is a con-
cept which does not walk the streets, but lives in the shad-
owy limbo of the logic-books. What I met was a thing, not
a concept, an actual man with a tailor and a bank-account or
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a public-house and a drunken wife. Again, the proposition
“any finite number is odd or even” is plainly true; yet the con-
cept “any finite number” is neither odd nor even. It is only
particular numbers that are odd or even; there is not, in addi-
tion to these, another entity, any number, which is either odd
or even, and if there were, it is plain that it could not be odd
and could not be even. Of the concept “any number,” almost
all the propositions that contain the phrase “any number” are
false. If we wish to speak of the concept, we have to indicate
the fact by italics or inverted commas. People often assert that
man is mortal; but what is mortal will die, and yet we should
be surprised to find in the “Times” such a notice as the follow-
ing: “Died at his residence of Camelot, Gladstone Road, Up- 54
perTooting, on the 18th of June 19—,Man, eldest sonofDeath
and Sin.” Man, in fact, does not die; hence if “man is mortal”
were, as it appears to be, a proposition about man, it would
be simply false. The fact is, the proposition is about men; and
here again, it is not about the conceptmen, but aboutwhat this
concept denotes. The whole theory of definition, of identity,
of classes, of symbolism, and of the variable is wrapped up in
the theory of denoting. The notion is a fundamental notion
of logic, and, in spite of its difficulties, it is quite essential to
be as clear about it as possible.
57. The notion of denotingmay be obtained by a kind of log-
ical genesis from subject-predicate propositions, upon which
it seemsmore or less dependent. The simplest of propositions
are those in which one predicate occurs otherwise than as a
term, and there is only one term of which the predicate in
question is asserted. Such propositions may be called subject-
predicate propositions. Instances are: A is, A is one, A is hu-
man. Conceptswhich are predicatesmight also be called class-
concepts, because they give rise to classes, but we shall find it
necessary to distinguish between thewords predicate and class-
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concept. Propositions of the subject -predicate type always im-
ply and are implied by other propositions of the type which
asserts that an individual belongs to a class. Thus the above
instances are equivalent to: A is an entity, A is a unit, A is a
man. These new propositions are not identical with the previ-
ous ones, since they have an entirely different form. To begin
with, is is now the only concept not used as a term. Aman, we
shall find, is neither a concept nor a term, but a certain kind
of combination of certain terms, namely of those which are
human. And the relation of Socrates to aman is quite differ-
ent fromhis relation to humanity; indeed “Socrates is human”
must beheld, if the above view is correct, to benot, in themost
usual sense, a judgment of relation between Socrates and hu-
manity, since this view would make human occur as term in
“Socrates is human.” It is, of course, undeniable that a rela-
tion to humanity is implied by “Socrates is human,” namely
the relation expressed by “Socrates has humanity”; and this
relation conversely implies the subject-predicate proposition.
But the two propositions can be clearly distinguished, and it
is important to the theory of classes that this should be done.
Thus we have, in the case of every predicate, three types of
propositions which imply one another, namely, “Socrates is
human,” “Socrates has humanity,” and “Socrates is a man.”
Thefirst contains a termand apredicate, the second two terms
and a relation (the second term being identical with the predi-
cate of the first proposition)*, while the third contains a term,
a relation, and what I shall call a disjunction (a term which
will be explained shortly)†. The class-concept differs little,
*Cf. §49.
†There are two allied propositions expressed by the same words,
namely “Socrates is a-man” and “Socrates is-a man.” The above remarks
apply to the former; but in future, unless the contrary is indicated by a
hyphen or otherwise, the latter will always be in question. The former ex-
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if at all, from the predicate, while the class, as opposed to 55
the class-concept, is the sum or conjunction of all the terms
which have the given predicate. The relation which occurs in
the second type (Socrates has humanity) is characterized com-
pletely by the fact that it implies and is implied by a proposi-
tion with only one term, in which the other term of the rela-
tion has become a predicate. A class is a certain combination
of terms, a class-concept is closely akin to a predicate, and the
terms whose combination forms the class are determined by
the class-concept. Predicates are, in a certain sense, the sim-
plest type of concepts, since they occur in the simplest type of
proposition.
58. There is, connected with every predicate, a great variety
of closely allied concepts, which, in so far as they are distinct,
it is important to distinguish. Starting, for example, with hu-
man, we have man, men, all men, every man, any man, the hu-
man race, of which all except the first are twofold, a denoting
concept and an object denoted; we have also, less closely anal-
ogous, the notions “a man” and “some man,” which again de-
note objects* other than themselves. This vast apparatus con-
nected with every predicate must be borne in mind, and an
endeavour must be made to give an analysis of all the above
notions. But for the present, it is the property of denoting,
rather than the various denoting concepts, that we are con-
cerned with.
The combination of concepts as such to form new con-
cepts, of greater complexity than their constituents, is a sub-
presses the identity of Socrates with an ambiguous individual; the latter
expresses a relation of Socrates to the class-conceptman.
*I shall use the word object in a wider sense than term, to cover both sin-
gular andplural, and also cases of ambiguity, such as “aman.” The fact that
a word can be framed with a wider meaning than term raises grave logical
problems. Cf. §47.
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ject upon which writers on logic have said many things. But
the combination of terms as such, to form what by analogy
may be called complex terms, is a subject upon which logi-
cians, old and new, give us only the scantiest discussion. Nev-
ertheless, the subject is of vital importance to the philosophy
of mathematics, since the nature both of number and of the
variable turns upon just this point. Six words, of constant oc-
currence in daily life, are also characteristic of mathematics:
these are the words all, every, any, a, some and the. For correct-
ness of reasoning, it is essential that these words should be
sharply distinguished one from another; but the subject bris-
tles with difficulties, and is almost wholly neglected by logi-
cians†.
It is plain, to beginwith, that a phrase containing one of the
above six words always denotes. It will be convenient, for the 56
present discussion, to distinguish a class-concept from a pred-
icate: I shall call human a predicate, and man a class-concept,
though the distinction is perhaps only verbal. The characteris-
tic of a class-concept, as distinguished from terms in general,
is that “x is a u” is a propositional function when, and only
when, u is a class-concept. It must be held that when u is not a
class-concept, we do not have a false proposition, but simply
no proposition at all, whatever value we may give to x. This
enables us to distinguish a class-concept belonging to the null-
class, for which all propositions of the above form are false,
from a termwhich is not a class-concept at all, for which there
are no propositions of the above form. Also it makes it plain
that a class-concept is not a term in the proposition “x is a u,”
for u has a restricted variability if the formula is to remain a
proposition. A denoting phrase, we may now say, consists al-
†On the indefinite article, some good remarks are made by Meinong,
“Abstrahiren und Vergleichen,” Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der
Sinnesorgane, Vol. xxiv, p. 63.
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ways of a class-concept precededbyoneof the above sixwords
or some synonym of one of them.
59. The question which first meets us in regard to denoting
is this: Is there one way of denoting six different kinds of ob-
jects, or are the ways of denoting different? And in the latter
case, is the object denoted the same in all six cases, or does
the object differ as well as the way of denoting it? In order to
answer this question, it will be first necessary to explain the
differences between the six words in question. Here it will be
convenient to omit theword the to beginwith, since this word
is in a different position from the others, and is liable to limi-
tations from which they are exempt.
In caseswhere the class definedby a class-concepthas only a
finite number of terms, it is possible to omit the class-concept
wholly, and indicate the various objects denoted by enumer-
ating the terms and connecting them by means of and or or as
the case may be. It will help to isolate a part of our problem
if we first consider this case, although the lack of subtlety in
language renders it difficult to grasp the difference between
objects indicated by the same form of words.
Let us begin by considering two terms only, say Brown and
Jones. The objects denoted by all, every, any, a and some* are
respectively involved in the following five propositions. (1)
Brown and Jones are two of Miss Smith’s suitors; (2) Brown
and Jones are paying court to Miss Smith; (3) if it was Brown
or Jones you met, it was a very ardent lover; (4) if it was one
of Miss Smith’s suitors, it must have been Brown or Jones;
(5) Miss Smith will marry Brown or Jones. Although only
two forms of words, Brown and Jones and Brown or Jones, are
involved in these propositions, I maintain that five different
*I intend to distinguish between a and some in a way not warranted by
language; the distinction of all and every is also a straining of usage. Both
are necessary to avoid circumlocution.
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combinations are involved. The distinctions, some of which
are rather subtle, may be brought out by the following consid- 57
erations. In the first proposition, it is Brown and Joneswho are
two, and this is not true of either separately; nevertheless it is
not the whole composed of Brown and Jones which is two, for
this is only one. The two are a genuine combination of Brown
with Jones, the kind of combination which, as we shall see
in the next chapter, is characteristic of classes. In the second
proposition, on the contrary, what is asserted is true of Brown
and Jones severally; the proposition is equivalent to, though
not (I think) identical with, “Brown is paying court to Miss
Smith and Jones is paying court toMissSmith.” Thus the com-
bination indicated by and is not the same here as in the first
case: the first case concerned all of them collectively, while
the second concerns all distributively, i.e. each or every one
of them. For the sake of distinction, we may call the first a nu-
merical conjunction, since it gives rise to number, the second a
propositional conjunction, since the proposition in which it oc-
curs is equivalent to a conjunction of propositions. (It should
be observed that the conjunction of propositions in question
is of a wholly different kind from any of the combinations we
are considering, being in fact of the kind which is called the
logical product. The propositions are combined quâ proposi-
tions, not quâ terms.)
The third proposition gives the kind of conjunction by
which any is defined. There is some difficulty about this no-
tion, which seems half-way between a conjunction and a dis-
junction. Thisnotionmaybe further explainedas follows. Let
a and b be two different propositions, each of which implies a
third proposition c. Then the disjunction “a or b” implies c.
Now let a and b be propositions assigning the same predicate
to two different subjects, then there is a combination of the
two subjects to which the given predicate may be assigned so
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that the resulting proposition is equivalent to the disjunction
“a or b.” Thus suppose we have “if you met Brown, you met
a very ardent lover,” and “if you met Jones, you met a very ar-
dent lover.” Hence we infer “if you met Brown or if you met
Jones, youmet a very ardent lover,” andwe regard this as equiv-
alent to “if youmet Brown or Jones, etc.” The combination of
Brown and Jones here indicated is the same as that indicated
by either of them. It differs from a disjunction by the fact that
it implies and is implied by a statement concerning both; but
in some more complicated instances, this mutual implication
fails. The method of combination is, in fact, different from
that indicated by both, and is also different from both forms
of disjunction. I shall call it the variable conjunction. The first
formofdisjunction is givenby (4): this is the formwhich I shall
denote by a suitor. Here, although itmust have beenBrownor
Jones, it is not true that itmust have beenBrownnor yet that it
must have been Jones. Thus the proposition is not equivalent
to the disjunction of propositions “it must have been Brown
or it must have been Jones.” The proposition, in fact, is not
capable of statement either as a disjunction or as a conjunc- 58
tion of propositions, except in the very roundabout form: “if
it was not Brown, it was Jones, and if it was not Jones, it was
Brown,” a form which rapidly becomes intolerable when the
number of terms is increased beyond two, and becomes the-
oretically inadmissible when the number of terms is infinite.
Thus this form of disjunction denotes a variable term, that is,
whichever of the two terms we fix upon, it does not denote
this term, and yet it does denote one or other of them. This
form accordingly I shall call the variable disjunction. Finally,
the second form of disjunction is given by (5). This is what I
shall call the constant disjunction, since here either Brown is
denoted, or Jones is denoted, but the alternative is undecided.
That is to say, our proposition is now equivalent to a disjunc-
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tion of propositions, namely “Miss Smith will marry Brown,
or she will marry Jones.” She will marry some one of the two,
and the disjunction denotes a particular one of them, though
it may denote either particular one. Thus all the five combina-
tions are distinct.
It is to be observed that these five combinations yield nei-
ther terms nor concepts, but strictly and only combinations
of terms. The first yields many terms, while the others yield
something absolutely peculiar, which is neither one normany.
The combinations are combinations of terms, effected with-
out the use of relations. Corresponding to each combination
there is, at least if the terms combined form a class, a perfectly
definite concept, which denotes the various terms of the com-
bination combined in the specified manner. To explain this,
let us repeat our distinctions in a case where the terms to be
combined are not enumerated, as above, but are defined as the
terms of a certain class.
60. When a class-concept a is given, it must be held that
the various terms belonging to the class are also given. That
is to say, any term being proposed, it can be decided whether
or not it belongs to the class. In this way, a collection of terms
can be given otherwise than by enumeration. Whether a col-
lection can be given otherwise than by enumeration or by a
class-concept, is a question which, for the present, I leave un-
determined. But thepossibility of giving a collectionbya class-
concept is highly important, since it enables us to deal with in-
finite collections, as we shall see in Part V. For the present, I
wish to examine the meaning of such phrases as all a’s, every
a, any a, an a, and some a. All a’s, to begin with, denotes a nu-
merical conjunction; it is definite as soon as a is given. The
concept alla’s is a perfectly definite single concept, which de-
notes the terms of a taken all together. The terms so taken
have a number, whichmay thus be regarded, if we choose, as a
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property of the class-concept, since it is determinate for any
given class-concept. Everya, on the contrary, though it still
denotes all the a’s, denotes them in a different way, i.e. sev-
erally instead of collectively. Any a denotes only one a, but it
is wholly irrelevant which it denotes, and what is said will be
equally true whichever it may be. Moreover, any a denotes a 59
variable a, that is, whatever particular a we may fasten upon,
it is certain that any a does not denote that one; and yet of
that one any proposition is true which is true of any a. An
a denotes a variable disjunction: that is to say, a proposition
which holds of an amay be false concerning each particular a,
so that it is not reducible to a disjunction of propositions. For
example, a point lies between any point and any other point;
but it would not be true of any one particular point that it lay
between any point and any other point, since there would be
many pairs of points between which it did not lie. This brings
us finally to some a, the constant disjunction. This denotes
just one term of the class a, but the term it denotesmay be any
term of the class. Thus “some moment does not follow any
moment” would mean that there was a first moment in time,
while “a moment precedes any moment” means the exact op-
posite, namely, that every moment has predecessors.
61. In the case of a class a which has a finite number of
terms—say a1; a2; a3; : : : an, we can illustrate these various no-
tions as follows:
(1)All a’s denotes a1 and a2 and … and an.
(2) Every a denotes a1 and denotes a2 and … and denotes an.
(3)Any a denotes a1 or a2 or … or an, where or has the mean-
ing that it is irrelevant which we take.
(4)Anadenotes a1 or a2 or…or an, where orhas themeaning
that no one in particular must be taken, just as in all a’s we
must not take any one in particular.
(5) Some a denotes a1 or denotes a2 … or denotes an, where it
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is not irrelevant which is taken, but on the contrary some one
particular amust be taken.
As the nature and properties of the various ways of com-
bining terms are of vital importance to the principles of math-
ematics, it may be well to illustrate their properties by the fol-
lowing important examples.
(α) Let a be a class, and b a class of classes. We then obtain
in all six possible relations of a to b fromvarious combinations
of any, a and some. All and every do not, in this case, introduce
anything new. The six cases are as follows.
(1)Any a belongs to any class belonging to b, in other words,
the class a is wholly contained in the common part or logical
product of the various classes belonging to b.
(2) Any a belongs to a b, i.e. the class a is contained in any
class which contains all the b’s, or, is contained in the logical
sum of all the b’s.
(3)Any abelongs to some b, i.e. there is a class belonging to b,
in which the class a is contained. The difference between this
case and the second arises from the fact that here there is one
b towhich every a belongs, whereas before it was only decided
that every a belonged to a b, and different a’s might belong to
different b’s.
(4)An a belongs to any b, i.e.whatever bwe take, it has a part 60
in common with a.
(5) An a belongs to a b, i.e. there is a b which has a part in
common with a. This is equivalent to “some (or an) a belongs
to some b.”
(6) Some a belongs to any b, i.e. there is an a which belongs
to the common part of all the b’s, or a and all the b’s have a
common part. These are all the cases that arise here.
(β) It is instructive, as showing the generality of the type of
relations here considered, to compare the above case with the
following. Let a, b be two series of real numbers; then six pre-
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cisely analogous cases arise.
(1) Any a is less than any b, or, the series a is contained
among numbers less than every b.
(2) Any a is less than a b, or, whatever awe take, there is a b
which is greater, or, the series a is contained among numbers
less than a (variable) termof the series b. It does not follow that
some term of the series b is greater than all the a’s.
(3) Any a is less than some b, or, there is a term of bwhich is
greater than all the a’s. This case is not to be confoundedwith
(2).
(4) An a is less than any b, i.e.whatever bwe take, there is an
awhich is less than it.
(5) An a is less than a b, i.e. it is possible to find an a and a b
such that the a is less than the b. This merely denies that any
a is greater than any b.
(6) Some a is less than any b, i.e. there is an a which is less
than all the b’s. This was not implied in (4), where the a was
variable, whereas here it is constant.
In this case, actual mathematics have compelled the distinc-
tion between the variable and the constant disjunction. But
in other cases, where mathematics have not obtained sway,
the distinction has been neglected; and the mathematicians,
as was natural, have not investigated the logical nature of the
disjunctive notions which they employed.
(γ) I shall give one other instance, as it brings in the differ-
ence between any and every, which has not been relevant in
the previous cases. Let a and b be two classes of classes; then
twenty different relations between them arise from different
combinations of the terms of their terms. The following tech-
nical terms will be useful. If a be a class of classes, its logical
sum consists of all terms belonging to any a, i.e. all terms such
that there is an a to which they belong, while its logical prod-
uct consists of all terms belonging to every a, i.e. to the com-
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mon part of all the a’s. We have then the following cases.
(1) Any term of any a belongs to every b, i.e. the logical sum
of a is contained in the logical product of b.
(2) Any term of any a belongs to a b, i.e. the logical sum of a
is contained in the logical sum of b.
(3)Any termof any abelongs to some b, i.e. there is a bwhich 61
contains the logical sum of a.
(4) Any term of some (or an) a belongs to every b, i.e. there is
an awhich is contained in the product of b.
(5) Any term of some (or an) a belongs to a b, i.e. there is an
awhich is contained in the sum of b.
(6) Any term of some (or an) a belongs to some b, i.e. there is
a bwhich contains one class belonging to a.
(7) A term of any a belongs to any b, i.e. any class of a and
any class of b have a common part.
(8) A term of any a belongs to a b, i.e. any class of a has a part
in common with the logical sum of b.
(9) A term of any a belongs to some b, i.e. there is a b with
which any a has a part in common.
(10) A term of an a belongs to every b, i.e. the logical sum of
a and the logical product of b have a common part.
(11) A term of an a belongs to any b, i.e. given any b, an a can
be found with which it has a common part.
(12) A term of an a belongs to a b, i.e. the logical sums of a
and of b have a common part.
(13) Any term of every a belongs to every b, i.e. the logical
product of a is contained in the logical product of b.
(14)Any termof everyabelongs to a b, i.e. the logical product
of a is contained in the logical sum of b.
(15) Any term of every a belongs to some b, i.e. there is a term
of b in which the logical product of a is contained.
(16) A (or some) term of every a belongs to every b, i.e. the
logical products of a and of b have a common part.
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(17) A (or some) term of every a belongs to a b, i.e. the logical
product of a and the logical sum of b have a common part.
(18) Some term of any a belongs to every b, i.e. any a has a
part in common with the logical product of b.
(19)A termof some a belongs to any b, i.e. there is some term
of awith which any b has a common part.
(20) A term of every a belongs to any b, i.e. any b has a part
in common with the logical product of a.
The above examples show that, although it may often hap-
pen that there is a mutual implication (which has not always
been stated) of corresponding propositions concerning some
and a, or concerning any and every, yet in other cases there is
no such mutual implication. Thus the five notions discussed
in the present chapter are genuinely distinct, and to confound
themmay lead to perfectly definite fallacies.
62. It appears from the above discussion that, whether there
are different ways of denoting or not, the objects denoted by
allmen, everyman, etc. are certainly distinct. It seems therefore
legitimate to say that the whole difference lies in the objects, 62
and that denoting itself is the same in all cases. There are, how-
ever, many difficult problems connected with the subject, es-
pecially as regards the nature of the objects denoted. All men,
which I shall identify with the class of men, seems to be an un-
ambiguous object, although grammatically it is plural. But in
the other cases the question is not so simple: we may doubt
whether an ambiguous object is unambiguously denoted, or
a definite object ambiguously denoted. Consider again the
proposition “I met a man.” It is quite certain, and is implied
by this proposition, that what I met was an unambiguous per-
fectly definite man: in the technical language which is here
adopted, the proposition is expressed by “I met some man.”
But the actual man whom I met forms no part of the propo-
sition in question, and is not specially denoted by some man.
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Thus the concrete event which happened is not asserted in
the proposition. What is asserted is merely that some one of a
class of concrete events took place. The whole human race is
involved in my assertion: if any man who ever existed or will
exist had not existed or been going to exist, the purport of my
proposition would have been different. Or, to put the same
point inmore intensional language, if I substitute forman any
of the other class-concepts applicable to the individual whom
Ihad thehonour tomeet,myproposition is changed, although
the individual in question is just as much denoted as before.
What this proves is, that some manmust not be regarded as ac-
tuallydenotingSmithandactuallydenotingBrown, and soon:
the whole procession of human beings throughout the ages
is always relevant to every proposition in which some man oc-
curs, andwhat is denoted is essentially not each separate man,
but a kind of combination of all men. This is more evident
in the case of every, any, and a. There is, then, a definite some-
thing, different in eachof the five cases, whichmust, in a sense,
be an object, but is characterized as a set of terms combined in
a certain way, which something is denoted by all men, every
man, any man, a man or some man; and it is with this very para-
doxical object that propositions are concerned in which the
corresponding concept is used as denoting.
63. It remains to discuss the notion of the. This notion has
been symbolically emphasized by Peano, with very great ad-
vantage to his calculus; but here it is to be discussed philo-
sophically. The use of identity and the theory of definition are
dependent upon this notion, which has thus the very highest
philosophical importance.
The word the, in the singular, is correctly employed only
in relation to a class-concept of which there is only one in-
stance. We speak of the King, the Prime Minister, and so on
(understanding at the present time); and in such cases there is a
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methodof denotingone single definite termbymeansof a con-
cept, which is not given us by any of our other five words. It is
owing to this notion that mathematics can give definitions of 63
terms which are not concepts—a possibility which illustrates
the difference between mathematical and philosophical defi-
nition. Every term is the only instance of some class-concept,
and thus every term, theoretically, is capable of definition,
providedwe have not adopted a system inwhich the said term
is one of our indefinables. It is a curious paradox, puzzling
to the symbolic mind, that definitions, theoretically, are noth-
ing but statements of symbolic abbreviations, irrelevant to the
reasoning and inserted only for practical convenience, while
yet, in the development of a subject, they always require a very
large amount of thought, and often embody some of the great-
est achievements of analysis. This fact seems to be explained
by the theory of denoting. An object may be present to the
mind, without our knowing any concept of which the said
object is the instance; and the discovery of such a concept is
not a mere improvement in notation. The reason why this ap-
pears to be the case is that, as soon as the definition is found,
it becomes wholly unnecessary to the reasoning to remember
the actual object defined, since only concepts are relevant to
our deductions. In the moment of discovery, the definition is
seen to be true, because the object to be definedwas already in
our thoughts; but as part of our reasoning it is not true, but
merely symbolic, since what the reasoning requires is not that
it should deal with that object, but merely that it should deal
with the object denoted by the definition.
In most actual definitions of mathematics, what is defined
is a class of entities, and the notion of the does not then ex-
plicitly appear. But even in this case, what is really defined is
the class satisfying certain conditions; for a class, as we shall
see in the next chapter, is always a term or conjunction of
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terms and never a concept. Thus the notion of the is always
relevant in definitions; and we may observe generally that the
adequacy of concepts to deal with things is wholly dependent
upon the unambiguous denoting of a single term which this
notion gives.
64. The connection of denoting with the nature of identity
is important, and helps, I think, to solve some rather serious
problems. Thequestionwhether identity is or is not a relation,
and even whether there is such a concept at all, is not easy to
answer. For, itmay be said, identity cannot be a relation, since,
where it is truly asserted, we have only one term, whereas two
terms are required for a relation. And indeed identity, an ob-
jector may urge, cannot be anything at all: two terms plainly
are not identical, and one term cannot be, for what is it identi-
cal with? Nevertheless identity must be something. Wemight
attempt to remove identity from terms to relations, and say
that two terms are identical in some respect when they have a
given relation to a given term. But then we shall have to hold
either that there is strict identity between the two cases of the
given relation, or that the two cases have identity in the sense
of having a given relation to a given term; but the latter view
leads to an endless process of the illegitimate kind. Thus iden- 64
tity must be admitted, and the difficulty as to the two terms
of a relation must be met by a sheer denial that two different
terms are necessary. There must always be a referent and a
relatum, but these need not be distinct; and where identity is
affirmed, they are not so*.
But the question arises: Why is it ever worthwhile to affirm
identity? This question is answered by the theory of denoting.
If we say “Edward VII is the King,” we assert an identity; the
reason why this assertion is worth making is, that in the one
*On relations of terms to themselves, v. inf.Chap. ix, §95.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 96
case the actual term occurs, while in the other a denoting con-
cept takes its place. (For purposes of discussion, I ignore the
fact that Edwards form a class, and that seventh Edwards form
a class havingonlyone term. EdwardVII is practically, though
not formally, a propername.) Often twodenoting concepts oc-
cur, and the term itself is notmentioned, as in the proposition
“the present Pope is the last survivor of his generation.” When
a term is given, the assertion of its identity with itself, though
true, is perfectly futile, and is never made outside the logic-
books; but where denoting concepts are introduced, identity
is at once seen to be significant. In this case, of course, there is
involved, though not asserted, a relation of the denoting con-
cept to the term, or of the twodenoting concepts to eachother.
But the is which occurs in such propositions does not itself
state this further relation, but states pure identity†.
65. To sum up. When a class-concept, preceded by one of
the six words all, every, any, a, some, the, occurs in a proposi-
tion, the proposition is, as a rule, not about the concept formed
of the two words together, but about an object quite differ-
ent from this, in general not a concept at all, but a term or
complex of terms. This may be seen by the fact that propo-
sitions in which such concepts occur are in general false con-
cerning the concepts themselves. At the same time, it is pos-
sible to consider and make propositions about the concepts
themselves, but these are not the natural propositions tomake
†The word is is terribly ambiguous, and great care is necessary in order
not to confound its various meanings. We have (1) the sense in which it
asserts Being, as in “A is”; (2) the sense of identity; (3) the sense of predica-
tion, in “A is human”; (4) the sense of “A is a-man” (cf. p. 54, note), which is
very like identity. In addition to these there are less commonuses, as “to be
good is to be happy,” where a relation of assertions is meant, that relation,
in fact, which, where it exists, gives rise to formal implication. Doubtless
there are further meanings which have not occurred to me. On the mean-
ings of is, cf. DeMorgan, Formal Logic, pp. 49, 50.
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in employing the concepts. “Any number is odd or even” is a
perfectly natural proposition, whereas “Any number is a vari-
able conjunction” is a proposition only to bemade in a logical
discussion. In such cases, we say that the concept in question
denotes. We decided that denoting is a perfectly definite rela- 65
tion, the same in all six cases, and that it is the nature of the
denoted object and the denoting concept which distinguishes
the cases. We discussed at some length the nature and the
differences of the denoted objects in the five cases in which
these objects are combinations of terms. In a full discussion, it
would be necessary also to discuss the denoting concepts: the
actualmeanings of these concepts, as opposed to the nature of
the objects they denote, have not been discussed above. But
I do not know that there would be anything further to say on
this topic. Finally, we discussed the, and showed that this no-
tion is essential to what mathematics calls definition, as well
as to the possibility of uniquely determining a term by means
of concepts; the actual use of identity, though not its mean-
ing, was also found to depend upon this way of denoting a sin-
gle term. From this point we can advance to the discussion
of classes, thereby continuing the development of the topics
connected with adjectives.
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chapter vi
CLASSES
66. To bring clearly before the mind what is meant by class, 66
and to distinguish this notion from all the notions to which it
is allied, is one of the most difficult and important problems
of mathematical philosophy. Apart from the fact that class is
a very fundamental concept, the utmost care and nicety is re-
quired in this subject on account of the contradiction to be
discussed in Chapter x. I must ask the reader, therefore, not
to regard as idle pedantry the apparatus of somewhat subtle
discriminations to be found in what follows.
It has been customary, in works on logic, to distinguish two
standpoints, that of extension and that of intension. Philoso-
phers have usually regarded the latter as more fundamental,
whileMathematics has beenheld to deal speciallywith the for-
mer. M. Couturat, in his admirable work on Leibniz, states
roundly that Symbolic Logic can only be built up from the
standpoint of extension*; and if there really were only these
two points of view, his statement would be justified. But as a
matter of fact, there are positions intermediate between pure
intension and pure extension, and it is in these intermediate
regions that Symbolic Logic has its lair. It is essential that the
classes with which we are concerned should be composed of
terms, and should not be predicates or concepts, for a class
*La Logique de Leibniz, Paris, 1901, p. 387.
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must be definite when its terms are given, but in general there
will be many predicates which attach to the given terms and
to no others. We cannot of course attempt an intensional
definition of a class as the class of predicates attaching to the
terms in question and to no others, for this would involve a
vicious circle; hence the point of view of extension is to some
extent unavoidable. On the other hand, if we take extension
pure, our class is defined by enumeration of its terms, and this
methodwill not allow us to deal, as Symbolic Logic does, with
infinite classes. Thus, our classes must in general be regarded
as objects denoted by concepts, and to this extent the point of
view of intension is essential. It is owing to this consideration 67
that the theory of denoting is of such great importance. In the
present chapterwe have to specify the precise degree inwhich
extension and intension respectively enter into the definition
and employment of classes; and throughout the discussion, I
must ask the reader to remember that whatever is said has to
be applicable to infinite as well as to finite classes.
67. Whenanobject is unambiguously denotedby a concept,
I shall speak of the concept as a concept (or sometimes, loosely,
as the concept) of the object in question. Thus it will be neces-
sary to distinguish the concept of a class from a class-concept.
We agreed to callman a class-concept, butman does not, in its
usual employment, denote anything. On the other hand,men
and all men (which I shall regard as synonyms) do denote, and
I shall contend that what they denote is the class composed of
all men. Thus man is the class-concept, men (the concept) is
the concept of the class, and men (the object denoted by the
conceptmen) are the class. It is no doubt confusing, at first, to
use class-concept and concept of a class in different senses; but
so many distinctions are required that some straining of lan-
guage seems unavoidable. In the phraseology of the preceding
chapter, we may say that a class is a numerical conjunction of
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terms. This is the thesis which is to be established.
68. In Chapter ii we regarded classes as derived from asser-
tions, i.e. as all the entities satisfying some assertion, whose
form was left wholly vague. I shall discuss this view criti-
cally in the next chapter; for the present, we may confine our-
selves to classes as they are derived from predicates, leaving
open the question whether every assertion is equivalent to
a predication. We may, then, imagine a kind of genesis of
classes, through the successive stages indicated by the typical
propositions “Socrates is human,” “Socrates has humanity,”
“Socrates is a man,” “Socrates is one among men.” Of these
propositions, the last only, we should say, explicitly contains
the class as a constituent; but every subject-predicate proposi-
tion gives rise to the other three equivalent propositions, and
thus every predicate (provided it can be sometimes truly pred-
icated) gives rise to a class. This is the genesis of classes from
the intensional standpoint.
On the other hand, when mathematicians deal with what
they call a manifold, aggregate, Menge, ensemble, or some
equivalent name, it is common, especially where the number
of terms involved is finite, to regard the object in question
(which is in fact a class) as defined by the enumeration of its
terms, and as consisting possibly of a single term, which in
that case is the class. Here it is not predicates and denoting
that are relevant, but terms connected by the word and, in the
sense in which this word stands for a numerical conjunction.
Thus Brown and Jones are a class, and Brown singly is a class.
This is the extensional genesis of classes.
69. The best formal treatment of classes in existence is that 68
of Peano*. But in this treatment a number of distinctions of
great philosophical importance are overlooked. Peano, not
*Neglecting Frege, who is discussed in the Appendix.
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I think quite consciously, identifies the class with the class-
concept; thus the relation of an individual to its class is, for
him, expressed by is a. For him, “2 is a number” is a propo-
sition in which a term is said to belong to the class number.
Nevertheless, he identifies the equality of classes, which con-
sists in their having the same terms, with identity—a proceed-
ing which is quite illegitimate when the class is regarded as
the class-concept. In order to perceive thatman and featherless
biped are not identical, it is quite unnecessary to take a hen and
deprive the poor bird of its feathers. Or, to take a less complex
instance, it is plain that even prime is not identical with integer
next after 1. Thus when we identify the class with the class-
concept, wemust admit that two classesmay be equal without
being identical. Nevertheless, it is plain that when two class-
concepts are equal, some identity is involved, for we say that
they have the same terms. Thus there is some object which
is positively identical when two class-concepts are equal; and
this object, it would seem, is more properly called the class.
Neglecting the plucked hen, the class of featherless bipeds, ev-
ery one would say, is the same as the class of men; the class
of even primes is the same as the class of integers next after
1. Thus we must not identify the class with the class-concept,
or regard “Socrates is a man” as expressing the relation of an
individual to a class of which it is a member. This has two
consequences (to be established presently) which prevent the
philosophical acceptance of certain points in Peano’s formal-
ism. Thefirst consequence is, that there is no such thing as the
null-class, though there are null class-concepts. The second is,
that a class having only one term is to be identified, contrary
to Peano’s usage, with that one term. I should not propose,
however, to alter his practice or his notation in consequence
of either of these points; rather I should regard them as proofs
that Symbolic Logic ought to concern itself, as far as notation
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goes, with class-concepts rather than with classes.
70. A class, we have seen, is neither a predicate nor a class-
concept, for different predicates and different class-concepts
may correspond to the same class. A class also, in one sense
at least, is distinct from the whole composed of its terms, for
the latter is only andessentially one,while the former,where it
hasmany terms, is, as we shall see later, the very kind of object
of which many is to be asserted. The distinction of a class as
many from a class as a whole is often made by language: space
and points, time and instants, the army and the soldiers, the
navy and the sailors, the Cabinet and the Cabinet Ministers,
all illustrate the distinction. The notion of a whole, in the
sense of a pure aggregate which is here relevant, is, we shall 69
find, not always applicable where the notion of the class as
many applies (seeChapter x). In such cases, though termsmay
be said to belong to the class, the class must not be treated as
itself a single logical subject*. But this case never arises where
a class can be generated by a predicate. Thus we may for the
present dismiss this complication from our minds. In a class
as many, the component terms, though they have some kind
of unity, have less than is required for a whole. They have, in
fact, just somuch unity as is required tomake themmany, and
not enough to prevent them from remaining many. A further
reason for distinguishing wholes from classes as many is that
a class as one may be one of the terms of itself as many, as in
“classes are one among classes” (the extensional equivalent of
“class is a class-concept”), whereas a complex whole can never
be one of its own constituents.
71. Class may be defined either extensionally or intension-
ally. That is to say, we may define the kind of object which is
*Apluralityof terms isnot the logical subjectwhenanumber is asserted
of it: such propositions have not one subject, but many subjects. See end
of §74.
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a class, or the kind of concept which denotes a class: this is
the precise meaning of the opposition of extension and inten-
sion in this connection. But although the general notion can
be defined in this two-fold manner, particular classes, except
when they happen to be finite, can only be defined intension-
ally, i.e. as the objects denoted by such and such concepts. I
believe this distinction to be purely psychological: logically,
the extensional definition appears to be equally applicable to
infinite classes, but practically, if we were to attempt it, Death
would cut short our laudable endeavour before it had attained
its goal. Logically, therefore, extension and intension seem to
be on a par. I will begin with the extensional view.
When a class is regarded as defined by the enumeration of
its terms, it is more naturally called a collection. I shall for the
moment adopt this name, as it will not prejudge the question
whether the objects denoted by it are truly classes or not. By
a collection I mean what is conveyed by “A and B” or “A and
B and C,” or any other enumeration of definite terms. The
collection is defined by the actual mention of the terms, and
the terms are connected by and. It would seem that and rep-
resents a fundamental way of combining terms, and that just
this way of combination is essential if anything is to result of
which a number other than 1 can be asserted. Collections do
not presuppose numbers, since they result simply from the
terms togetherwith and: they could only presupposenumbers
in the particular case where the terms of the collection them-
selves presupposednumbers. There is a grammatical difficulty
which, since no method exists of avoiding it, must be pointed
out and allowed for. A collection, grammatically, is singular, 70
whereas A and B, A and B and C, etc. are essentially plural.
This grammatical difficulty arises from the logical fact (to be
discussed presently) that whatever is many in general forms a
whole which is one; it is, therefore, not removable by a better
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choice of technical terms.
The notion of and was brought into prominence by
Bolzano*. In order to understand what infinity is, he says, “we
must go back to one of the simplest conceptions of our under-
standing, in order to reach an agreement concerning theword
that we are to use to denote it. This is the conception which
underlies the conjunction and, which, however, if it is to stand
out as clearly as is required, in many cases, both by the pur-
poses of mathematics and by those of philosophy, I believe to
be best expressed by thewords: ‘A system (Inbegriff) of certain
things,’ or ‘a whole consisting of certain parts.’ But we must
add that every arbitrary objectA can be combined in a system
with any others B;C;D; : : : ; or (speaking still more correctly)
already forms a system by itself†, of which some more or less
important truth can be enunciated, provided only that each
of the presentationsA;B;C;D; : : : in fact represents a different
object, or in so far as none of the propositions ‘A is the same
as B,’ ‘A is the same asC,’ ‘A is the same asD,’ etc., is true. For
if e.g. A is the same as B, then it is certainly unreasonable to
speak of a system of the thingsA and B.”
The above passage, good as it is, neglects several distinc-
tions which we have found necessary. First and foremost, it
does not distinguish the many from the whole which they
form. Secondly, it does not appear to observe that themethod
of enumeration is not practically applicable to infinite systems.
Thirdly, and this is connected with the second point, it does
not make any mention of intensional definition nor of the no-
tion of a class. What we have to consider is the difference, if
any, of a class from a collection on the one hand, and from the
whole formed of the collection on the other. But let us first
examine further the notion of and.
*Paradoxien des Unendlichen, Leipzig, 1854 (2nd ed., Berlin, 1889), §3.
†i.e. the combination ofAwith B;C;D; : : : already forms a system.
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Anything of which a finite number other than 0 or 1 can be
asserted would be commonly said to be many, and many, it
might be said, are always of the form “A and B and C and …”
HereA, B, C, … are each one and are all different. To say that
A is one seems to amount to much the same as to say that A
is not of the form “A1 and A2 and A3 and ….” To say that A,
B; C, … are all different seems to amount only to a condition
as regards the symbols: it should be held that “A and A” is
meaningless, so that diversity is implied by and, and need not
be specially stated.
A termAwhich is one may be regarded as a particular case
of a collection, namely as a collection of one term. Thus ev- 71
ery collection which is many presupposes many collections
which are each one: A and B presupposesA and presupposes
B. Conversely some collections of one term presupposemany,
namely those which are complex: thus “A differs from B” is
one, but presupposes A and difference and B. But there is not
symmetry in this respect, for the ultimate presuppositions of
anything are always simple terms.
Every pair of terms, without exception, can be combined in
the manner indicated by A and B, and if neither A nor B be
many, thenA and B are two. A and Bmay be any conceivable
entities, any possible objects of thought, they may be points
or numbers or true or false propositions or events or people,
in short anything that can be counted. A teaspoon and the
number 3, or a chimaera and a four-dimensional space, are cer-
tainly two. Thus no restriction whatever is to be placed on A
andB, except that neither is to bemany. It should be observed
that A and B need not exist, but must, like anything that can
be mentioned, have Being. The distinction of Being and ex-
istence is important, and is well illustrated by the process of
counting. What can be countedmust be something, andmust
certainly be, though it need by no means be possessed of the
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further privilege of existence. Thus what we demand of the
terms of our collection is merely that each should be an entity.
The question may now be asked: What is meant by A and
B? Does this mean anything more than the juxtaposition of
Awith B? That is, does it contain any element over and above
that ofA and that ofB? Isand a separate concept,whichoccurs
besidesA,B? To either answer there are objections. In the first
place, and, we might suppose, cannot be a new concept, for
if it were, it would have to be some kind of relation between
A and B; A and B would then be a proposition, or at least a
propositional concept, and would be one, not two. Moreover,
if there are twoconcepts, thereare two, andno thirdmediating
concept seems necessary to make them two. Thus and would
seem meaningless. But it is difficult to maintain this theory.
To begin with, it seems rash to hold that any word is meaning-
less. When we use the word and, we do not seem to be utter-
ingmere idle breath, but some idea seems to correspond to the
word. Again somekindof combination seems tobe impliedby
the fact thatA and B are two, which is not true of either sepa-
rately. When we say “A and B are yellow,” we can replace the
proposition by “A is yellow” and “B is yellow”; but this cannot
be done for “A and B are two”; on the contrary,A is one and B
is one. Thus it seems best to regard and as expressing a definite
unique kind of combination, not a relation, and not combin-
ing A and B into a whole, which would be one. This unique
kindof combinationwill in future be called addition of individu-
als. It is important to observe that it applies to terms, and only
applies to numbers in consequence of their being terms. Thus 72
for the present, 1 and 2 are two, and 1 and 1 is meaningless.
As regards what is meant by the combination indicated by
and, it is indistinguishable from what we before called a nu-
merical conjunction. That is, A and B is what is denoted by
the concept of a class of whichA and B are the only members.
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If u be a class-concept of which the propositions “A is a u” “B
is a u” are true, but of which all other propositions of the same
form are false, then “all u’s” is the concept of a class whose
only terms are A and B; this concept denotes the terms A, B
combined in a certainway, and “A andB” are those terms com-
bined in just that way. Thus “A and B” are the class, but are
distinct from the class-concept and from the concept of the
class.
The notion of and, however, does not enter into the mean-
ing of a class, for a single term is a class, although it is not a
numerical conjunction. If u be a class-concept, and only one
proposition of the form “x is a u” be true, then “all u’s” is a con-
cept denoting a single term, and this term is the class of which
“all u’s” is a concept. Thus what seems essential to a class is
not the notion of and, but the being denoted by some concept
of a class. This brings us to the intensional view of classes.
72. We agreed in the preceding chapter that there are not
different ways of denoting, but only different kinds of denot-
ing concepts and correspondingly different kinds of denoted
objects. We have discussed the kind of denoted object which
constitutes a class; we have now to consider the kind of denot-
ing concept.
The consideration of classes which results from denoting
concepts is more general than the extensional consideration,
and that in two respects. In the first place it allows, what the
other practically excludes, the admission of infinite classes; in
the second place it introduces the null concept of a class. But,
before discussing these matters, there is a purely logical point
of some importance to be examined.
If u be a class-concept, is the concept “all u’s” analyzable
into two constituents, all and u, or is it a new concept, de-
fined by a certain relation to u, and no more complex than
u itself? We may observe, to begin with, that “all u’s” is syn-
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onymous with “u’s,” at least according to a very common use
of the plural. Our question is, then, as to the meaning of the
plural. The word all has certainly some definite meaning, but
it seems highly doubtful whether it means more than the in-
dication of a relation. “All men” and “all numbers” have in
common the fact that they both have a certain relation to a
class-concept, namely to man and number respectively. But it
is very difficult to isolate any further element of all-nesswhich
both share, unless we take as this element the mere fact that
both are concepts of classes. It would seem, then, that “all u’s”
is not validly analyzable into all and u, and that language, in 73
this case as in some others, is a misleading guide. The same
remark will apply to every, any, some, a, and the.
It might perhaps be thought that a class ought to be con-
sidered, not merely as a numerical conjunction of terms, but
as a numerical conjunction denoted by the concept of a class.
This complication, however, would serve no useful purpose,
except to preserve Peano’s distinction between a single term
and the classwhose only term it is—adistinctionwhich is easy
to graspwhen the class is identifiedwith the class-concept, but
which is inadmissible in our view of classes. It is evident that
a numerical conjunction considered as denoted is either the
same entity as when not so considered, or else is a complex
of denoting together with the object denoted; and the object
denoted is plainly what we mean by a class.
With regard to infinite classes, say the class of numbers, it
is to be observed that the concept all numbers, though not it-
self infinitely complex, yet denotes an infinitely complex ob-
ject. This is the inmost secret of our power to deal with in-
finity. An infinitely complex concept, though there may be
such, can certainly not be manipulated by the human intelli-
gence; but infinite collections, owing to the notion of denot-
ing, can be manipulated without introducing any concepts of
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 109
infinite complexity. Throughout the discussions of infinity in
later Parts of the present work, this remark should be borne in
mind: if it is forgotten, there is an air of magic which causes
the results obtained to seem doubtful.
73. Great difficulties are associated with the null-class, and
generally with the idea of nothing. It is plain that there is such
a concept as nothing, and that in some sense nothing is some-
thing. In fact, the proposition “nothing is not nothing” is un-
doubtedly capable of an interpretation which makes it true—
a point which gives rise to the contradictions discussed in
Plato’s Sophist. In Symbolic Logic the null-class is the class
whichhas no terms at all; and symbolically it is quite necessary
to introduce some such notion. We have to consider whether
the contradictions which naturally arise can be avoided.
It is necessary to realize, in the first place, that a concept
maydenote although it does not denote anything. This occurs
when there are propositions in which the said concept occurs,
and which are not about the said concept, but all such propo-
sitions are false. Or rather, the above is a first step towards the
explanation of a denoting concept which denotes nothing. It
is not, however, an adequate explanation. Consider, for exam-
ple, the proposition “chimaeras are animals” or “even primes
other than 2 are numbers.” These propositions appear to be
true, and it would seem that they are not concerned with the
denoting concepts, but with what these concepts denote; yet
that is impossible, for the concepts in question do not denote
anything. Symbolic Logic says that these concepts denote the 74
null-class, and that thepropositions inquestion assert that the
null-class is contained in certain other classes. But with the
strictly extensional view of classes propounded above, a class
which has no terms fails to be anything at all: what is merely
and solely a collection of terms cannot subsist when all the
terms are removed. Thus we must either find a different inter-
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pretation of classes, or else find a method of dispensing with
the null-class.
The above imperfect definition of a concept which denotes,
but does not denote anything,may be amended as follows. All
denoting concepts, aswe saw, are derived from class-concepts;
anda is a class-conceptwhen“x is ana” is a propositional func-
tion. The denoting concepts associatedwith awill not denote
anything when and only when “x is an a” is false for all val-
ues of x. This is a complete definition of a denoting concept
which does not denote anything; and in this case we shall say
that a is a null class-concept, and that “all a’s” is a null con-
cept of a class. Thus for a system such as Peano’s, in which
what are called classes are really class-concepts, technical dif-
ficulties need not arise; but for us a genuine logical problem
remains.
The proposition “chimaeras are animals” may be easily in-
terpreted by means of formal implication, as meaning “x is a
chimaera implies x is an animal for all values of x.” But in deal-
ingwith classes we have been assuming that propositions con-
taining all or any or every, though equivalent to formal implica-
tions, were yet distinct from them, and involved ideas requir-
ing independent treatment. Now in the case of chimaeras, it
is easy to substitute the pure intensional view, according to
which what is really stated is a relation of predicates: in the
case in question the adjective animal is part of the definition
of the adjective chimerical (if we allow ourselves to use this
word, contrary to usage, to denote the defining predicate of
chimaeras). But here again it is fairly plain that we are dealing
with a proposition which implies that chimaeras are animals,
but is not the same proposition—indeed, in the present case,
the implication is not even reciprocal. By a negation we can
give a kind of extensional interpretation: nothing is denoted
by a chimaera which is not denoted by an animal. But this
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is a very roundabout interpretation. On the whole, it seems
most correct to reject the proposition altogether, while retain-
ing the various other propositions that would be equivalent
to it if there were chimaeras. By symbolic logicians, who have
experienced the utility of the null-class, this will be felt as a re-
actionary view. But I amnot at present discussingwhat should
be done in the logical calculus, where the established practice
appears tome thebest, butwhat is the philosophical truth con-
cerning the null-class. We shall say, then, that, of the bundle
of normally equivalent interpretations of logical symbolic for-
mulae, the class of interpretations considered in the present
chapter, which are dependent upon actual classes, fail where 75
we are concernedwith null class-concepts, on the ground that
there is no actual null-class.
We may now reconsider the proposition “nothing is not
nothing”—aproposition plainly true, and yet, unless carefully
handled, a source of apparently hopeless antinomies. Nothing
is a denoting concept, which denotes nothing. The concept
which denotes is of course not nothing, i.e. it is not denoted
by itself. The proposition which looks so paradoxical means
nomore than this: Nothing, the denoting concept, is not noth-
ing, i.e. is not what itself denotes. But it by no means follows
from this that there is an actual null-class: only the null class-
concept and the null concept of a class are to be admitted.
But nowanewdifficulty has to bemet. The equality of class-
concepts, like all relations which are reflexive, symmetrical,
and transitive, indicates an underlying identity, i.e. it indicates
that every class-concept has to some term a relation which all
equal class-concepts also have to that term—the term in ques-
tion being different for different sets of equal class-concepts,
but the same for the various members of a single set of equal
class-concepts. Now for all class-concepts which are not null,
this term is found in the corresponding class; but where are
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we to find it for null class-concepts? To this question several
answers may be given, any of which may be adopted. For we
now know what a class is, and we may therefore adopt as our
term the class of all null class-concepts or of all null propo-
sitional functions. These are not null-classes, but genuine
classes, and to either of them all null class-concepts have the
same relation. If we then wish to have an entity analogous
to what is elsewhere to be called a class, but corresponding
to null class-concepts, we shall be forced, wherever it is nec-
essary (as in counting classes) to introduce a term which is
identical for equal class-concepts, to substitute everywhere
the class of class-concepts equal to a given class-concept for
the class corresponding to that class-concept. The class cor-
responding to the class-concept remains logically fundamen-
tal, but need not be actually employed in our symbolism. The
null-class, in fact, is in some ways analogous to an irrational
in Arithmetic: it cannot be interpreted on the same princi-
ples as other classes, and if we wish to give an analogous in-
terpretation elsewhere, we must substitute for classes other
more complicated entities—in the present case, certain corre-
lated classes. The object of such a procedure will be mainly
technical; but failure to understand the procedure will lead
to inextricable difficulties in the interpretation of the symbol-
ism. A very closely analogous procedure occurs constantly in
Mathematics, for example with every generalization of num-
ber; and so far as I know, no single case in which it occurs has
been rightly interpreted either by philosophers or by mathe-
maticians. Somany instances will meet us in the course of the
present work that it is unnecessary to linger longer over the
point at present. Only one possible misunderstanding must
be guarded against. No vicious circle is involved in the above 76
account of the null-class; for the general notion of class is first
laid down, is found to involve what is called existence, is then
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symbolically, not philosophically, replaced by the notion of a
class of equal class-concepts, and is found, in this new form, to
be applicable towhat corresponds tonull class-concepts, since
what corresponds is now a class which is not null. Between
classes simpliciter and classes of equal class-concepts there is
a one-one correlation, which breaks down in the sole case of
the class of null class-concepts, to which no null-class corre-
sponds; and this fact is the reason for the whole complication.
74. Aquestionwhich is very fundamental in thephilosophy
of Arithmetic must now be discussed in a more or less prelim-
inary fashion. Is a class which has many terms to be regarded
as itself one or many? Taking the class as equivalent simply to
the numerical conjunction “A and B andC and etc.,” it seems
plain that it is many; yet it is quite necessary that we should be
able to count classes as one each, and we do habitually speak
of a class. Thus classes would seem to be one in one sense and
many in another.
There is a certain temptation to identify the class as many
and the class as one, e.g., all men and the human race. Neverthe-
less, wherever a class consists of more than one term, it can be
proved that no such identification is permissible. A concept of
a class, if it denotes a class as one, is not the same as any con-
cept of the class which it denotes. That is to say, classes of all
rational animals, which denotes the human race as one term, is
different frommen, which denotes men, i.e. the human race as
many. But if the human racewere identicalwithmen, itwould
follow that whatever denotes the one must denote the other,
and the above difference would be impossible. We might be
tempted to infer that Peano’s distinction, betweena termanda
class of which the said term is the onlymember, must bemain-
tained, at least when the term in question is a class*. But it is
*This conclusion is actually drawn by Frege from an analogous argu-
ment: Archiv für syst. Phil. i, p. 444. See Appendix.
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more correct, I think, to infer an ultimate distinction between
a class as many and a class as one, to hold that the many are
onlymany, and are not also one. The class as onemay be iden-
tified with the whole composed of the terms of the class, i.e.,
in the case of men, the class as one will be the human race.
But canwe now avoid the contradiction always to be feared,
where there is something that cannot be made a logical sub-
ject? I do not myself see any way of eliciting a precise con-
tradiction in this case. In the case of concepts, we were deal-
ing with what was plainly one entity; in the present case, we
are dealing with a complex essentially capable of analysis into
units. In such a proposition as “A and B are two,” there is no
logical subject: the assertion is not about A, nor about B, nor 77
about thewhole composedof both, but strictly andonly about
A and B. Thus it would seem that assertions are not necessar-
ily about single subjects, but may be about many subjects; and
this removes the contradictionwhich arose, in the case of con-
cepts, from the impossibility of making assertions about them
unless they were turned into subjects. This impossibility be-
ing here absent, the contradictionwhichwas to be feared does
not arise.
75. Wemay ask, as suggested by the above discussion, what
is to be said of the objects denoted by a man, every man, some
man, and any man. Are these objects one or many or neither?
Grammar treats them all as one. But to this view, the natu-
ral objection is, which one? Certainly not Socrates, nor Plato,
nor any other particular person. Canwe conclude that no one
is denoted? As well might we conclude that every one is de-
noted, which in fact is true of the concept every man. I think
one is denoted in every case, but in an impartial distributive
manner. Any number is neither 1 nor 2 nor any other particular
number, whence it is easy to conclude that any number is not
any one number, a proposition at first sight contradictory, but
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 115
really resulting from an ambiguity in any, and more correctly
expressed by “any number is not some one number.” There are,
however, puzzles in this subject which I do not yet know how
to solve.
A logical difficulty remains in regard to the nature of the
whole composed of all the terms of a class. Two propositions
appear self-evident: (1) Two wholes composed of different
terms must be different; (2) A whole composed of one term
only is that one term. It follows that the whole composed of
a class considered as one term is that class considered as one
term, and is therefore identical with the whole composed of
the terms of the class; but this result contradicts the first of
our supposed self-evident principles. The answer in this case,
however, is not difficult. The first of our principles is only uni-
versally true when all the terms composing our two wholes
are simple. A given whole is capable, if it has more than two
parts, of being analyzed in a plurality of ways; and the result-
ing constituents, so long as analysis is not pushed as far as pos-
sible, will be different for different ways of analyzing. This
proves that different sets of constituents may constitute the
same whole, and thus disposes of our difficulty.
76. Something must be said as to the relation of a term to
a class of which it is a member, and as to the various allied re-
lations. One of the allied relations is to be called ϵ, and is to
be fundamental in Symbolic Logic. But it is to some extent
optional which of them we take as symbolically fundamental.
Logically, the fundamental relation is that of subject and
predicate, expressed in “Socrates is human”—a relation
which, as we saw in Chapter iv, is peculiar in that the relatum
cannot be regarded as a term in the proposition. The first re- 78
lation that grows out of this is the one expressed by “Socrates
has humanity,”which is distinguishedby the fact that here the
relation is a term. Next comes “Socrates is aman.” This propo-
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sition, considered as a relation between Socrates and the con-
ceptman, is the onewhich Peano regards as fundamental; and
his ϵ expresses the relation is a between Socrates andman. So
long asweuse class-concepts for classes in our symbolism, this
practice is unobjectionable; but if we give ϵ this meaning, we
must not assume that two symbols representing equal class-
concepts both represent one and the same entity. We may go
on to the relation between Socrates and the human race, i.e.
between a term and its class considered as a whole; this is ex-
pressed by “Socrates belongs to the human race.” This rela-
tion might equally well be represented by ϵ. It is plain that,
since a class, except when it has one term, is essentially many,
it cannot be as such represented by a single letter: hence in any
possible Symbolic Logic the letters which do duty for classes
cannot represent the classesasmany, butmust represent either
class-concepts, or the wholes composed of classes, or some
other allied single entities. And thus ϵ cannot represent the
relation of a term to its class as many; for this would be a rela-
tion of one term to many terms, not a two-term relation such
as we want. This relation might be expressed by “Socrates is
one among men”; but this, in any case, cannot be taken to be
the meaning of ϵ.
77. A relation which, before Peano, was almost univer-
sally confounded with ϵ, is the relation of inclusion between
classes, as e.g. between men and mortals. This is a time-
honoured relation, since it occurs in the traditional form of
the syllogism: it has been a battleground between intension
and extension, and has been so much discussed that it is as-
tonishing how much remains to be said about it. Empiricists
hold that such propositions mean an actual enumeration of
the terms of the contained class, with the assertion, in each
case, of membership of the containing class. They must, it is
to be inferred, regard it as doubtful whether all primes are in-
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tegers, since they will scarcely have the face to say that they
have examined all primes one by one. Their opponents have
usually held, on the contrary, that what is meant is a relation
of whole and part between the defining predicates, but turned
in the opposite sense from the relation between the classes: i.e.
the defining predicate of the larger class is part of that of the
smaller. This view seems far more defensible than the other;
and wherever such a relation does hold between the defining
predicates, the relation of inclusion follows. But two objec-
tions may be made, first, that in some cases of inclusion there
is no such relation between the defining predicates, and sec-
ondly, that in any case what ismeant is a relation between the
classes, not a relation of their defining predicates. The first
pointmay be easily established by instances. The concept even 79
prime does not contain as a constituent the concept integer be-
tween 1 and 10; the concept “English King whose head was cut
off” does not contain the concept “people who died in 1649”;
and so on through innumerable obvious cases. This might be
met by saying that, though the relation of the defining predi-
cates is not one of whole and part, it is one more or less anal-
ogous to implication, and is always what is really meant by
propositions of inclusion. Such a view represents, I think,
what is said by the better advocates of intension, and I am not
concerned to deny that a relation of the kind in question does
always subsist between defining predicates of classes one of
which is contained in the other. But the second of the above
points remains valid as against any intensional interpretation.
Whenwe say thatmen aremortals, it is evident thatwe are say-
ing something about men, not about the concept man or the
predicate human. The question is, then, what exactly are we
saying?
Peano held, in earlier editions of his Formulaire, that what is
asserted is the formal implication “x is aman implies x is amor-
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tal.” This is certainly implied, but I cannot persuade myself
that it is the same proposition. For in this proposition, as we
saw in Chapter iii, it is essential that x should take all values,
and not only such as are men. But when we say “all men are
mortals,” it seems plain that we are only speaking of men, and
not of all other imaginable terms. Wemay, ifwewish for a gen-
uine relation of classes, regard the assertion as one of whole
and part between the two classes each considered as a single
term. Or we may give a still more purely extensional form to
our proposition, by making it mean: Every (or any) man is a
mortal. This proposition raises very interesting questions in
the theory of denoting: for it appears to assert an identity, yet
it is plain that what is denoted by every man is different from
what is denoted by a mortal. These questions, however, inter-
esting as they are, cannot be pursued here. It is only neces-
sary to realize clearly what are the various equivalent propo-
sitions involved where one class is included in another. The
form most relevant to Mathematics is certainly the one with
formal implication,whichwill receive a freshdiscussion in the
following chapter.
Finally, we must remember that classes are to be derived,
by means of the notion of such that, from other sources than
subject-predicate propositions and their equivalents. Any
propositional function in which a fixed assertion is made of
a variable term is to be regarded, as was explained in Chap-
ter ii, as giving rise to a class of values satisfying it. This topic
requires a discussion of assertions; but one strange contradic-
tion, which necessitates the care in discrimination aimed at in
the present chapter, may be mentioned at once.
78. Among predicates, most of the ordinary instances can-
not be predicated of themselves, though, by introducing neg- 80
ative predicates, it will be found that there are just as many in-
stances of predicateswhich are predicable of themselves. One
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at least of these, namely predicability, or the property of being
a predicate, is not negative: predicability, as is evident, is pred-
icable, i.e. it is a predicate of itself. But the most common in-
stances are negative: thus non-humanity is non-human, and
so on. The predicates which are not predicable of themselves
are, therefore, only a selection from among predicates, and it
is natural to suppose that they form a class having a defining
predicate. But if so, let us examinewhether this defining pred-
icate belongs to the class or not. If it belongs to the class, it is
not predicable of itself, for that is the characteristic property
of the class. But if it is not predicable of itself, then it does
not belong to the class whose defining predicate it is, which
is contrary to the hypothesis. On the other hand, if it does
not belong to the class whose defining predicate it is, then it is
not predicable of itself, i.e. it is one of those predicates that are
not predicable of themselves, and therefore it does belong to
the class whose defining predicate it is—again contrary to the
hypothesis. Hence from either hypothesis we can deduce its
contradictory. I shall return to this contradiction in Chapter
x; for the present, I have introduced it merely as showing that
no subtlety in distinguishing is likely to be excessive.
79. To sum up the above somewhat lengthy discussion. A
class, we agreed, is essentially to be interpreted in extension;
it is either a single term, or that kind of combination of terms
which is indicated when terms are connected by the word and.
But practically, though not theoretically, this purely exten-
sional method can only be applied to finite classes. All classes,
whether finite or infinite, can be obtained as the objects de-
noted by the plurals of class-concepts—men, numbers, points,
etc. Starting with predicates, we distinguished two kinds of
proposition, typified by “Socrates is human” and “Socrates
has humanity,” of which the first uses human as predicate, the
second as a term of a relation. These two classes of propo-
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sitions, though very important logically, are not so relevant
to Mathematics as their derivatives. Starting from human, we
distinguished (1) the class-conceptman, which differs slightly,
if at all, from human; (2) the various denoting concepts all
men, every man, any man, a man and some man; (3) the ob-
jects denoted by these concepts, of which the one denoted by
all men was called the class as many, so that all men (the con-
cept) was called the concept of the class; (4) the class as one, i.e.
the human race. We had also a classification of propositions
about Socrates, dependent upon the above distinctions, and
approximately parallel with them: (1) “Socrates is-a man” is
nearly, if not quite, identical with “Socrates has humanity”; (2)
“Socrates is a-man” expresses identity between Socrates and 81
one of the terms denoted by aman; (3) “Socrates is one among
men,” a proposition which raises difficulties owing to the plu-
rality of men; (4) “Socrates belongs to the human race,” which
alone expresses a relation of an individual to its class, and, as
the possibility of relation requires, takes the class as one, not
as many. We agreed that the null-class, which has no terms,
is a fiction, though there are null class-concepts. It appeared
throughout that, although any symbolic treatmentmust work
largely with class-concepts and intension, classes and exten-
sion are logicallymore fundamental for theprinciples ofMath-
ematics; and this may be regarded as our main general conclu-
sion in the present chapter.
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chapter vii
PROPOSITIONAL FUNCTIONS
80. In the preceding chapter an endeavour was made to in- 82
dicate the kind of object that is to be called a class, and for pur-
poses of discussion classes were considered as derived from
subject-predicate propositions. This did not affect our view as
to the notion of class itself; but if adhered to, it would greatly
restrict the extension of the notion. It is often necessary to
recognize as a class an object not definedbymeans of a subject-
predicate proposition. The explanation of this necessity is to
be sought in the theory of assertions and such that.
The general notion of an assertion has been already ex-
plained in connectionwith formal implication. In the present
chapter its scope and legitimacy are to be critically examined,
and its connection with classes and such that is to be inves-
tigated. The subject is full of difficulties, and the doctrines
which I intend to advocate are put forwardwith a very limited
confidence in their truth.
The notion of such thatmight be thought, at first sight, to be
capable of definition; Peano used, in fact, to define the notion
by the proposition “the x’s such that x is an a are the class a.”
Apart from further objections, to be noticed immediately, it is
to be observed that the class as obtained from such that is the
genuine class, taken in extension and as many, whereas the
a in “x is an a” is not the class, but the class-concept. Thus
it is formally necessary, if Peano’s procedure is to be permis-
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sible, that we should substitute for “x’s such that so-and-so”
the genuine class-concept “x such that so-and-so,” whichmay
be regarded as obtained from the predicate “such that so-and-
so” or rather, “being an x such that so-and-so,” the latter form
being necessary because so-and-so is a propositional function
containing x. But when this purely formal emendation has
been made the point remains that such thatmust often be put
before such propositions as xRa, where R is a given relation
and a a given term. We cannot reduce this proposition to the
form “x is an a0” without using such that; for if we ask what a0
must be, the answer is: a0 must be such that each of its terms, 83
and no other terms, have the relationR to a. To take examples
from daily life: the children of Israel are a class defined by a
certain relation to Israel, and the class can only be defined as
the terms such that theyhave this relation. Such that is roughly
equivalent to who or which, and represents the general notion
of satisfying a propositional function. But we may go further:
given a class a, we cannot define, in terms of a, the class of
propositions “x is an a” for different values of x. It is plain
that there is a relation which each of these propositions has
to the xwhich occurs in it, and that the relation in question is
determinate when a is given. Let us call the relation R. Then
any entitywhich is a referentwith respect toR is a proposition
of the type “x is an a.” But here the notion of such that is al-
ready employed. And the relation R itself can only be defined
as the relationwhich holds between “x is an a” and x for all val-
ues of x, and does not hold between any other pairs of terms.
Here such that again appears. The point which is chiefly im-
portant in these remarks is the indefinability of propositional
functions. When these have been admitted, the general no-
tion of one-valued functions is easily defined. Every relation
which is many-one, i.e. every relation for which a given refer-
ent has only one relatum, defines a function: the relatum is
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that function of the referent which is defined by the relation
in question. But where the function is a proposition, the no-
tion involved is presupposed in the symbolism, and cannot
be defined by means of it without a vicious circle: for in the
above general definition of a function propositional functions
already occur. In the case of propositions of the type “x is an
a,” if we ask what propositions are of this type, we can only
answer “all propositions in which a term is said to be a”; and
here the notion to be defined reappears.
81. Can the indefinable element involved in propositional
functions be identified with assertion together with the no-
tion of every proposition containing a given assertion, or an
assertion made concerning every term? The only alternative,
so far as I can see, is to accept the general notion of a propo-
sitional function itself as indefinable, and for formal purposes
this course is certainly the best; but philosophically, the no-
tion appears at first sight capable of analysis, and we have to
examine whether or not this appearance is deceptive.
We saw in discussing verbs, in Chapter iv, that when
a proposition is completely analyzed into its simple con-
stituents, these constituents taken together do not reconsti-
tute it. A less complete analysis of propositions into subject
and assertion has also been considered; and this analysis does
much less to destroy the proposition. A subject and an as-
sertion, if simply juxtaposed, do not, it is true, constitute a
proposition; but as soon as the assertion is actually asserted
of the subject, the proposition reappears. The assertion is ev-
erything that remains of the proposition when the subject is
omitted: the verb remains an asserted verb, and is not turned 84
into a verbal noun; or at any rate the verb retains that curious
indefinable intricate relation to the other terms of the propo-
sition which distinguishes a relating relation from the same
relation abstractly considered. It is the scope and legitimacy
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of this notion of assertion which is now to be examined. Can
every proposition be regarded as an assertion concerning any
termoccurring in it, or are limitations necessary as to the form
of the proposition and the way in which the term enters into
it?
In some simple cases, it is obvious that the analysis into
subject and assertion is legitimate. In “Socrates is a man,”
we can plainly distinguish Socrates and something that is as-
serted about him; we should admit unhesitatingly that the
same thing may be said about Plato or Aristotle. Thus we can
consider a class of propositions containing this assertion, and
this will be the class of which a typical number is represented
by “x is a man.” It is to be observed that the assertion must ap-
pear as assertion, not as term: thus “to be a man is to suffer”
contains the same assertion, but used as term, and this propo-
sition does not belong to the class considered. In the case of
propositions asserting a fixed relation to a fixed term, the anal-
ysis seems equally undeniable. To be more than a yard long,
for example, is a perfectly definite assertion, and we may con-
sider the class of propositions in which this assertion is made,
which will be represented by the propositional function “x is
more than a yard long.” In such phrases as “snakes which are
more than a yard long,” the assertion appears very plainly; for
it is here explicitly referred to a variable subject, not asserted
of any one definite subject. Thus if R be a fixed relation and a
a fixed term, …Ra is a perfectly definite assertion. (I place dots
before the R, to indicate the place where the subject must be
inserted in order to make a proposition.) It may be doubted
whether a relational proposition can be regarded as an asser-
tion concerning the relatum. For my part, I hold that this can
be done except in the case of subject-predicate propositions;
but this question is better postponed until we have discussed
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relations*.
82. More difficult questions must now be considered. Is
such a proposition as “Socrates is a man implies Socrates is a
mortal,” or “Socrates has a wife implies Socrates has a father,”
an assertion concerning Socrates or not? It is quite certain
that, if we replace Socrates by a variable, we obtain a propo-
sitional function; in fact, the truth of this function for all val-
ues of the variable is what is asserted in the corresponding for-
mal implication, which does not, as might be thought at first
sight, assert a relation between two propositional functions.
Now it was our intention, if possible, to explain propositional
functions by means of assertions; hence, if our intention can
be carried out, the above propositions must be assertions con- 85
cerning Socrates. There is, however, a very great difficulty in
so regarding them. An assertion was to be obtained from a
proposition by simply omitting one of the terms occurring in
the proposition. But when we omit Socrates, we obtain “… is
aman implies … is amortal.” In this formula it is essential that,
in restoring the proposition, the same term should be substi-
tuted in the two places where dots indicate the necessity of a
term. It does not matter what term we choose, but it must be
identical in both places. Of this requisite, however, no trace
whatever appears in the would-be assertion, and no trace can
appear, since all mention of the term to be inserted is neces-
sarily omitted. When an x is inserted to stand for the variable,
the identity of the term tobe inserted is indicatedby the repeti-
tion of the letter x; but in the assertional formno suchmethod
is available. And yet, at first sight, it seems very hard to deny
that the proposition in question tells us a fact about Socrates,
and that the same fact is true about Plato or a plum-pudding
or the number 2. It is certainly undeniable that “Plato is aman
implies Plato is a mortal” is, in some sense or other, the same
*See §96.
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function of Plato as our previous proposition is of Socrates.
The natural interpretation of this statementwould be that the
one proposition has to Plato the same relation as the other has
to Socrates. But this requires thatwe should regard the propo-
sitional function in question as definable by means of its rela-
tion to the variable. Such a view, however, requires a proposi-
tional function more complicated than the one we are consid-
ering. If we represent “x is a man implies x is a mortal” by φx,
the view in question maintains that φx is the term having to x
the relation R, where R is some definite relation. The formal
statement of this view is as follows: For all values of x and y, “y
is identical withφx” is equivalent to “y has the relationR to x.”
It is evident that this will not do as an explanation, since it has
far greater complexity than what it was to explain. It would
seem to follow that propositionsmay have a certain constancy
of form, expressed in the fact that they are instances of a given
propositional function, without its being possible to analyze
the propositions into a constant and a variable factor. Such
a view is curious and difficult: constancy of form, in all other
cases, is reducible to constancy of relations, but the constancy
involved here is presupposed in the notion of constancy of re-
lation, and cannot therefore be explained in the usual way.
The same conclusion, I think, will result from the case of
two variables. The simplest instance of this case is xRy, where
R is a constant relation, while x and y are independently vari-
able. It seems evident that this is a propositional function of
two independent variables: there is no difficulty in the notion
of the class of all propositions of the form xRy. This class is
involved—or at least all those members of the class that are
true are involved—in the notion of the classes of referents and 86
relatawith respect toR, and these classes areunhesitatingly ad-
mitted in suchwords as parents and children, masters and ser-
vants, husbands and wives, and innumerable other instances
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from daily life, as also in logical notions such as premisses and
conclusions, causes and effects, and so on. All such notions
depend upon the class of propositions typified by xRy, where
R is constant while x and y are variable. Yet it is very difficult
to regard xRy as analyzable into the assertion R concerning x
and y, for the very sufficient reason that this view destroys the
sense of the relation, i.e. its direction from x to y, leaving us
with someassertionwhich is symmetricalwith respect to x and
y, such as “the relation R holds between x and y.” Given a re-
lation and its terms, in fact, two distinct propositions are pos-
sible. Thus if we take R itself to be an assertion, it becomes
an ambiguous assertion: in supplying the terms, if we are to
avoid ambiguity, we must decide which is referent and which
relatum. We may quite legitimately regard … Ry as an asser-
tion, as was explained before; but here y has become constant.
We may then go on to vary y, considering the class of asser-
tions … Ry for different values of y; but this process does not
seem to be identical with that which is indicated by the inde-
pendent variability of x and y in the propositional function
xRy. Moreover, the suggested process requires the variation
of an element in an assertion, namely of y in … Ry, and this is
in itself a new and difficult notion.
A curious point arises, in this connection, from the consid-
eration, often essential in actual Mathematics, of a relation
of a term to itself. Consider the propositional function xRx,
where R is a constant relation. Such functions are required
in considering, e.g., the class of suicides or of self-made men;
or again, in considering the values of the variable for which
it is equal to a certain function of itself, which may often be
necessary in ordinary Mathematics. It seems exceedingly ev-
ident, in this case, that the proposition contains an element
which is lost when it is analyzed into a term x and an assertion
R. Thus here again, the propositional functionmust be admit-
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ted as fundamental.
83. A difficult point arises as to the variation of the concept
in a proposition. Consider, for example, all propositions of
the type aRb, where a and b are fixed terms, and R is a vari-
able relation. There seems no reason to doubt that the class-
concept “relation between a and b” is legitimate, and that
there is a corresponding class; but this requires the admission
of such propositional functions as aRb, which, moreover, are
frequently required in actual Mathematics, as, for example, in
counting the number of many-one relations whose referents
and relata are given classes. But if our variable is to have, as we
normally require, anunrestricted field, it is necessary to substi-
tute the propositional function “R is a relation implies aRb.”
In this proposition the implication involved is material, not
formal. If the implication were formal, the proposition would 87
not be a function of R, but would be equivalent to the (nec-
essarily false) proposition: “All relations hold between a and
b.” Generally we have some such proposition as “aRb implies
φ(R) provided R is a relation,” and we wish to turn this into
a formal implication. If φ(R) is a proposition for all values of
R, our object is effected by substituting “If ‘R is a relation’ im-
plies ‘aRb,’ then φ(R).” Here R can take all values*, and the if
and then is a formal implication, while the implies is a material
implication. If φ(R) is not a propositional function, but is a
proposition only when R satisfies ψ(R), where ψ(R) is a propo-
sitional function implied by “R is a relation” for all values ofR,
thenour formal implication canbe put in the form“If ‘R is a re-
lation’ impliesaRb, then, for all values ofR,ψ(R) impliesφ(R),”
where both the subordinate implications are material. As re-
gards the material implication “‘R is a relation’ implies aRb,”
this is always a proposition, whereas aRb is only a proposition
*It is necessary to assign some meaning (other than a proposition) to
aRbwhen R is not a relation.
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whenR is a relation. Thenewpropositional functionwill only
be true when R is a relation which does hold between a and b:
when R is not a relation, the antecedent is false and the con-
sequent is not a proposition, so that the implication is false;
when R is a relation which does not hold between a and b, the
antecedent is true and the consequent false, so that again the
implication is false; only when both are true is the implication
true. Thus in defining the class of relations holding between
a and b, the formally correct course is to define them as the
values satisfying “R is a relation implies aRb”—an implication
which, though it contains a variable, is not formal, but mate-
rial, being satisfied by some only of the possible values of R.
The variable R in it is, in Peano’s language, real and not appar-
ent.
The general principle involved is: If φx is only a proposi-
tion for some values of x, then “‘φx impliesφx’ impliesφx” is a
proposition for all values of x, and is truewhen andonlywhen
φx is true. (The implications involved are both material.) In
some cases, “φx implies φx” will be equivalent to some sim-
pler propositional function ψx (such as “R is a relation” in the
above instance), which may then be substituted for it†.
Such a propositional function as “R is a relation implies
aRb” appears even less capable thanprevious instances of anal-
ysis into R and an assertion about R, since we should have to
assign a meaning to “a : : : b,” where the blank space may be
filled by anything, not necessarily by a relation. There is here,
however, a suggestion of an entitywhich has not yet been con-
sidered, namely the couple with sense. It may be doubted
whether there is any such entity, and yet such phrases as “R 88
is a relation holding from a to b” seem to show that its rejec-
†A propositional function, though for every value of the variable it is
true or false, is not itself true or false, beingwhat is denoted by “any propo-
sition of the type in question,” which is not itself a proposition.
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tion would lead to paradoxes. This point, however, belongs
to the theory of relations, and will be resumed in Chapter ix
(§98).
Fromwhat has been said, it appears that propositional func-
tions must be accepted as ultimate data. It follows that for-
mal implication and the inclusion of classes cannot be gener-
ally explained by means of a relation between assertions, al-
though,where a propositional function asserts a fixed relation
to a fixed term, the analysis into subject and assertion is legit-
imate and not unimportant.
84. It only remains to say a fewwords concerning thederiva-
tion of classes from propositional functions. When we con-
sider the x’s such that φx, where φx is a propositional function,
we are introducing a notion ofwhich, in the calculus of propo-
sitions, only a very shadowy use is made—I mean the notion
of truth. We are considering, among all the propositions of
the type φx, those that are true: the corresponding values of
x give the class defined by the function φx. It must be held, I
think, that every propositional function which is not null de-
fines a class, which is denoted by “x’s such that φx.” There is
thus always a concept of the class, and the class-concept cor-
responding will be the singular, “x such that φx.” But it may
bedoubted—indeed the contradictionwithwhich I ended the
preceding chapter gives reason for doubting—whether there
is always a defining predicate of such classes. Apart from
the contradiction in question, this point might appear to be
merely verbal: “being an x such that φx,” it might be said, may
always be taken to be a predicate. But in viewof our contradic-
tion, all remarks on this subject must be viewed with caution.
This subject, however, will be resumed in Chapter x.
85. It is tobeobserved that, according to the theoryofpropo-
sitional functions here advocated, the φ in φx is not a separate
and distinguishable entity: it lives in the propositions of the
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form φx, and cannot survive analysis. I am highly doubtful
whether such a view does not lead to a contradiction, but it
appears to be forced upon us, and it has the merit of enabling
us to avoid a contradiction arising from the opposite view. Ifφ
were a distinguishable entity, there would be a proposition as-
serting φ of itself, which we may denote by φ(φ); there would
also be a proposition not-φ(φ), denying φ(φ). In this propo-
sition we may regard φ as variable; we thus obtain a proposi-
tional function. The question arises: Can the assertion in this
propositional function be asserted of itself? The assertion is
non-assertibility of self, hence if it can be asserted of itself, it
cannot, and if it cannot, it can. This contradiction is avoided
by the recognition that the functional part of a propositional
function is not an independent entity. As the contradiction
in question is closely analogous to the other, concerning pred-
icates net predicable of themselves, wemay hope that a similar
solution will apply there also.
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chapter viii
THEVARIABLE
86. The discussions of the preceding chapter elicited the 89
fundamental nature of the variable; no apparatus of assertions
enables us to dispense with the consideration of the varying
of one or more elements in a proposition while the other ele-
ments remain unchanged. The variable is perhaps the most
distinctively mathematical of all notions; it is certainly also
one of the most difficult to understand. The attempt, if not
the deed, belongs to the present chapter.
The theory as to the nature of the variable, which results
from our previous discussions, is in outline the following.
When a given term occurs as term in a proposition, that term
may be replaced by any other while the remaining terms are
unchanged. The class of propositions so obtained have what
may be called constancy of form, and this constancy of form
must be taken as a primitive idea. The notion of a class of
propositions of constant form is more fundamental than the
general notion of class, for the latter can be defined in terms
of the former, but not the former in terms of the latter. Tak-
ing any term, a certain member of any class of propositions of
constant form will contain that term. Thus x, the variable, is
what is denoted by any term, and φx, the propositional func-
tion, is what is denoted by the proposition of the form φ in
which x occurs. We may say that x is the x is any φx, where
φx denotes the class of propositions resulting from different
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values of x. Thus in addition to propositional functions, the
notions of any and of denoting are presupposed in the notion
of the variable. This theory, which, I admit, is full of difficul-
ties, is the least objectionable that I have been able to imagine.
I shall now set it forth more in detail.
87. Let us observe, to begin with, that the explicit mention
of any, some, etc., need not occur in Mathematics: formal im-
plication will express all that is required. Let us recur to an in-
stance already discussed in connection with denoting, where
a is a class and b a class of classes. We have
“Any a belongs to any b” is equivalent to “‘x is an a’ implies
that ‘u is a b’ implies ‘x is a u’”;
“Any a belongs to a b” is equivalent to “‘x is an a’ implies 90
‘there is a b, say u, such that x is a u’”*;
“Any a belongs to some b” is equivalent to “there is a b, say u,
such that ‘x is an a’ implies ‘x is a u’”;
and so on for the remaining relations considered in Chapter
v. The question arises: How far do these equivalences consti-
tute definitions of any, a, some, and how far are these notions
involved in the symbolism itself?
The variable is, from the formal standpoint, the characteris-
tic notion of Mathematics. Moreover it is the method of stat-
ing general theorems, which alwaysmean something different
from the intensional propositions to which such logicians as
Mr Bradley endeavour to reduce them. That the meaning of
an assertion about all men or any man is different from the
meaning of an equivalent assertion about the conceptman, ap-
pears to me, I must confess, to be a self-evident truth—as ev-
ident as the fact that propositions about John are not about
the name John. This point, therefore, I shall not argue further.
That the variable characterizes Mathematics will be generally
*Here “there is a c,” where c is any class, is defined as equivalent to “If
p implies p, and ‘x is a c’ implies p for all values of x, then p is true.”
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admitted, though it is not generally perceived to be present in
elementary Arithmetic. Elementary Arithmetic, as taught to
children, is characterized by the fact that the numbers occur-
ring in it are constants; the answer to any schoolboy’s sum is
obtainable without propositions concerning any number. But
the fact that this is the case can only be proved by the help
of propositions about any number, and thus we are led from
schoolboy’s Arithmetic to the Arithmetic which uses letters
for numbers and proves general theorems. How very different
this subject is from childhood’s enemymay be seen at once in
such works as those of Dedekind† and Stolz‡. Now the differ-
ence consists simply in this, that our numbers have now be-
come variables instead of being constants. We now prove the-
orems concerning n, not concerning 3 or 4 or any other partic-
ular number. Thus it is absolutely essential to any theory of
Mathematics to understand the nature of the variable.
Originally, no doubt, the variable was conceived dynami-
cally, as something which changed with the lapse of time, or,
as is said, as something which successively assumed all values
of a certain class. This view cannot be too soon dismissed. If a
theorem is proved concerning n, it must not be supposed that
n is a kind of arithmetical Proteus, which is 1 on Sundays and 2
onMondays, and so on. Normust it be supposed that n simul-
taneously assumes all its values. If n stands for any integer, we
cannot say that n is 1, nor yet that it is 2, nor yet that it is any 91
other particular number. In fact, n just denotes any number,
and this is something quite distinct from each and all of the
numbers. It is not true that 1 is any number, though it is true
that whatever holds of any number holds of 1. The variable,
in short, requires the indefinable notion of any which was ex-
†Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? Brunswick, 1893.
‡Allgemeine Arithmetik, Leipzig, 1886.
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plained in Chapter v.
88. We may distinguish what may be called the true or for-
mal variable from the restricted variable. Any term is a concept
denoting the true variable; if u be a class not containing all
terms, any u denotes a restricted variable. The terms included
in the object denoted by the defining concept of a variable are
called the values of the variable: thus every value of a variable
is a constant. There is a certain difficulty about such proposi-
tions as “any number is a number.” Interpreted by formal im-
plication, they offer no difficulty, for they assert merely that
the propositional function “x is a number implies x is a num-
ber” holds for all values of x. But if “any number” be taken to
be a definite object, it is plain that it is not identical with 1 or 2
or 3 or anynumber thatmaybementioned. Yet these are all the
numbers there are, so that “any number” cannot be a number
at all. The fact is that the concept “any number” does denote
one number, but not a particular one. This is just the distinc-
tive point about any, that it denotes a term of a class, but in
an impartial distributive manner, with no preference for one
term over another. Thus although x is a number, and no one
number is x, yet there is here no contradiction, so soon as it is
recognized that x is not one definite term.
The notion of the restricted variable can be avoided, except
in regard to propositional functions, by the introduction of a
suitable hypothesis, namely the hypothesis expressing the re-
striction itself. But in respect of propositional functions this is
not possible. The x inφx, whereφx is a propositional function,
is an unrestricted variable; but the φx itself is restricted to the
classwhichwemay callφ. (It is to be remembered that the class
is here fundamental, for we found it impossible, without a vi-
cious circle, to discover any common characteristic by which
the class could be defined, since the statement of any common
characteristic is itself a propositional function.) By making
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 136
our x always an unrestricted variable, we can speak of the vari-
able, which is conceptually identical in Logic, Arithmetic, Ge-
ometry, and all other formal subjects. The terms dealt with are
always all terms; only the complex concepts that occur distin-
guish the various branches of Mathematics.
89. We may now return to the apparent definability of any,
some, anda, in termsof formal implication. Leta and bbe class-
concepts, and consider the proposition “any a is a b.” This is
to be interpreted as meaning “x is an a implies x is a b.” It is
plain that, to beginwith, the twopropositions donotmean the
same thing: for any a is a concept denoting only a’s, whereas
in the formal implication x need not be an a. But we might,
in Mathematics, dispense altogether with “any a is a b,” and 92
content ourselves with the formal implication: this is, in fact,
symbolically the best course. The question to be examined,
therefore, is: How far, if at all, do any and some and a enter
into the formal implication? (The fact that the indefinite arti-
cle appears in “x is an a” and “x is a b” is irrelevant, for these are
merely taken as typical propositional functions.) We have, to
beginwith, a class of true propositions, each asserting of some
constant term that if it is an a it is a b. We then consider the re-
stricted variable, “any proposition of this class.” We assert the
truth of any term included among the values of this restricted
variable. But in order to obtain the suggested formula, it is
necessary to transfer the variability from the proposition as a
whole to its variable term. In this way we obtain “x is an a im-
plies x is b.” But the genesis remains essential, for we are not
here expressing a relation of two propositional functions “x is
an a” and “x is a b.” If this were expressed, we should not re-
quire the same x both times. Only one propositional function
is involved, namely the whole formula. Each proposition of
the class expresses a relation of one term of the propositional
function “x is an a” to one of “x is a b”; and we may say, if
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we choose, that the whole formula expresses a relation of any
termof “x is ana” to some termof “x is a b.” Wedonot somuch
have an implication containing a variable as a variable implica-
tion. Or again, we may say that the first x is any term, but the
second is some term, namely the first x. We have a class of im-
plications not containing variables, andwe consider anymem-
ber of this class. If anymember is true, the fact is indicated by
introducing a typical implication containing a variable. This
typical implication is what is called a formal implication: it is
anymember of a class of material implications. Thus it would
seem that any is presupposed in mathematical formalism, but
that some and a may be legitimately replaced by their equiva-
lents in terms of formal implications.
90. Although some may be replaced by its equivalent in
terms of any, it is plain that this does not give the meaning of
some. There is, in fact, a kind of duality of any and some: given
a certain propositional function, if all terms belonging to the
propositional function are asserted, we have any, while if one
at least is asserted (which gives what is called an existence-
theorem), we get some. The proposition φx asserted without
comment, as in “x is a man implies x is a mortal,” is to be taken
to mean that φx is true for all values of x (or for any value), but
it might equally well have been taken to mean that φx is true
for some value of x. In this way we might construct a calculus
with two kinds of variable, the conjunctive and the disjunc-
tive, in which the latter would occur wherever an existence-
theoremwas to be stated. But this method does not appear to
possess any practical advantages.
91. It is to be observed that what is fundamental is not par-
ticular propositional functions, but the class-concept propo-
sitional function. A propositional function is the class of all 93
propositions which arise from the variation of a single term,
but this is not to be considered as a definition, for reasons ex-
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plained in the preceding chapter.
92. Frompropositional functions all other classes can be de-
rived by definition, with the help of the notion of such that.
Given a propositional function φx, the terms such that, when
x is identified with any one of them, φx is true, are the class de-
fined by φx. This is the class as many, the class in extension. It
is not to be assumed that every class so obtained has a defining
predicate: this subject will be discussed afresh in Chapter x.
But it must be assumed, I think, that a class in extension is de-
fined by any propositional function, and in particular that all
terms form a class, since many propositional functions (e.g. all
formal implications) are true of all terms. Here, as with formal
implications, it is necessary that thewhole propositional func-
tion whose truth defines the class should be kept intact, and
not, even where this is possible for every value of x, divided
into separate propositional functions. For example, if a and
b be two classes, defined by φx and ψx respectively, their com-
mon part is defined by the product φx : ψx, where the product
has to be made for every value of x, and then x varied after-
wards. If this is not done, we do not necessarily have the same
x in φx and ψx. Thus we do not multiply propositional func-
tions, but propositions: the new propositional function is the
class of products of corresponding propositions belonging to
the previous functions, and is by no means the product of φx
and ψx. It is only in virtue of a definition that the logical prod-
uct of the classes defined by φx and ψx is the class defined by
φx : ψx. And wherever a proposition containing an apparent
variable is asserted, what is asserted is the truth, for all values
of the variable or variables, of the propositional function cor-
responding to the whole proposition, and is never a relation
of propositional functions.
93. It appears from the above discussion that the variable
is a very complicated logical entity, by no means easy to ana-
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lyze correctly. The following appears to be as nearly correct as
any analysis I can make. Given any proposition (not a propo-
sitional function), let a be one of its terms, and let us call the
proposition φ(a). Then in virtue of the primitive idea of a
propositional function, if x be any term, we can consider the
proposition φ(x), which arises from the substitution of x in
place of a. We thus arrive at the class of all propositions φ(x).
If all are true, φ(x) is asserted simply: φ(x)may then be called
a formal truth. In a formal implication, φ(x), for every value of x,
states an implication, and the assertion ofφ(x) is the assertion
of a class of implications, not of a single implication. If φ(x)
is sometimes true, the values of x which make it true form a
class, which is the class defined byφ(x): the class is said to exist
in this case. If φ(x) is false for all values of x, the class defined
by φ(x) is said not to exist, and as a matter of fact, as we saw 94
in Chapter vi, there is no such class, if classes are taken in ex-
tension. Thus x is, in some sense, the object denoted by any
term; yet this can hardly be strictly maintained, for different
variablesmay occur in a proposition, yet the object denoted by
any term, one would suppose, is unique. This, however, elicits
a new point in the theory of denoting, namely that any term
does not denote, properly speaking, an assemblage of terms,
but denotes one term, only not one particular definite term.
Thus any term may denote different terms in different places.
We may say: any term has some relation to any term; and this
is quite a different proposition from: any term has some rela-
tion to itself. Thus variables have a kind of individuality. This
arises, as I have tried to show, from propositional functions.
When a propositional function has two variables, it must be
regarded as obtained by successive steps. If the propositional
function φ(x; y) is to be asserted for all values of x and y, we
must consider the assertion, for all values of y, of the propo-
sitional function φ(a; y) where a is a constant. This does not
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involve y, andmaybe representedbyψ(a). We thenvarya, and
assert ψ(x) for all values of x. The process is analogous to dou-
ble integration; and it is necessary to prove formally that the
order in which the variations are mademakes no difference to
the result. The individuality of variables appears to be thus
explained. A variable is not any term simply, but any term as
entering into a propositional function. We may say, if φx be
a propositional function, that x is the term in any proposition
of the class of propositions whose type is φx. It thus appears
that, as regards propositional functions, the notions of class,
of denoting, and of any, are fundamental, being presupposed
in the symbolism employed. With this conclusion, the analy-
sis of formal implication, which has been one of the principal
problems of Part I, is carried as far as I am able to carry it. May
some reader succeed in rendering it more complete, and in an-
swering the many questions which I have had to leave unan-
swered.
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chapter ix
RELATIONS
94. Next after subject-predicate propositions come two 95
types of propositions which appear equally simple. These are
the propositions in which a relation is asserted between two
terms, and those inwhich two terms are said tobe two. The lat-
ter class of propositions will be considered hereafter; the for-
mermust be considered at once. It has often been held that ev-
ery proposition can be reduced to one of the subject-predicate
type, but this viewwe shall, throughout the presentwork, find
abundant reason for rejecting. It might be held, however, that
all propositions not of the subject-predicate type, and not as-
serting numbers, could be reduced to propositions containing
two terms and a relation. This opinionwould bemore difficult
to refute, but this too, we shall find, has no good grounds in its
favour*. We may therefore allow that there are relations hav-
ingmore than two terms; but as these aremore complex, itwill
be well to consider first such as have two terms only.
A relation between two terms is a conceptwhich occurs in a
proposition inwhich there are two terms not occurring as con-
cepts†, and in which the interchange of the two terms gives a
different proposition. This lastmark is required todistinguish
a relational proposition fromone of the type “a and b are two,”
*See inf., Part IV, Chap. xxv, §200.
†This description, as we saw above (§48), excludes the pseudo-relation
of subject to predicate.
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which is identical with “b and a are two.” A relational propo-
sitionmay be symbolized by aRb, whereR is the relation and a
and b are the terms; and aRbwill then always, provided a and
b are not identical, denote a different proposition from bRa.
That is to say, it is characteristic of a relation of two terms that
it proceeds, so to speak, from one to the other. This is what
may be called the sense of the relation, and is, as we shall find,
the source of order and series. Itmust be held as an axiom that
aRb implies and is implied by a relational proposition bR0a, in
which the relationR0 proceeds from b to a, andmay ormaynot 96
be the same relation asR. But evenwhenaRb implies and is im-
plied by bRa, it must be strictly maintained that these are dif-
ferent propositions. We may distinguish the term fromwhich
the relation proceeds as the referent, and the term to which it
proceeds as the relatum. The sense of a relation is a fundamen-
tal notion, which is not capable of definition. The relation
which holds between b and awheneverRholds between a and
b will be called the converse of R, and will be denoted (follow-
ing Schröder) by R. The relation of R to R is the relation of
oppositeness, or difference of sense; and this must not be de-
fined (as would seem at first sight legitimate) by the above mu-
tual implication in any single case, but only by the fact of its
holding for all cases in which the given relation occurs. The
grounds for this view are derived from certain propositions in
which terms are related to themselves not-symmetrically, i.e.
by a relationwhose converse is not identical with itself. These
propositions must now be examined.
95. There is a certain temptation to affirm that no term
can he related to itself; and there is a still stronger tempta-
tion to affirm that, if a term can be related to itself, the rela-
tion must be symmetrical, i.e. identical with its converse. But
both these temptations must be resisted. In the first place,
if no term were related to itself, we should never be able to
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assert self-identity, since this is plainly a relation. But since
there is such a notion as identity, and since it seems unde-
niable that every term is identical with itself, we must allow
that a termmay be related to itself. Identity, however, is still a
symmetrical relation, and may be admitted without any great
qualms. The matter becomes far worse when we have to ad-
mit not-symmetrical relations of terms to themselves. Nev-
ertheless the following propositions seem undeniable; Being
is, or has being; 1 is one, or has unity; concept is conceptual;
term is a term; class-concept is a class-concept. All these are
of one of the three equivalent typeswhichwe distinguished at
the beginning of Chapter v, which may be called respectively
subject-predicate propositions, propositions asserting the re-
lation of predication, and propositions asserting membership
of a class. What we have to consider is, then, the fact that a
predicate may be predicable of itself. It is necessary, for our
present purpose, to take our propositions in the second form
(Socrates has humanity), since the subject-predicate form is
not in the above sense relational. We may take, as the type of
such propositions, “unity has unity.” Now it is certainly unde-
niable that the relation of predication is asymmetrical, since
subjects cannot in general be predicated of their predicates.
Thus “unity has unity” asserts one relation of unity to itself,
and implies another, namely the converse relation: unity has
to itself both the relation of subject to predicate, and the rela-
tion of predicate to subject. Now if the referent and the rela-
tumare identical, it is plain that the relatumhas to the referent
the same relation as the referent has to the relatum. Hence 97
if the converse of a relation in a particular case were defined
by mutual implication in that particular case, it would appear
that, in the present case, our relation has two converses, since
two different relations of relatum to referent are implied by
“unity has unity.” We must therefore define the converse of
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a relation by the fact that aRb implies and is implied by bRa
whatever a and b may be, and whether or not the relation R
holds between them. That is to say, a and b are here essentially
variables, and if we give them any constant value, wemay find
that aRb implies and is implied by bR0a, where R0 is some rela-
tion other than R.
Thus three points must be noted with regard to relations of
two terms: (1) they all have sense, so that, provided a and b
are not identical, we can distinguish aRb from bRa; (2) they all
have a converse, i.e. a relation R such thataRb implies and is im-
plied by bRa, whatever a and bmay be; (3) some relations hold
between a term and itself, and such relations are not necessar-
ily symmetrical, i.e. theremaybe twodifferent relations, which
are each other’s converses, and which both hold between a
term and itself.
96. For the general theory of relations, especially in itsmath-
ematical developments, certain axioms relating classes and re-
lations are of great importance. It is to be held that to have a
given relation to a given term is a predicate, so that all terms
having this relation to this term form a class. It is to be held
further that to have a given relation at all is a predicate, so that
all referents with respect to a given relation form a class. It fol-
lows, by considering the converse relation, that all relata also
form a class. These two classes I shall call respectively the do-
main and the converse domain of the relation; the logical sum
of the two I shall call the field of the relation.
The axiom that all referents with respect to a given relation
form a class seems, however, to require some limitation, and
that on account of the contradiction mentioned at the end
of Chapter vi. This contradiction may be stated as follows.
We saw that some predicates can be predicated of themselves.
Consider now those of which this is not the case. These are
the referents (and also the relata) in what seems like a com-
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plex relation, namely the combination of non-predicability
with identity. But there is no predicate which attaches to all
of them and to no other terms. For this predicate will either
be predicable or not predicable of itself. If it is predicable of
itself, it is one of those referents by relation to which it was
defined, and therefore, in virtue of their definition, it is not
predicable of itself. Conversely, if it is not predicable of itself,
then again it is one of the said referents, of all of which (by hy-
pothesis) it is predicable, and therefore again it is predicable
of itself. This is a contradiction, which shows that all the ref-
erents considered have no exclusive common predicate, and
therefore, if defining predicates are essential to classes, do not
form a class.
Thematter may be put otherwise. In defining the would-be 98
class of predicates, all those not predicable of themselves have
been used up. The common predicate of all these predicates
cannot be one of them, since for each of them there is at least
one predicate (namely itself) of which it is not predicable. But
again, the supposed common predicate cannot be any other
predicate, for if it were, it would be predicable of itself, i.e. it
would be a member of the supposed class of predicates, since
these were defined as those of which it is predicable. Thus no
predicate is left over which could attach to all the predicates
considered.
It follows from the above that not every definable collec-
tion of terms forms a class defined by a common predicate.
This fact must be borne in mind, and we must endeavour to
discover what properties a collection must have in order to
form such a class. The exact point established by the above
contradiction may be stated as follows: A proposition appar-
ently containing only one variable may not be equivalent to
any proposition asserting that the variable in question has a
certain predicate. It remains an open question whether every
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class must have a defining predicate.
That all terms having a given relation to a given term form
a class defined by an exclusive common predicate results from
thedoctrineofChapter vii, that thepropositionaRb canbe an-
alyzed into the subject a and the assertion Rb. To be a term of
whichRb can be asserted appears to be plainly a predicate. But
it does not follow, I think, that to be a term of which, for some
value of y, Ry can be asserted, is a predicate. The doctrine of
propositional functions requires, however, that all terms hav-
ing the latter property should form a class. This class I shall
call the domain of the relation R as well as the class of refer-
ents. The domain of the converse relation will be also called
the converse domain, as well as the class of relata. The two do-
mains togetherwill be called the field of the relation—anotion
chiefly important as regards series. Thus if paternity be the re-
lation, fathers form its domain, children its converse domain,
and fathers and children together its field.
It may be doubted whether a proposition aRb can be re-
garded as asserting aR of b, or whether only Ra can be asserted
of b. In other words, is a relational proposition only an asser-
tion concerning the referent, or also an assertion concerning
the relatum? If we take the latter view, we shall have, con-
nected with (say) “a is greater than b,” four assertions, namely
“is greater than b,” “a is greater than,” “is less than a” and “b is
less than.” I am inclined myself to adopt this view, but I know
of no argument on either side.
97. We can form the logical sum and product of two rela-
tions or of a class of relations exactly as in the case of classes,
except that here we have to deal with double variability. In ad-
dition to these ways of combination, we have also the relative
product, which is in general non-commutative, and therefore 99
requires that the number of factors should be finite. If R, S be
two relations, to say that their relative product RS holds be-
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tween two terms x, z is to say that there is a term y to which
x has the relation R, and which itself has the relation S to z.
Thusbrother-in-law is the relativeproductofwife andbrother
or of sister and husband: father-in-law is the relative product
of wife and father, whereas the relative product of father and
wife is mother or step-mother.
98. There is a temptation to regard a relation as definable in
extension as a class of couples. This has the formal advantage
that it avoids thenecessity for the primitive proposition assert-
ing that every couple has a relation holding between no other
pair of terms. But it is necessary to give sense to the couple,
to distinguish the referent from the relatum: thus a couple be-
comes essentially distinct from a class of two terms, and must
itself be introduced as a primitive idea. It would seem, view-
ing the matter philosophically, that sense can only be derived
from some relational proposition, and that the assertion that
a is referent and b relatum already involves a purely relational
proposition inwhich a and b are terms, though the relation as-
serted is only the general one of referent to relatum. There are,
in fact, concepts such as greater, whichoccur otherwise than as
terms in propositions having two terms (§§48, 54); and no doc-
trine of couples can evade such propositions. It seems there-
fore more correct to take an intensional view of relations, and
to identify them rather with class-concepts than with classes.
This procedure is formally more convenient, and seems also
nearer to the logical facts. Throughout Mathematics there
is the same rather curious relation of intensional and exten-
sional points of view: the symbols other than variable terms
(i.e. the variable class-concepts and relations) stand for inten-
sions,while the actual objects dealtwith are always extensions.
Thus in the calculus of relations, it is classes of couples that are
relevant, but the symbolism deals with them bymeans of rela-
tions. This is precisely similar to the state of things explained
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in relation to classes, and it seems unnecessary to repeat the
explanations at length.
99. Mr Bradley, in Appearance and Reality, Chapter iii, has
based an argument against the reality of relations upon the
endless regress arising from the fact that a relation which re-
lates two terms must be related to each of them. The endless
regress is undeniable, if relational propositions are taken to be
ultimate, but it is very doubtful whether it forms any logical
difficulty. We have already had occasion (§55) to distinguish
two kinds of regress, the one proceeding merely to perpetu-
ally new implied propositions, the other in the meaning of a
proposition itself; of these two kinds, we agreed that the for-
mer, since the solution of the problem of infinity, has ceased
to be objectionable, while the latter remains inadmissible. We
have to inquire which kind of regress occurs in the present
instance. It may be urged that it is part of the very meaning
of a relational proposition that the relation involved should 100
have to the terms the relation expressed in saying that it re-
lates them, and that this is what makes the distinction, which
we formerly (§54) left unexplained, between a relating relation
and a relation in itself. It may be urged, however, against this
view, that the assertion of a relation between the relation and
the terms, though implied, is no part of the original proposi-
tion, and that a relating relation is distinguished from a rela-
tion in itself by the indefinable element of assertionwhich dis-
tinguishes a proposition from a concept. Against this it might
be retorted that, in the concept “difference of a and b,” dif-
ference relates a and b just as much as in the proposition “a
and b differ”; but to this it may be rejoined that we found the
difference of a and b, except in so far as some specific point
of differencemay be in question, to be indistinguishable from
bare difference. Thus it seems impossible to prove that the
endless regress involved is of the objectionable kind. Wemay
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 149
distinguish, I think, between “a exceeds b” and “a is greater
than b,” though it would be absurd to deny that people usually
mean the same thing by these two propositions. On the prin-
ciple, fromwhich I can see no escape, that every genuineword
must have somemeaning, the is and thanmust form part of “a
is greater than b,” which thus contains more than two terms
and a relation. The is seems to state that a has to greater the re-
lation of referent, while the than states similarly that b has to
greater the relation of relatum. But “a exceeds b” may be held
to express solely the relation of a to b, without including any
of the implications of further relations. Hence we shall have
to conclude that a relational proposition aRb does not include
in its meaning any relation of a or b to R, and that the endless
regress, though undeniable, is logically quite harmless. With
these remarks, we may leave the further theory of relations to
later Parts of the present work.
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chapter x
THECONTRADICTION
100. Before taking leave of fundamental questions, it is nec- 101
essary to examinemore in detail the singular contradiction, al-
ready mentioned, with regard to predicates not predicable of
themselves. Before attempting to solve this puzzle, it will be
well to make some deductions connected with it, and to state
it in various different forms. I may mention that I was led to
it in the endeavour to reconcile Cantor’s proof that there can
be no greatest cardinal number with the very plausible suppo-
sition that the class of all terms (which we have seen to be es-
sential to all formal propositions) has necessarily the greatest
possible number of members*.
Let w be a class concept which can be asserted of itself, i.e.
such that “w is a w.” Instances are class-concept, and the nega-
tions of ordinary class-concepts, e.g. not-man. Then (α) if w
be contained in another class v, since w is a w, w is a v; conse-
quently there is a term of v which is a class-concept that can
be asserted of itself. Hence by contraposition, (β) if u be a
class-concept none of whose members are class-concepts that
can be asserted of themselves, no class-concept contained in
u can be asserted of itself. Hence further, (γ) if u be any class-
concept whatever, and u0 the class-concept of those members
of uwhich are not predicable of themselves, this class-concept
*See Part V, Chap. xliii, §344ff.
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is contained in itself, and none of its members are predicable
of themselves; hence by (β) u0 is not predicable of itself. Thus
u0 is not a u0, and is therefore not a u; for the terms of u that
are not terms of u0 are all predicable of themselves, which u0
is not. Thus (δ) if u be any class-concept whatever, there is a
class-concept contained in u which is not a member of u, and
is also one of those class-concepts that are not predicable of
themselves. So far, ourdeductions seemscarcely open toques-
tion. But ifwenow take the last of them, and admit the class of
those class-concepts that cannot be asserted of themselves, we
find that this class must contain a class-concept not a member
of itself and yet not belonging to the class in question.
Wemay observe also that, in virtue of what we have proved
in (β), the class of class-concepts which cannot be asserted of
themselves, whichwewill callw, contains asmembers of itself 102
all its sub-classes, although it is easy to prove that every class
has more sub-classes than terms. Again, if y be any term of w,
andw0 be the whole ofw except y, thenw0, being a sub-class of
w, is not a w0 but is a w, and therefore is y. Hence each class-
concept which is a term of w has all other terms of w as its ex-
tension. It follows that the concept bicycle is a teaspoon, and
teaspoon is a bicycle. This is plainly absurd, and any number of
similar absurdities can be proved.
101. Let us leave these paradoxical consequences, and at-
tempt the exact statement of the contradiction itself. We
have first the statement in terms of predicates, which has been
given already. If x be a predicate, xmay or may not be predica-
ble of itself. Let us assume that “not-predicable of oneself” is a
predicate. Then to suppose either that this predicate is, or that
it is not, predicable of itself, is self-contradictory. The conclu-
sion, in this case, seems obvious: “not-predicable of oneself”
is not a predicate.
Let us now state the same contradiction in terms of class-
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 152
concepts. A class-conceptmay ormay not be a term of its own
extension. “Class-concept which is not a term of its own ex-
tension” appears to be a class-concept. But if it is a term of its
own extension, it is a class-concept which is not a term of its
ownextension, and vice versâ. Thuswemust conclude, against
appearances, that “class-conceptwhich is not a termof its own
extension” is not a class-concept.
In terms of classes the contradiction appears even more ex-
traordinary. A class as one may be a term of itself as many.
Thus the class of all classes is a class; the class of all the terms
that are not men is not a man, and so on. Do all the classes
that have this property form a class? If so, is it as one a mem-
ber of itself as many or not? If it is, then it is one of the classes
which, as ones, are not members of themselves as many, and
vice versâ. Thuswemust conclude again that the classes which
as ones are not members of themselves as many do not form a
class—or rather, that they do not form a class as one, for the
argument cannot show that they do not form a class as many.
102. A similar result, which, however, does not lead to a con-
tradiction, may be proved concerning any relation. Let R be a
relation, and consider the class w of terms which do not have
the relation R to themselves. Then it is impossible that there
should be any term a to which all of them and no other terms
have the relation R. For, if there were such a term, the propo-
sitional function “x does not have the relation R to x” would
be equivalent to “x has the relation R to a.” Substituting a for
x throughout, which is legitimate since the equivalence is for-
mal, we find a contradiction. When in place of Rwe put ϵ, the
relationof a term to a class-conceptwhich canbe asserted of it,
we get the above contradiction. The reason that a contradic-
tion emerges here is that we have taken it as an axiom that any
propositional function containing only one variable is equiv- 103
alent to asserting membership of a class defined by the propo-
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sitional function. Either this axiom, or the principle that ev-
ery class can be taken as one term, is plainly false, and there
is no fundamental objection to dropping either. But having
dropped the former, the question arises: Which propositional
functions define classeswhich are single terms aswell asmany,
andwhich do not? Andwith this question our real difficulties
begin.
Anymethod by which we attempt to establish a one-one or
many-one correlation of all terms and all propositional func-
tions must omit at least one propositional function. Such a
method would exist if all propositional functions could be ex-
pressed in the form … ϵu, since this form correlates u with …
ϵu. But the impossibility of any such correlation is proved as
follows. Let φx be a propositional function correlated with
x; then, if the correlation covers all terms, the denial of φx(x)
will be a propositional function, since it is a proposition for all
values of x. But it cannot be included in the correlation; for
if it were correlated with a, φ(x) would be equivalent, for all
values of x, to the denial of φx(x); but this equivalence is im-
possible for the value a, since it makes φ(a) equivalent to its
own denial. It follows that there are more propositional func-
tions than terms—a result which seems plainly impossible, al-
though the proof is as convincing as any in Mathematics. We
shall shortly see how the impossibility is removed by the doc-
trine of logical types.
103. The first method which suggests itself is to seek an am-
biguity in the notion of ϵ. But in Chapter vi we distinguished
the variousmeanings as far as any distinction seemed possible,
andwehave just seen thatwith eachmeaning the same contra-
diction emerges. Let us, however, attempt to state the contra-
diction throughout in terms of propositional functions. Every
propositional functionwhich is notnull, we supposed, defines
a class, and every class can certainly be defined by a proposi-
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tional function. Thus to say that a class as one is not a mem-
ber of itself as many is to say that the class as one does not sat-
isfy the function by which itself as many is defined. Since all
propositional functions except such as are null define classes,
all will be used up, in considering all classes having the above
property, except such as do not have the above property. If
any propositional function were satisfied by every class hav-
ing the above property, it would therefore necessarily be one
satisfied also by the class w of all such classes considered as a
single term. Hence the class w does not itself belong to the
class w, and therefore there must be some propositional func-
tion satisfied by the terms of w but not by w itself. Thus the
contradiction re-emerges, and we must suppose, either that
there is no such entity as w, or that there is no propositional
function satisfied by its terms and by no others.
It might be thought that a solution could be found by deny-
ing the legitimacy of variable propositional functions. If we
denote by kφ, for the moment, the class of values satisfying 104
φ, our propositional function is the denial of φ(kφ) where φ
is the variable. The doctrine of Chapter vii, that φ is not a
separable entity, mightmake such a variable seem illegitimate;
but this objection can be overcome by substituting for φ the
class of propositionsφx, or the relation ofφx to x. Moreover it
is impossible to exclude variable propositional functions alto-
gether. Wherever a variable class or a variable relation occurs,
we have admitted a variable propositional function, which is
thus essential to assertions about every class or about every
relation. The definition of the domain of a relation, for exam-
ple, and all the general propositions which constitute the cal-
culus of relations, would be swept away by the refusal to allow
this type of variation. Thus we require some further charac-
teristic by which to distinguish two kinds of variation. This
characteristic is to be found, I think, in the independent vari-
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ability of the function and the argument. In general, φx is it-
self a function of two variables, φ and x; of these, either may
be given a constant value, and either may be varied without
reference to the other. But in the type of propositional func-
tionswe are considering in thisChapter, the argument is itself
a function of the propositional function: instead of φx, we
have φff(φ)g, where f(φ) is defined as a function of φ. Thus
when φ is varied, the argument of which φ is asserted is varied
too. Thus “x is an x” is equivalent to: “φ can be asserted of
the class of terms satisfying φ,” this class of terms being x. If
here φ is varied, the argument is varied at the same time in a
manner dependent upon the variation of φ. For this reason,
φff(φ)g, though it is a definite proposition when x is assigned,
is not a propositional function, in the ordinary sense, when x
is variable. Propositional functions of this doubtful type may
be called quadratic forms, because the variable enters into them
in a way somewhat analogous to that in which, in Algebra, a
variable appears in an expression of the second degree.
104. Perhaps the best way to state the suggested solution is
to say that, if a collectionof terms canonly be definedby a vari-
able propositional function, then, though a class as manymay
be admitted, a class as one must be denied. When so stated, it
appears that propositional functions may be varied, provided
the resulting collection is never itself made into the subject in
the original propositional function. In such cases there is only
a class asmany, not a class as one. We took it as axiomatic that
the class as one is to be foundwherever there is a class asmany;
but this axiom need not be universally admitted, and appears
to have been the source of the contradiction. By denying it,
therefore, the whole difficulty will be overcome.
A class as one, we shall say, is an object of the same type as
its terms; i.e. any propositional function φ(x) which is signifi-
cant when one of the terms is substituted for x is also signifi-
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cant when the class as one is substituted. But the class as one 105
does not always exist, and the class as many is of a different
type from the terms of the class, even when the class has only
one term, i.e. there are propositional functions φ(u) in which
u may be the class as many, which are meaningless if, for u,
we substitute one of the terms of the class. And so “x is one
among x’s” is not a proposition at all if the relation involved
is that of a term to its class as many; and this is the only re-
lation of whose presence a propositional function always as-
sures us. In this view, a class as many may be a logical subject,
but in propositions of a different kind from those in which
its terms are subjects; of any object other than a single term,
the question whether it is one or many will have different an-
swers according to the proposition in which it occurs. Thus
we have “Socrates is one among men,” in which men are plu-
ral; but “menare one among species of animals,” inwhichmen
are singular. It is the distinction of logical types that is the key
to the whole mystery*.
105. Other ways of evading the contradiction, which might
be suggested, appear undesirable, on the ground that they de-
stroy toomany quite necessary kinds of propositions. Itmight
be suggested that identity is introduced in “x is not an x” in a
way which is not permissible. But it has been already shown
that relations of terms to themselves are unavoidable, and it
may be observed that suicides or self-made men or the heroes
of Smiles’s Self-Help are all defined by relations to themselves.
Andgenerally, identity enters in a very similarway into formal
implication, so that it is quite impossible to reject it.
A natural suggestion for escaping from the contradiction
would be to demur to the notion of all terms or of all classes.
It might be urged that no such sum-total is conceivable; and
if all indicates a whole, our escape from the contradiction re-
*On this subject, see Appendix.
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quires us to admit this. But we have already abundantly seen
that if this view were maintained against any term, all formal
truth would be impossible, and Mathematics, whose charac-
teristic is the statement of truths concerning any term, would
be abolished at one stroke. Thus the correct statement of for-
mal truths requires the notion of any term or every term, but
not the collective notion of all terms.
It should be observed, finally, that no peculiar philosophy
is involved in the above contradiction, which springs directly
from common sense, and can only be solved by abandoning
some common-sense assumption. Only the Hegelian philoso-
phy, which nourishes itself on contradictions, can remain in-
different, because it finds similar problems everywhere. In any
other doctrine, so direct a challenge demands an answer, on
pain of a confession of impotence. Fortunately, no other sim-
ilar difficulty, so far as I know, occurs in any other portion of
the Principles of Mathematics.
106. We may now briefly review the conclusions arrived at 106
in Part I. Pure Mathematics was defined as the class of propo-
sitions asserting formal implications and containing no con-
stants except logical constants. And logical constants are:
Implication, the relation of a term to a class of which it is a
member, the notion of such that, the notion of relation, and
such further notions as are involved in formal implication,
which we found (§93) to be the following: propositional func-
tion, class*, denoting, and any or every term. This definition
brought Mathematics into very close relation to Logic, and
made it practically identical with Symbolic Logic. An exam-
ination of Symbolic Logic justified the above enumeration of
mathematical indefinables. In Chapter iii we distinguished
*The notion of class in general, we decided, could be replaced, as an
indefinable, by that of the class of propositions defined by a propositional
function.
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implication and formal implication. The former holds be-
tween any two propositions provided the first be false or the
second true. The latter is not a relation, but the assertion,
for every value of the variable or variables, of a propositional
function which, for every value of the variable or variables,
asserts an implication. Chapter iv distinguished what may
be called things from predicates and relations (including the
is of predications among relations for this purpose). It was
shown that this distinction is connected with the doctrine
of substance and attributes, but does not lead to the tradi-
tional results. Chapters v and vi developed the theory of pred-
icates. In the former of these chapters it was shown that cer-
tain concepts, derived from predicates, occur in propositions
not about themselves, but about combinations of terms, such
as are indicated by all, every, any, a, some, and the. Concepts of
this kind, we found, are fundamental inMathematics, and en-
able us to deal with infinite classes by means of propositions
of finite complexity. In Chapter vi we distinguished predi-
cates, class-concepts, concepts of classes, classes as many, and
classes as one. We agreed that single terms, or such combina-
tions as result from and, are classes, the latter being classes as
many; and that classes asmany are the objects denoted by con-
cepts of classes, which are the plurals of class-concepts. But
in the present chapter we decided that it is necessary to distin-
guish a single term from the classwhose onlymember it is, and
that consequently the null-class may be admitted.
In Chapter vii we resumed the study of the verb. Subject-
predicate propositions, and such as express a fixed relation
to a fixed term, could be analyzed, we found, into a subject
and an assertion; but this analysis becomes impossible when
a given term enters into a proposition in a more complicated
manner than as referent of a relation. Hence it became nec-
essary to take propositional function as a primitive notion. A
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propositional function of one variable is any proposition of
a set defined by the variation of a single term, while the other
terms remain constant. But in general it is impossible to de- 107
fine or isolate the constant element in a propositional func-
tion, since what remains, when a certain term, wherever it oc-
curs, is left out of a proposition, is in general no discoverable
kind of entity. Thus the term in question must be not simply
omitted, but replaced by a variable.
The notion of the variable, we found, is exceedingly compli-
cated. The x is not simplyany term, but any termwith a certain
individuality; for if not, any two variables would be indistin-
guishable. We agreed that a variable is any term quâ term in
a certain propositional function, and that variables are distin-
guished by the propositional functions in which they occur,
or, in the case of several variables, by the place they occupy in
a given multiply variable propositional function. A variable,
we said, is the term in any proposition of the set denoted by a
given propositional function.
Chapter ix pointed out that relational propositions are ul-
timate, and that they all have sense: i.e. the relation being the
concept as such in a proposition with two terms, there is an-
other proposition containing the same terms and the same
concept as such, as in “A is greater than B” and “B is greater
than A.” These two propositions, though different, contain
precisely the same constituents. This is a characteristic of re-
lations, and an instance of the loss resulting from analysis. Re-
lations, we agreed, are to be taken intensionally, not as classes
of couples*.
Finally, in the present chapter, we examined the contradic-
tion resulting from the apparent fact that, if w be the class of
all classeswhichas single terms arenotmembersof themselves
*On this point, however, see Appendix.
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as many, thenw as one can be proved both to be and not to be
a member of itself as many. The solution suggested was that
it is necessary to distinguish various types of objects, namely
terms, classes of terms, classes of classes, classes of couples of
terms, and so on; and that a propositional function φx in gen-
eral requires, if it is to have anymeaning, that x should belong
to some one type. Thus x ϵ x was held to be meaningless, be-
cause ϵ requires that the relatumshouldbe a class composedof
objects which are of the type of the referent. The class as one,
where it exists, is, we said, of the same type as its constituents;
but a quadratic propositional function in general appears to
define only a class as many, and the contradiction proves that
the class as one, if it ever exists, is certainly sometimes absent.
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PART II
NUMBER
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chapter xi
DEFINITIONOFCARDINAL
NUMBERS
107. We have now briefly reviewed the apparatus of gen- 111
eral logical notions with which Mathematics operates. In
the present Part, it is to be shown how this apparatus suf-
fices, without new indefinables or new postulates, to establish
the whole theory of cardinal integers as a special branch of
Logic*. No mathematical subject has made, in recent years,
greater advances than the theory of Arithmetic. The move-
ment in favour of correctness in deduction, inaugurated by
Weierstrass, has beenbrilliantly continuedbyDedekind,Can-
tor, Frege, and Peano, and attains what seems its final goal by
means of the logic of relations. As the modern mathemati-
cal theory is but imperfectly known even by most mathemati-
cians, I shall begin this Part by four chapters setting forth its
outlines in a non-symbolic form. I shall then examine the pro-
cess of deduction from a philosophical standpoint, in order
to discover, if possible, whether any unperceived assumptions
have covertly intruded themselves in the course of the argu-
ment.
108. It is often held that both number and particular num-
bers are indefinable. Now definability is a word which, in
*Cantor has shown that it is necessary to separate the study of Cardi-
nal and Ordinal numbers, which are distinct entities, of which the former
are simpler, but of which both are essential to ordinary Mathematics. On
Ordinal numbers, cf. Chaps. xxix, xxxviii, infra.
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Mathematics, has a precise sense, though one which is rela-
tive to some given set of notions†. Given any set of notions,
a term is definable by means of these notions when, and only
when, it is the only term having to certain of these notions
a certain relation which itself is one of the said notions. But
philosophically, the word definition has not, as a rule, been
employed in this sense; it has, in fact, been restricted to the
analysis of an idea into its constituents. This usage is incon-
venient and, I think, useless; moreover it seems to overlook
the fact that wholes are not, as a rule, determinate when their 112
constituents are given, but are themselves new entities (which
may be in some sense simple), defined, in the mathematical
sense, by certain relations to their constituents. I shall, there-
fore, in future, ignore the philosophical sense, and speak only
of mathematical definability. I shall, however, restrict this no-
tion more than is done by Professor Peano and his disciples.
They hold that the various branches ofMathematics have vari-
ous indefinables, bymeansofwhich the remaining ideas of the
said subjects are defined. I hold—and it is an important part
of my purpose to prove—that all Pure Mathematics (includ-
ingGeometry and even rational Dynamics) contains only one
set of indefinables, namely the fundamental logical concepts
discussed in Part I. When the various logical constants have
been enumerated, it is somewhat arbitrary which of them we
regard as indefinable, though there are apparently somewhich
must be indefinable in any theory. But my contention is, that
the indefinables of Pure Mathematics are all of this kind, and
that the presence of any other indefinables indicates that our
subject belongs to Applied Mathematics. Moreover, of the
three kinds of definition admitted by Peano—thenominal def-
inition, the definition by postulates, and the definition by ab-
†SeePeano,F. 1901, p. 6ff. andPadoa, “ThéorieAlgébriquedesNombres
Entiers,”Congrès, Vol. iii, p. 314ff.
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straction*—I recognize only the nominal: the others, it would
seem, are only necessitated by Peano’s refusal to regard rela-
tions as part of the fundamental apparatus of logic, and by his
somewhat undue haste in regarding as an individual what is
really a class. These remarks will be best explained by consid-
ering their application to the definition of cardinal numbers.
109. It has been common in the past, among those who re-
garded numbers as definable, to make an exception as regards
the number 1, and to define the remainder by its means. Thus
2 was 1 + 1, 3 was 2 + 1, and so on. This method was only ap-
plicable to finite numbers, and made a tiresome difference be-
tween 1 and other numbers; moreover the meaning of + was
commonly not explained. We are able now-a-days to improve
greatly upon this method. In the first place, since Cantor has
shown how to deal with the infinite, it has become both de-
sirable and possible to deal with the fundamental properties
of numbers in a way which is equally applicable to finite and
infinite numbers. In the second place, the logical calculus has
enabled us to give an exact definition of arithmetical addition;
and in the third place, it has become as easy to define 0 and 1
as to define any other number. In order to explain how this
is done, I shall first set forth the definition of numbers by ab-
straction; I shall then point out formal defects in this defini-
tion, and replace it by a nominal definition.
Numbers are, it will be admitted, applicable essentially to
classes. It is true that, where the number is finite, individ-
uals may be enumerated to make up the given number, and 113
may be counted one by one without any mention of a class-
concept. But all finite collections of individuals form classes,
so that what results is after all the number of a class. And
where the number is infinite, the individuals cannot be enu-
*Cf. Burali-Forti, “Sur les différentes definitions du nombre réel,”Con-
grès, iii, p. 294ff.
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merated, but must be defined by intension, i.e. by some com-
monproperty in virtue ofwhich they form a class. Thuswhen
any class-concept is given, there is a certain number of individ-
uals to which this class-concept is applicable, and the number
may therefore be regarded as a property of the class. It is this
view of numbers which has rendered possible the whole the-
ory of infinity, since it relieves us of the necessity of enumer-
ating the individuals whose number is to be considered. This
view depends fundamentally upon the notion of all, the nu-
merical conjunction as we agreed to call it (§59). All men, for
example, denotes men conjoined in a certain way; and it is as
thus denoted that they have a number. Similarly all numbers
or all points denotes numbers or points conjoined in a certain
way, and as thus conjoined numbers or points have a number.
Numbers, then, are to be regarded as properties of classes.
The next question is: Under what circumstances do two
classes have the same number? The answer is, that they have
the same number when their terms can be correlated one to
one, so that any one term of either corresponds to one and
only one term of the other. This requires that there should
be some one-one relation whose domain is the one class and
whose converse domain is the other class. Thus, for exam-
ple, if in a community all the men and all the women are mar-
ried, and polygamy and polyandry are forbidden, the number
of men must be the same as the number of women. It might
be thought that a one-one relation could not be defined ex-
cept by reference to the number 1. But this is not the case. A
relation is one-one when, if x and x0 have the relation in ques-
tion to y, then x and x0 are identical; while if x has the rela-
tion in question to y and y0, then y and y0 are identical. Thus
it is possible, without the notion of unity, to define what is
meant by a one-one relation. But in order to provide for the
case of two classeswhich have no terms, it is necessary tomod-
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ify slightly the above account of what is meant by saying that
two classes have the same number. For if there are no terms,
the terms cannot be correlated one to one. Wemust say: Two
classes have the same number when, and only when, there is
a one-one relation whose domain includes the one class, and
which is such that the class of correlates of the terms of the
one class is identical with the other class. From this it appears
that two classes having no terms have always the same num-
ber of terms; for if we take any one-one relation whatever, its
domain includes the null-class, and the class of correlates of
the null-class is again the null-class. When two classes have
the same number, they are said to be similar.
Some readers may suppose that a definition of what is
meant by saying that two classes have the same number is
wholly unnecessary. The way to find out, they may say, is 114
to count both classes. It is such notions as this which have,
until very recently, prevented the exhibition of Arithmetic as
a branch of Pure Logic. For the question immediately arises:
What is meant by counting? To this question we usually get
only some irrelevant psychological answer, as, that counting
consists in successive acts of attention. In order to count 10,
I suppose that ten acts of attention are required: certainly a
most useful definition of the number 10! Counting has, in fact,
a goodmeaning, which is not psychological. But thismeaning
is highly complex; it is only applicable to classes which can be
well-ordered,which are not known tobe all classes; and it only
gives the number of the class when this number is finite—a
rare and exceptional case. We must not, therefore, bring in
counting where the definition of numbers is in question.
The relation of similarity between classes has the three
properties of being reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive; that
is to say, if u, v, w be classes, u is similar to itself; if u be sim-
ilar to v, v is similar to u; and if u be similar to v, and v to w,
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then u is similar to w. These properties all follow easily from
the definition. Now these three properties of a relation are
held by Peano and common sense to indicate that when the
relation holds between two terms, those two terms have a cer-
tain common property, and vicevers. This common property
we call their number*. This is the definition of numbers by
abstraction.
110. Now this definition by abstraction, and generally the
process employed in such definitions, suffers from an abso-
lutely fatal formal defect: it does not show that only oneobject
satisfies the definition†. Thus instead of obtaining one com-
mon property of similar classes, which is the number of the
classes in question, we obtain a class of such properties, with
no means of deciding how many terms this class contains. In
order tomake this point clear, let us examinewhat ismeant, in
the present instance, by a common property. What is meant
is, that any class has to a certain entity, its number, a relation
which it has to nothing else, but which all similar classes (and
no other entities) have to the said number. That is, there is a
many-one relation which every class has to its number and to
nothing else. Thus, so far as the definition by abstraction can
show, any set of entities to each of which some class has a cer-
tain many-one relation, and to one and only one of which any
given class has this relation, andwhich are such that all classes
similar to a given class have this relation to one and the same
entity of the set, appear as the set of numbers, and any entity
of this set is the number of some class. If, then, there are many
such sets of entities—and it is easy to prove that there are an 115
*Cf. Peano, F. 1901, §32, ·0, Note.
†On the necessity of this condition, cf. Padoa, loc. cit., p. 324. Padoa
appears not to perceive, however, that all definitions define the single indi-
vidual of a class: whenwhat is defined is a class, this must be the only term
of some class of classes.
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infinite number of them—every classwill havemanynumbers,
and the definition wholly fails to define the number of a class.
This argument is perfectly general, and shows that definition
by abstraction is never a logically valid process.
111. There are twoways in which wemay attempt to remedy
this defect. One of these consists in defining as the number of
a class the whole class of entities, chosen one from each of the
above sets of entities, to which all classes similar to the given
class (and no others) have some many-one relation or other.
But this method is practically useless, since all entities, with-
out exception, belong to every such class, so that every class
will have as its number the class of all entities of every sort
and description. The other remedy is more practicable, and
applies to all the cases in which Peano employs definition by
abstraction. This method is, to define as the number of a class
the class of all classes similar to the given class. Membership
of this class of classes (considered as a predicate) is a common
property of all the similar classes and of no others; moreover
every class of the set of similar classes has to the set a relation
which it has to nothing else, and which every class has to its
own set. Thus the conditions are completely fulfilled by this
class of classes, and it has themerit of being determinatewhen
a class is given, and of being different for two classeswhich are
not similar. This, then, is an irreproachable definition of the
number of a class in purely logical terms.
To regard a number as a class of classes must appear, at first
sight, a wholly indefensible paradox. Thus Peano (F. 1901, §32)
remarks that “we cannot identify the number of [a class] awith
the class of classes in question [i.e. the class of classes similar
to a], for these objects have different properties.” He does not
tell us what these properties are, and for my part I am unable
to discover them. Probably it appeared to him immediately ev-
ident that a number is not a class of classes. But something
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may be said tomitigate the appearance of paradox in this view.
In the first place, such a word as couple or trio obviously does
denote a class of classes. Thus what we have to say is, for ex-
ample, that “twomen”means “logical product of class of men
and couple,” and “there are two men” means “there is a class
of men which is also a couple.” In the second place, when we
remember that a class-concept is not itself a collection, but a
property by which a collection is defined, we see that, if we
define the number as the class-concept, not the class, a num-
ber is really defined as a common property of a set of similar
classes and of nothing else. This view removes the appearance
of paradox to a great degree. There is, however, a philosoph-
ical difficulty in this view, and generally in the connection of
classes and predicates. It may be that there are many predi-
cates common to a certain collection of objects and to no oth-
ers. In this case, these predicates are all regarded by Symbolic
Logic as equivalent, and any one of them is said to be equal
to any other. Thus if the predicate were defined by the col- 116
lection of objects, we should not obtain, in general, a single
predicate, but a class of predicates; for this class of predicates
we should require a new class-concept, and so on. The only
available class-concept would be “predicability of the given
collection of terms and of no others.” But in the present case,
where the collection is defined by a certain relation to one of
its terms, there is some danger of a logical error. Let u be a
class; then the number of u, we said, is the class of classes simi-
lar to u. But “similar to u” cannot be the actual concept which
constitutes the number of u; for, if v be similar to u, “similar
to v” defines the same class, although it is a different concept.
Thus we require, as the defining predicate of the class of simi-
lar classes, some concept which does not have any special rela-
tion to one or more of the constituent classes. In regard to ev-
ery particular number that may be mentioned, whether finite
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or infinite, such a predicate is, as amatter of fact, discoverable;
butwhenallwe are told about anumber is that it is thenumber
of some class u, it is natural that a special reference to u should
appear in the definition. This, however, is not the point at is-
sue. The real point is, that what is defined is the samewhether
we use the predicate “similar to u” or “similar to v,” provided
u is similar to v. This shows that it is not the class-concept
or defining predicate that is defined, but the class itself whose
terms are the various classes which are similar to u or to v. It is
such classes, therefore, and not predicates such as “similar to
u,” that must be taken to constitute numbers.
Thus, to sumup: Mathematically, a number is nothingbut a
class of similar classes: this definition allows the deduction of
all the usual properties of numbers, whether finite or infinite,
and is the only one (so far as I know)which is possible in terms
of the fundamental concepts of general logic. But philosophi-
cally we may admit that every collection of similar classes has
some common predicate applicable to no entities except the
classes inquestion, and ifwecanfind, by inspection, that there
is a certain class of such commonpredicates, ofwhich one and
only one applies to each collection of similar classes, then we
may, ifwe see fit, call this particular class of predicates the class
of numbers. For my part, I do not know whether there is any
such class of predicates, and I do know that, if there be such a
class, it is wholly irrelevant to Mathematics. Wherever Math-
ematics derives a common property from a reflexive, symmet-
rical, and transitive relation, all mathematical purposes of the
supposed common property are completely served when it is
replaced by the class of terms having the given relation to a
given term; and this is precisely the case presented by cardi-
nal numbers. For the future, therefore, I shall adhere to the
above definition, since it is at once precise and adequate to all
mathematical uses.
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chapter xii
ADDITIONAND
MULTIPLICATION
112. In most mathematical accounts of arithmetical opera- 117
tions we find the error of endeavouring to give at once a def-
inition which shall be applicable to rationals, or even to real
numbers, without dwelling at sufficient length upon the the-
ory of integers. For the present, integers alone will occupy us.
The definition of integers, given in the preceding chapter, ob-
viously does not admit of extension to fractions; and in fact
the absolute difference between integers and fractions, even
between integers and fractions whose denominator is unity,
cannot possibly be too strongly emphasized. What rational
fractions are, and what real numbers are, I shall endeavour to
explain at a later stage; positive and negative numbers also are
at present excluded. The integers with which we are now con-
cerned are not positive, but signless. And so the addition and
multiplication to be defined in this chapter are only applicable
to integers; but they have themerit of being equally applicable
to finite and infinite integers. Indeed, for the present, I shall
rigidly exclude all propositions which involve either the fini-
tude or the infinity of the numbers considered.
113. There is only one fundamental kindof addition, namely
the logical kind. All other kinds canbedefined in termsof this
and logicalmultiplication. In the present chapter the addition
of integers is to be defined by its means. Logical addition, as
was explained in Part I, is the same as disjunction; if p and q
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are propositions, their logical sum is the proposition “p or q,”
and if u and v are classes, their logical sum is the class “u or v,”
i.e. the class to which belongs every termwhich either belongs
to u or belongs to v. The logical sumof two classes u and vmay
be defined in terms of the logical product of two propositions,
as the class of terms belonging to every class in which both
u and v are contained*. This definition is not essentially con-
fined to two classes, but may be extended to a class of classes,
whether finite or infinite. Thus if k be a class of classes, the log-
ical sumof the classes composing k (called for short the sumof
k) is the class of terms belonging to every class which contains 118
every class which is a term of k. It is this notion which under-
lies arithmetical addition. If k be a class of classes no two of
which have any common terms (called for short an exclusive
class of classes), then the arithmetical sum of the numbers of
the various classes of k is the number of terms in the logical
sum of k. This definition is absolutely general, and applies
equally whether k or any of its constituent classes be finite or
infinite. In order to assure ourselves that the resulting number
depends only upon the numbers of the various classes belong-
ing to k, and not upon the particular class k that happens to be
chosen, it is necessary to prove (as is easily done) that if k0 be
another exclusive class of classes, similar to k, and every mem-
ber of k is similar to its correlate in k0, and vice versâ, then the
number of terms in the sum of k is the same as the number in
the sumof k0. Thus, for example, suppose khasonly two terms,
u and v, and suppose u and v have no common part. Then the
number of terms in the logical sum of u and v is the sum of the
number of terms in u and in v; and if u0 be similar to u, and v0
to v, and u0, v0 have no common part, then the sum of u0 and v0
*F. 1901, §2, Prop. 1·0.
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is similar to the sum of u and v.
114. With regard to this definition of a sum of numbers, it is
to be observed that it cannot be freed from reference to classes
which have the numbers in question. The number obtained
by summation is essentially the number of the logical sum of a
certain class of classes or of some similar class of similar classes.
The necessity of this reference to classes emerges when one
number occurs twice or oftener in the summation. It is to be
observed that the numbers concerned have no order of sum-
mation, so that we have no such proposition as the commu-
tative law: this proposition, as introduced in Arithmetic, re-
sults only from a defective symbolism, which causes an order
among the symbols which has no correlative order in what is
symbolized. But owing to the absence of order, if one number
occurs twice in a summation, we cannot distinguish a first and
a second occurrence of the said number. If we exclude a refer-
ence to classes which have the said number, there is no sense
in the supposition of its occurring twice: the summation of a
class of numbers can be defined, but in that case, no number
can be repeated. In the above definition of a sum, the num-
bers concerned are defined as the numbers of certain classes,
and therefore it is not necessary to decide whether any num-
ber is repeated or not. But in order to define, without refer-
ence to particular classes, a sum of numbers of which some
are repeated, it is necessary first to define multiplication.
This point may be made clearer by considering a special
case, such as 1+1. It is plain thatwe cannot take thenumber 1 it-
self twice over, for there is onenumber 1, and there are not two
instances of it. And if the logical addition of 1 to itself were in
question, we should find that 1 and 1 is 1, according to the gen-
eral principle of Symbolic Logic. Nor canwe define 1+ 1 as the 119
arithmetical sum of a certain class of numbers. This method
can be employed as regards 1+2, or any sum inwhich no num-
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ber is repeated; but as regards 1+ 1, the only class of numbers
involved is the class whose only member is 1, and since this
class has one member, not two, we cannot define 1 + 1 by its
means. Thus the full definition of 1 + 1 is as follows: 1 + 1 is
the number of a classwwhich is the logical sum of two classes
u and v which have no common term and have each only one
term. The chief point to be observed is, that logical addition
of classes is the fundamental notion, while the arithmetical ad-
dition of numbers is wholly subsequent.
115. The general definition of multiplication is due to Mr
A.N.Whitehead*. It is as follows. Let kbe a class of classes, no
two of which have any term in common. Form what is called
the multiplicative class of k, i.e. the class each of whose terms
is a class formed by choosing one and only one term from each
of the classes belonging to k. Then the number of terms in the
multiplicative class of k is the product of all thenumbers of the
various classes composing k. This definition, like that of addi-
tion given above, has two merits, which make it preferable to
any other hitherto suggested. In the first place, it introduces
no order among the numbers multiplied, so that there is no
need of the commutative law, which, here as in the case of ad-
dition, is concerned rather with the symbols than with what
is symbolized. In the second place, the above definition does
not require us to decide, concerning any of the numbers in-
volved, whether they are finite or infinite. Cantor has given†
definitions of the sum and product of two numbers, which do
not require a decision as to whether these numbers are finite
or infinite. These definitions can be extended to the sum and
product of any finite number of finite or infinite numbers; but
they do not, as they stand, allow the definition of the sum or
product of an infinite number of numbers. This grave defect
*American Journal of Mathematics, Oct. 1902.
†Math. Annalen, Vol. xlvi, §3.
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is remedied in the above definitions, which enable us to pur-
sueArithmetic, as it ought tobepursued,without introducing
the distinction of finite and infinite until we wish to study it.
Cantor’s definitions have also the formal defect of introduc-
ing an order among the numbers summed or multiplied: but
this is, in his case, a mere defect in the symbols chosen, not in
the ideas which he symbolizes. Moreover it is not practically
desirable, in the case of the sum or product of two numbers,
to avoid this formal defect, since the resulting cumbrousness
becomes intolerable.
116. It is easy to deduce from the above definitions the usual
connection of addition andmultiplication, whichmay be thus
stated. If k be a class of b mutually exclusive classes, each of
which contains a terms, then the logical sum of k contains
a  b terms‡. It is also easy to obtain the definition of ab, and 120
to prove the associative and distributive laws, and the formal
laws for powers, such as abac = ab+c But it is to be observed
that exponentiation is not to be regarded as a new indepen-
dent operation, since it is merely an application of multiplica-
tion. It is true that exponentiation can be independently de-
fined, as is done by Cantor*, but there is no advantage in so
doing. Moreover exponentiation unavoidably introduces or-
dinal notions, since ab is not in general equal to ba. For this
reasonwe cannot define the result of an infinite number of ex-
ponentiations. Powers, therefore, are to be regarded simply
as abbreviations for products in which all the numbers multi-
plied together are equal.
From the datawhichwe nowpossess, all those propositions
which hold equally of finite and infinite numbers can be de-
duced. The next step, therefore, is to consider the distinction
between the finite and the infinite.
‡SeeWhitehead, loc. cit.
*Loc. cit., §4.
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chapter xiii
FINITE AND INFINITE
117. The purpose of the present chapter is not to discuss 121
the philosophical difficulties concerning the infinite, which
are postponed to Part V. For the present I wish merely to set
forth briefly the mathematical theory of finite and infinite as
it appears in the theory of cardinal numbers. This is its most
fundamental form, and must be understood before the ordi-
nal infinite can be adequately explained*.
Let u be any class, and let u0 be a class formed by taking away
one term x from u. Then it may or may not happen that u is
similar to u0. For example, if u be the class of all finite num-
bers, and u0 the class of all finite numbers except 0, the terms
of u0 are obtained by adding 1 to each of the terms of u, and this
correlates one term of u with one of u0 and vice versâ, no term
of either being omitted or taken twice over. Thus u0 is similar
to u. But if u consists of all finite numbers up to n, where n is
some finite number, and u0 consists of all these except 0, then
u0 is not similar to u. If there is one term xwhich can be taken
away from u to leave a similar class u0, it is easily proved that if
any other term y is taken away instead of x we also get a class
similar to u. When it is possible to take away one term from u
and leave a class u0 similar to u, we say that u is an infinite class.
*Onthepresent topic cf.Cantor,Math.Annalen, Vol. xlvi, §§5, 6,where
most of what follows will be found.
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When this is not possible, we say that u is a finite class. From
these definitions it follows that the null-class is finite, since
no term can be taken from it. It is also easy to prove that if u
be a finite class, the class formed by adding one term to u is fi-
nite; and conversely if this class is finite, so is u. It follows from
the definition that the numbers of finite classes other than the
null-class are altered by subtracting 1, while those of infinite
classes are unaltered by this operation. It is easy to prove that
the same holds of the addition of 1.
118. Among finite classes, if one is a proper part of another,
the one has a smaller number of terms than the other. (A
proper part is a part not thewhole.) But among infinite classes,
this no longer holds. This distinction is, in fact, an essential 122
part of the above definitions of the finite and the infinite. Of
two infinite classes, one may have a greater or a smaller num-
ber of terms than the other. A class u is said to be greater than
a class v, or to have a number greater than that of v, when the
two are not similar, but v is similar to a proper part of u. It is
known that if u is similar to a proper part of v, and v to a proper
part of u (a case which can only arise when u and v are infinite),
then u is similar to v; hence “u is greater than v” is inconsistent
with “v is greater than u.” It is not at present known whether,
of two different infinite numbers, onemust be greater and the
other less. But it is known that there is a least infinite num-
ber, i.e. a number which is less than any different infinite num-
ber. This is the number of finite integers, which will be de-
noted, in the present work, by α0*. This number is capable of
several definitions in which no mention is made of the finite
numbers. In the first place it may be defined (as is implicitly
done by Cantor†) by means of the principle of mathematical
*Cantor employs for this number the Hebrew Aleph with the suffix 0,
but this notation is inconvenient.
†Math. Annalen, Vol. xlvi, §6.
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induction. This definition is as follows: α0 is the number of
any class uwhich is the domain of a one-one relationR, whose
converse domain is contained in but not coextensive with u,
and which is such that, calling the term to which x has the re-
lation R the successor of x, if s be any class to which belongs a
term of u which is not a successor of any other term of u, and
to which belongs the successor of every term of u which be-
longs to s, then every term of u belongs to s. Or again, we may
define α0 as follows. Let P be a transitive and asymmetrical re-
lation, and let any two different terms of the field of P have the
relation P or its converse. Further let any class u contained in
the field of P and having successors (i.e. terms to which every
term of u has the relation P) have an immediate successor, i.e.
a termwhose predecessors either belong to u or precede some
term of u; let there be one term of the field of P which has no
predecessors, but let every term which has predecessors have
successors and also have an immediate predecessor; then the
number of terms in the field of P is α0. Other definitions may
be suggested, but as all are equivalent it is notnecessary tomul-
tiply them. The following characteristic is important: Every
class whose number is α0 can be arranged in a series having
consecutive terms, a beginning but no end, and such that the
number of predecessors of any term of the series is finite; and
any series having these characteristics has the number α0.
It is very easy to show that every infinite class contains
classes whose number is α0. For let u be such a class, and let x0
be a term of u. Then u is similar to the class obtained by taking
away x0, which we will call the class u1. Thus u1 is an infinite
class. From this we can take away a term x1, leaving an infinite 123
class u2, and so on. The series of terms x1; x2; : : : is contained
in u, and is of the type which has the number α0. From this
point we can advance to an alternative definition of the finite
and the infinite by means of mathematical induction, which
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must now be explained.
119. If n be any finite number, the number obtained by
adding 1 to n is also finite, and is different from n. Thus be-
ginning with 0 we can form a series of numbers by successive
additions of 1. We may define finite numbers, if we choose, as
those numbers that can be obtained from 0 by such steps, and
that obey mathematical induction. That is, the class of finite
numbers is the class of numbers which is contained in every
class s to which belongs 0 and the successor of every number
belonging to s, where the successor of a number is the number
obtained by adding 1 to the given number. Now α0 is not such
a number, since, in virtue of propositions already proved, no
such number is similar to a part of itself. Hence also no num-
ber greater than α0 is finite according to the new definition.
But it is easy to prove that every number less than α0 is finite
with the new definition as with the old. Hence the two defi-
nitions are equivalent. Thus we may define finite numbers ei-
ther as those that can be reached by mathematical induction,
starting from 0 and increasing by 1 at each step, or as those
of classes which are not similar to the parts of themselves ob-
tained by taking away single terms. These two definitions are
both frequently employed, and it is important to realize that ei-
ther is a consequence of the other. Both will occupy us much
hereafter; for the present it is only intended, without contro-
versy, to set forth the bare outlines of themathematical theory
of finite and infinite, leaving the details to be filled in during
the course of the work.
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chapter xiv
THEORYOF FINITE NUMBERS
120. Having now clearly distinguished the finite from the 124
infinite, we can devote ourselves to the consideration of finite
numbers. It is customary, in the best treatises on the elements
of Arithmetic*, not to define number or particular finite num-
bers, but to begin with certain axioms or primitive proposi-
tions, from which all the ordinary results are shown to follow.
ThismethodmakesArithmetic into an independent study, in-
stead of regarding it, as is done in the present work, as merely
a development, without new axioms or indefinables, of a cer-
tain branch of general Logic. For this reason, the method in
question seems to indicate a less degree of analysis than that
adopted here. I shall nevertheless begin by an exposition of
the more usual method, and then proceed to definitions and
proofs of what are usually taken as indefinables and indemon-
strables. For this purpose, I shall take Peano’s exposition in
the Formulaire†, which is, so far as I know, the best from the
point of view of accuracy and rigour. This exposition has the
inestimable merit of showing that all Arithmetic can be devel-
oped from three fundamental notions (in addition to those
*Except Frege’sGrundgesetze der Arithmetik (Jena, 1893).
†F. 1901, Part II and F. 1899, §20ff. F. 1901 differs from earlier editions in
making “number is a class” a primitive proposition. I regard this as unnec-
essary, since it is implied by “0 is a number.” I therefore follow the earlier
editions.
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of general Logic) and five fundamental propositions concern-
ing these notions. It proves also that, if the three notions
be regarded as determined by the five propositions, these five
propositions aremutually independent. This is shownbyfind-
ing, for each set of four out of the five propositions, an inter-
pretation which renders the remaining proposition false. It
therefore only remains, in order to connect Peano’s theory
with that here adopted, to give a definition of the three fun-
damental notions and a demonstration of the five fundamen-
tal propositions. When once this has been accomplished, we
know with certainty that everything in the theory of finite in-
tegers follows. Peano’s three indefinables are 0, finite integer*, 125
and successor of. It is assumed, as part of the idea of succession
(though it would, I think, be better to state it as a separate ax-
iom), that every number has one and only one successor. (By
successor is meant, of course, immediate successor.) Peano’s
primitive propositions are then the following. (1) 0 is a num-
ber. (2) If a is a number, the successor of a is a number. (3) If
two numbers have the same successor, the two numbers are
identical. (4) 0 is not the successor of any number. (5) If s be a
class to which 0 belongs and also the successor of every num-
ber belonging to s, then every number belongs to s. The last of
these propositions is the principle of mathematical induction.
121. The mutual independence of these five propositions
has been demonstrated by Peano and Padoa as follows†. (1)
Giving the usual meanings to 0 and successor, but denoting by
number finite integers other than 0, all the above propositions
except the first are true. (2)Giving the usualmeanings to 0 and
successor, but denoting by number only finite integers less than
10, or less than any other specified finite integer, all the above
*Throughout the rest of this chapter, I shall use number as synonymous
with finite integer.
†F. 1899, p. 30.
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propositions are true except the second. (3) A series which be-
gins by an antiperiod and then becomes periodic (for example,
the digits in a decimal which becomes recurring after a certain
number of places)will satisfy all the abovepropositions except
the third. (4) A periodic series (such as the hours on the clock)
satisfies all except the fourth of the primitive propositions. (5)
Giving to successor the meaning greater by 2, so that the succes-
sor of 0 is 2, and of 2 is 4, and so on, all the primitive proposi-
tions are satisfied except the fifth, which is not satisfied if s be
the class of even numbers including 0. Thus no one of the five
primitive propositions can be deduced from the other four.
122. Peanopoints out (loc. cit.) that other classes besides that
of the finite integers satisfy the above five propositions. What
he says is as follows: “There is an infinity of systems satisfy-
ing all the primitive propositions. They are all verified, e.g., by
replacing number and 0 by number other than 0 and 1. All the
systems which satisfy the primitive propositions have a one-
one correspondence with the numbers. Number is what is ob-
tained from all these systems by abstraction; in other words,
number is the system which has all the properties enunciated
in the primitive propositions, and those only.” This observa-
tion appears to me lacking in logical correctness. In the first
place, the question arises: How are the various systems dis-
tinguished, which agree in satisfying the primitive proposi-
tions? How, for example, is the system beginning with 1 dis-
tinguished from that beginning with 0? To this question two 126
different answers may be given. We may say that 0 and 1 are
both primitive ideas, or at least that 0 is so, and that therefore
0 and 1 can be intrinsically distinguished, as yellow and blue
are distinguished. But if we take this view—which, by theway,
will have to be extended to the other primitive ideas, number
and succession—we shall have to say that these three notions
are what I call constants, and that there is no need of any such
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process of abstraction as Peano speaks of in the definition of
number. In this method, 0, number, and succession appear,
like other indefinables, as ideas which must be simply recog-
nized. Their recognition yields what mathematicians call the
existence-theorem, i.e. it assures us that there really are num-
bers. But this process leaves it doubtful whether numbers
are logical constants or not, and therefore makes Arithmetic,
according to the definition in Part I, Chapter i, primâ facie a
branch of Applied Mathematics. Moreover it is evidently not
the processwhich Peanohas inmind. The other answer to the
question consists in regarding 0, number, and succession as a
class of three ideas belonging to a certain class of trios defined
by the five primitive propositions. It is very easy so to state
the matter that the five primitive propositions become trans-
formed into the nominal definition of a certain class of trios.
There are then no longer any indefinables or indemonstrables
in our theory, which has become a pure piece of Logic. But 0,
number and succession become variables, since they are only
determinedasoneof the class of trios: moreover the existence-
theorem now becomes doubtful, since we cannot know, ex-
ceptby thediscoveryof at least one actual trioof this class, that
there are any such trios at all. One actual trio, however, would
be a constant, and thuswe require somemethod of giving con-
stant values to 0, number, and succession. What we can show
is that, if there is one such trio, there are an infinite number of
them. For by striking out the first term from any class satisfy-
ing the conditions laid down concerning number, we always
obtain a class which again satisfies the conditions in question.
But even this statement, since the meaning of number is still
in question, must be differently worded if circularity is to be
avoided. Moreover we must ask ourselves: Is any process of
abstraction from all systems satisfying the five axioms, such as
Peano contemplates, logically possible? Every term of a class
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is the term it is, and satisfies some propositionwhich becomes
false when another term of the class is substituted. There is
therefore no term of a class which has merely the properties
defining the class and no others. What Peano’s process of ab-
straction really amounts to is the consideration of the class
and variable members of it, to the exclusion of constant mem-
bers. For only a variable member of the class will have only
the properties by which the class is defined. Thus Peano does
not succeed in indicating any constantmeaning for 0, number,
and succession, nor in showing that any constant meaning is
possible, since the existence-theorem is not proved. His only 127
method, therefore, is to say that at least one such constant
meaning can be immediately perceived, but is not definable.
Thismethod is not logically unsound, but it iswholly different
from the impossible abstraction which he suggests. And the
proof of the mutual independence of his five primitive propo-
sitions is only necessary in order to show that the definition of
the class of trios determinedby them isnot redundant. Redun-
dancy is not a logical error, butmerely a defect of whatmay be
called style. My object, in the above account of cardinal num-
bers, has been to prove, from general Logic, that there is one
constant meaning which satisfies the above five propositions,
and that this constant meaning should be called number, or
rather finite cardinal number. And in this way, new indefin-
ables and indemonstrables are wholly avoided; for when we
have shown that the class of trios in question has at least one
member, andwhen this member has been used to define num-
ber, we easily show that the class of trios has an infinite num-
ber of members, and we define the class by means of the five
properties enumerated in Peano’s primitive propositions. For
the comprehension of the connection between Mathematics
and Logic, this point is of very great importance, and similar
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points will occur constantly throughout the present work.
123. In order to bring out more clearly the difference be-
tween Peano’s procedure andmine, I shall here repeat the def-
inition of the class satisfying his five primitive propositions,
the definition of finite number, and the proof, in the case of fi-
nite numbers, of his five primitive propositions.
The class of classes satisfying his axioms is the same as the
class of classes whose cardinal number is α0, i.e. the class of
classes, according to my theory, which is α0. It is most simply
defined as follows: α0 is the class of classes u each of which is
the domain of some one-one relation R (the relation of a term
to its successor) which is such that there is at least one term
which succeeds no other term, every termwhich succeeds has
a successor, and u is contained in any class s which contains
a term of u having no predecessors, and also contains the suc-
cessor of every termof uwhich belongs to s. This definition in-
cludes Peano’s five primitive propositions and no more. Thus
of every such class all the usual propositions in the arithmetic
of finitenumbers canbeproved: addition,multiplication, frac-
tions, etc. can be defined, and the whole of analysis can be de-
veloped, in so far as complex numbers are not involved. But
in this whole development, themeaning of the entities and re-
lations which occur is to a certain degree indeterminate, since
the entities and the relation with which we start are variable
members of a certain class. Moreover, in this whole develop-
ment, nothing shows that there are such classes as the defini-
tion speaks of.
In the logical theory of cardinals, we start from the opposite
end. We first define a certain class of entities, and then show
that this class of entities belongs to the class α0 above defined. 128
This is done as follows. (1) 0 is the class of classes whose only
member is the null-class. (2)Anumber is the class of all classes
similar to any one of themselves. (3) 1 is the class of all classes
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which are not null and are such that, if x belongs to the class,
the class without x is the null-class; or such that, if x and y be-
long to the class, then x and y are identical. (4) Having shown
that if two classes be similar, and a class of one term be added
to each, the sums are similar, we define that, if n be a number,
n+ 1 is the number resulting from adding a unit to a class of n
terms. (5) Finitenumbers are thosebelonging to every class s to
which belongs 0, and to which n+ 1 belongs if n belongs. This
completes the definition of finite numbers. We then have, as
regards the five propositions which Peano assumes: (1) 0 is a
number. (2) Meaning n+ 1 by the successor of n, if n be a num-
ber, then n+1 is a number. (3) If n+1 = m+1, then n = m. (4) If
n be any number,n+ 1 is different from 0. (5) If s be a class, and
0 belongs to this class, and ifwhen nbelongs to it, n+1 belongs
to it, then all finite numbers belong to it. Thus all the five es-
sential properties are satisfied by the class of finite numbers as
above defined. Hence the class of classes α0 has members, and
the class finitenumber is one definite member of α0. There is,
therefore, from the mathematical standpoint, no need what-
ever of new indefinables or indemonstrables in the whole of
Arithmetic and Analysis.
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chapter xv
ADDITIONOF TERMSAND
ADDITIONOFCLASSES
124. Having now briefly set forth the mathematical theory 129
of cardinal numbers, it is time to turn our attention to the
philosophical questions raised by this theory. I shall begin by
a fewpreliminary remarks as to thedistinctionbetweenphilos-
ophy and mathematics, and as to the function of philosophy
in such a subject as the foundations of mathematics. The fol-
lowingobservations are not necessarily to be regarded as appli-
cable to other branches of philosophy, since they are derived
specially from the consideration of the problems of logic.
The distinction of philosophy and mathematics is broadly
one of point of view: mathematics is constructive and deduc-
tive, philosophy is critical, and in a certain impersonal sense
controversial. Wherever we have deductive reasoning, we
have mathematics; but the principles of deduction, the recog-
nition of indefinable entities, and the distinguishing between
such entities, are the business of philosophy. Philosophy is,
in fact, mainly a question of insight and perception. Entities
which are perceived by the so-called senses, such as colours
and sounds, are, for some reason, not commonly regarded as
coming within the scope of philosophy, except as regards the
more abstract of their relations; but it seems highly doubt-
ful whether any such exclusion can be maintained. In any
case, however, since the present work is essentially uncon-
cerned with sensible objects, we may confine our remarks to
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entities which are not regarded as existing in space and time.
Such entities, if we are to know anything about them, must
be also in some sense perceived, and must be distinguished
one from another; their relations also must be in part immedi-
ately apprehended. A certain body of indefinable entities and
indemonstrable propositionsmust form the starting-point for
any mathematical reasoning; and it is this starting-point that
concerns the philosopher. When the philosopher’s work has
been perfectly accomplished, its results can be wholly embod-
ied in premisses from which deduction may proceed. Now it
follows from the very nature of such inquiries that resultsmay
be disproved, but can never be proved. The disproof will con-
sist in pointing out contradictions and inconsistencies; but 130
the absence of these can never amount to proof. All depends,
in the end, upon immediate perception; and philosophical ar-
gument, strictly speaking, consists mainly of an endeavour to
cause the reader to perceive what has been perceived by the
author. The argument, in short, is not of the nature of proof,
but of exhortation. Thus the question of the present chapter:
Is there any indefinable set of entities commonly called num-
bers, and different from the set of entities above defined? is an
essentially philosophical question, to be settled by inspection
rather than by accurate chains of reasoning.
125. In the present chapter, we shall examine the question
whether the above definition of cardinal numbers in any way
presupposes somemore fundamental sense of number. There
are several ways in which this may be supposed to be the case.
In the first place, the individuals which compose classes seem
to be each in some sense one, and it might be thought that
a one-one relation could not be defined without introducing
the number 1. In the second place, it may very well be ques-
tioned whether a class which has only one term can be distin-
guished from that one term. And in the third place, it may be
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held that the notion of class presupposes number in a sense
different from that above defined: it may be maintained that
classes arise from the addition of individuals, as indicated by
the word and, and that the logical addition of classes is sub-
sequent to this addition of individuals. These questions de-
mand a new inquiry into the meaning of one and of class, and
here, I hope, we shall find ourselves aided by the theories set
forth in Part I.
As regards the fact that any individual or term is in some
sense one, this is of course undeniable. But it does not fol-
low that thenotionof one is presupposedwhen individuals are
spoken of: it may be, on the contrary, that the notion of term
or individual is the fundamental one, from which that of one
is derived. This view was adopted in Part I, and there seems
no reason to reject it. And as for one-one relations, they are
defined by means of identity, without any mention of one, as
follows: R is a one-one relation if, when x and x0 have the re-
lation R to y, and x has the relation R to y and y0, then x and
x0 are identical, and so are y and y0. It is true that here x, y, x0,
y0 are each one term, but this is not (it would seem) in any way
presupposed in the definition. This disposes (pending a new
inquiry into the nature of classes) of the first of the above ob-
jections.
The next question is as to the distinction between a class
containing only one member, and the one member which it
contains. If we could identify a class with its defining predi-
cate or class-concept, no difficulty would arise on this point.
When a certain predicate attaches to one and only one term,
it is plain that that term is not identical with the predicate in
question. But if two predicates attach to precisely the same
terms, we should say that, although the predicates are differ-
ent, the classes which they define are identical, i.e. there is
only one class which both define. If, for example, all feath- 131
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erless bipeds are men, and all men are featherless bipeds, the
classesmen and featherless bipeds are identical, thoughman dif-
fers from featherless biped. This shows that a class cannot be
identified with its class-concept or defining predicate. There
might seem to be nothing left except the actual terms, so that
when there is only one term, that term would have to be iden-
tical with the class. Yet for many formal reasons this view can-
not give the meaning of the symbols which stand for classes
in symbolic logic. For example, consider the class of numbers
which, added to 3, give 5. This is a class containing no terms
except the number 2. But we can say that 2 is a member of this
class, i.e. it has to the class that peculiar indefinable relation
which terms have to the classes they belong to. This seems
to indicate that the class is different from the one term. The
point is a prominent one in Peano’s Symbolic Logic, and is
connectedwithhis distinctionbetween the relationof an indi-
vidual to its class and the relationof a class to another inwhich
it is contained. Thus the class of numbers which, added to 3,
give 5, is contained in the class of numbers, but is not a num-
ber; whereas 2 is a number, but is not a class contained in the
class of numbers. To identify the two relations which Peano
distinguishes is to cause havoc in the theory of infinity, and
to destroy the formal precision of many arguments and defi-
nitions. It seems, in fact, indubitable that Peano’s distinction
is just, and that some way must be found of discriminating a
term from a class containing that term only.
126. In order to decide this point, it is necessary to pass to
our third difficulty, and reconsider the notion of class itself.
This notion appears to be connected with the notion of de-
noting, explained in Part I, Chapter v. We there pointed out
five ways of denoting, one of which we called the numerical
conjunction. This was the kind indicated by all. This kind of
conjunction appears to be that which is relevant in the case of
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classes. For example,man being the class-concept, all menwill
be the class. But it will not be all men quâ concept which will
be the class, but what this concept denotes, i.e. certain terms
combined in the particular way indicated by all. The way of
combination is essential, since any man or some man is plainly
not the class, though either denotes combinations of precisely
the same terms. It might seem as though, if we identify a class
with the numerical conjunction of its terms, we must deny
the distinction of a term from a class whose only member is
that term. But we found in Chapter x that a class must be
always an object of a different logical type from its members,
and that, in order to avoid the proposition x ϵ x, this doctrine
must be extended even to classes which have only one mem-
ber. How far this forbids us to identify classes with numerical
conjunctions, I do not profess to decide; in any case, the dis-
tinction between a term and the class whose only member it
is must be made, and yet classes must be taken extensionally
to the degree involved in their being determinate when their 132
members are given. Such classes are called by FregeWerthver-
läufe; and cardinal numbers are to be regarded as classes in this
sense.
127. There is still, however, a certain difficulty, which is this:
a class seems to be notmany terms, but to be itself a single term,
even when many terms are members of the class. This diffi-
cultywould seem to indicate that the class cannotbe identified
with all its members, but is rather to be regarded as the whole
which they compose. In order, however, to state the difficulty
in anunobjectionablemanner, wemust excludeunity andplu-
rality from the statement of it, since these notions were to be
defined by means of the notion of class. And here it may be
well to clear up a pointwhich is likely to occur to the reader. Is
the notion of one presupposed every time we speak of a term?
A term, it may be said, means one term, and thus no statement
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can be made concerning a term without presupposing one. In
some sense of one, this proposition seems indubitable. What-
ever is, is one: being and one, as Leibniz remarks, are convert-
ible terms*. It is difficult to be sure how far such statements are
merely grammatical. For although whatever is, is one, yet it is
equally true that whatever are, are many. But the truth seems
to be that the kind of object which is a class, i.e. the kind of
object denoted by all men, or by any concept of a class, is not
one except where the class has only one term, and must not
be made a single logical subject. There is, as we said in Part I,
Chapter vi, in simple cases an associated single term which
is the class as a whole; but this is sometimes absent, and is
in any case not identical with the class as many. But in this
view there is not a contradiction, as in the theory that verbs
and adjectives cannot be made subjects; for assertions can be
made about classes as many, but the subject of such assertions
ismany, not one only as in other assertions. “Brown and Jones
are two ofMiss Smith’s suitors” is an assertion about the class
“Brown and Jones,” but not about this class considered as a
single term. Thus one-ness belongs, in this view, to a certain
type of logical subjects, but classes which are not one may yet
have assertions made about them. Hence we conclude that
one-ness is implied, but not presupposed, in statements about
a term, and “a term” is to be regarded as an indefinable.
128. It seems necessary, however, to make a distinction as
regards the use of one. The sense in which every object is one,
which is apparently involved in speaking of an object is, as
Frege urges†, a very shadowy sense, since it is applicable to ev-
erything alike. But the sense in which a class may be said to
have one member is quite precise. A class u has one member
when u is not null, and “x and y are u’s” implies “x is identical
*Ed. Gerhardt, ii, p. 300.
†Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Breslau, 1884, p. 40.
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with y.” Here theone-ness is a property of the class, whichmay 133
therefore be called a unit-class. The x which is its only mem-
ber may be itself a class of many terms, and this shows that
the sense of one involved in oneterm or aterm is not relevant to
Arithmetic, formany terms as suchmay be a singlemember of
a class of classes. One, therefore, is not to be asserted of terms,
but of classes having one member in the above-defined sense;
i.e. “u is one,” or better “u is a unit” means “u is not null, and
‘x and y are u’s’ implies ‘x and y are identical’.” The member of
u, in this case, will itself be none or one or many if u is a class
of classes; but if u is a class of terms, the member of u will be
neither none nor one nor many, but simply a term.
129. The commonly received view, as regards finite num-
bers, is that they result from counting, or, as some philoso-
phers would prefer to say, from synthesizing. Unfortunately,
those who hold this view have not analyzed the notion of
counting: if they had done so, they would have seen that it
is very complex, and presupposes the very numbers which it
is supposed to generate.
The process of counting has, of course, a psychological as-
pect, but this is quite irrelevant to the theory of Arithmetic.
What Iwish now to point out is the logical process involved in
the act of counting,which is as follows. Whenwe sayone, two,
three, etc., we are necessarily considering some one-one rela-
tion which holds between the numbers used in counting and
the objects counted. What ismeant by the “one, two, three” is
that theobjects indicatedby thesenumbers are their correlates
with respect to the relation which we have in mind. (This re-
lation, by the way, is usually extremely complex, and is apt to
involve a reference to our state of mind at the moment.) Thus
we correlate a class of objects with a class of numbers; and the
class of numbers consists of all the numbers from 1 up to some
number n. The only immediate inference to be drawn from
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this correlation is, that the number of objects is the same as
the number of numbers from 1 up to n. A further process is re-
quired to show that this number of numbers is n, which is only
true, as a matter of fact, when n is finite, or, in a certain wider
sense, when n is α0 (the smallest of infinite numbers). More-
over the process of counting gives us no indication as to what
the numbers are, as to why they form a series, or as to how it
is to be proved (in the cases where it is true) that there are n
numbers from 1 up to n. Hence counting is irrelevant in the
foundations of Arithmetic; and with this conclusion, it may
be dismissed until we come to order and ordinal numbers.
130. Let us return to the notion of the numerical conjunc-
tion. It is plain that it is of such objects as “A and B,” “A and
B andC,” that numbers other than one are to be asserted. We
examined such objects, in Part I, in relation to classes, with
which we found them to be identical. Now we must investi-
gate their relation to numbers and plurality.
The notion to be now examined is the notion of a numer- 134
ical conjunction or, more shortly, a collection. This is not to
be identified, to begin with, with the notion of a class, but is
to receive a new and independent treatment. By a collection
I mean what is conveyed by “A and B” or “A and B and C,”
or any other enumeration of definite terms. The collection
is defined by the actual mention of the terms, and the terms
are connected by and. It would seem that and represents a
fundamental way of combining terms, and it might be urged
that just this way of combination is essential if anything is to
result of which a number other than 1 is to be asserted. Col-
lections do not presuppose numbers, since they result simply
from the terms together with and: they could only presuppose
numbers in the particular case where the terms of the collec-
tion themselves presupposed numbers. There is a grammat-
ical difficulty which, since no method exists of avoiding it,
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must be pointed out and allowed for. A collection, grammati-
cally, is one, whereasA andB, orA andB andC, are essentially
many. The strict meaning of collection is the whole composed
of many, but since a word is needed to denote the many them-
selves, I choose to use the word collection in this sense, so that
a collection, according to the usage here adopted, is many and
not one.
As regards what is meant by the combination indicated by
and, it gives what we called before the numerical conjunction.
That is A and B is what is denoted by the concept of a class
of which A and B are the only terms, and is precisely A and
B denoted in the way which is indicated by all. We may say,
if u be the class-concept corresponding to a class of which A
and B are the only terms, that “all u’s” is a concept which de-
notes the terms A, B combined in a certain way, and A and
B are those terms combined in precisely that way. Thus A
and B appears indistinguishable from the class, though distin-
guishable from the class-concept and from the concept of the
class. Hence if u be a class of more than one term, it seems
necessary to hold that u is not one, but many, since u is dis-
tinguished both from the class-concept and from the whole
composed of the terms of u*. Thus we are brought back to the
dependence of numbers upon classes; and where it is not said
that the classes in question are finite, it is practically necessary
to begin with class-concepts and the theory of denoting, not
with the theory of and which has just been given. The theory
of and applies practically only to finite numbers, and gives to
finite numbers a positionwhich is different, at least psycholog-
*A conclusive reason against identifying a class with the whole com-
posed of its terms is, that one of these terms may be the class itself, as in
the case “class is a class,” or rather “classes are one among classes.” The
logical type of the class class is of an infinite order, and therefore the usual
objection to “x ϵ x” does not apply in this case.
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ically, from that of infinite numbers. There are, in short, two 135
ways of defining particular finite classes, but there is only one
practicable way of defining particular infinite classes, namely
by intension. It is largely the habit of considering classes pri-
marily from the side of extension which has hitherto stood in
the way of a correct logical theory of infinity.
131. Addition, it should be carefully observed, is not primar-
ily amethodof formingnumbers, but of forming classes or col-
lections. If we add B toA, we do not obtain the number 2, but
we obtainA andB, which is a collection of two terms, or a cou-
ple. And a couple is defined as follows: u is a couple if u has
terms, and if, if x be a term of u, there is a term of u different
from x, but if x, y be different terms of u, and z differs from x
and from y, then every class to which z belongs differs from
u. In this definition, only diversity occurs, together with the
notion of a class having terms. It might no doubt be objected
that we have to take just two terms x, y in the above defini-
tion: but as a matter of fact any finite number can be defined
by induction without introducing more than one term. For,
if n has been defined, a class u has n + 1 terms when, if x be
a term of u, the number of terms of u which differ from x is
n. And the notion of the arithmetical sum n + 1 is obtained
from that of the logical sum of a class of n terms and a class of
one term. When we say 1 + 1 = 2, it is not possible that we
should mean 1 and 1, since there is only one 1: if we take 1 as
an individual, 1 and 1 is nonsense, while if we take it as a class,
the rule of Symbolic Logic applies, according to which 1 and
1 is 1. Thus in the corresponding logical proposition, we have
on the left-hand side terms of which 1 can be asserted, and on
the right-hand side we have a couple. That is, 1+ 1 = 2 means
“one term and one term are two terms,” or, stating the propo-
sition in terms of variables, “if u has one term and v has one
term, and u differs from v, their logical sum has two terms.”
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It is to be observed that on the left-hand side we have a nu-
merical conjunction of propositions, while on the right-hand
side we have a proposition concerning a numerical conjunc-
tion of terms. But the true premiss, in the above proposition,
is not the conjunction of the three propositions, but their log-
ical product. This point, however, has little importance in the
present connection.
132. Thus the only point which remains is this: Does the
notion of a term presuppose the notion of 1? For we have seen
that all numbers except 0 involve in their definitions the no-
tion of a term, and if this in turn involves 1, the definition of
1 becomes circular, and 1 will have to be allowed to be inde-
finable. This objection to our procedure is answered by the
doctrine of §128, that a term is not one in the sensewhich is rel-
evant to Arithmetic, or in the sense which is opposed tomany.
The notion of any term is a logical indefinable, presupposed in
formal truth and in the whole theory of the variable; but this
notion is that of the variable conjunction of terms, which in
no way involves the number 1. There is therefore nothing cir- 136
cular in defining the number 1 bymeans of the notion of a term
or of any term.
To sum up: Numbers are classes of classes, namely of all
classes similar to a given class. Here classes have to be under-
stood in the sense of numerical conjunctions in the case of
classes havingmany terms; but a class may have no terms, and
a class of one term is distinct from that term, so that a class is
not simply the sum of its terms. Only classes have numbers;
of what is commonly called one object, it is not true, at least
in the sense required, to say that it is one, as appears from the
fact that the objectmay be a class ofmany terms. “One object”
seems to mean merely “a logical subject in some proposition.”
Finite numbers are not to be regarded as generated by count-
ing, which on the contrary presupposes them; and addition is
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primarily logical addition, first of propositions, then of classes,
from which latter arithmetical addition is derivative. The as-
sertion of numbers depends upon the fact that a class of many
terms canbe a logical subjectwithout being arithmetically one.
Thus it appeared that no philosophical argument could over-
throw the mathematical theory of cardinal numbers set forth
in Chapters xi to xiv.
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chapter xvi
WHOLEAND PART
133. For the comprehension of analysis, it is necessary 137
to investigate the notion of whole and part, a notion which
has been wrapped in obscurity—though not without certain
more or less valid logical reasons—by the writers who may be
roughly called Hegelian. In the present chapter I shall do my
best to set forth a straightforward and non-mystical theory of
the subject, leaving controversy as far as possible on one side.
It may be well to point out, to begin with, that I shall use the
wordwhole as strictly correlative to part, so that nothingwill be
called awhole unless it has parts. Simple terms, such as points,
instants, colours, or the fundamental concepts of logic, will
not be called wholes.
Terms which are not classes may be, as we saw in the pre-
ceding chapter, of two kinds. The first kind are simple: these
may be characterized, though not defined, by the fact that the
propositions asserting the being of such terms have no pre-
suppositions. The second kind of terms that are not classes,
on the other hand, are complex, and in their case, their be-
ing presupposes the being of certain other terms. Whatever
is not a class is called a unit, and thus units are either simple or
complex. A complex unit is a whole; its parts are other units,
whether simple or complex, which are presupposed in it. This
suggests the possibility of defining whole and part by means
of logical priority, a suggestion which, though it must be ulti-
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mately rejected, it will be necessary to examine at length.
134. Wherever we have a one-sided formal implication, it
may be urged, if the two propositional functions involved are
obtainable one from the other by the variation of a single con-
stituent, then what is implied is simpler than what implies it.
Thus “Socrates is a man” implies “Socrates is a mortal,” but
the latter propositiondoesnot imply the former: also the latter
proposition is simpler than the former, sinceman is a concept
of which mortal forms part. Again, if we take a proposition
asserting a relation of two entities A and B, this proposition
implies the being of A and the being of B, and the being of
the relation, none of which implies the proposition, and each 138
of which is simpler than the proposition. There will only be
equal complexity—according to the theory that intension and
extension vary inversely as one another—in cases of mutual
implication, such as “A is greater than B” and “B is less than
A.” Thus we might be tempted to set up the following defi-
nition: A is said to be part of B when B is implies A is, but A
is does not imply B is. If this definition could be maintained,
whole and part would not be a new indefinable, but would be
derivative from logical priority. There are, however, reasons
why such an opinion is untenable.
The first objection is, that logical priority is not a simple re-
lation: implication is simple, but logical priority of A to B re-
quires not only “B implies A,” but also “A does not imply B.”
(For convenience, I shall say thatA impliesBwhenA is implies
B is.) This state of things, it is true, is realized when A is part
of B; but it seems necessary to regard the relation of whole to
part as something simple, which must be different from any
possible relation of one whole to another which is not part of
it. This would not result from the above definition. For ex-
ample, “A is greater and better than B” implies “B is less than
A,” but the converse implication does not hold: yet the latter
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proposition is not part of the former*.
Another objection is derived from such cases as redness
and colour. These two concepts appear to be equally simple:
there is no specification, other and simpler than redness itself,
which can be added to colour to produce redness, in the way
in which specifications will turn mortal into man. Hence A is
red is no more complex than A is coloured, although there is
here a one-sided implication. Redness, in fact, appears to be
(when taken to mean one particular shade) a simple concept,
which, although it implies colour, does not contain colour as
a constituent. The inverse relation of extension and inten-
sion, therefore, does not hold in all cases. For these reasons,
we must reject, in spite of their very close connection, the at-
tempt to define whole and part by means of implication.
135. Having failed to define wholes by logical priority, we
shall not, I think, find it possible to define them at all. The re-
lation of whole and part is, it would seem, an indefinable and
ultimate relation, or rather, it is several relations, often con-
founded, of which one at least is indefinable. The relation of
a part to a whole must be differently discussed according to
the nature both of the whole and of the parts. Let us begin
with the simplest case, and proceed gradually to those that are
more elaborate.
(1) Whenever we have any collection of many terms, in the
sense explained in the preceding chapter, there the terms,
provided there is some non-quadratic propositional function 139
which they all satisfy, together form a whole. In the preced-
ing chapter we regarded the class as formed by all the terms,
but usage seems to show no reason why the class should not
equally be regarded as the whole composed of all the terms in
those cases where there is such a whole. The first is the class
*See Part IV, Chap. xxvii.
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as many, the second the class as one. Each of the terms then
has to the whole a certain indefinable relation*, which is one
meaning of the relation of whole and part. The whole is, in
this case, a whole of a particular kind, which I shall call an ag-
gregate: it differs from wholes of other kinds by the fact that it
is definite as soon as its constituents are known.
(2) But the above relation holds only between the aggregate
and the single termsof the collection composing the aggregate:
the relation to our aggregate of aggregates containing some
but not all the terms of our aggregate, is a different relation,
though also one which would be commonly called a relation
of part towhole. For example, the relationof theGreeknation
to the human race is different from that of Socrates to the hu-
man race; and the relation of the whole of the primes to the
whole of the numbers is different from that of 2 to the whole
of the numbers. This most vital distinction is due to Peano†.
The relation of a subordinate aggregate to one in which it is
contained can be defined, as was explained in Part I, bymeans
of implication and the first kind of relation of part to whole.
If u, v be two aggregates, and for every value of x “x is u” im-
plies “x is a v,” then, provided the converse implication does
not hold, u is a proper part (in the second sense) of v. This
sense of whole and part, therefore, is derivative and definable.
(3) But there is another kind ofwhole, whichmay be called a
unity. Such awhole is always a proposition, though it neednot
be an asserted proposition. For example, “A differs from B,” or
“A’s difference from B,” is a complex of which the parts areA
and B and difference; but this sense of whole and part is differ-
*Which may, if we choose, be taken as Peano’s ϵ. The objection to this
meaning for ϵ is that not every propositional function defines a whole of
the kind required. Thewhole differs from the class asmany by being of the
same type as its terms.
†Cf. e.g. F. 1901, §1, Prop. 4.4, note (p. 12).
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ent from the previous senses, since “A differs from B” is not
an aggregate, and has no parts at all in the first two senses of
parts. It is parts in this third sense that are chiefly considered
by philosophers, while the first two senses are those usually
relevant in symbolic logic and mathematics. This third sense
of part is the sense which corresponds to analysis: it appears
to be indefinable, like the first sense—i.e., I know no way of
defining it. It must be held that the three senses are always to
be kept distinct: i.e., if A is part of B in one sense, while B is
part of C in another, it must not be inferred (in general) that
A is part of C in any of the three senses. But we may make a
fourth general sense, in which anything which is part in any 140
sense, or part in one sense of part in another, is to be called a
part. This sense, however, has seldom, if ever, any utility in
actual discussion.
136. The difference between the kinds of wholes is impor-
tant, and illustrates a fundamental point inLogic. I shall there-
fore repeat it in other words. Any collection whatever, if de-
fined by a non-quadratic propositional function, though as
such it is many, yet composes a whole, whose parts are the
terms of the collection or any whole composed of some of the
terms of the collection. It is highly important to realize the
difference between a whole and all its parts, even in this case
where the difference is a minimum. The word collection, be-
ing singular, applies more strictly to the whole than to all the
parts; but convenience of expression has led me to neglect
grammar, and speak of all the terms as the collection. The
whole formed of the terms of the collection I call an aggregate.
Such a whole is completely specified when all its simple con-
stituents are specified; its parts have no direct connection in-
ter se, but only the indirect connection involved in being parts
of one and the same whole. But other wholes occur, which
contain relations or what may be called predicates, not occur-
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ring simply as terms in a collection, but as relating or qualify-
ing. Such wholes are always propositions. These are not com-
pletely specifiedwhen their parts are all known. Take, as a sim-
ple instance, the proposition “A differs from B,” whereA and
B are simple terms. The simple parts of this whole are A and
B and difference; but the enumeration of these three does not
specify the whole, since there are two other wholes composed
of the same parts, namely the aggregate formed ofA andB and
difference, and the proposition “B differs from A.” In the for-
mer case, although the whole was different from all its parts,
yet it was completely specified by specifying its parts; but in
the present case, not only is the whole different, but it is not
even specified by specifying its parts. We cannot explain this
fact by saying that the parts stand in certain relations which
are omitted in the analysis; for in the above case of “A differs
from B,” the relation was included in the analysis. The fact
seems to be that a relation is one thing when it relates, and an-
other when it is merely enumerated as a term in a collection.
There are certain fundamental difficulties in this view, which
however I leave aside as irrelevant to our present purpose*.
Similar remarks apply to A is, which is a whole composed
of A and Being, but is different from the whole formed of the
collection A and Being. A is one raises the same point, and so
does A and B are two. Indeed all propositions raise this point,
andwemaydistinguish themamongcomplex termsby the fact
that they raise it.
Thus we see that there are two very different classes of
wholes, of which the first will be called aggregates, while the
second will be called unities. (Unit is a word having a quite dif-
ferent application, since whatever is a class which is not null, 141
and is such that, if x and y be members of it, x and y are iden-
*See Part I, Chap. iv, esp. §54.
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tical, is a unit.) Each class of wholes consists of terms not sim-
ply equivalent to all their parts; but in the case of unities, the
whole is not even specified by its parts. For example, the parts
A, greater than, B, may compose simply an aggregate, or either
of the propositions “A is greater thanB,” “B is greater thanA.”
Unities thus involve problems fromwhich aggregates are free.
As aggregates aremore specially relevant tomathematics than
unities, I shall in future generally confinemyself to the former.
137. It is important to realize that a whole is a new single
term, distinct from each of its parts and from all of them: it is
one, not many*, and is related to the parts, but has a being dis-
tinct from theirs. The readermayperhapsbe inclined todoubt
whether there is anyneedofwholes other thanunities; but the
following reasons seem to make aggregates logically unavoid-
able. (1) We speak of one collection, one manifold, etc., and
it would seem that in all these cases there really is something
that is a single term. (2) The theory of fractions, as we shall
shortly see, appears to depend partly upon aggregates. (3) We
shall find it necessary, in the theory of extensive quantity, to
assume that aggregates, evenwhen they are infinite, havewhat
may be called magnitude of divisibility, and that two infinite
aggregates may have the same number of terms without hav-
ing the same magnitude of divisibility: this theory, we shall
find, is indispensable in metrical geometry. For these reasons,
it would seem, the aggregatemust be admitted as an entity dis-
tinct from all its constituents, and having to each of them a
certain ultimate and indefinable relation.
138. I have already touched on a very important logical
doctrine, which the theory of whole and part brings into
prominence—Imean the doctrine that analysis is falsification.
Whatever canbe analyzed is awhole, andwehave already seen
that analysis of wholes is in some measure falsification. But it
*I.e. it is of the same logical type as its simple parts.
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is important to realize the very narrow limits of this doctrine.
We cannot conclude that the parts of a whole are not really
its parts, nor that the parts are not presupposed in the whole
in a sense in which the whole is not presupposed in the parts,
nor yet that the logically prior is not usually simpler than the
logically subsequent. In short, though analysis gives us the
truth, and nothing but the truth, yet it can never give us the
whole truth. This is the only sense in which the doctrine is to
be accepted. In any wider sense, it becomes merely a cloak for
laziness, by giving an excuse to thosewhodislike the labour of
analysis.
139. It is to be observed that what we called classes as one
may always, except where they contain one term or none,
or are defined by quadratic propositional functions, be inter-
preted as aggregates. The logical product of two classes as one 142
will be the common part (in the second of our three senses) of
the two aggregates, and their sum will be the aggregate which
is identical with or part of (again in the second sense) any ag-
gregate of which the two given aggregates are parts, but is nei-
ther identical with nor part of any other aggregate*. The rela-
tion of whole and part, in the second of our three senses, is
transitive and asymmetrical, but is distinguished from other
such relations by the fact of allowing logical addition and
multiplication. It is this peculiarity which forms the basis
of the Logical Calculus as developed by writers previous to
Peano and Frege (including Schröder)†. But wherever infinite
wholes are concerned it is necessary, and in many other cases
it is practically unavoidable, to begin with a class-concept or
predicate or propositional function, and obtain the aggregate
from this. Thus the theory of whole and part is less funda-
mental logically than that of predicates or class-concepts or
*Cf. Peano, F. 1901, §2, Prop. 1·0 (p. 19).
†See e.g. hisAlgebra der Logik, Vol. i (Leipzig, 1890).
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propositional functions; and it is for this reason that the con-
sideration of it has been postponed to so late a stage.
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chapter xvii
INFINITEWHOLES
140. In the present chapter the special difficulties of infin- 143
ity are not to be considered: all these are postponed to Part V.
My object now is to consider two questions: (1) Are there any
infinite wholes? (2) If so, must an infinite whole which con-
tains parts in the second of our three senses be an aggregate
of parts in the first sense? In order to avoid the reference to
the first, second and third senses, I propose henceforward to
use the following phraseology: A part in the first sense is to be
called a term of the whole*; a part in the second sense is to be
called a part simply; and apart in the third sensewill be called a
constituent of thewhole. Thus terms and parts belong to aggre-
gates, while constituents belong to unities. The consideration
of aggregates andunities, where infinity is concerned,must be
separately conducted. I shall begin with aggregates.
An infinite aggregate is an aggregate corresponding to an
infinite class, i.e. an aggregate which has an infinite number of
terms. Such aggregates are defined by the fact that they con-
tain parts which have as many terms as themselves. Our first
question is: Are there any such aggregates?
Infinite aggregates are often denied. Even Leibniz, favour-
able as he was to the actual infinite, maintained that, where
*A part in this sense will also be sometimes called a simple or indivisible
part.
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infinite classes are concerned, it is possible tomake valid state-
ments about any term of the class, but not about all the terms,
nor yet about the whole which (as he would say) they do not
compose†. Kant, again, has beenmuch criticised formaintain-
ing that space is an infinite given whole. Many maintain that
every aggregate must have a finite number of terms, and that
where this condition is not fulfilled there is no truewhole. But
I do not believe that this view can be successfully defended.
Among those who deny that space is a given whole, not a few
would admit that what they are pleased to call a finite space
may be a given whole, for instance, the space in a room, a box, 144
a bag, or a book-case. But such a space is only finite in a psy-
chological sense, i.e. in the sense that we can take it in at a
glance: it is not finite in the sense that it is an aggregate of a
finite number of terms, nor yet a unity of a finite number of
constituents. Thus to admit that such a space can be a whole
is to admit that there are wholes which are not finite. (This
does not follow, it should be observed, from the admission
of material objects apparently occupying finite spaces, for it
is always possible to hold that such objects, though apparently
continuous, consist really of a large but finite number ofmate-
rial points.) With respect to time, the same argument holds: to
say, for example, that a certain length of time elapses between
sunrise and sunset, is to admit an infinite whole, or at least a
whole which is not finite. It is customarywith philosophers to
deny the reality of space and time, and todeny also that, if they
were real, theywould be aggregates. I shall endeavour to show,
in Part VI, that these denials are supported by a faulty logic,
and by the now resolved difficulties of infinity. Since science
and common sense join in the opposite view, it will therefore
be accepted; and thus, since no argument à priori can now be
†Cf. Phil. Werke, ed. Gerhardt, ii, p. 316; also i, p. 338, v, pp. 144–5.
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adduced against infinite aggregates, we derive from space and
time an argument in their favour.
Again, the natural numbers, or the fractions between 0 and
1, or the sum-total of all colours, are infinite, and seem to be
true aggregates: the position that, although true propositions
can be made about any number, yet there are no true proposi-
tions about all numbers, could be supported formerly, as Leib-
niz supported it, by the supposed contradictions of infinity,
but has become, since Cantor’s solution of these contradic-
tions, a wholly unnecessary paradox. And where a collection
can be defined by a non-quadratic propositional function, this
must beheld, I think, to imply that there is a genuine aggregate
composed of the terms of the collection. It may be observed
also that, if there were no infinite wholes, the word Universe
would be wholly destitute of meaning.
141. We must, then, admit infinite aggregates. It remains
to ask a more difficult question, namely: Are we to admit in-
finite unities? This question may also be stated in the form:
Are there any infinitely complex propositions? This question
is one of great logical importance, and we shall require much
care both in stating and in discussing it.
The first point is to be clear as to the meaning of an infinite
unity. A unity will be infinite when the aggregate of all its
constituents is infinite, but this scarcely constitutes themean-
ing of an infinite unity. In order to obtain the meaning, we
must introduce the notion of a simple constituent. We may
observe, to begin with, that a constituent of a constituent is a
constituent of the unity, i.e. this form of the relation of part to
whole, like the second, but unlike the first form, is transitive. 145
A simple constituent may now be defined as a constituent
which itself has no constituents. We may assume, in order
to eliminate the question concerning aggregates, that no con-
stituent of our unity is to be an aggregate, or, if there be a con-
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stituent which is an aggregate, then this constituent is to be
taken as simple. (This view of an aggregate is rendered legiti-
mate by the fact that an aggregate is a single term, anddoes not
have that kind of complexity which belongs to propositions.)
With this the definition of a simple constituent is completed.
We may now define an infinite unity as follows: A unity is
finite when, and only when, the aggregate of its simple con-
stituents is finite. In all other cases a unity is said to be infinite.
We have to inquire whether there are any such unities*.
If a unity is infinite, it is possible to find a constituent unity,
which again contains a constituent unity, and so on without
end. If there be any unities of this nature, two cases are primâ
facie possible. (1) There may be simple constituents of our
unity, but these must be infinite in number. (2) There may be
no simple constituents at all, but all constituents, without ex-
ception, may be complex; or, to take a slightly more compli-
cated case, it may happen that, although there are some sim-
ple constituents, yet these and the unities composed of them
do not constitute all the constituents of the original unity. A
unity of either of these two kinds will be called infinite. The
two kinds, though distinct, may be considered together.
An infinite unity will be an infinitely complex proposition:
it will not be analyzable in any way into a finite number of
constituents. It thus differs radically from assertions about
infinite aggregates. For example, the proposition “any num-
ber has a successor” is composed of a finite number of con-
stituents: the number of concepts entering into it can be enu-
merated, and in addition to these there is an infinite aggregate
of terms denoted in the way indicated by any, which counts
as one constituent. Indeed it may be said that the logical pur-
pose which is served by the theory of denoting is, to enable
propositions of finite complexity to deal with infinite classes
*In Leibniz’s philosophy, all contingent things are infinite unities.
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of terms: this object is effected by all, any, and every, and if it
were not effected, every general proposition about an infinite
class would have to be infinitely complex. Now, for my part,
I see no possible way of deciding whether propositions of in-
finite complexity are possible or not; but this at least is clear,
that all the propositions known to us (and, it would seem, all
propositions that we can know) are of finite complexity. It
is only by obtaining such propositions about infinite classes
that we are enabled to deal with infinity; and it is a remark-
able and fortunate fact that this method is successful. Thus
the question whether or not there are infinite unities must be
left unresolved; the only thing we can say, on this subject, is
that no such unities occur in any department of human know- 146
ledge, and therefore none such are relevant to the foundations
of mathematics.
142. I come now to our second question: Must an infinite
whole which contains parts be an aggregate of terms? It is of-
ten held, for example, that spaces have parts, and can be di-
vided ad lib., but that they have no simple parts, i.e. they are not
aggregates of points. The same view is put forward as regards
periods of time. Now it is plain that, if our definition of a part
by means of terms (i.e. of the second sense of part by means
of the first) was correct, the present problem can never arise,
since parts only belong to aggregates. But it may be urged that
the notion of part ought to be taken as an indefinable, and that
therefore it may apply to other wholes than aggregates. This
will require thatwe should add to aggregates andunities a new
kindofwhole, corresponding to the second sense of part. This
will be a whole which has parts in the second sense, but is not
an aggregate or a unity. Such a whole seems to be what many
philosophers are fond of calling a continuum, and space and
time are often held to afford instances of such a whole.
Now itmaybe admitted that, among infinitewholes, wefind
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a distinction which seems relevant, but which, I believe, is in
reality merely psychological. In some cases, we feel no doubt
as to the terms, but great doubt as to thewhole,while inothers,
the whole seems obvious, but the terms seem a precarious in-
ference. The ratios between 0 and 1, for instance, are certainly
indivisible entities; but the whole aggregate of ratios between
0 and 1 seems to be of the nature of a construction or infer-
ence. On the other hand, sensible spaces and times seem to
be obvious wholes; but the inference to indivisible points and
instants is so obscure as to be often regarded as illegitimate.
This distinction seems, however, to have no logical basis, but
to be wholly dependent on the nature of our senses. A slight
familiarity with coordinate geometry suffices to make a finite
length seem strictly analogous to the stretch of fractions be-
tween 0 and 1. It must be admitted, nevertheless, that in cases
where, as with the fractions, the indivisible parts are evident
on inspection, the problemwithwhichwe are concerned does
not arise. But to infer that all infinite wholes have indivisible
partsmerely because this is known to be the case with some of
them, would certainly be rash. The general problem remains,
therefore, namely: Given an infinite whole, is there a univer-
sal reason for supposing that it contains indivisible parts?
143. In the first place, the definition of an infinite whole
must not be held to deny that it has an assignable number of
simple parts which do not reconstitute it. For example, the
stretch of fractions from 0 to 1 has three simple parts, 13 , 12 , 23 .
But these do not reconstitute the whole, that is, the whole has
other parts which are not parts of the assigned parts or of the
sum of the assigned parts. Again, if we form a whole out of 147
the number 1 and a line an inch long, this whole certainly has
one simple part, namely 1. Such a case as this may be excluded
by asking whether every part of our whole either is simple or
contains simple parts. In this case, if our whole be formed by
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adding n simple terms to an infinite whole, the n simple terms
can be taken away, and the question can be asked concerning
the infinite whole which is left. But again, the meaning of our
question seems hardly to be: Is our infinite whole an actual ag-
gregate of innumerable simple parts? This is doubtless an im-
portant question, but it is subsequent to the question we are
asking, which is: Are there always simple parts at all? Wemay
observe that, if a finite number of simple parts be found, and
taken away from the whole, the remainder is always infinite.
For if not, it would have a finite number; and since the term
of two finite numbers is finite, the original whole would then
be finite. Hence if it can be shown that every infinite whole
contains one simple part, it follows that it contains an infinite
number of them. For, taking away the one simple part, the re-
mainder is an infinite whole, and therefore has a new simple
part, and so on. It follows that every part of thewhole either is
simple, or contains simple parts, provided that every infinite
wholehas at least one simplepart. But it seemsashard toprove
this as to prove that every infinite whole is an aggregate.
If an infinite whole be divided into a finite number of parts,
one at least of these parts must be infinite. If this be again di-
vided, one of its parts must be infinite, and so on. Thus no
finite number of divisions will reduce all the parts to finitude.
Successivedivisions give anendless series ofparts, and in such
endless series there is (as we shall see in Parts IV and V) no
manner of contradiction. Thus there is nomethod of proving
by actual division that every infinite whole must be an aggre-
gate. So far as this method can show, there is no more reason
for simple constituents of infinite wholes than for a first mo-
ment in time or a last finite number.
But perhaps a contradictionmay emerge in the present case
from the connection of whole and part with logical priority.
It certainly seems a greater paradox to maintain that infinite
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wholes do not have indivisible parts than to maintain that
there is no first moment in time or furthest limit to space.
This might be explained by the fact that we know many sim-
ple terms, and some infinitewholes undoubtedly composedof
simple terms, whereas we knowof nothing suggesting a begin-
ning of time or space. But it may perhaps have amore solid ba-
sis in logical priority. For the simpler is always implied in the
more complex, and therefore there can be no truth about the
more complex unless there is truth about the simpler. Thus in
the analysis of our infinite whole, we are always dealing with
entities which would not be at all unless their constituents
were. This makes a real difference from the time-series, for
example: a moment does not logically presuppose a previous
moment, and if it did it would perhaps be self-contradictory 148
to deny a first moment, as it has been held (for the same rea-
son) self-contradictory to deny a First Cause. It seems to fol-
low that infinite wholes would not have Being at all, unless
there were innumerable simple Beings whose Being is presup-
posed in that of the infinitewholes. Forwhere the presupposi-
tion is false, the consequence is false also. Thus there seems a
special reason for completing the infinite regress in the case of
infinite wholes, which does not exist where other asymmetri-
cal transitive relations are concerned. This is another instance
of the peculiarity of the relation of whole and part: a relation
so important and fundamental that almost all our philosophy
depends upon the theory we adopt in regard to it.
The same argument may be otherwise stated by asking how
our infinite wholes are to be defined. The definition must
not be infinitely complex, since this would require an infinite
unity. Now if there is any definition which is of finite com-
plexity, this cannot be obtained from the parts, since these
are either infinitely numerous (in the case of an aggregate), or
themselves as complex as the whole (in the case of a whole
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which is not an aggregate). But any definition which is of fi-
nite complexity will necessarily be intensional, i.e. it will give
some characteristic of a collection of terms. There seems to
be no other known method of defining an infinite whole, or
of obtaining such a whole in a way not involving any infinite
unity.
The above argument, it must be admitted, is less conclu-
sive than could be wished, considering the great importance
of the point at issue. It may, however, be urged in support of
it that all the arguments on the other side depend upon the
supposed difficulties of infinity, and are therefore wholly fal-
lacious; also that the procedure of Geometry and Dynamics
(as will be shown in Parts VI and VII) imperatively demands
points and instants. In all applications, in short, the results
of the doctrine here advocated are far simpler, less paradoxi-
cal, andmore logically satisfactory, than those of the opposite
view. I shall therefore assume, throughout the remainder of
thiswork, that all the infinitewholeswithwhichwe shall have
to deal are aggregates of terms.
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chapter xviii
RATIOSAND FRACTIONS
144. The present chapter, in so far as it deals with relations 149
of integers, is essentially confined to finite integers: those that
are infinite have no relations strictly analogous to what are
usually called ratios. But I shall distinguish ratios, as relations
between integers, from fractions, which are relations between
aggregates, or rather between their magnitudes of divisibility;
and fractions, we shall find, may express relations which hold
where both aggregates are infinite. Itwill be necessary to begin
with the mathematical definition of ratio, before proceeding
to more general considerations.
Ratio is commonly associated with multiplication and di-
vision, and in this way becomes indistinguishable from frac-
tions. But multiplication and division are equally applicable
to finite and infinite numbers, though in the case of infinite
numbers they do not have the properties which connect them
with ratio in the finite case. Hence it becomes desirable to de-
velop a theory of ratio which shall be independent of multipli-
cation and division.
Two finite numbers are said to be consecutive when, if u be
a class having one of the numbers, and one term be added to
u, the resulting class has the other number. To be consecutive
is thus a relation which is one-one and asymmetrical. If now
a number a has to a number b the nth power of this relation
of consecutiveness (powers of relations being defined by rela-
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tive multiplication), then we have a + n = b. This equation
expresses, between a and b, a one-one relation which is deter-
minate when n is given. If now themth power of this relation
holds between a0 and b0, we shall have a0 + mn = b0. Also we
may define mn as 0 + mn. If now we have three numbers a, b,
c such that ab = c, this equation expresses between a and c a
one-one relation which is determinate when b is given. Let us
call this relation B. Suppose we have also a0b0 = c. Then a has
to a0 a relation which is the relative product of B and the con-
verse of B0, where B0 is derived from b0 as Bwas derived from b.
This relation we define as the ratio of a0 to a. This theory has
the advantage that it applies not only to finite integers, but to
all other series of the same type, i.e. all series of the type which 150
I call progressions.
145. The only point which it is important, for our present
purpose, to observe as regards the above definition of ratios is,
that they are one-one relations between finite integers, which
are with one exception asymmetrical, which are such that one
and only one holds between any specified pair of finite in-
tegers, which are definable in terms of consecutiveness, and
which themselves form a series having no first or last term and
having a term, and therefore an infinite number of terms, be-
tween any two specified terms. From the fact that ratios are
relations it results that no ratios are to be identified with inte-
gers: the ratio of 2 to 1, for example, is a wholly different entity
from 2. When, therefore, we speak of the series of ratios as
containing integers, the integers said to be contained are not
cardinal numbers, but relations which have a certain one-one
correspondence with cardinal numbers. The same remark ap-
plies to positive and negative numbers. The nth power of the
relation of consecutiveness is the positive number+n, which
is plainly awholly different concept from the cardinal number
n. The confusion of entities with others to which they have
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some important one-one relation is an error to which math-
ematicians are very liable, and one which has produced the
greatest havoc in the philosophy of mathematics. We shall
find hereafter innumerable other instances of the same error,
and it is well to realize, as early as possible, that any failure in
subtlety of distinctions is sure, in this subject at least, to cause
the most disastrous consequences.
There is no difficulty in connecting the above theory of ra-
tio with the usual theory derived from multiplication and di-
vision. But the usual theory does not show, as the present the-
ory does, why the infinite integers do not have ratios strictly
analogous to those of finite integers. The fact is, that ratio
depends upon consecutiveness, and consecutiveness as above
defined does not exist among infinite integers, since these are
unchanged by the addition of 1.
It should be observed that what is called addition of ratios
demands a new set of relations among ratios, relations which
may be called positive and negative ratios, just as certain rela-
tions among integers are positive and negative integers. This
subject, however, need not be further developed.
146. The above theory of ratio has, it must be confessed, a
highly artificial appearance, and one which makes it seem ex-
traordinary that ratios should occur in daily life. The fact is,
it is not ratios, but fractions, that occur, and fractions are not
purely arithmetical, but are really concerned with relations of
whole and part.
Propositions asserting fractions show an important differ-
ence from those asserting integers. We can say A is one, A
and B are two, and so on; but we cannot sayA is one-third, or
A and B are two-thirds. There is always need of some second 151
entity, to which our first has some fractional relation. We say
A is one-third ofC,A and B together are two-thirds ofC, and
so on. Fractions, in short, are either relations of a simple part
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to a whole, or of two wholes to one another. But it is not nec-
essary that the onewhole, or the simple part, should be part of
the other whole. In the case of finite wholes, the matter seems
simple: the fraction expresses the ratio of the number of parts
in the one to the number in the other. But the consideration
of infinite wholes will show us that this simple theory is inad-
equate to the facts.
147. There is no doubt that the notion of half a league, or
half a day, is a legitimate notion. It is therefore necessary to
find some sense for fractions in which they do not essentially
depend upon number. For, if a given period of twenty-four
hours is to be divided into two continuous portions, each of
which is to be half of the whole period, there is only one way
of doing this: but Cantor has shown that every possible way
of dividing the period into two continuous portions divides
it into two portions having the same number of terms. There
must be, therefore, some other respect in which two periods
of twelve hours are equal, while a period of one hour and an-
other of twenty-three hours are unequal. I shall have more to
say upon this subject in Part III; for the present I will point out
that what we want is of the nature of a magnitude, and that it
must be essentially a property of ordered wholes. I shall call
this propertymagnitude of divisibility. To say now thatA is one-
half of Bmeans: B is a whole, and if B be divided into two sim-
ilar parts which have both the same magnitude of divisibility
as each other, then A has the same magnitude of divisibility
as each of these parts. We may interpret the fraction 12 some-
what more simply, by regarding it as a relation (analogous to
ratio so long as finite wholes are concerned) between twomag-
nitudes of divisibility. Thus finite integral fractions (such as
n=1) will measure the relation of the divisibility of an aggre-
gate of n terms to the divisibility of a single term; the converse
relationwill be 1=n. Thus here againwe have a new class of en-
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tities which is in danger of being confusedwith finite cardinal
integers, though in reality quite distinct. Fractions, as now in-
terpreted, have the advantage (upon which all metrical geom-
etry depends) that they introduce a discrimination of greater
and smaller among infinite aggregates having the same num-
ber of terms. We shall see more and more, as the logical in-
adequacy of the usual accounts of measurement is brought to
light, how absolutely essential the notion of magnitude of di-
visibility really is. Fractions, then, in the sense in which they
may express relations of infinite aggregates—and this is the
sensewhich theyusuallyhave indaily life—are really of thena-
ture of relations between magnitudes of divisibility; and mag-
nitudes of divisibility are only measured by number of parts
where the aggregates concerned are finite. It may also be ob-
served (though this remark is anticipatory) that, whereas ra-
tios, as above defined, are essentially rational, fractions, in the 152
sense here given to them, are also capable of irrational values.
But the development of this topic must be left for Part V.
148. We may now sum up the results obtained in Part II. In
the first four chapters, themodernmathematical theory of car-
dinal integers, as it results from the joint labours of arithmeti-
cians and symbolic logicians, was briefly set forth. Chapter xi
explained the notion of similar classes, and showed that the
usual formal properties of integers result from defining them
as classes of similar classes. In Chapter xii, we showed how
arithmetical addition and multiplication both depend upon
logical addition, and how bothmay be defined in a way which
applies equally to finite and infinite numbers, and to finite,
and infinite sums and products, and which moreover intro-
duces nowhere any idea of order. In Chapter xiii, we gave
the strict definition of an infinite class, as one which is similar
to a class resulting from taking away one of its terms; and we
showed in outline how to connect this definitionwith the def-
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inition of finite numbers bymathematical induction. The spe-
cial theory of finite integers was discussed inChapter xiv, and
it was shown how the primitive propositions, which Peano
proves to be sufficient in this subject, can all be deduced from
our definition of finite cardinal integers. This confirmed us
in the opinion that Arithmetic contains no indefinables or in-
demonstrables beyond those of general logic.
We then advanced, in Chapter xv, to the consideration of
philosophical questions, with a view of testing critically the
above mathematical deductions. We decided to regard both
term and a term as indefinable, and to define the number 1,
as well as all other numbers, by means of these indefinables
(together with certain others). We also found it necessary to
distinguish a class from its class-concept, since one class may
have several different class-concepts. We decided that a class
consists of all the termsdenotedby the class-concept, denoted
in a certain indefinablemanner; but it appeared that both com-
mon usage and the majority of mathematical purposes would
allow us to identify a class with the whole formed of the terms
denoted by the class-concept. The only reasons against this
view were, the necessity of distinguishing a class containing
only one term from that one term, and the fact that some
classes are members of themselves. We found also a distinc-
tion between finite and infinite classes, that the former can,
while the latter cannot, be defined extensionally, i.e. by actual
enumeration of their terms. We then proceeded to discuss
what may be called the addition of individuals, i.e. the notion
involved in “A and B”; and we found that a more or less inde-
pendent theoryof finite integers canbebasedupon this notion.
But it appeared finally, in virtue of our analysis of the notion
of class, that this theory was really indistinguishable from the
theory previously expounded, the only difference being that
it adopted an extensional definition of classes.
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Chapter xvi dealt with the relation of whole and part. We 153
found that there are two indefinable senses of this relation,
and one definable sense, and that there are two correspond-
ingly different sorts of wholes, which we called unities and
aggregates respectively. We saw also that, by extending the
notion of aggregates to single terms and to the null-class, we
could regard the whole of the traditional calculus of Sym-
bolic Logic as an algebra specially applicable to the relations of
wholes and parts in the definable sense. We considered next,
in Chapter xvii, the notion of an infinite whole. It appeared
that infinite unities, even if they be logically possible, at any
rate never appear in anything accessible to human knowledge.
But infinite aggregates, we found, must be admitted; and it
seemed that all infinite wholes which are not unities must be
aggregates of terms, though it is by no means necessary that
the terms should be simple. (They must, however, owing to
the exclusion of infinite unities, be assumed to be of finite com-
plexity.)
In Chapter xviii, finally, we considered ratios and fractions:
the former were found to be somewhat complicated relations
of finite integers, while the latter were relations between the
divisibilities of aggregates. These divisibilities being magni-
tudes, their further discussion belongs to Part III, inwhich the
general nature of quantity is to be considered.
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PART III
QUANTITY
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chapter xix
THEMEANINGOF
MAGNITUDE
149. Among the traditional problems of mathematical phi- 157
losophy, few are more important than the relation of quantity
to number. Opinion as to this relation has undergone many
revolutions. Euclid, as is evident from his definitions of ra-
tio andproportion, and indeed fromhiswhole procedure, was
not persuaded of the applicability of numbers to spatial mag-
nitudes. When Des Cartes and Vieta, by the introduction of
co-ordinate Geometry, made this applicability a fundamental
postulate of their systems, a newmethodwas founded, which,
however fruitful of results, involved, like most mathematical
advances of the seventeenth century, a diminution of logi-
cal precision and a loss in subtlety of distinction. What was
meant by measurement, and whether all spatial magnitudes
were susceptible of a numerical measure, were questions for
whose decision, until very lately, the necessary mathematical
instrument was lacking; and even now much remains to be
done before a complete answer can be given. The view pre-
vailed that number andquantitywere the objects ofmathemat-
ical investigation, and that the two were so similar as not to
require careful separation. Thus number was applied to quan-
tities without any hesitation, and conversely, where existing
numbers were found inadequate to measurement, new ones
were created on the sole ground that every quantitymust have
a numerical measure.
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All this is nowhappily changed. Two different lines of argu-
ment, conducted in the main by different men, have laid the
foundations both for large generalizations, and for thorough
accuracy in detail. On the one hand, Weierstrass, Dedekind,
Cantor, and their followers, havepointedout that, if irrational
numbers are to be significantly employed asmeasures of quan-
titative fractions, they must be defined without reference to
quantity; and the samemenwho showed the necessity of such
adefinitionhave supplied thewantwhich theyhad created. In
this way, during the last thirty or forty years, a new subject,
which has added quite immeasurably to theoretical correct-
ness, has been created, whichmay legitimately be calledArith-
metic; for, starting with integers, it succeeds in defining what- 158
ever else it requires—rationals, limits, irrationals, continuity,
and so on. It results that, for all Algebra andAnalysis, it is un-
necessary to assume any material beyond the integers, which,
as we have seen, can themselves be defined in logical terms. It
is this science, far more than non-EuclideanGeometry, that is
really fatal to theKantian theory of à priori intuitions as the ba-
sis of mathematics. Continuity and irrationals were formerly
the strongholds of the school whomay be called intuitionists,
but these strongholds are theirs no longer. Arithmetic has
grown so as to include all that can strictly be called pure in
the traditional mathematics.
150. But, concurrently with this purist’s reform, an oppo-
site advance has been effected. New branches of mathemat-
ics, which deal neither with number nor with quantity, have
been invented; such are the Logical Calculus, Projective Ge-
ometry, and—in its essence—the Theory of Groups. More-
over it has appeared that measurement—if this means the cor-
relation, with numbers, of entities which are not numbers or
aggregates—isnot aprerogativeof quantities: somequantities
cannot be measured, and some things which are not quanti-
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 227
ties (for example anharmonic ratios projectively defined) can
be measured. Measurement, in fact, as we shall see, is appli-
cable to all series of a certain kind—a kind which excludes
some quantities and includes some thingswhich are not quan-
tities. The separation between number and quantity is thus
complete: each is wholly independent of the other. Quan-
tity, moreover, has lost the mathematical importance which it
used to possess, owing to the fact thatmost theorems concern-
ing it can be generalized so as to become theorems concerning
order. It would therefore be natural to discuss order before
quantity. As all propositions concerning order can, however,
be established independently for particular instances of order,
and as quantity will afford an illustration, requiring slightly
less effort of abstraction, of the principles to be applied to se-
ries in general; as, further, the theory of distance, which forms
a part of the theory of order, presupposes somewhat contro-
versial opinions as to the nature of quantity, I shall follow the
more traditional course, and consider quantity first. My aim
will be to give, in the present chapter, a theory of quantity
which does not depend upon number, and then to show the
peculiar relation to number which is possessed by two spe-
cial classes of quantities, upon which depends the measure-
ment of quantitieswherever this is possible. Thewhole of this
Part, however—and it is important to realize this—is a conces-
sion to tradition; for quantity, we shall find, is not definable
in terms of logical constants, and is not properly a notion be-
longing to pure mathematics at all. I shall discuss quantity
because it is traditionally supposed to occur in mathematics,
and because a thorough discussion is required for disproving
this supposition; but if the supposition did not exist, I should
avoid all mention of any such notion as quantity.
151. In fixing the meaning of such a term as quantity or mag- 159
nitude, one is faced with the difficulty that, however one may
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define the word, one must appear to depart from usage. This
difficulty arises wherever two characteristics have been com-
monly supposed inseparable which, upon closer examination,
are discovered to be capable of existing apart. In the case
of magnitude, the usual meaning appears to imply (1) a ca-
pacity for the relations of greater and less, (2) divisibility. Of
these characteristics, the first is supposed to imply the second.
But as I propose to deny the implication, I must either admit
that some things which are indivisible are magnitudes, or that
some things which are greater or less than others are not mag-
nitudes. As oneof these departures fromusage is unavoidable,
I shall choose the former, which I believe to be the less seri-
ous. A magnitude, then, is to be defined as anything which is
greater or less than something else.
It might be thought that equality should be mentioned,
along with greater and less, in the definition of magnitude.
We shall see reason to think, however—paradoxical as such a
view may appear—that what can be greater or less than some
term, can never be equal to any term whatever, and vice versâ.
This will require a distinction, whose necessity will become
more and more evident as we proceed, between the kind of
terms that can be equal, and the kind that can be greater or
less. The former I shall callquantities, the lattermagnitudes. An
actual foot-rule is a quantity: its length is amagnitude. Magni-
tudes are more abstract than quantities: when two quantities
are equal, they have the samemagnitude. The necessity of this
abstraction is the first point to be established.
152. Setting aside magnitudes for the moment, let us con-
sider quantities. A quantity is anything which is capable of
quantitative equality to something else. Quantitative equal-
ity is to be distinguished from other kinds, such as arithmeti-
cal or logical equality. All kinds of equality have in common
the three properties of being reflexive, symmetrical, and tran-
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sitive, i.e. a term which has this relation at all has this relation
to itself; ifA has the relation to B, B has it toA; ifA has it to B,
and B toC,A has it toC*. What it is that distinguishes quan-
titative equality from other kinds, and whether this kind of
equality is analyzable, is a further and more difficult question,
to which we must now proceed.
There are, so far as I know, three main views of quantita-
tive equality. There is (1) the traditional view, which denies
quantity as an independent idea, and asserts that two terms 160
are equalwhen, and onlywhen, they have the samenumber of
parts. (2) There iswhatmay be called the relative viewof quan-
tity, according to which equal, greater and less are all direct
relations between quantities. In this view we have no need
of magnitude, since sameness of magnitude is replaced by the
symmetrical and transitive relation of equality. (3) There is the
absolute theory of quantity, in which equality is not a direct
relation, but is to be analyzed into possession of a common
magnitude, i.e. into sameness of relation to a third term. In
this case there will be a special kind of relation of a term to its
magnitude; between two magnitudes of the same kind there
will be the relation of greater and less; while equal, greater and
less will apply to quantities only in virtue of their relation to
magnitudes. Thedifference between the second and third the-
ories is exactly typical of a difference which arises in the case
of many other series, and notably in regard to space and time.
The decision is, therefore, a matter of very considerable im-
*On the independence of these three properties, see Peano, Revue de
Mathématique, VII, p. 22. The reflexive property is not strictly necessary;
what is properly necessary and what is alone (at first sight at any rate) true
ofquantitative equality, is, that there exists at least onepair of termshaving
the relation in question. It follows then from the other two properties that
each of these terms has to itself the relation in question.
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portance.
153. (1) The kind of equality which consists in having the
same number of parts has been already discussed in Part II.
If this be indeed the meaning of quantitative equality, then
quantity introduces nonew idea. But itmay be shown, I think,
that greater and less have a wider field than whole and part,
and an independentmeaning. The argumentsmay be enumer-
ated as follows: (α) We must admit indivisible quantities; (β)
where the number of simple parts is infinite, there is no gener-
alizationofnumberwhichwill give the recognized results as to
inequality; (γ) some relations must be allowed to be quantita-
tive, and relations are not even conceivably divisible; (δ) even
where there is divisibility, the axiom that the whole is greater
than thepartmust be allowed tobe significant, andnot a result
of definition.
(α) Some quantities are indivisible. For it is generally admit-
ted that some psychical existents, such as pleasure and pain,
are quantitative. If now equality means sameness in the num-
ber of indivisible parts, we shall have to regard a pleasure or a
pain as consisting of a collection of units, all perfectly simple,
and not, in any significant sense, equal inter se; for the equal-
ity of compound pleasures results on this hypothesis, solely
from the number of simple ones entering into their compo-
sition, so that equality is formally inapplicable to indivisible
pleasures. If, on the other hand, we allow pleasures to be in-
finitely divisible, so that no unit we can take is indivisible,
then the number of units in any given pleasure is wholly ar-
bitrary, and if there is to be any equality of pleasures, we shall
have to admit that any two units may be significantly called
equal or unequal*. Hence we shall require for equality some
meaning other than sameness as to the number of parts. This
*I shall never use theword unequal tomeanmerely not equal, but always
to mean greater or less, i.e. not equal, though of the same kind of quantities.
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latter theory, however, seems unavoidable. For there is not 161
only no reason to regard pleasures as consisting of definite
sums of indivisible units, but further—as a candid considera-
tion will, I think, convince anyone—two pleasures can always
be significantly judged equal or unequal. However small two
pleasures may be, it must always be significant to say that they
are equal. But on the theory I am combating, the judgment
in question would suddenly cease to be significant when both
pleasureswere indivisible units. Such a view seemswholly un-
warrantable, and I cannot believe that it has been consciously
held by those* who have advocated the premisses from which
it follows.
(β) Some quantities are infinitely divisible, and in these,
whatever definitionwe take of infinite number, equality is not
coextensive with sameness in the number of parts. In the first
place, equality or inequality must always be definite: concern-
ing two quantities of the same kind, one answer must be right
and the other wrong, though it is often not in our power to
decide the alternative. From this it follows that, where quan-
tities consist of an infinite number of parts, if equality or in-
equality is to be reduced to number of parts at all, it must be
reduced to number of simple parts; for the number of complex
parts that may be taken to make up the whole is wholly arbi-
trary. But equality, for example in Geometry, is far narrower
than sameness in the number of parts. The cardinal number
of parts in any two continuous portions of space is the same,
as we know from Cantor; even the ordinal number or type is
the same for any two lengths whatever. Hence if there is to
be any spatial inequality of the kind to which Geometry and
common-sense have accustomed us, wemust seek some other
meaning for equality than that obtained from the number of
*E.g. Mr Bradley, “What do we mean by the Intensity of Psychical
States?” Mind, N. S. Vol. iv; see esp. p. 5.
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parts. At this point I shall be told that the meaning is very ob-
vious: it is obtained from superposition. Without trenching
too far on discussions which belong to a later part, I may ob-
serve (a) that superposition applies to matter, not to space, (b)
that as a criterionof equality, it presupposes that thematter su-
perposed is rigid, (c) that rigidity means constancy as regards
metrical properties. This shows that we cannot, without a vi-
cious circle, define spatial equality by superposition. Spatial
magnitude is, in fact, as indefinable as every other kind; and
number of parts, in this case as in all others where the number
is infinite, is wholly inadequate even as a criterion.
(γ) Some relations are quantities. This is suggested by the
above discussion of spatial magnitudes, where it is very natu-
ral to base equality upon distances. Although this view, as we
shall see hereafter, is not wholly adequate, it is yet partly true.
There appear to be in certain spaces, and there certainly are in
some series (for instance that of the rational numbers), quan- 162
titative relations of distance among the various terms. Also
similarity and difference appear to be quantities. Consider for
example two shades of colour. It seems undeniable that two
shades of red are more similar to each other than either is to a
shade of blue; yet there is no commonproperty in the one case
which is not found in the other also. Red is a mere collective
name for a certain series of shades, and the only reason for giv-
ing a collective name to this series lies in the close resemblance
between its terms. Hence red must not be regarded as a com-
mon property in virtue of which two shades of red resemble
each other. And since relations are not even conceivably di-
visible, greater and less among relations cannot depend upon
number of parts.
(δ) Finally, it is well to consider directly the meanings of
greater and less on the one hand, and ofwhole and part on the
other. Euclid’s axiom, that the whole is greater than the part,
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seems undeniably significant; but on the traditional view of
quantity, this axiom would be a mere tautology. This point is
again connected with the question whether superposition is
to be taken as the meaning of equality, or as a mere criterion.
On the latter view, the axiommust be significant, and we can-
not identify magnitude with number of parts*.
154. (2) There is therefore in quantity something over and
above the ideas which we have hitherto discussed. It remains
to decide between the relative and absolute theories of magni-
tude.
The relative theory regards equal quantities as not pos-
sessed of any common property over and above that of un-
equal quantities, but as distinguished merely by the mutual
relation of equality. There is no such thing as a magnitude,
shared by equal quantities. We must not say: This and that
are both a yard long; we must say: This and that are equal, or
are both equal to the standard yard in the Exchequer. Inequal-
ity is also a direct relation between quantities, not between
magnitudes. There is nothing by which a set of equal quan-
tities are distinguished from one which is not equal to them,
except the relation of equality itself. The course of definition
is, therefore, as follows: We have first a quality or relation,
say pleasure, of which there are various instances, specialized,
in the case of a quality, by temporal or spatio-temporal posi-
tion, and in the case of a relation, by the terms betweenwhich
it holds. Let us, to fix ideas, consider quantities of pleasure.
Quantities of pleasure consist merely of the complexes plea-
sure at such a time, and pleasure at such another time (to which
place may be added, if it be thought that pleasures have posi-
tion in space). In the analysis of a particular pleasure, there
is, according to the relational theory, no other element to be
*Compare, with the above discussion,Meinong,Ueber die Bedeutung des
Weberschen Gesetzes, Hamburg and Leipzig, 1896; especially Chap. i, §3.
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found. But on comparing these particular pleasures, we find 163
that any two have one and only one of three relations, equal,
greater, and less. Why some have one relation, some another,
is a question to which it is theoretically and strictly impossi-
ble to give an answer; for there is, ex hypothesi, no point of dif-
ference except temporal or spatio-temporal position, which is
obviously irrelevant. Equal quantities of pleasure donot agree
in any respect inwhich unequal ones differ: itmerely happens
that some have one relation and some another. This state of
things, it must be admitted, is curious, and it becomes still
more so when we examine the indemonstrable axioms which
the relational theory obliges us to assume. They are the follow-
ing (A, B,C being all quantities of one kind):
(a)A = B, orA is greater than B, orA is less than B.
(b)Abeing given, there is always aB, whichmaybe identical
withA, such thatA = B.
(c) IfA = B, then B = A.
(d) IfA = B and B = C, thenA = C.
(e) IfA is greater than B, then B is less thanA.
(f) If A is greater than B, and B is greater than C, then A is
greater thanC.
(g) If A is greater than B, and B = C, then A is greater than
C.
(h) IfA = B, and B is greater thanC, thenA is greater than
C.
From (b), (c), and (d) it follows thatA = A*. From (e) and (f)
it follows that, ifA is less than B, and B is less than C, thenA
is less than C; from (c), (e), and (h) it follows that, if A is less
than B, and B = C, thenA is less thanC; from (c), (e), and (g)
it follows that, if A = B, and B is less than C, then A is less
than C. (In the place of (b) we may put the axiom: If A be a
*This does not follow from (c) and (d) alone, since they do not assert
thatA is ever equal to B. See Peano, loc. cit.
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quantity, thenA = A.) These axioms, it will be observed, lead
to the conclusion that, in any proposition asserting equality,
excess, or defect, an equal quantity may be substituted any-
where without affecting the truth or falsehood of the propo-
sition. Further, the proposition A = A is an essential part of
the theory. Now the first of these facts strongly suggests that
what is relevant in quantitative propositions is not the actual
quantity, but some property which it shares with other equal
quantities. And this suggestion is almost demonstrated by the
second fact,A = A. For it may be laid down that the only un-
analyzable symmetrical and transitive relation which a term
can have to itself is identity, if this be indeed a relation. Hence
the relation of equality should be analyzable. Now to say that
a relation is analyzable is to say either that it consists of two or
more relations between its terms, which is plainly not the case
here, or that, when it is said to hold between two terms, there
is some third term to which both are related in ways which,
when compounded, give the original relation. Thus to assert 164
that A is B’s grandparent is to assert that there is some third
personC, who isA’s son or daughter andB’s father ormother.
Hence if equality be analyzable, two equal termsmust both be
related to some third term; and since a term may be equal to
itself, any two equal terms must have the same relation to the
third term in question. But to admit this is to admit the abso-
lute theory of magnitude.
A direct inspection of what we mean when we say that
two terms are equal or unequal will reinforce the objections
to the relational theory. It seems preposterous to maintain
that equal quantities have absolutely nothing in common be-
yondwhat is shared by unequal quantities. Moreover unequal
quantities are not merely different: they are different in the
specific manner expressed by saying that one is greater, the
other less. Such a difference seems quite unintelligible un-
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less there is some point of difference, where unequal quanti-
ties are concerned, which is absent where quantities are equal.
Thus the relational theory, though apparently not absolutely
self-contradictory, is complicated and paradoxical. Both the
complication and the paradox, we shall find, are entirely ab-
sent in the absolute theory.
155. (3) In the absolute theory, there is, belonging to a set of
equal quantities, one definite concept, namely a certain mag-
nitude. Magnitudes are distinguished among concepts by the
fact that they have the relations of greater and less (or at least
one of them) to other terms, which are therefore also magni-
tudes. Two magnitudes cannot be equal, for equality belongs
to quantities, and is defined as possession of the same magni-
tude. Every magnitude is a simple and indefinable concept.
Not any twomagnitudes are one greater and the other less; on
the contrary, given any magnitude, those which are greater or
less than that magnitude form a certain definite class, within
which any two are one greater and the other less. Such a class
is called a kind of magnitude. A kind of magnitude may, how-
ever, be also defined in another way, which has to be con-
nectedwith the above by an axiom. Everymagnitude is a mag-
nitude of something—pleasure, distance, area, etc.—and has
thus a certain specific relation to the something of which it is
a magnitude. This relation is very peculiar, and appears to be
incapable of further definition. All magnitudes which have
this relation to one and the same something (e.g. pleasure) are
magnitudes of one kind; and with this definition, it becomes
an axiom to say that, of twomagnitudes of the same kind, one
is greater and the other less.
156. An objection to the above theory may be based on the
relation of a magnitude to that whose magnitude it is. To fix
our ideas, let us consider pleasure. Amagnitude of pleasure is
so much pleasure, such and such an intensity of pleasure. It
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seems difficult to regard this, as the absolute theory demands,
as a simple idea: there seem to be two constituents, pleasure
and intensity. Intensity need not be intensity of pleasure, and
intensity of pleasure is distinct from abstract pleasure. But 165
what we require for the constitution of a certainmagnitude of
pleasure is, not intensity in general, but a certain specific in-
tensity; and a specific intensity cannot be indifferently of plea-
sure or of something else. We cannot first settle how much
we will have, and then decide whether it is to be pleasure or
mass. A specific intensity must be of a specific kind. Thus
intensity and pleasure are not independent and coordinate el-
ements in the definition of a given amount of pleasure. There
are different kinds of intensity, and different magnitudes in
each kind; but magnitudes in different kinds must be differ-
ent. Thus it seems that the common element, indicated by the
term intensity ormagnitude, is not any thing intrinsic, that can
be discovered by analysis of a single term, but is merely the
fact of being one term in a relation of inequality. Magnitudes
are defined by the fact that they have this relation, and they
do not, so far as the definition shows, agree in anything else.
The class to which they all belong, like the married portion of
a community, is defined by mutual relations among its terms,
not by a common relation to some outside term—unless, in-
deed, inequality itself were taken as such a term, whichwould
bemerely an unnecessary complication. It is necessary to con-
sider what may be called the extension or field of a relation,
as well as that of a class-concept: and magnitude is the class
which forms the extension of inequality. Thus magnitude of
pleasure is complex, because it combines magnitude and plea-
sure; but a particular magnitude of pleasure is not complex,
for magnitude does not enter into its concept at all. It is only
a magnitude because it is greater or less than certain other
terms; it is only a magnitude of pleasure because of a certain
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relation which it has to pleasure. This is more easily under-
stood where the particular magnitude has a special name. A
yard, for instance, is a magnitude, because it is greater than a
foot; it is a magnitude of length, because it is what is called a
length. Thus all magnitudes are simple concepts, and are clas-
sified into kinds by their relation to some quality or relation.
The quantities which are instances of a magnitude are partic-
ularizedby spatio-temporal positionor (in the case of relations
which are quantities) by the terms betweenwhich the relation
holds. Quantities are not properly greater or less, for the rela-
tionsof greater and lessholdbetween theirmagnitudes,which
are distinct from the quantities.
When this theory is applied in the enumeration of the nec-
essary axioms, we find a very notable simplification. The ax-
ioms inwhich equality appears have all become demonstrable,
and we require only the following (L,M,N being magnitudes
of one kind):
(a) No magnitude is greater or less than itself.
(b) L is greater thanM or L is less thanM.
(c) If L is greater thanM, thenM is less than L.
(d) If L is greater thanM andM is greater thanN, then L is
greater thanN.
The difficult axiom which we formerly called (b) is avoided, 166
as are the other axioms concerning equality; and those that
remain are simpler than our former set.
157. The decision between the absolute and relative theories
can bemade at once by appealing to a certain general principle,
of very wide application, which I propose to call the principle
of Abstraction. This principle asserts that, whenever a rela-
tion, ofwhich there are instances, has the twoproperties of be-
ing symmetrical and transitive, then the relation in question
is not primitive, but is analyzable into sameness of relation to
some other term; and that this common relation is such that
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there is only one term at most to which a given term can be so
related, though many terms may be so related to a given term.
(That is, the relation is like that of son to father: a man may
have many sons, but can have only one father.)
This principle, which we have already met with in connec-
tion with cardinals, may seem somewhat elaborate. It is, how-
ever, capable of proof, and is merely a careful statement of a
very commonassumption. It is generally held that all relations
are analyzable into identity or diversity of content. Though I
entirely reject this view, I retain, so far as symmetrical transi-
tive relations are concerned, what is really a somewhat modi-
fied statement of the traditional doctrine. Such relations, to
adopt more usual phraseology, are always constituted by pos-
session of a common property. But a common property is not
a very precise conception, andwill not, in most of its ordinary
significations, formally fulfil the function of analyzing the re-
lations in question. A common quality of two terms is usually
regarded as a predicate of those terms. But thewhole doctrine
of subject and predicate, as the only form of which proposi-
tions are capable, and the whole denial of the ultimate reality
of relations, are rejected by the logic advocated in the present
work. Abandoning the word predicate, we may say that the
most general sense which can be given to a common property
is this: A common property of two terms is any third term to
which both have one and the same relation. In this general
sense, the possession of a common property is symmetrical,
but not necessarily transitive. In order that it may be transi-
tive, the relation to the common property must be such that
only one term at most can be the property of any given term*.
Such is the relation of a quantity to its magnitude, or of an
*The proof of these assertions is mathematical, and depends upon the
Logic of Relations; it will be found in my article “Sur la Logique des Rela-
tions,” R. d.M. vii, No. 2, §1, Props. 6.1, and 6.2.
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event to the time at which it occurs: given one term of the re-
lation, namely the referent, the other is determinate, but given
the other, the one is by nomeans determinate. Thus it is capa-
ble of demonstration that the possession of a common prop-
erty of the type in question always leads to a symmetrical tran- 167
sitive relation. What the principle of abstraction asserts is the
converse, that such relations only spring from common prop-
erties of the above type*. It should be observed that the rela-
tion of the terms to what I have called their common property
can never be that which is usually indicated by the relation
of subject to predicate, or of the individual to its class. For
no subject (in the received view) can have only one predicate,
andno individual canbelong toonly one class. The relationof
the terms to their common property is, in general, different in
different cases. In the present case, the quantity is a complex
of which the magnitude forms an element: the relation of the
quantity to the magnitude is further defined by the fact that
the magnitude has to belong to a certain class, namely that of
magnitudes. It must then be taken as an axiom (as in the case
of colours) that two magnitudes of the same kind cannot co-
exist in one spatio-temporal place, or subsist as relations be-
tween the same pair of terms; and this supplies the required
uniqueness of the magnitude. It is such synthetic judgments
of incompatibility that lead to negative judgments; but this is
a purely logical topic, uponwhich it is not necessary to enlarge
in this connection.
158. We may now sum up the above discussion in a brief
*The principle is proved by showing that, if R be a symmetrical transi-
tive relation, and a a term of the field of R, a has, to the class of terms to
which it has the relation B taken as a whole, a many-one relationwhich, re-
lationally multiplied by its converse, is equal to R. Thus a magnitude may,
so far as formal arguments are concerned, be identifiedwith a class of equal
quantities.
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statement of results. There are a certain pair of indefinable
relations, called greater and less; these relations are asymmetri-
cal and transitive, and are inconsistent the one with the other.
Each is the converse of the other, in the sense that, whenever
the oneholds betweenA andB, the other holds betweenB and
A. The terms which are capable of these relations are magni-
tudes. Every magnitude has a certain peculiar relation to some
concept, expressed by saying that it is amagnitude of that con-
cept. Two magnitudes which have this relation to the same
concept are said to be of the same kind; to be of the same kind
is the necessary and sufficient condition for the relations of
greater and less. When a magnitude can be particularized by
temporal, spatial, or spatio-temporal position, or when, being
a relation, it can be particularized by taking into a considera-
tion a pair of terms between which it holds, then the magni-
tude so particularized is called a quantity. Two magnitudes of
the same kind can never be particularized by exactly the same
specifications. Two quantities which result from particulariz-
ing the same magnitude are said to be equal.
Thus our indefinables are (1) greater and less, (2) every par-
ticular magnitude. Our indemonstrable propositions are:
(1) Every magnitude has to some term the relation which 168
makes it of a certain kind.
(2)Any twomagnitudesof the samekindareonegreater and
the other less.
(3) Two magnitudes of the same kind, if capable of occupy-
ing space or time, cannot both have the same spatio-temporal
position; if relations, can never be both relations between the
same pair of terms.
(4) No magnitude is greater than itself.
(5) IfA is greater than B, B is less thanA, and vice versâ.
(6) If A is greater than B and B is greater than C, then A is
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greater thanC*.
Further axioms characterize various species of magnitudes,
but the above seem alone necessary to magnitude in general.
None of them depend in any way upon number or measure-
ment; hence wemay be undismayed in the presence of magni-
tudes which cannot be divided or measured, of which, in the
next chapter, we shall find an abundance of instances.
Note toChapter XIX.Thework ofHerrMeinong onWeber’s
Law, already alluded to, is one from which I have learnt so
much, and with which I so largely agree, that it seems desir-
able to justify myself on the points in which I depart from it.
This work begins (§1) by a characterization of magnitude as
that which is limited towards zero. Zero is understood as the
negation of magnitude, and after a discussion, the following
statement is adopted (p. 8):
“That is or has magnitude, which allows the interpolation
of terms between itself and its contradictory opposite.”
Whether this constitutes a definition, or a mere criterion,
is left doubtful (ib.), but in either case, it appears to me to be
undesirable as a fundamental characterization of magnitude.
It derives support, as Herr Meinong points out (p. 6n), from
its similarity to Kant’s “Anticipations of Perception†.” But it
is, if I am not mistaken, liable to several grave objections. In
the first place, the whole theory of zero is most difficult, and
seems subsequent, rather than prior, to the theory of other
magnitudes. And to regard zero as the contradictory opposite
of other magnitudes seems erroneous. The phrase should de-
note the class obtainedbynegationof the class “magnitudes of
such and such a kind”; but this obviously would not yield the
*It is not necessary in (5) and (6) to add “A, B,C being magnitudes,” for
the above relations of greater and less are what definemagnitudes, and the
addition would therefore be tautological.
†Reine Vernunft, ed. Hartenstein (1867), p. 158.
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zero of that kind of magnitude. Whatever interpretation we
give to the phrase, it would seem to imply that wemust regard
zero as not a magnitude of the kind whose zero it is. But in
that case it is not less than themagnitudes of the kind in ques-
tion, and there seems no particular meaning in saying that a 169
lessermagnitude is between zero and a greatermagnitude. And
in any case, the notion of between, as we shall see in Part IV,
demands asymmetrical relations among the terms concerned.
These relations, it would seem, are, in the case of magnitude,
none other than greater and less, which are therefore prior to
the betweenness of magnitudes, and more suitable to defini-
tion. I shall endeavour at a later stage to givewhat I conceive to
be the true theory of zero; and it will then appear how difficult
this subject is. It can hardly be wise, therefore, to introduce
zero in the first account ofmagnitude. Other objectionsmight
be urged, as, for instance, that it is doubtful whether all kinds
of magnitude have a zero; that in discrete kinds of magnitude,
zero is unimportant; and that among distances, where the zero
is simply identity, there is hardly the same relation of zero to
negation or non-existence as in the case of qualities such as
pleasure. But the main reason must be the logical inversion
involved in the introduction of between before any asymmet-
rical relations have been specified from which it could arise.
This subject will be resumed in Chapter xxii.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 244
chapter xx
THE RANGEOFQUANTITY
159. The questions to be discussed in the present chapter 170
are these: What kinds of terms are there which, by their com-
mon relation to a number of magnitudes, constitute a class of
quantities of one kind? Have all such terms anything else in
common? Is there any mark which will ensure that a term is
thus related to a set of magnitudes? What sorts of terms are
capable of degree, or intensity, or greater and less?
The traditional view regards divisibility as a commonmark
of all terms having magnitude. We have already seen that
there is no à priori ground for this view. We are now to exam-
ine the question inductively, to find as many undoubted in-
stances of quantities as possible, and to inquire whether they
all have divisibility or any other commonmark.
Any term of which a greater or less degree is possible con-
tains under it a collection of magnitudes of one kind. Hence
the comparative form in grammar is primâ facie evidence of
quantity. If this evidence were conclusive, we should have to
admit that all, or almost all, qualities are susceptible of mag-
nitude. The praises and reproaches addressed by poets to
theirmistresseswould afford comparatives and superlatives of
most known adjectives. But some circumspection is required
in using evidence of this grammatical nature. There is always,
I think, some quantitative comparisonwherever a comparative
or superlative occurs, but it is often not a comparison as re-
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gards the quality indicated by grammar.
“O ruddier than the cherry,
O sweeter than the berry,
O nymphmore bright
Than moonshine light,”
are lines containing three comparatives. As regards sweet-
ness and brightness, we have, I think, a genuine quantitative
comparison; but as regards ruddiness, this may be doubted.
The comparative here—and generally where colours are
concerned—indicates, I think, notmore of a given colour, but 171
more likeness to a standard colour. Various shades of colour
are supposed to be arranged in a series, such that the differ-
ence of quality is greater or less according as the distance in
the series is greater or less. One of these shades is the ideal
“ruddiness,” and others are called more or less ruddy accord-
ing as they are nearer to or further from this shade in the se-
ries. The same explanation applies, I think, to such terms as
whiter, blacker, redder. The true quantity involved seems to be,
in all these cases, a relation, namely the relation of similarity.
The difference between two shades of colour is certainly a dif-
ference of quality, not merely of magnitude; and when we say
that one thing is redder than another, we donot imply that the
two are of the same shade. If therewere no difference of shade,
we should probably say one was brighter than the other, which
is quite a different kind of comparison. But though the differ-
ence of two shades is a difference of quality, yet, as the pos-
sibility of serial arrangement shows, this difference of quality
is itself susceptible of degrees. Each shade of colour seems to
be simple and unanalyzable; but neighbouring colours in the
spectrum are certainly more similar than remote colours. It
is this that gives continuity to colours. Between two shades of
colour,A andB, we should say, there is always a third colourC;
and thismeans thatC resemblesA orBmore thanB orA does.
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But for such relations of immediate resemblance, we should
not be able to arrange colours in series. The resemblancemust
be immediate, since all shades of colour are unanalyzable, as
appears from any attempt at description or definition*. Thus
we have an indubitable case of relations which have magni-
tude. The difference or resemblance of two colours is a rela-
tion, and is a magnitude; for it is greater or less than other dif-
ferences or resemblances.
160. I have dwelt upon this case of colours, since it is one in-
stance of a very important class. When any number of terms
can be arranged in a series, it frequently happens that any two
of them have a relation which may, in a generalized sense, be
called a distance. This relation suffices to generate a serial ar-
rangement, and is always necessarily a magnitude. In all such
cases, if the terms of the series have names, and if these names
have comparatives, the comparatives indicate, notmore of the
term in question, but more likeness to that term. Thus, if we
suppose the time-series to be one in which there is distance,
when an event is said to be more recent than another, what is
meant is that its distance from the present was less than that
of the other. Thus recentness is not itself a quality of the time
or of the event. What are quantitatively compared in such 172
cases are relations, not qualities. The case of colours is con-
venient for illustration, because colours have names, and the
difference of two colours is generally admitted to be qualita-
tive. But the principle is of very wide application. The impor-
tance of this class ofmagnitudes, and the absolute necessity of
*On the subject of the resemblances of colours, see Meinong, “Ab-
strahiren und Vergleichen,” Zeitschrift f. Psych. u. Phys. d. Sinnesorgane, Vol.
xxiv, p. 72ff. I am not sure that I agree with the whole of Meinong’s argu-
ment, but his general conclusion, “dass die Umfangscollective des Aehn-
lichen Allgemeinheiten darstellen, an denen die Abstraction wenigstens
unmittelbar keinen Antheil hat” (p. 78), appears to me to be a correct and
important logical principle.
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clear notions as to their nature, will appear more and more as
we proceed. The whole philosophy of space and time, and the
doctrine of so-called extensive magnitudes, depend through-
out upon a clear understanding of series and distance.
Distancemust be distinguished frommere difference or un-
likeness. It holds only between terms in a series. It is inti-
mately connected with order, and implies that the terms be-
tween which it holds have an ultimate and simple difference,
not one capable of analysis into constituents. It implies also
that there is a more or less continuous passage, through other
terms belonging to the same series, from one of the distant
terms to the other. Mere difference per se appears to be the
bare minimum of a relation, being in fact a precondition of al-
most all relations. It is always absolute, and is incapable of de-
grees. Moreover it holds betweenany two termswhatever, and
is hardly to be distinguished from the assertion that they are
two. But distance holds only between the members of certain
series, and its existence is then the source of the series. It is
a specific relation, and it has sense; we can distinguish the dis-
tance ofA from B from that of B fromA. This last mark alone
suffices to distinguish distance from bare difference.
Itmight perhaps be supposed that, in a series inwhich there
is distance, although the distanceABmust be greater than or
less than AC, yet the distance BD need not be either greater
or less than AC. For example, there is obviously more differ-
ence between the pleasure derivable from £5 and that deriv-
able from £100 than between that from £5 and that from £20.
Butneed there be either equality or inequality between thedif-
ference for £1 and £20 and that for £5 and £100? This question
must be answered affirmatively. ForAC is greater or less than
BC, and BC is greater or less than BD; henceAC, BC and also
BC, BD are magnitudes of the same kind. Hence AC, BD are
magnitudes of the same kind, and if not identical, one must
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be the greater and the other the less. Hence, when there is
distance in a series, any two distances are quantitatively com-
parable.
It should be observed that all the magnitudes of one kind
form a series, and that their distances, therefore, if they have
distances, are again magnitudes. But it must not be supposed
that these can, in general, be obtained by subtraction, or are
of the same kind as themagnitudes whose differences they ex-
press. Subtraction depends, as a rule, upon divisibility, and is
therefore in general inapplicable to indivisible quantities. The
point is important, and will be treated in detail in the follow-
ing chapter.
Thus nearness and distance are relations which have mag-
nitude. Are there any other relations havingmagnitude? This 173
may, I think, be doubted*. At least I am unaware of any other
such relation, though I know no way of disproving their exis-
tence.
161. There is a difficult class of terms, usually regarded as
magnitudes, apparently implying relations, though certainly
not always relational. These are differential coefficients, such
as velocity and acceleration. They must be borne in mind
in all attempts to generalize about magnitude, but owing to
their complexity they require a special discussion. This will
be given in Part V; and we shall then find that differential co-
efficients are never magnitudes, but only real numbers, or seg-
ments in some series.
162. All the magnitudes dealt with hitherto have been,
strictly speaking, indivisible. Thus the question arises: Are
there any divisible magnitudes? Here I think a distinction
must be made. A magnitude is essentially one, not many.
Thus no magnitude is correctly expressed as a number of
*Meinong, Ueber die Bedeutung des Weber’schen Gesetzes, Hamburg and
Leipzig, 1896, p. 23.
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terms. But may not the quantity which has magnitude be a
sum of parts, and the magnitude a magnitude of divisibility?
If so, every whole consisting of parts will be a single term pos-
sessed of the property of divisibility. The more parts it con-
sists of, the greater is its divisibility. On this supposition, di-
visibility is a magnitude, of which we may have a greater or
less degree; and the degree of divisibility corresponds exactly,
in finitewholes, to the number of parts. But though thewhole
which has divisibility is of course divisible, yet its divisibility,
which alone is strictly a magnitude, is not properly speaking
divisible. The divisibility does not itself consist of parts, but
only of the property of having parts. It is necessary, in or-
der to obtain divisibility, to take the whole strictly as one, and
to regard divisibility as its adjective. Thus although, in this
case, we have numerical measurement, and all the mathemat-
ical consequences of division, yet, philosophically speaking,
our magnitude is still indivisible.
There are difficulties, however, in the way of admitting di-
visibility as a kind of magnitude. It seems to be not a property
of the whole, but merely a relation to the parts. It is difficult
to decide this point, but a good deal may be said, I think, in
support of divisibility as a simple quality. Thewhole has a cer-
tain relation, which for convenience wemay call that of inclu-
sion, to all its parts. This relation is the samewhether there be
many parts or few; what distinguishes awhole ofmany parts is
that it has many such relations of inclusion. But it seems rea-
sonable to suppose that a whole of many parts differs from a
whole of few parts in some intrinsic respect. In fact, wholes
may be arranged in a series according as they have more or
fewer parts, and the serial arrangement implies, as we have
already seen, some series of properties differing more or less
fromeachother, and agreeingwhen twowholes have the same
finite number of parts, but distinct from number of parts in fi- 174
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nite wholes. These properties can be none other than greater
or less degrees of divisibility. Thus magnitude of divisibility
would appear to be a simple property of a whole, distinct from
thenumber of parts included in thewhole, but correlatedwith
it, provided this number be finite. If this view can be main-
tained, divisibility may be allowed to remain as a numerically
measurable, but not divisible, class ofmagnitudes. In this class
we should have to place lengths, areas and volumes, but not
distances. At a later stage, however, we shall find that the di-
visibility of infinite wholes, in the sense in which this is not
measured by cardinal numbers, must be derived through rela-
tions in a way analogous to that in which distance is derived,
and must be really a property of relations*.
Thus it would appear, in any case, that all magnitudes are
indivisible. This is one common mark which they all possess,
and so far as I know, it is the only one to be added to those
enumerated in Chapter xix. Concerning the range of quan-
tity, there seems to be no further general proposition. Very
many simple non-relational terms havemagnitude, the princi-
pal exceptions being colours, points, instants and numbers.
163. Finally, it is important to remember that, on the theory
adopted inChapter xix, a givenmagnitude of a given kind is a
simple concept, having to the kind a relation analogous to that
of inclusion in a class. When the kind is a kind of existents,
such as pleasure, what actually exists is never the kind, but
various particularmagnitudes of the kind. Pleasure, abstractly
taken, does not exist, but various amounts of it exist. This de-
gree of abstraction is essential to the theory of quantity: there
must be entities which differ from each other in nothing ex-
cept magnitude. The grounds for the theory adoptedmay per-
haps appear more clearly from a further examination of this
case.
*See Chap. xlvii.
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Let us start with Bentham’s famous proposition: “Quantity
of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry.” Here
the qualitative difference of the pleasures is the very point of
the judgment; but in order to be able to say that the quantities
of pleasure are equal, we must be able to abstract the qualita-
tive differences, and leave a certain magnitude of pleasure. If
this abstraction is legitimate, the qualitative difference must
be not truly a difference of quality, but only a difference of re-
lation to other terms, as, in the present case, a difference in the
causal relation. For it is not the whole pleasurable states that
are compared, but only—as the form of the judgment aptly
illustrates—their quality of pleasure. If we suppose the mag-
nitude of pleasure to be not a separate entity, a difficulty will
arise. For themere element of pleasuremust be identical in the
two cases, whereas we require a possible difference of magni-
tude. Hence we can neither hold that only the whole concrete
state exists, and any part of it is an abstraction, nor that what 175
exists is abstract pleasure, notmagnitude of pleasure. Nor can
we say: We abstract, from the whole states, the two elements
magnitude and pleasure. For then we should not get a quan-
titative comparison of the pleasures. The two states would
agree in being pleasures, and in being magnitudes. But this
would not give us a magnitude of pleasure; and it would give
a magnitude to the states as a whole, which is not admissi-
ble. Hence we cannot abstract magnitude in general from the
states, since as wholes they have no magnitude. And we have
seen that we must not abstract bare pleasure, if we are to have
any possibility of different magnitudes. Thus what we have
to abstract is a magnitude of pleasure as a whole. This must
not be analyzed into magnitude and pleasure, but must be ab-
stracted as a whole. And the magnitude of pleasure must ex-
ist as a part of the whole pleasurable states, for it is only where
there is no difference save atmost one ofmagnitude that quan-
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titative comparison is possible. Thus the discussion of this
particular case fully confirms the theory that everymagnitude
is unanalyzable, and has only the relation analogous to inclu-
sion in a class to that abstract quality or relation of which it is
a magnitude.
Having seen that all magnitudes are indivisible, we have
next to consider the extent to which numbers can be used
to express magnitudes, and the nature and limits of measure-
ment.
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chapter xxi
NUMBERSAS EXPRESSING
MAGNITUDES:
MEASUREMENT
164. It is oneof the assumptionsof educated common-sense 176
that two magnitudes of the same kind must be numerically
comparable. People are apt to say that they are thirty per cent,
healthier or happier than they were, without any suspicion
that such phrases are destitute of meaning. The purpose of
the present chapter is to explain what is meant by measure-
ment, what are the classes of magnitudes to which it applies,
and how it is applied to those classes.
Measurement of magnitudes is, in its most general sense,
anymethodbywhich aunique and reciprocal correspondence
is established between all or some of themagnitudes of a kind
and all or some of the numbers, integral, rational, or real, as
the case may be. (It might be thought that complex numbers
ought to be included; but what can only be measured by com-
plex numbers is in fact always an aggregrate of magnitudes
of different kinds, not a single magnitude.) In this general
sense, measurement demands some one-one relation between
the numbers and magnitudes in question—a relation which
may be direct or indirect, important or trivial, according to cir-
cumstances. Measurement in this sense can be applied to very
manyclasses ofmagnitudes; to twogreat classes, distances and
divisibilities, it applies, as we shall see, in a more important
and intimate sense.
Concerning measurement in the most general sense, there
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is very little to be said. Since the numbers form a series, and
since every kind of magnitude also forms a series, it will be de-
sirable that the order of the magnitudes measured should cor-
respond to that of the numbers, i.e. that all relations of between
should be the same formagnitudes and theirmeasures. Wher-
ever there is a zero, it is well that this should be measured by
the number zero. These and other conditions, which a mea-
sure should fulfil if possible, may be laid down; but they are of
practical rather than theoretical importance.
165. There are two general metaphysical opinions, either
of which, if accepted, shows that all magnitudes are theoret-
ically capable of measurement in the above sense. The first of
these is the theory that all events either are, or are correlated 177
with, events in the dynamical causal series. In regard to the
so-called secondary qualities, this view has been so far acted
upon by physical science that it has provided most of the so-
called intensive quantities that appear in space with spatial,
and thence numerical, measures. And with regard to mental
quantities the theory in question is that of psychophysical par-
allelism. Here themotionwhich is correlatedwith any psychi-
cal quantity always theoretically affords ameans ofmeasuring
that quantity. The other metaphysical opinion, which leads
to universal measurability, is one suggested by Kant’s “Antic-
ipations of Perception*,” namely that, among intensive mag-
nitudes, an increase is always accompanied by an increase of
reality. Reality, in this connection, seems synonymous with
existence; hence the doctrine may be stated thus: Existence
is a kind of intensive magnitude, of which, where a greater
magnitude exists, there is always more than where a less mag-
nitude exists. (That this is exactly Kant’s doctrine seems im-
*Reine Vernunft, ed. Hart. (1867), p. 160. The wording of the first edition
illustrates better than that of the second the doctrine towhich I allude. See
e.g. Erdmann’s edition, p. 161.
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probable; but it is at least a tenable view.) In this case, since
two instances of the same magnitude (i.e. two equal quanti-
ties) must have more existence than one, it follows that, if a
single magnitude of the same kind can be found having the
same amount of existence as the two equal quantities together,
then that magnitude may be called double that of each of the
equal quantities. In this way all intensive magnitudes become
theoretically capable of measurement. That this method has
any practical importance it would be absurd to maintain; but
it may contribute to the appearance of meaning belonging to
twice as happy. It gives a sense, for example, in which we may
say that a child derives as much pleasure from one chocolate
as from two acid drops; andon the basis of such judgments the
hedonistic Calculus could theoretically be built.
There is one other general observation of some importance.
If it be maintained that all series of magnitudes are either con-
tinuous inCantor’s sense, or are similar to series which can be
chosen out of continuous series, then it is theoretically pos-
sible to correlate any kind of magnitudes with all or some of
the real numbers, so that the zeros correspond, and the greater
magnitudes correspond to the greater numbers. But if any se-
ries of magnitudes, without being continuous, contains con-
tinuous series, then such a series ofmagnitudeswill be strictly
and theoretically incapable of measurement by the real num-
bers†.
166. Leaving now these somewhat vague generalities, let us
examine the more usual and concrete sense of measurement.
What we require is some sense in which we may say that one
magnitude is double of another. In the above instances this 178
sense was derived by correlation with spatio-temporal magni-
tudes, or with existence. This presupposed that in these cases
†See Part V, Chap. xxxiii ff.
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a meaning had been found for the phrase. Hence measure-
mentdemands that, in some cases, there shouldbe an intrinsic
meaning to the proposition “thismagnitude is double of that.”
(In what sense the meaning is intrinsic will appear as we pro-
ceed.) Now so long as quantities are regarded as inherently di-
visible, there is a perfectly obvious meaning to such a proposi-
tion: amagnitudeA is double ofBwhen it is themagnitude of
two quantities together, each of these having the magnitude
B. (It should be observed that to divide a magnitude into two
equal parts must always be impossible, since there are no such
things as equal magnitudes.) Such an interpretation will still
apply to magnitudes of divisibility; but since we have admit-
ted other magnitudes, a different interpretation (if any) must
be found for these. Let us first examine the case of divisibili-
ties, and then proceed to the other cases where measurement
is intrinsically possible.
167. The divisibility of a finite whole is immediately and
inherently correlated with the number of simple parts in the
whole. In this case, although the magnitudes are even now
incapable of addition of the sort required, the quantities can
be added in the manner explained in Part II. The addition of
two magnitudes of divisibility yields merely two magnitudes,
not a new magnitude. But the addition of two quantities of
divisibility, i.e. two wholes, does yield a new single whole, pro-
vided the addition is of the kindwhich results from logical ad-
ditionby regarding classes as thewholes formedby their terms.
Thus there is a good meaning in saying that one magnitude
of divisibility is double of another, when it applies to a whole
containing twice as many parts. But in the case of infinite
wholes, the matter is by no means so simple. Here the num-
ber of simple parts (in the only senses of infinite number hith-
erto discovered) may be equal without equality in the magni-
tude of divisibility. We require here a methodwhich does not
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go back to simple parts. In actual space, we have immediate
judgments of equality as regards two infinite wholes. When
we have such judgments, we can regard the sum of n equal
wholes as n times each of them; for addition of wholes does
not demand their finitude. In this way numerical comparison
of some pairs of wholes becomes possible. By the usual well-
knownmethods, by continual subdivision and the method of
limits, this is extended to all pairs of wholes which are such
that immediate comparisons are possible. Without these im-
mediate comparisons, which are necessary both logically and
psychologically*, nothing can be accomplished: we are always
reduced in the last resort to the immediate judgment that our
foot-rule has not greatly changed its size duringmeasurement,
and this judgment is prior to the results of physical science as 179
to the extent to which bodies do actually change their sizes.
But where immediate comparison is psychologically impossi-
ble, we may theoretically substitute a logical variety of mea-
surement, which, however, gives a property not of the divis-
ible whole, but of some relation or class of relations more or
less analogous to those that hold between points in space.
That divisibility, in the sense required for areas and vol-
umes, is not a property of a whole, results from the fact (which
will be established in Part VI) that between the points of a
space there are always relations which generate a different
space. Thus two sets of points which, with regard to one set
of relations, form equal areas, formunequal areaswith respect
to another set, or even form one an area and the other a line or
a volume. If divisibility in the relevant sense were an intrinsic
property of wholes, this would be impossible. But this subject
cannot be fully discussed until we come to Metrical Geome-
try.
*Cf. Meinong, op. cit., pp. 63–4.
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Where our magnitudes are divisibilities, not only do num-
bers measure them, but the difference of two measuring num-
bers, with certain limitations, measures the magnitude of the
difference (in the sense of dissimilarity) between the divisibil-
ities. If one of the magnitudes be fixed, its difference from the
other increases as the difference of themeasuring numbers in-
creases; for this difference depends upon the difference in the
number of parts. But I do not think it can be shown generally
that, ifA;B;C;D be the numbers measuring four magnitudes,
and A   B = C   D, then the differences of the magnitudes
are equal. It would seem, for instance, that the difference be-
tween one inch and two inches is greater than that between
1001 inches and 1002 inches. This remark has no importance
in the present case, since differences of divisibility are never
required; but in the case of distances it has a curious connec-
tion with non-Euclidean Geometry. But it is theoretically im-
portant to observe that, if divisibility be indeed amagnitude—
as the equality of areas and volumes seems to require—then
there is strictly no ground for saying that the divisibility of a
sum of two units is twice as great as that of one unit. Indeed
this proposition cannot be strictly taken, for nomagnitude is a
sumof parts, andnomagnitude therefore is double of another.
We can only mean that the sum of two units contains twice as
many parts, which is an arithmetical, not a quantitative, judg-
ment, and is adequate only in the case where the number of
parts is finite, since in other cases the double of a number is
in general equal to it. Thus even themeasurement of divisibil-
ity by numbers contains an element of convention; and this
element, we shall find, is still more prominent in the case of
distances.
168. In the above case we still had addition in one of its two
fundamental senses, i.e. the combination of wholes to form a
new whole. But in other cases of magnitude we do not have
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any such addition. The sumof two pleasures is not a new plea-
sure, but is merely two pleasures. The sum of two distances 180
is also not properly one distance. But in this case we have
an extension of the idea of addition. Some such extension
must always be possible where measurement is to be effected
in themore natural and restricted sense whichwe are now dis-
cussing. I shall first explain this generalized addition in ab-
stract terms, and then illustrate its application to distances.
It sometimes happens that two quantities, which are not ca-
pable of addition proper, have a relation, which has itself a
one-one relation to a quantity of the same kind as those be-
tween which it holds. Supposing a; b; c to be such quantities,
we have, in the case supposed, some proposition aBc, where B
is a relation which uniquely determines and is uniquely deter-
mined by some quantity b of the same kind as that to which
a and c belong. Thus for example two ratios have a relation,
which we may call their difference, which is itself wholly de-
termined by another ratio, namely the difference, in the arith-
metical sense, of the two given ratios. If α; β; γ be terms in a
series in which there is distance, the distances αβ, αγ have a
relation which is measured by (though not identical with) the
distance βγ. In all such cases, by an extension of addition, we
may put a+b = c in place of aBc. Wherever a set of quantities
have relations of this kind, if further aBc implies bAc, so that
a + b = b + a, we shall be able to proceed as if we had ordi-
nary addition, and shall be able in consequence to introduce
numerical measurement.
The conception of distance will be discussed fully in Part
IV, in connection with order: for the present I am concerned
only to showhowdistances come to bemeasurable. Theword
will be used to cover a far more general conception than that
of distance in space. I shall mean by a kind of distance a set
of quantitative asymmetrical relations of which one and only
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one holds between any pair of terms of a given class; which
are such that, if there is a relation of the kind between a and
b, and also between b and c, then there is one of the kind be-
tween a and c, the relation between a and c being the relative
product of those between a and b, b and c; this product is to be
commutative, i.e. independent of the order of its factors; and
finally, if the distance ab be greater than the distance ac, then,
dbeing any othermember of the class, db is greater than dc. Al-
though distances are thus relations, and therefore indivisible
and incapable of addition proper, there is a simple and natu-
ral convention by which such distances become numerically
measurable.
The convention is this. Let it be agreed that, when the dis-
tances a0a1; a1a2 : : : an 1an are all equal and in the same sense,
then a0an is said to be n times each of the distances a0a1, etc.,
i.e. is to be measured by a number n times as great. This has
generally been regarded as not a convention, but an obvious
truth; owing, however, to the fact that distances are indivisi-
ble, no distance is really a sum of other distances, and numeri- 181
cal measurementmust be in part conventional. With this con-
vention, thenumbers corresponding todistances, where there
are such numbers, become definite, except as to a common
factor dependent upon the choice of a unit. Numbers are also
assigned by this method to the members of the class between
which the distances hold; these numbers have, in addition to
the arbitrary factor, an arbitrary additive constant, depending
upon the choice of origin. This method, which is capable of
still further generalization, will bemore fully explained in Part
IV. In order to show that all the distances of our kind, and all
the termsof our set, canhavenumbers assigned to them,we re-
quire two further axioms, the axiomofArchimedes, andwhat
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may be called the axiom of linearity*.
169. The importance of the numerical measurement of dis-
tance, at least as applied to space and time, depends partly
upon a further fact, by which it is brought into relation with
the numerical measurement of divisibility. In all series there
are terms intermediate between any twowhose distance is not
theminimum. These terms are determinate when the two dis-
tant terms are specified. The intermediate termsmay be called
the stretch from a0 to an†. The whole composed of these terms
is a quantity, and has a divisibility measured by the number of
terms, provided their number is finite. If the series is such that
the distances of consecutive terms are all equal, then, if there
aren 1 termsbetweena0 andan, themeasureof thedistance is
proportional to n. Thus, if we include in the stretch one of the
end terms, but not the other, the measures of the stretch and
the distance are proportional, and equal stretches correspond
to equal distances. Thus the number of terms in the stretch
measures both the distance of the end terms and the amount
of divisibility of thewhole stretch. When the stretch contains
an infinite number of terms, we estimate equal stretches as ex-
plained above. It then becomes an axiom, which may or may
not hold in a given case, that equal stretches correspond to
equal distances. In this case, coordinatesmeasure two entirely
distinct magnitudes, which, owing to their common measure,
are perpetually confounded.
170. The above analysis explains a curious problem
which must have troubled most people who have endeav-
*See Part IV, Chap. xxxi. This axiom asserts that a magnitude can be
divided into n equal parts, and forms part ofDuBoisRaymond’s definition
of linear magnitude. See hisAllgemeine Functionentheorie (Tübingen, 1882),
Chap. i, §16; also Bettazzi, Teoria delle Grandezze (Pisa, 1890), p. 44. The ax-
iom of Archimedes asserts that, given any twomagnitudes of a kind, some
finite multiple of the lesser exceeds the greater.
†Called Strecke byMeinong, op. cit., e.g. p. 22.
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oured to philosophize about Geometry. Starting from one-
dimensional magnitudes connected with the straight line,
most theories may be divided into two classes, those appro-
priate to areas and volumes, and those appropriate to angles
between lines or planes. Areas and volumes are radically dif- 182
ferent from angles, and are generally neglected in philoso-
phieswhich hold to relational views of space or start frompro-
jective Geometry. The reason of this is plain enough. On
the straight line, if, as is usually supposed, there is such a re-
lation as distance, we have two philosophically distinct but
practically conjoined magnitudes, namely the distance, and
the divisibility of the stretch. The former is similar to angles;
the latter, to areas and volumes. Angles may also be regarded
as distances between terms in a series, namely between lines
through a point or planes through a line. Areas and volumes,
on the contrary, are sums, or magnitudes of divisibility. Ow-
ing to the confusion of the two kinds ofmagnitude connected
with the line, either angles, or else areas and volumes, are usu-
ally incompatiblewith thephilosophy invented to suit the line.
By the above analysis, this incompatibility is at once explained
and overcome*.
171. We thus see how two great classes of magnitudes—
divisibilities and distances—are rendered amenable to mea-
sure. These two classes practically cover what are usually
called extensive magnitudes, and it will be convenient to con-
tinue to allow the name to them. I shall extend this name to
cover all distances and divisibilities, whether they have any re-
lation to space and time or not. But the word extensive must
not be supposed to indicate, as it usually does, that the magni-
*In Part VI, we shall find reason to deny distance in most spaces. But
there is still a distinction between stretches, consisting of the terms of
some series, and such quantities as areas and volumes, where the terms
do not, in any simple sense, form a one-dimensional series.
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tudes sodesignated aredivisible. Wehave already seen thatno
magnitude is divisible. Quantities are only divisible into other
quantities in the one case of wholes which are quantities of di-
visibility. Quantities which are distances, though I shall call
them extensive, are not divisible into smaller distances; but
they allow the important kind of addition explained above,
which I shall call in future relational addition†.
All othermagnitudes and quantities may be properly called
intensive. Concerning these, unless by some causal relation, or
by means of some more or less roundabout relation such as
those explained at the beginning of the present chapter, nu-
merical measurement is impossible. Those mathematicians
who are accustomed to an exclusive emphasis on numbers,
will think that not much can be said with definiteness con-
cerning magnitudes incapable of measurement. This, how-
ever, is by no means the case. The immediate judgments of
equality, upon which (as we saw) all measurements depend,
are still possible where measurement fails, as are also the im-
mediate judgments of greater and less. Doubt only arises
where the difference is small; and all that measurement does,
in this respect, is to make the margin of doubt smaller—an 183
achievement which is purely psychological, and of no philo-
sophical importance. Quantities not susceptible of numerical
measurement can thus be arranged in a scale of greater and
smaller magnitudes, and this is the only strictly quantitative
achievement of even numerical measurement. We can know
that onemagnitude is greater than another, and that a third is
intermediate between them; also, since the differences ofmag-
nitudes are always magnitudes, there is always (theoretically,
at least) an answer to the question whether the difference of
one pair of magnitudes is greater than, less than, or the same
†Not to be confounded with the relative addition of the Algebra of Rel-
atives. It is connected rather with relative multiplication.
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as the difference of another pair of the same kind. And such
propositions, though to the mathematician they may appear
approximate, are just as precise and definite as the proposi-
tions of Arithmetic. Without numerical measurement, there-
fore, the quantitative relations of magnitudes have all the def-
initeness of which they are capable—nothing is added, from
the theoretical standpoint, by the assignment of correlated
numbers. The whole subject of the measurement of quanti-
ties is, in fact, one of more practical than theoretical impor-
tance. What is theoretically important in it is merged in the
wider question of the correlation of series, which will occupy
us much hereafter. The chief reason why I have treated the
subject thus at length is derived from its traditional impor-
tance, but for which it might have been far more summarily
treated.
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chapter xxii
ZERO
172. The present chapter is concerned, not with any form 184
of the numerical zero, nor yet with the infinitesimal, but with
the pure zero ofmagnitude. This is the zerowhichKant has in
mind, in his refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof of the immor-
tality of the soul*. Kant points out that an intensive magni-
tude, while remaining of the same kind, can become zero; and
that, though zero is a definite magnitude, no quantity whose
magnitude is zero can exist. This kind of zero, we shall find, is
a fundamental quantitative notion, and is one of the points in
which the theory of quantity presents features peculiar to it-
self. The quantitative zero has a certain connection both with
the number 0 and with the null-class in Logic, but it is not (I
think) definable in terms of either. What is less universally re-
alized is its complete independence of the infinitesimal. The
latter notion will not be discussed until the following chapter.
The meaning of zero, in any kind of quantity, is a ques-
tion of much difficulty, upon which the greatest care must
be bestowed, if contradictions are to be avoided. Zero seems
to be definable by some general characteristic, without refer-
ence to any special peculiarity of the kindof quantity towhich
it belongs. To find such a definition, however, is far from
easy. Zero seems to be a radically distinct conception accord-
*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, ed. Hartenstein, p. 281ff.
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ing as the magnitudes concerned are discrete or continuous.
To prove that this is not the case, let us examine various sug-
gested definitions.
173. (1) Herr Meinong (op. cit., p. 8) regards zero as the con-
tradictory opposite of each magnitude of its kind. The phrase
“contradictory opposite” is one which is not free from ambi-
guity. The opposite of a class, in symbolic logic, is the class
containing all individuals not belonging to the first class; and
hence the opposite of an individual should be all other indi-
viduals. But this meaning is evidently inappropriate: zero is
not everything except onemagnitudeof its kind, nor yet every-
thing except the class of magnitudes of its kind. It can hardly
be regarded as true to say that a pain is a zero pleasure. On the 185
other hand, a zero pleasure is said to be no pleasure, and this is
evidently what Herr Meinong means. But although we shall
find this view to be correct, the meaning of the phrase is very
difficult to seize. It does not mean something other than plea-
sure, as when our friends assure us that it is no pleasure to tell
us our faults. It seems to mean what is neither pleasure, nor
yet anything else. But thiswould bemerely a cumbrousway of
saying nothing, and the reference to pleasure might be wholly
dropped. This gives a zero which is the same for all kinds of
magnitude, and if this be the truemeaning of zero, then zero is
not one among themagnitudes of a kind, nor yet a term in the
series formed by magnitudes of a kind. For though it is often
true that there is nothing smaller than all the magnitudes of a
kind, yet it is always false that nothing itself is smaller than all
of them. This zero, therefore, has no special reference to any
particular kind of magnitude, and is incapable of fulfilling the
functions which Herr Meinong demands of it*. The phrase,
however, as we shall see, is capable of an interpretation which
*See note to Chap. xix, supra.
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avoids this difficulty. But let us first examine some other sug-
gested meanings of the word.
174. (2) Zero may be defined as the least magnitude of its
kind. Where a kind of magnitude is discrete, and generally
when it has what Professor Bettazzi calls a limitingmagnitude
of the kind†, such a definition is insufficient. For in such a
case, the limiting magnitude seems to be really the least of
its kind. And in any case, the definition gives rather a char-
acteristic than a true definition, which must be sought in
some more purely logical notion, for zero cannot fail to be in
some sense a denial of all other magnitudes of the kind. The
phrase that zero is the smallest ofmagnitudes is like the phrase
Which De Morgan commends for its rhetoric: “Achilles was
the strongest of all his enemies.” Thus it would be obviously
false to say that 0 is the least of the positive integers, or that
the interval between A and A is the least interval between
any two letters of the alphabet. On the other hand, where a
kind of magnitude is continuous, and has no limiting magni-
tude, althoughwehave apparently a gradual and unlimited ap-
proach to zero, yet now a new objection arises. Magnitudes of
this kind are essentially such as have no minimum. Hence we
cannot without express contradiction take zero as their min-
imum. We may, however, avoid this contradiction by saying
that there is always a magnitude less than any other, but not
zero, unless that other be zero. This emendation avoids any
formal contradiction, and is only inadequate because it gives
rather a mark of zero than its true meaning. Whatever else is
a magnitude of the kind in question might have been dimin-
ished; and we wish to know what it is that makes zero obvi-
ously incapable of any further diminution. This the suggested
definition does not tell us, and therefore, though it gives a
characteristic which often belongs to no other magnitude of 186
†Teoria delle Grandezze, Pisa, 1890, p. 24.
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the kind, it cannot be considered philosophically sufficient.
Moreover, where there are negative magnitudes, it precludes
us from regarding these as less than zero.
175. (3) Where our magnitudes are differences or distances,
zero has, at first sight, an obvious meaning, namely identity.
But here again, the zero so defined seems to have no relation
to one kind of distances rather than another: a zero distance
in time would seem to be the same as a zero distance in space.
This can, however, be avoided, by substituting, for identity
simply, identity with some member of the class of terms be-
tween which the distances in question hold. By this device,
the zero of any class of relationswhich aremagnitudes ismade
perfectly definite and free from contradiction; moreover we
have both zero quantities and zero magnitudes, for ifA and B
be terms of the class which has distances, identity withA and
identity with B are distinct zero quantities*. This case, there-
fore, is thoroughly clear. And yet the definition must be re-
jected: for it is plain that zero has some general logical mean-
ing, if only this could be clearly stated, which is the same for
all classes of quantities; and that a zero distance is not actually
the same concept as identity.
176. (4) In any class of magnitudes which is continuous, in
the sense of having a term between any two, and which also
has no limiting magnitude, we can introduce zero in the man-
ner in which real numbers are obtained from rationals. Any
collection of magnitudes defines a class of magnitudes less
thanall of them. This class ofmagnitudes canbemadeas small
as we please, and can actually be made to be the null-class, i.e.
to contain no members at all. (This is effected, for instance,
if our collection consists of all magnitudes of the kind.) The
classes so defined form a series, closely related to the series of
originalmagnitudes, and in this new series thenull-class is def-
*On this point, however, see §55 above.
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initely the first term. Thus taking the classes as quantities, the
null-class is a zero quantity. There is no class containing a fi-
nite number ofmembers, so that there is not, as inArithmetic,
a discrete approach to the null-class; on the contrary, the ap-
proach is (in several senses of the word) continuous. This
method of defining zero, which is identical with that bywhich
the real number zero is introduced, is important, and will be
discussed in Part V. But for the present we may observe that
it again makes zero the same for all kinds of magnitude, and
makes it not one among the magnitudes whose zero it is.
177. (5)We are compelled, in this question, to face the prob-
lem as to the nature of negation. “No pleasure” is obviously a
different concept from “no pain,” even when these terms are
taken strictly asmere denials of pleasure and pain respectively.
It would seem that “no pleasure” has the same relation to plea- 187
sure as the variousmagnitudes of pleasure have, though it has
also, of course, the special relation of negation. If this be al-
lowed, we see that, if a kind of magnitudes be defined by that
of which they are magnitudes, then no pleasure is one among
the various magnitudes of pleasure. If, then, we are to hold to
our axiom, that all pairs of magnitudes of one kind have rela-
tions of inequality, we shall be compelled to admit that zero
is less than all other magnitudes of its kind. It seems, indeed,
to be rendered evident that this must be admitted, by the fact
that zero is obviously not greater than all other magnitudes of
its kind. This shows that zero has a connectionwith lesswhich
it does not have with greater. And if we adopt this theory, we
shall no longer accept the clear and simple account of zero dis-
tances given above, but we shall hold that a zero distance is
strictly andmerely no distance, and is only correlatedwith iden-
tity.
Thus itwould seem thatHerrMeinong’s theory,withwhich
we began, is substantially correct; it requires emendation, on
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the above view, only in this, that a zeromagnitude is the denial
of the defining concept of a kind ofmagnitudes, not the denial
of any one particular magnitude, or of all of them. We shall
have to hold that any concept which defines a kind of magni-
tudes defines also, by its negation, a particular magnitude of
the kind, which is called the zero of that kind, and is less than
all othermembers of the kind. Andwenow reap the benefit of
the absolute distinction which we made between the defining
concept of a kind of magnitude, and the various magnitudes
of the kind. The relation which we allowed between a partic-
ular magnitude and that of which it is a magnitude was not
identifiedwith the class-relation, but was held to be sui generis;
there is thus no contradiction, as there would be inmost theo-
ries, in supposing this relation to hold between no pleasure and
pleasure, or between no distance and distance.
178. But finally, itmust be observed that no pleasure, the zero
magnitude, is not obtained by the logical denial of pleasure,
and is not the same as the logical notion of not pleasure. On
the contrary, no pleasure is essentially a quantitative concept,
having a curious and intimate relation to logical denial, just as
0 has a very intimate relation to the null-class. The relation is
this, that there is no quantity whose magnitude is zero, so that
the class of zero quantities is the null-class*. The zero of any
kind of magnitude is incapable of that relation to existence or
to particulars, of which the other magnitudes are capable. But
this is a synthetic proposition, to be accepted only on account
of its self-evidence. The zero magnitude of any kind, like the
other magnitudes, is properly speaking indefinable, but is ca-
pable of specification by means of its peculiar relation to the
logical zero.
*This must be applied in correction of what was formerly said about
zero distances.
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chapter xxiii
INFINITY, THE INFINITESIMAL,
ANDCONTINUITY
179. Almost all mathematical ideas present one great dif- 188
ficulty: the difficulty of infinity. This is usually regarded by
philosophers as an antinomy, and as showing that the propo-
sitions of mathematics are not metaphysically true. From this
received opinion I am compelled to dissent. Although all ap-
parent antinomies, except such as are quite easily disposed of,
and such as belong to the fundamentals of logic, are, in my
opinion, reducible to the one difficulty of infinite number, yet
this difficulty itself appears to be soluble by a correct philos-
ophy of any, and to have been generated very largely by con-
fusions due to the ambiguity in the meaning of finite integers.
The problem in general will be discussed in Part V; the pur-
pose of the present chapter is merely to show that quantity,
which has been regarded as the true home of infinity, the in-
finitesimal, and continuity, must give place, in this respect, to
order; while the statement of the difficulties which arise in re-
gard to quantity can be made in a form which is at once ordi-
nal and arithmetical, but involves no reference to the special
peculiarities of quantity.
180. The three problems of infinity, the infinitesimal, and
continuity, as they occur in connection with quantity, are
closely related. None of them can be fully discussed at
this stage, since all depend essentially upon order, while
the infinitesimal depends also upon number. The question
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of infinite quantity, though traditionally considered more
formidable than that of zero, is in reality far less so, andmight
be briefly disposed of, but for the great devotion commonly
shown by philosophers to a proposition which I shall call the
axiom of finitude. Of some kinds of magnitude (for exam-
ple ratios, or distances in space and time), it appears to be
true that there is a magnitude greater than any given magni-
tude. That is, any magnitude being mentioned, another can
be found which is greater than it. The deduction of infinity
from this fact is, when correctly performed, a mere fiction to
facilitate compression in the statement of results obtained by
the method of limits. Any class u of magnitudes of our kind 189
being defined, three cases may arise: (1) There may be a class
of terms greater than any of our class u, and this new class of
terms may have a smallest member; (2) there may be such a
class, but it may have no smallest member; (3) there may be
no magnitudes which are greater than any term of our class u.
Supposing our kind of magnitudes to be one in which there
is no greatest magnitude, case (2) will always arise where the
classu contains a finite number of terms. On theotherhand, if
our series bewhat is called condensed in itself, case (2) will never
arise when u is an infinite class, and has no greatest term; and
if our series is not condensed in itself, but does have a term be-
tween any two, another which has this property can always be
obtained from it*. Thus all infinite series which have no great-
est termwill have limits, except in case (3). To avoid circumlo-
cution, case (3) is defined as that in which the limit is infinite.
But this is amere device, and it is generally admitted bymathe-
maticians to be such. Apart from special circumstances, there
is no reason,merely because a kind ofmagnitudes has nomax-
imum, to admit that there is an infinitemagnitude of the kind,
*This will be further explained in Part V, Chap. xxxvi.
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or that there are many such. When magnitudes of a kind hav-
ing nomaximum are capable of numerical measurement, they
very often obey the axiom of Archimedes, in virtue of which
the ratio of any two magnitudes of the kind is finite. Thus, so
far, theremight appear to be no problem connectedwith infin-
ity.
But at this point the philosopher is apt to step in, and to
declare that, by all true philosophic principles, every well-
defined series of terms must have a last term. If he insists
upon creating this last term, and calling it infinity, he easily
deduces intolerable contradictions, from which he infers the
inadequacy of mathematics to obtain absolute truth. For my
part, however, I see no reason for the philosopher’s axiom. To
show, if possible, that it is not a necessary philosophic prin-
ciple, let us undertake its analysis, and see what it really in-
volves.
The problem of infinity, as it has now emerged, is not prop-
erly a quantitative problem, but rather one concerning order.
It is only because our magnitudes form a series having no last
term that the problem arises: the fact that the series is com-
posed of magnitudes is wholly irrelevant. With this remark I
might leave the subject to a later stage. But it will be worth
while now to elicit, if not to examine, the philosopher’s axiom
of finitude.
181. It will be well, in the first place, to show how the prob-
lem concerning infinity is the same as that concerning conti-
nuity and the infinitesimal. For this purpose, we shall find it
convenient to ignore the absolute zero, and tomean, whenwe
speak of any kind of magnitudes, all the magnitudes of the
kind except zero. This is a mere change of diction, without 190
which intolerable repetitions would be necessary. Now there
certainly are some kinds of magnitude where the three follow-
ing axioms hold:
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(1) If A and B be any two magnitudes of the kind, and A is
greater than B, there is always a third magnitude C such that
A is greater thanC andC greater than B. (This I shall call, for
the present, the axiom of continuity.)
(2) There is always a magnitude less than any given magni-
tude B.
(3) There is always a magnitude greater than any given mag-
nitudeA.
From these it follows:—
(1) That no two magnitudes of the kind are consecutive.
(2) That there is no least magnitude.
(3) That there is no greatest magnitude.
The above propositions are certainly true of some kinds of
magnitude; whether they are true of all kinds remains to be ex-
amined. The following threepropositions,whichdirectly con-
tradict the previous three, must be always true, if the philoso-
pher’s axiom of finitude is to be accepted:
(a) There are consecutive magnitudes, i.e.magnitudes such
that no other magnitude of the same kind is greater than the
less and less than the greater of the two given magnitudes.
(b) There is a magnitude smaller than any other of the same
kind.
(c) There is a magnitude greater than any other of the same
kind*.
As these three propositions directly contradict the previous
*ThoseHegelianswho search for a chance of an antinomymay proceed
to the definition of zero and infinity by means of the above propositions.
When (2) and (b) both hold, they may say, the magnitude satisfying (b) is
called zero; when (3) and (c) bothhold, themagnitude satisfying (c) is called
infinity. We have seen, however, that zero is to be otherwise defined, and
has to be excluded before (2) becomes true; while infinity is not a magni-
tudeof thekind inquestion at all, butmerely a pieceofmathematical short-
hand. (Not infinity in general, that is, but infinite magnitude in the cases
we are discussing.)
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three, it would seem that both sets cannot be true. We have to
examine the grounds for both, and let one set of alternatives
fall.
182. Let us begin with the propositions (a), (b), (c), and ex-
amine the nature of their grounds.
(a) A definite magnitudeA being given, all the magnitudes
greater than A form a series, whose differences from A are
magnitudes of a new kind. If there be a magnitude B consec-
utive to A, its difference from A will be the least magnitude
of its kind, provided equal stretches correspond to equal dis-
tances in the series. And conversely, if there be a smallest dif-
ference between twomagnitudes. A, B, then these twomagni-
tudes must always be consecutive; for if not, any intermediate
magnitude would have a smaller difference fromA than B has. 191
Thus if (b) is universally true, (a) must also be true; and con-
versely, if (a) is true, and if the series of magnitudes be such
that equal stretches correspond to equal distances, then (b) is
true of the distances between themagnitudes considered. We
might rest content with the reduction of (a) to (b), and pro-
ceed to the proof of (b); but it seems worth while to offer a
direct proof, such as presumably the finitist philosopher has
in his mind.
Between A and B there is a certain number of magnitudes,
unlessA andB are consecutive. The intermediatemagnitudes
all have order, so that in passing from A to B all the interme-
diate magnitudes would be met with. In such an enumera-
tion, there must be some magnitude which comes next after
any magnitude C; or, to put the matter otherwise, since the
enumeration has to begin, it must begin somewhere, and the
termwithwhich it beginsmust be themagnitude next toA. If
this were not the case, there would be no definite series; for if
all the terms have an order, some of themmust be consecutive.
In the above argument, what is important is its dependence
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upon number. The whole argument turns upon the princi-
ple bywhich infinite number is shown tobe self-contradictory,
namely: A given collection of many terms must contain some finite
number of terms. We say: All the magnitudes between A and
B form a given collection. If there are no such magnitudes, A
andB are consecutive, and the question is decided. If there are
suchmagnitudes, theremust be a finite number of them, say n.
Since they form a series, there is a definite way of assigning to
them the ordinal numbers from 1 to n. Themth and (m+ 1)th
are then consecutive.
If the axiom in italics be denied, the whole argument col-
lapses; and this, we shall find, is also the case as regards (b) and
(c).
(b) The proof here is precisely similar to the proof of (a). If
there are no magnitudes less than A, then A is the least of its
kind, and the question is decided. If there are any, they form a
definite collection, and therefore (by our axiom) have a finite
number, say n. Since they form a series, ordinal numbers may
be assigned to themgrowinghigher as themagnitudes become
more distant from A. Thus the nth magnitude is the smallest
of its kind.
(c) The proof here is obtained as in (b), by considering the
collection of magnitudes greater thanA. Thus everything de-
pends upon our axiom, without which no case can be made
out against continuity, or against the absence of a greatest and
least magnitude.
As regards the axiom itself, it will be seen that it has no par-
ticular reference to quantity, and at first sight it might seem
to have no reference to order. But the word finite, which oc-
curs in it, requires definition; and this definition, in the form
suited to thepresent discussion, has, we shall find, an essential
reference to order.
183. Of all the philosophers who have inveighed against in- 192
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finite number, I doubt whether there is one who has known
the difference between finite and infinite numbers. The differ-
ence is simply this. Finite numbers obey the law of mathemat-
ical induction; infinite numbers do not. That is to say, given
any number n, if n belongs to every class s to which 0 belongs,
and to which belongs also the number next after any number
which is an s, then n is finite; if not, not. It is in this alone, and
in its consequences, that finite and infinite numbers differ*.
The principle may be otherwise stated thus: If every propo-
sition which holds concerning 0, and also holds concerning
the immediate successor of every number of which it holds,
holds concerning the number n, then n is finite; if not, not.
This is the precise sense of what may be popularly expressed
by saying that every finite number can be reached from 0 by
successive steps, or by successive additions of 1. This is the
principle which the philosopher must be held to lay down as
obviously applicable to all numbers, though he will have to
admit that the more precisely his principle is stated, the less
obvious it becomes.
184. It may be worth while to show exactly how mathemat-
ical induction enters into the above proofs. Let us take the
proof of (a), and suppose there are n magnitudes between A
and B. Then to begin with, we supposed these magnitudes ca-
pable of enumeration, i.e. of an order in which there are con-
secutive terms and a first term, and a term immediately pre-
ceding any term except the first. This property presupposes
mathematical induction, and was in fact the very property in
dispute. Hencewemust not presuppose the possibility of enu-
meration, which would be a petitio principii. But to come to
*Itmust, however, bementioned that one of these consequences gives a
logical difference between finite and infinite numbers, whichmay be taken
as an independent definition. This has been already explained in Part II,
Chap. xiii, and will be further discussed in Part V.
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the kernel of the argument: we supposed that, in any series,
there must be a definite way of assigning ordinal numbers to
the terms. This property belongs to a series of one term, and
belongs to every series having m + 1 terms, if it belongs to ev-
ery series havingm terms. Hence, by mathematical induction,
it belongs to all series having a finite number of terms. But if
it be allowed that the number of terms may not be finite, the
whole argument collapses.
As regards (b) and (c), the argument is similar. Every se-
ries having a finite number of terms can be shown by math-
ematical induction to have a first and last term; but no way
exists of proving this concerning other series, or of proving
that all series are finite. Mathematical induction, in short, like
the axiom of parallels, is useful and convenient in its proper
place; but to suppose it always true is to yield to the tyranny 193
ofmere prejudice. Thephilosopher’s finitist arguments, there-
fore, rest on a principle of which he is ignorant, which there is
no reason to affirm, and every reason to deny. With this con-
clusion, the apparent antinomies may be considered solved.
185. It remains to consider what kinds of magnitude satisfy
the propositions (1), (2), (3). There is no general principle from
which these canbeprovedordisproved, but there are certainly
cases where they are true, and others where they are false. It
is generally held by philosophers that numbers are essentially
discrete, while magnitudes are essentially continuous. This
we shall find to benot the case. Real numbers possess themost
complete continuity known, while many kinds of magnitude
possess no continuity at all. The word continuity has many
meanings, but in mathematics it has only two—one old, the
other new. For present purposes the old meaning will suffice.
I therefore set up, for the present, the following definition:
Continuity applies to series (and only to series) whenever
these are such that there is a term between any two given
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terms*. Whatever is not a series, or a compound of series, or
whatever is a series not fulfilling the above condition, is dis-
continuous.
Thus the series of rational numbers is continuous, for the
arithmeticmean of two of them is always a third rational num-
ber between the two. The letters of the alphabet are not con-
tinuous.
We have seen that any two terms in a series have a distance,
or a stretch which has magnitude. Since there are certainly
discrete series (e.g. the alphabet), there are certainly discrete
magnitudes, namely, the distances or the stretches of terms
in discrete series. The distance between the letters A and C
is greater than that between the letters A and B, but there is
nomagnitude which is greater than one of these and less than
the other. In this case, there is also a greatest possible and a
least possible distance, so that all three propositions (1), (2), (3)
fail. It must not be supposed, however, that the three propo-
sitions have any necessary connection. In the case of the inte-
gers, for example, there are consecutive distances, and there
is a least possible distance, namely, that between consecutive
integers, but there is no greatest possible distance. Thus (3)
is true, while (1) and (2) are false. In the case of the series of
notes, or of colours of the rainbow, the series has a beginning
and end, so that there is a greatest distance; but there is no
least distance, and there is a term between any two. Thus (1)
and (2) are true, while (3) is false. Or again, if we take the series
composed of zero and the fractions having one for numerator,
there is a greatest distance, but no least distance, though the 194
series is discrete. Thus (2) is true, while (1) and (3) are false.
*The objection to this definition (as we shall see in Part V) is, that it
does not give the usual properties of the existence of limits to convergent
series which are commonly associatedwith continuity. Series of the above
kind will be called compact, except in the present discussion.
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And other combinations might be obtained from other series.
Thus the three propositions (1), (2), (3), have no necessary
connection, and all of them, or any selection, may be false
as applied to any given kind of magnitude. We cannot hope,
therefore, to prove their truth from the nature of magnitude.
If they are ever to be true, this must be proved independently,
or discovered bymere inspection in each particular case. That
they are sometimes true, appears from a consideration of the
distances between terms of the number-continuum or of the
rational numbers. Either of these series is continuous in the
above sense, and has no first or last term (when zero is ex-
cluded). Hence its distances or stretches fulfil all three condi-
tions. The same might be inferred from space and time, but I
do not wish to anticipate what is to be said of these. Quan-
tities of divisibility do not fulfil these conditions when the
wholeswhich aredivisible consist of a finitenumberof indivis-
ible parts. But where the number of parts is infinite in a whole
class of differingmagnitudes, all three conditions are satisfied,
as appears from the properties of the number-continuum.
We thus see that the problems of infinity and continu-
ity have no essential connection with quantity, but are due,
where magnitudes present them at all, to characteristics de-
pending upon number and order. Hence the discussion of
these problems can only be undertaken after the pure theory
of order has been set forth*. To do this will be the aim of the
following Part.
186. We may now sum up the results obtained in Part III.
In Chapter xix we determined to define a magnitude as what-
ever is either greater or less than something else. We found
that magnitude has no necessary connection with divisibility,
and that greater and less are indefinable. Every magnitude,
*Cf. Couturat, “Sur la Definition du Continu,” Revue de Métaphysique
et de Morale, 1900.
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we saw, has a certain relation—analogous to, but not identical
with, that of inclusion in a class—to a certain quality or rela-
tion; and this fact is expressed by saying that themagnitude in
question is amagnitude of that quality or relation. Wedefined
a quantity as a particular contained under a magnitude, i.e. as
the complex consisting of a magnitude with a certain spatio-
temporal position, or with a pair of terms between which it is
a relation. We decided, by means of a general principle con-
cerning transitive symmetrical relations, that it is impossible
to content ourselves with quantities, and deny the further ab-
straction involved in magnitudes; that equality is not a direct
relation between quantities, but consists in being particular-
izations of the same magnitude. Thus equal quantities are in-
stances of the same magnitude. Similarly greater and less are 195
not direct relations between quantities, but between magni-
tudes: quantities are only greater and less in virtue of being
instancesof greater and lessmagnitudes. Any twomagnitudes
which are of the same quality or relation are one greater, the
other less; and greater and less are asymmetrical transitive re-
lations.
Among the termswhich havemagnitude are not onlymany
qualities, but also asymmetrical relations by which certain
kinds of series are constituted. These may be called distances.
When there are distances in a series, any two terms of the se-
ries have a distance, which is the same as, greater than, or less
than, the distance of any two other terms in the series. An-
other peculiar class of magnitudes discussed in Chapter xx is
constituted by the degrees of divisibility of different wholes.
This, we found, is the only case in which quantities are divisi-
ble, while there is no instance of divisible magnitudes.
Numerical measurement, which was discussed in Chapter
xxi, required, owing to the decision that most quantities and
all magnitudes are indivisible, a somewhat unusual treatment.
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The problem lies, we found, in establishing a one-one rela-
tion between numbers and the magnitudes of the kind to be
measured. On certain metaphysical hypotheses (which were
neither accepted nor rejected), this was found to be always
theoretically possible as regards existents actual or possible,
though often not practically feasible or important. In regard
to two classes of magnitudes, namely divisibilities and dis-
tances, measurement was found to proceed from a very nat-
ural convention, which defines what is meant by saying (what
can never have the simple sense which it has in connection
with finite wholes and parts) that one such magnitude is dou-
ble of, or n times, another. The relation of distance to stretch
was discussed, and it was found that, apart from a special ax-
iom to that effect, there was no à priori reason for regarding
equal distances as corresponding to equal stretches.
In Chapter xxii we discussed the definition of zero. The
problem of zero was found to have no connectionwith that of
the infinitesimal, being in fact closely related to thepurely logi-
cal problem as to the nature of negation. Wedecided that, just
as there are the distinct logical and arithmetical negations, so
there is a third fundamental kind, the quantitative negation;
but that this is negation of that quality or relation of which
the magnitudes are, not of magnitude of that quality or rela-
tion. Hencewewere able to regard zero as one among themag-
nitudes contained in a kind of magnitude, and to distinguish
the zeroes of different kinds. We showed also that quantita-
tive negation is connected with logical negation by the fact
that there cannot be any quantities whose magnitude is zero.
In the present Chapter the problems of continuity, the infi-
nite, and the infinitesimal, were shown tobelong, not specially
to the theory of quantity, but to those of number and order. It 196
was shown that, though there are kinds ofmagnitude inwhich
there is no greatest and no least magnitude, this fact does not
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require us to admit infinite or infinitesimal magnitudes; and
that there is no contradiction in supposing a kind of magni-
tudes to form a series in which there is a term between any
two, and inwhich, consequently, there is no term consecutive
to a given term. The supposed contradiction was shown to re-
sult from an undue use of mathematical induction—a princi-
ple, the full discussion of which presupposes the philosophy
of order.
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PART IV
ORDER
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chapter xxiv
THEGENESIS OF SERIES
187. The notion of order or series is onewithwhich, in con- 199
nection with distance, and with the order of magnitude, we
have already had to deal. The discussion of continuity in the
last chapter of Part III showed us that this is properly an ordi-
nal notion, and prepared us for the fundamental importance
of order. It is now high time to examine this concept on its
own account. The importance of order, from a purely mathe-
matical standpoint, has been immeasurably increasedbymany
modern developments. Dedekind, Cantor, and Peano have
shown how to base all Arithmetic and Analysis upon series
of a certain kind—i.e. upon those properties of finite numbers
in virtue of which they form what I shall call a progression. Ir-
rationals are defined (as we shall see) entirely by the help of
order; and a new class of transfinite ordinals is introduced,
by which the most important and interesting results are ob-
tained. In Geometry, von Staudt’s quadrilateral construction
and Pieri’s work on Projective Geometry have shown how to
give points, lines, and planes an order independent of metri-
cal considerations and of quantity; while descriptive Geom-
etry proves that a very large part of Geometry demands only
the possibility of serial arrangement. Moreover the whole phi-
losophy of space and time depends upon the view we take of
order. Thus a discussion of order, which is lacking in the cur-
rent philosophies, has become essential to any understanding
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of the foundations of mathematics.
188. The notion of order is more complex than any hitherto
analyzed. Two terms cannot have an order, and even three
cannot have a cyclic order. Owing to this complexity, the log-
ical analysis of order presents considerable difficulties. I shall
therefore approach the problemgradually, considering, in this
chapter, the circumstances under which order arises, and re-
serving for the second chapter the discussion as to what order
really is. This analysis will raise several fundamental points in
general logic, which will demand considerable discussion of
an almost purely philosophical nature. From this I shall pass
to more mathematical topics, such as the types of series and
the ordinal definition of numbers, thus gradually preparing 200
theway for the discussion of infinity and continuity in the fol-
lowing Part.
There are two different ways in which order may arise,
though we shall find in the end that the second way is re-
ducible to the first. In the first, what may be called the ordinal
element consists of three terms a; b; c; one of which (b say) is
between the other two. This happens whenever there is a re-
lation of a to b and of b to c, which is not a relation of b to a,
of c to b, or of c to a. This is the definition, or better perhaps,
the necessary and sufficient condition, of the proposition “b
is between a and c.” But there are other cases of order where,
at first sight, the above conditions are not satisfied, and where
between is not obviously applicable. These are cases where we
have four terms a; b; c; d; as the ordinal element, of which we
can say that a and c are separated by b and d. This relation
is more complicated, but the following seems to characterize
it: a and c are separated from b and d, when there is an asym-
metrical relation which holds between a and b, b and c, c and
d, or between a and d, d and c, c and b, or between c and d, d
and a, a and b; while if we have the first case, the same relation
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must hold either between d and a, or else betweenboth a and c,
and a and d; with similar assumptions for the other two cases*.
(No further special assumption is required as to the relation
between a and c or between b and d; it is the absence of such
an assumption which prevents our reducing this case to the
former in a simple manner.) There are cases—notably where
our series is closed—in which it seems formally impossible to
reduce this second case to the first, though this appearance,
as we shall see, is in part deceptive. We have to show, in the
present chapter, the principal ways in which series arise from
collections of such ordinal elements.
Although two terms alone cannot have an order, we must
not assume that order is possible except where there are rela-
tions between two terms. In all series, we shall find, there are
asymmetrical relations between two terms. But an asymmetri-
cal relationofwhich there is only one instancedoesnot consti-
tute order. We require at least two instances for between, and
at least three for separation of pairs. Thus although order is a
relation between three or four terms, it is only possible where
there are other relations which hold between pairs of terms.
These relations may be of various kinds, giving different ways
of generating series. I shall now enumerate the principal ways
with which I am acquainted.
189. (1) The simplest method of generating a series is as fol-
lows. Let there be a collection of terms, finite or infinite, such
that every term (with the possible exception of a single one)
has to one and only one other term of the collection a certain 201
asymmetrical relation (which must of course be intransitive),
and that every term (with again one possible exception, which
must not be the same as the term formerly excepted) has also
to one and only one other term of the collection the relation
*This gives a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the separation
of couples.
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which is the converse of the former one*. Further, let it be as-
sumed that, if a has the first relation to b, and b to c, then c
does not have the first relation to a. Then every term of the
collection except the two peculiar terms has one relation to a
second term, and the converse relation to a third, while these
terms themselves do not have to each other either of the rela-
tions in question. Consequently, by the definition of between,
our first term is betweenour secondand third terms. The term
to which a given term has one of the two relations in ques-
tion is called next after the given term; the term to which the
given term has the converse relation is called next before the
given term. Two terms between which the relations in ques-
tion hold are called consecutive. The exceptional terms (when
they exist) are not between any pair of terms; they are called
the two ends of the series, or one is called the beginning and
the other the end. The existence of the one does not imply
that of the other—for example the natural numbers have a
beginning but no end—and neither need exist—for example,
the positive and negative integers together have neither†.
The above method may perhaps become clear by a formal
exhibition. Let R be one of our relations, and let its converse
be denoted by R‡. Then if e be any term of our set, there are
two terms d, f, such that eRd, eRf, i.e. such that dRe, eRf. Since
each termonly has the relationR to one other, we cannot have
dRf; and it was one of the initial assumptions that wewere not
to have fRd. Hence e is between d and f§. If a be a term which
has only the relation R, then obviously a is not between any
*The converse of a relation is the relation which must hold between y
and xwhen the given relation holds between x and y.
†The above is the only method of generating series given by Bolzano,
“Paradoxien des Unendlichen,” §7.
‡This is the notation adopted by Professor Schröder.
§The denial of dRf is only necessary to this special method, but the de-
nial of fRd is essential to the definition of between.
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pair of terms. We may extend the notion of between by defin-
ing that, if c be between b and d, and d between c and e, then c
or dwill be said to be also between b and e. In this way, unless
we either reach an endor comeback to the termwithwhichwe
started, we can find any number of terms between which and
b the term c will lie. But if the total number of terms be not
less than seven, we cannot show in this way that of any three
terms onemust be between the other two, since the collection
may consist of two distinct series, of which, if the collection is 202
finite, one at least must be closed, in order to avoid more than
two ends.
This remark shows that, if the abovemethod is to give a sin-
gle series, to which any term of our collection is to belong, we
need a further condition, which may be expressed by saying
that the collection must be connected. We shall find means
hereafter of expressing this condition without reference to
number, but for the present we may content ourselves by say-
ing that our collection is connectedwhen, given any two of its
terms, there is a certain finite number (not necessarily unique)
of steps from one term to the next, by whichwe can pass from
one of our two terms to the other. When this condition is ful-
filled, we are assured that, of any three terms of our collection,
one must be between the other two.
Assuming now that our collection is connected, and there-
fore forms a single series, four cases may arise: (a) our series
may have two ends, (b) it may have one end, (c) it may have
no end and be open, (d) it may have no end and be closed.
Concerning (a), it is to be observed that our series must be
finite. For, taking the two ends, since the collection is con-
nected, there is some finite number n of steps which will take
us from one end to the other, and hence n + 1 is the number
of terms of the series. Every term except the two ends is be-
tween them, and neither of them is between any other pair of
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terms. In case (b), on the other hand, our collection must be
infinite, and thiswouldhold even if itwerenot connected. For
suppose the end which exists to have the relation R, but not
R. Then every other term of the collection has both relations,
and can never have both to the same term, sinceR is asymmet-
rical. Hence the term to which (say) e has the relation R is not
that towhich it had the relation R, but is either somenew term,
or one of e’s predecessors. Now it cannot be the end-term a,
since a does not have the relation R to any term. Nor can it
be any term which can be reached by successive steps from a
without passing through e, for if it were, this termwould have
two predecessors, contrary to the hypothesis that R is a one-
one relation. Hence, if k be any term which can be reached
by successive steps from a, k has a successor which is not a or
any of the terms between a and k; and hence the collection is
infinite, whether it be connected or not. In case (c), the collec-
tion must again be infinite. For here, by hypothesis, the series
is open—i.e., starting from any term e, no number of steps in
either direction brings us back to e. And there cannot be a fi-
nite limit to the number of possible steps, since, if there were,
the series would have an end. Here again, it is not necessary to
suppose the series connected. In case (d), on the contrary, we
must assume connection. By saying that the series is closed,
we mean that there exists some number n of steps by which,
starting from a certain term a, we shall be brought back to a. 203
In this case, n is the number of terms, and it makes no differ-
ence with which term we start. In this case, between is not def-
inite except where three terms are consecutive, and the series
containsmore than three terms. Otherwise, weneed themore
complicated relation of separation.
190. (2) The above method, as we have seen, will give either
open or closed series, but only such as have consecutive terms.
The secondmethod, which is now to be discussed, will give se-
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ries in which there are no consecutive terms, but will not give
closed series*. In this method we have a transitive asymmetri-
cal relation P, and a collection of terms any two of which are
such that either xPy or yPx. When these conditions are satis-
fied our terms necessarily form a single series. Since the rela-
tion is asymmetrical, we can distinguish xPy from yPx, and the
two cannot both subsist†. Since P is transitive, xPy and yPz in-
volve xPz. It follows that P is also asymmetrical and transitive‡.
Thus with respect to any term x of our collection, all other
terms of the collection fall into two classes, those for which
xPy, and those for which zPx. Calling these two classes πx and
πx respectively, we see that, owing to the transitiveness of P, if
y belongs to the class πx, πy is contained in πx; and if z belongs
to the class πx, πz is contained in πx. Takingnow two terms x, y,
for which xPy, all other terms fall into three classes: (1) Those
belonging to πx, and therefore to πy; (2) those belonging to πy,
and therefore to πx; (3) those belonging to πx but not to πy. If z
be of the first class, we have zPx, zPy; if v be of the second, xPv
and yPv; if w be of the third, xPw and wPy. The case yPu and
uPx is excluded: for xPy, yPu imply xPu, which is inconsistent
with uPx. Thus we have, in the three cases, (1) x is between z
*The following method is the only one given by Vivanti in the Formu-
laire deMathématiques, (1895), vi, §2, No. 7; also byGilman, “On the proper-
ties of a one-dimensional manifold,”Mind, N.S. Vol. i. We shall find that
it is general in a sense in which none of our other methods are so.
†I use the term asymmetrical as the contrary, rather than the contradic-
tory, of symmetrical. If xPy and the relation is symmetrical, we have al-
ways yPx; if asymmetrical, we never have yPx. Some relations—e.g. logical
implication—are neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical. Instead of assum-
ingP to be asymmetrical, wemaymake the equivalent assumption that it is
what Professor Peirce calls an aliorelative, i.e. a relation which no term has
to itself. (This assumption is not equivalent to asymmetry in general, but
only when combined with transitiveness.)
‡Pmaybe read precedes, and Pmaybe read follows, providedno temporal
or spatial ideas are allowed to intrude themselves.
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and y; (2) y is between x and v; (3) w is between x and y. Hence
any three terms of our collection are such that one is between
the other two, and the whole collection forms a single series.
If the class (3) contains no terms, x and y are said to be consecu-
tive; but many relations P can be assigned, for which there are
always terms in the class (3). If for example P be before, and our
collection be the moments in a certain interval, or in all time, 204
there is a moment between any two of our collection. Simi-
larly in the case of themagnitudeswhich, in the last chapter of
Part III, we called continuous. There is nothing in the present
method, as there was in the first, to show that there must be
consecutive terms, unless the total number of terms in our col-
lection be finite. On the other hand, the present method will
not allow closed series; for owing to the transitiveness of the
relation P, if the series were closed, and x were any one of its
terms, we should have xPx, which is impossible because P is
asymmetrical. Thus in a closed series, the generating relation
can never be transitive*. As in the former method, the series
may have two ends, or one, or none. In the first case only, it
may be finite; but even in this case itmay be infinite, and in the
other two cases it must be so.
191. (3) A series may be generated by means of distances, as
was already partially explained in Part III, and as we shall see
more fully hereafter. In this case, starting with a certain term
x, we are to have relations, which are magnitudes, between x
and a number of other terms y; z : : :. According as these rela-
tions are greater or less, we can order the corresponding terms.
If there are no similar relations between the remaining terms
y; z; : : : ; we require nothing further. But if these have rela-
tions which are magnitudes of the same kind, certain axioms
are necessary to insure that the order may be independent of
*For more precise statements, see Chap. xxviii.
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the particular term from which we start. Denoting by xz the
distance of x and z, if xz is less than xw, we must have yz less
than yw. A consequence, which did not follow when x was
the only term that had a distance, is that the distancesmust be
asymmetrical relations, and those which have one sense must
be considered less than zero. For “xz is less than xw” must in-
volve “wz is less than ww,” i.e. wz is less than 0. In this way
the present case is practically reduced to the second; for every
pair of terms x, ywill be such that xy is less than 0 or else xy is
greater than 0; and we may put in the first case yPx, in the sec-
ond xPy. But we require one further axiom in order that the
arrangement may be thus effected unambiguously. If xz = yw,
and zw0 = xy, w and w0 must be the same point. With this fur-
ther axiom, the reduction to case (2) becomes complete.
192. (4) Cases of triangular relations are capable of giving
rise to order. Let there be a relation R which holds between
y and (x; z), between z and (y; u), between u and (z;w), and
so on. Between is itself such a relation, and this might there-
fore seem themost direct and natural way of generating order.
We should say, in such a case, that y is between x and z, when
the relation R holds between y and the couple x; z. We should
need assumptions concerning R which should show that, if y
is between x and z, and z between y and w, then y and z are
each between x andw. That is, if we have yR(x; z), zR(y;w), we 205
must have yR(x;w) and zR(x;w). This is a kind of three-term
transitiveness. Also if y be between x and w, and z between y
and w, then z must be between x and w, and y between x and
z: that is, if yR(x;w) and zR(y;w), then zR(x;w) and yR(x; z).
Also yR(x; z) must be equivalent to yR(z; x)*. With these as-
sumptions, an unambiguous order will be generated among
any number of terms such that any triad has the relation R.
Whether such a state of things can ever be incapable of fur-
*See Peano, I Principii di Geometria, Turin, 1889, Axioms viii, ix, x, xi.
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ther analysis, is a question which I leave for the next chapter.
193. (5)We have found hitherto noway of generating closed
continuous series. There are, however, instances of such se-
ries, e.g. angles, the elliptic straight line, the complex numbers
with a given modulus. It is therefore necessary to have some
theory which allows of their possibility. In the case where
our terms are asymmetrical relations, as straight lines are, or
are correlated uniquely and reciprocally with such relations,
the following theory will effect this object. In other cases, the
sixth method (below) seems adequate to the end in view.
Let x; y; z : : : be a set of asymmetrical relations, and let R be
an asymmetrical relation which holds between any two x; y or
y; x except when y is the converse relation to x. Also let R be
such that, if it holds between x and y, it holds between y and
the converse of x; and if x be any term of the collection, let all
the terms to which x has either of the relations R, R be terms
of the collection. All these conditions are satisfied by angles,
and whenever they are satisfied, the resulting series is closed.
For xRy implies yRx, and hence xRy, and thence yRx; so that
by means of relations R it is possible to travel from x back to
x. Also there is nothing in the definition to show that our se-
ries cannot be continuous. Since it is closed, we cannot apply
universally the notion of between; but the notion of separation
can be always applied. The reason why it is necessary to sup-
pose that our terms either are, or are correlatedwith, asymmet-
rical relations, is, that such series often have antipodes, oppo-
site terms as they may be called; and that the notion of opposite
seems to be essentially bound up with that of the converse of
an asymmetrical relation.
194. (6) In the same way in which, in (4), we showed how
to construct a series by relations of between, we can construct
a series directly by four-term relations of separation. For this
purpose, as before, certain axioms are necessary. The follow-
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ing five axioms have been shown by Vailati† to be sufficient,
and by Padoa to possess ordered independence, i.e. to be such
that none can be deduced from its predecessors‡. Denoting “a
and b separate c from d” by abkcd, we must have:
(α) abkcd is equivalent to cdkab; 206
(β) abkcd is equivalent to abkdc;
(γ) abkcd excludes ackbd;
(δ) For any four terms of our collection, wemust have abkcd,
or ackbd, or adkbc;
(ε) If abkcd, and ackbe, then ackde.
Bymeans of these five assumptions, our terms a; b; c; d; e : : :
acquire an unambiguous order, in which we start from a rela-
tion between two pairs of terms, which is undefined except to
the extent to which the above assumptions define it. The fur-
ther consideration of this case, as generally of the relation of
separation, I postpone to a later stage.
The above sixmethods of generating series are the principal
ones with which I am acquainted, and all other methods, so
far as I know, are reducible to one of these six. The last alone
gives a method of generating closed continuous series whose
terms neither are, nor are correlated with, asymmetrical rela-
tions*. This lastmethod should therefore be applied in projec-
tive and ellipticGeometry, where the correlation of the points
on a line with the lines through a point appears to be logically
subsequent to the order of the points on a line. But before we
can decide whether these six methods (especially the fourth
and sixth) are irreducible and independent, we must discuss
(what has not hitherto been analyzed) the meaning of order,
and the logical constituents (if any) of which this meaning is
compounded. This will be done in the following chapter.
†Rivista di Matematica, v, pp. 76, 183.
‡Ibid., p. 185.
*See Chap. xxviii.
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chapter xxv
THEMEANINGOFORDER
195. We have now seen under what circumstances there is 207
an order among a set of terms, and by this means we have ac-
quired a certain inductive familiarity with the nature of order.
But we have not yet faced the question: What is order? This
is a difficult question, and one upon which, so far as I know,
nothing at all has been written. All the authors with whom
I am acquainted are content to exhibit the genesis of order;
and since most of them give only one of the six methods enu-
merated in Chapter xxiv, it is easy for them to confound the
genesis of order with its nature. This confusion is rendered
evident to us by the multiplicity of the above methods; for it
is evident that we mean by order something perfectly definite,
which, being generated equally in all our six cases, is clearly
distinct from each and all of the ways in which it may be gen-
erated, unless one of these ways should turn out to be fun-
damental, and the others to be reducible to it. To elicit this
common element in all series, and to broach the logical discus-
sions connected with it, is the purpose of the present chapter.
This discussion is of purely philosophical interest, and might
be wholly omitted in a mathematical treatment of the subject.
In order to approach the subject gradually, let us separate
the discussion of between from that of separation of couples.
When we have decided upon the nature of each of these sepa-
rately, it will be time to combine them, and examine what it is
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that both have in common. I shall beginwith between, as being
the simpler of the two.
196. Between may be characterized (as in Chapter xxiv) as
a relation of one term y to two others x and z, which holds
whenever x has to y, and y has to z, some relation which y does
not have to x, nor z to y, nor z to x*. These conditions are un- 208
doubtedly sufficient for betweenness, but it may be questioned
whether they are necessary. Several possible opinions must be
distinguished in this respect. (1) We may hold that the above
conditions give the verymeaning of between, that they consti-
tute an actual analysis of it, and not merely a set of conditions
insuring its presence. (2) We may hold that between is not a
relation of the terms x; y; z at all, but a relation of the relation
of y to x to that of y to z, namely the relation of difference of
sense. (3) We may hold that between is an indefinable notion,
like greater and less; that the above conditions allow us to in-
fer that y is between x and z, but that there may be other cir-
cumstances under which this occurs, and even that it may oc-
cur without involving any relation except diversity among the
pairs (x; y); (y; z); (x; z). In order to decide between these theo-
ries, it will be well to develop each in turn.
197. (1) In this theory, we define “y is between x and z” to
mean: “There is a relation R such that xRy, yRz but not yRx,
zRy”; and it remains a question whether we are to add “not
zRx.” We will suppose to begin with that this addition is not
made. The following propositions will be generally admitted
to be self-evident: (α) If y be between x and z, and z between
*The condition that z does not have to x the relation in question is com-
paratively inessential, being only required in order that, if y be between x
and z, we may not have x between y and z, or z between x and y. If we are
willing to allow that in such cases, for example, as the angles of a triangle,
each is between the other two, wemay drop the condition in question alto-
gether. The other four conditions, on the contrary, seemmore essential.
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y and w, then y is between x and w; (β) if y be between x and z,
and w between x and y, then y is between w and z. For brevity,
let us express “y is between x and z” by the symbol xyz. Then
our two propositions are: (α) xyz and yzw imply xyw; (β) xyz
and xwy imply wyz. We must add that the relation of between
is symmetrical so far as the extremes are concerned: i.e. xyz im-
plies zyx. This condition follows directly from our definition.
With regard to the axioms (α) and (β), it is to be observed that
between, on our present view, is always relative to some rela-
tion R, and that the axioms are only assumed to hold when it
is the same relationR that is in question in both the premisses.
Let us see whether these axioms are consequences of our def-
inition. For this purpose, let us write R for not-R.
xyzmeans xRy, yRz, yRx, zRy.
yzwmeans yRz, zRw, zRy, wRz.
Thus yzw only adds to xyz the two conditions zRw,wRz. IfR
is transitive, these conditions insure xyw; if not, not. Now we
have seen that some series are generated by one-one relations
R, which are not transitive. In these cases, however, denoting
by R2 the relation between x and z implied by xRy, yRz, and so
on for higher powers, we can substitute a transitive relationR0
forR, whereR0means “some positive power of R.” In this way,
if xyz holds for a relation which is some definite power of R,
then xyzholds forR0, providedonly thatnopositivepowerofR
is equivalent to R. For, in this latter event, we shouldhave yR0x
whenever xR0y, and R0 could not be substituted for R in the
explanation of xyz. Now this condition, that the converse ofR
is not tobe apositive powerofR, is equivalent to the condition 209
that our series is not to be closed. For if R = Rn, then RR =
Rn+1; but since R is a one-one relation, RR implies the relation
of identity. Thus n + 1 steps bring us back from x to x, and
our series is a closed series of n+ 1 terms. Nowwe have agreed
already that between is not properly applicable to closed series.
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Hence this condition, that R is not to be a power ofR, imposes
only such restrictions upon our axiom (α) as we should expect
it to be subject to.
With regard to (β), we have
xyz = xRy : yRz : yRx : zRy.
xwy = xRw : wRy : wRx : yRw.
The case contemplated by this axiom is only possible ifR be
not a one-one relation, sincewehave xRy and xRw. Thededuc-
tion wyz is here an immediate consequence of the definition,
without the need of any further conditions.
It remains to examine whether we can dispense with the
condition zRx in the definition of between. If we suppose R
to be a one-one relation, and zRx to be satisfied, we shall have
xyz = xRy : yRz : zRy : yRx,
andwe have further by hypothesis zRx, and sinceR is one-one,
and xRy, we have xRz. Hence, in virtue of the definition, we
have yzx; and similarly we shall obtain zxy. If we now adhere
to our axiom (α), we shall have xzx, which is impossible; for it
is certainly part of themeaning of between that the three terms
in the relation should be different, and it is impossible that
a term should be between x and x. Thus we must either in-
sert our condition zRx, or we must set up the new condition
in the definition, that x and z are to be different. (It should be
observed that our definition implies that x is different from y
and y from z; for if not, xRywould involve yRx, and yRzwould
involve zRy.) It would seem preferable to insert the condition
that x and z are to be different: for this is in any case neces-
sary, and is not implied by zRx. This condition must then be
added to our axiom (α); xyz and yzw are to imply xyw, unless
x and w are identical. In axiom (β), this addition is not neces-
sary, since it is implied in the premisses. Thus the condition
zRx is not necessary, if we are willing to admit that xyz is com-
patible with yzx—an admissionwhich such cases as the angles
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of a triangle render possible. Orwemay insert, in place of zRx,
the condition which we found necessary before to the univer-
sal validity of our axiom (α), namely that no power of R is to
be equivalent to the converse of R: for if we have both xyz and
yzx, we shall have (so far at least as x; y; z are concerned)R2 = R,
i.e. if xRy and yRz, then zRx. This last course seems to be the 210
best. Hence in all cases where our first instance of between is
defined by a one-one relation R, we shall substitute the rela-
tionR0, whichmeans “somepositive power ofR.” The relation
R0 is then transitive, and the condition that no positive power
ofR is to be equivalent to R is equivalent to the condition that
R0 is to be asymmetrical. Hence, finally, the whole matter is
simplified into the following:
To say that y is between x and z is equivalent to saying that
there is some transitive asymmetrical relation which relates
both x and y, and y and z.
This short and simple statement, as the above lengthy argu-
ment shows, contains neither more nor less than our original
definition, together with the emendationswhichwe gradually
found to be necessary. The question remains, however: Is this
themeaning of between?
198. A negative instance can be at once established if we al-
low the phrase: R is a relation between x and y. The phrase,
as the reader will have observed, has been with difficulty ex-
cluded from the definitions of between, which its introduction
wouldhave rendered at least verbally circular. Thephrasemay
have none but a linguistic importance, or again itmay point to
a real insufficiency in the above definition. Let us examine the
relation of a relation R to its terms x and y. In the first place,
there certainly is such a relation. To be a term which has the
relation R to some other term is certainly to have a relation to
R, a relation which we may express as “belonging to the do-
main of R.” Thus if xRy, xwill belong to the domain of R, and
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y to that of R. If we express this relation between x and R, or
between y and R, by E, we shall have xER, yER. If further we
express the relation of R to R by I, we shall have RIR and RIR.
Thus we have xER, yEIR. Now EI is by no means the converse
ofE, and thus the abovedefinitionof between, if for this reason
only, does not apply; also neither E nor EI is transitive. Thus
our definition of between is wholly inapplicable to such a case.
Now it may well be doubted whether between, in this case, has
at all the same meaning as in other cases. Certainly we do not
in thisway obtain series: x and y are not, in the same sense asR,
betweenR and other terms. Moreover, if we admit relations of
a term to itself, we shall have to admit that such relations are
between a term and itself, which we agreed to be impossible.
Hence we may be tempted to regard the use of between in this
case as due to the linguistic accident that the relation is usually
mentioned between the subject and the object, as in “A is the
father ofB.” On the other hand, itmay be urged that a relation
does have a very peculiar relation to the pair of terms which it
relates, and that between should denote a relation of one term
to two others. To the objection concerning relations of a term
to itself, it may be answered that such relations, in any system,
constitute a grave logical difficulty; that they would, if possi- 211
ble, be denied philosophic validity; and that even where the
relation asserted is identity, there must be two identical terms,
which are therefore not quite identical. As this raises a fun-
damental difficulty, which we cannot discuss here, it will be
prudent to allow the answer to pass*. And it may be further
urged that use of the same word in two connections points al-
ways to some analogy, the extent of which should be carefully
indicated by those who deny that the meaning is the same in
both cases; and that the analogy here is certainly profounder
than the mere order of words in a sentence, which is, in any
*Cf. §95.
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case, far more variable in this respect than the phrase that a re-
lation is between its terms. To these remarks, however, it may
be retorted that the objector has himself indicated the precise
extent of the analogy: the relation of a relation to its terms is
a relation of one term to two others, just as between is, and this
is what makes the two cases similar. This last retort is, I think,
valid, and we may allow that the relation of a relation to its
terms, though involving a most important logical problem, is
not the same as the relation of between by which order is to be
constituted.
Nevertheless, the above definition of between, though we
shall be ultimately forced to accept it, seems, at first sight,
scarcely adequate from a philosophical point of view. The ref-
erence to some asymmetrical relation is vague, and seems to
require to be replaced by some phrase in which no such un-
defined relation appears, but only the terms and the between-
ness. This brings us to the second of the above opinions con-
cerning between.
199. (2) Between, it may be said, is not a relation of three
terms at all, but a relation of two relations, namely differ-
ence of sense. Now if we take this view, the first point to be
observed is, that we require the two opposite relations, not
merely in general, but as particularized by belonging to one
and the same term. This distinction is already familiar from
the case of magnitudes and quantities. Before and after in the
abstract do not constitute between: it is onlywhen one and the
same term is both before and after that between arises: this
term is then between what it is before and what it is after.
Hence there is a difficulty in the reduction of between to dif-
ference of sense. The particularized relation is a logically puz-
zling entity, which in Part I (§55) we found it necessary to deny;
and it is not quite easy to distinguish a relation of two rela-
tions, particularized as belonging to the same term, from a re-
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lation of the term in question to two others. At the same time,
great advantages are secured by this reduction. We get rid of
the necessity for a triangular relation, to which many philoso-
phersmay object, andwe assign a commonelement to all cases
of between, namely difference of sense, i.e. the difference be-
tween an asymmetrical relation and its converse.
200. The question whether there can be an ultimate trian- 212
gular relation is onewhose actual solution is both difficult and
unimportant, but whose precise statement is of very great im-
portance. Philosophers seem usually to assume—though not,
so far as I know, explicitly—that relations never have more
than two terms; and even such relations they reduce, by force
or guile, to predications. Mathematicians, on the other hand,
almost invariably speak of relations of many terms. We can-
not, however, settle the question by a simple appeal to math-
ematical instances, for it remains a question whether these
are, or are not, susceptible of analysis. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the projective plane has been defined as a relation of
three points: the philosopher may always say that it should
have been defined as a relation of a point and a line, or of two
intersecting lines—a change which makes little or no math-
ematical difference. Let us see what is the precise meaning
of the question. There are among terms two radically dif-
ferent kinds, whose difference constitutes the truth underly-
ing the doctrine of substance and attribute. There are terms
which can never occur except as terms; such are points, in-
stants, colours, sounds, bits of matter, and generally terms of
the kind of which existents consist. There are, on the other
hand, terms which can occur otherwise than as terms; such
are being, adjectives generally, and relations. Such terms we
agreed to call concepts*. It is the presence of concepts not oc-
curring as terms which distinguishes propositions from mere
*See Part I, Chap. iv.
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concepts; in every proposition there is at least one more con-
cept than there are terms. The traditional view—which may
be called the subject-predicate theory—holds that in every
proposition there is one term, the subject, and one concept
which is not a term, the predicate. This view, for many rea-
sons, must be abandoned†. The smallest departure from the
traditional opinion lies in holding that, where propositions
are not reducible to the subject-predicate form, there are al-
ways two terms only, and one concept which is not a term.
(The two termsmay, of course, be complex, andmay each con-
tain concepts which are not terms.) This gives the opinion
that relations are always between only two terms; for a rela-
tion may be defined as any concept which occurs in a propo-
sition containing more than one term. But there seems no à
priori reason for limiting relations to two terms, and there are
instances which lead to an opposite view. In the first place,
when the concept of a number is asserted of a collection, if
the collection has n terms, there are n terms, and only one con-
cept (namely n) which is not a term. In the second place, such
relations as those of an existent to the place and time of its
existence are only reducible by a very cumbrousmethod to re-
lations of two terms‡. If, however, the reduction be held essen-
tial, it seems to be always formally possible, by compounding 213
part of theproposition intoone complex term, and thenassert-
ing a relation between this part and the remainder, which can
be similarly reduced to one term. There may be cases where
this is not possible, but I do not know of them. The question
whether such a formal reduction is to be always undertaken is
not, however, so far as I have been able to discover, one of any
†See The Philosophy of Leibniz, by the present author, Cambridge, 1900;
Chapter ii, §10.
‡See Part VII, Chap. liv.
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great practical or theoretical importance.
201. There is thus no valid à priori reason in favour of an-
alyzing between into a relation of two relations, if a triangu-
lar relation seems otherwise preferable. The other reason in
favour of the analysis of between is more considerable. So long
as between is a triangular relation of the terms, it must be taken
either as indefinable, or as involving a reference to some tran-
sitive asymmetrical relation. But if we make between consist
essentially in the opposition of two relations belonging to one
term, there seems to be no longer any undue indeterminate-
ness. Against this view we may urge, however, that no reason
now appears why the relations in question should have to be
transitive, and that—what is more important—the verymean-
ing of between involves the terms, for it is they, and not their
relations, that have order. And if it were only the relations
that were relevant, it would not be necessary, as in fact it is, to
particularize themby themention of the terms betweenwhich
they hold. Thus on the whole, the opinion that between is not
a triangular relation must be abandoned.
202. (3)We comenow to the view that between is an ultimate
and indefinable relation. In favour of this view it might be
urged that, in all our ways of generating open series, we could
see that cases of between did arise, and that we could apply a
test to suggested definitions. This seems to show that the sug-
gested definitions were merely conditions which imply rela-
tions of between, and were not true definitions of this relation.
The question: Do such and such conditions insure that y shall
be between x and z? is always one which we can answer, with-
out having to appeal (at least consciously) to any previous def-
inition. And the unanalyzable nature of between may be sup-
ported by the fact that the relation is symmetrical with respect
to the two extremes, whichwas not the case with the relations
of pairs fromwhich betweenwas inferred. There is, however, a
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very grave difficulty in the way of such a view, and that is, that
sets of terms havemanydifferent orders, so that in onewemay
have y between x and z, while in another we have x between y
and z*. This seems to show that between essentially involves
reference to the relations from which it is inferred. If not, we
shall at least have to admit that these relations are relevant to
the genesis of series; for series require imperatively that there
shouldbe atmost one relevant relationof between among three 214
terms. Hence we must, apparently, allow that between is not
the sole source of series, but must always be supplemented by
the mention of some transitive asymmetrical relation with re-
spect to which the betweenness arises. The most that can be
said is, that this transitive asymmetrical relation of two terms
may itself be logically subsequent to, and derived from, some
relation of three terms, such as those considered in Chapter
xxiv, in the fourth way of generating series. When such rela-
tions fulfil the axioms which were then mentioned, they lead
of themselves to relations between pairs of terms. For wemay
say that b precedes cwhen acd implies bcd, and that b follows c
when abd implies cbd, where a and d are fixed terms. Though
such relations aremerely derivative, it is in virtue of them that
betweenoccurs in such cases. Hencewe seemfinally compelled
to leave the reference to an asymmetrical relation in our defi-
nition. We shall therefore say:
A term y is between two terms x and z with reference to a
transitive asymmetrical relation R when xRy and yRz. In no
other case can ybe saidproperly tobebetween x and z; and this
definition gives notmerely a criterion, but the verymeaning of
*This case is illustrated by the rational numbers, which may be
taken in order of magnitude, or in one of the orders (e.g. the logical
order) in which they are denumerable. The logical order is the order
1; 2; 1=2; 3; 1=3; 2=3; 4; : : : : : :.
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betweenness.
203. We have next to consider the meaning of separation
of couples. This is a more complicated relation than between,
and was but little considered until elliptic Geometry brought
it into prominence. It has been shown by Vailati* that this re-
lation, like between, always involves a transitive asymmetrical
relation of two terms; but this relation of a pair of terms is it-
self relative to three other fixed terms of the set, as, in the case
of between, it was relative to two fixed terms. It is further suf-
ficiently evident that wherever there is a transitive asymmetri-
cal relation, which relates every pair of terms in a collection of
not less than four terms, there there are pairs of couples hav-
ing the relation of separation. Thus we shall find it possible to
express separation, as well as between, by means of transitive
asymmetrical relations and their terms. But let us first exam-
ine directly the meaning of separation.
We may denote the fact that a and c are separated by b and
d by the symbol abcd. If, then, a; b; c; d; e be any five terms of
the set we require the following properties to hold of the rela-
tion of separation (of which, it will be observed, only the last
a
b
cd
e
involves five terms):
1. abcd = badc:
2. abcd = adcb:
3. abcd excludes acbd.
4. Wemust have abcd or acdb or adbc.
5. abcd and acde together imply abde†.
These properties may be illustrated 215
by the consideration of five points on
a circle, as in the accompanying figure.
Whatever relation of two pairs of terms possesses these prop-
*Rivista di Matematica, v, pp. 75–78. See also Pieri, I Principii delta Ge-
ometria di Posizione, Turin, 1898, §7.
†These five properties are taken fromVailati, loc. cit. and ib. p. 183.
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ertieswe shall call a relationof separationbetween the pairs. It
will be seen that the relation is symmetrical, but not in general
transitive.
204. Wherever we have a transitive asymmetrical relation
R between any two terms of a set of not less than four terms,
the relation of separation necessarily arises. For in any series,
if four terms have the order abcd, then a and c are separated by
b and d; and every transitive asymmetrical relation, as we have
seen, provided there are at least two consecutive instances of
it, gives rise to a series. Thus in this case, separation is a mere
extension of between: if R be asymmetrical and transitive, and
aRb, bRc, cRd, then a and c are separated by b and d. The ex-
istence of such a relation is therefore a sufficient condition of
separation.
It is also a necessary condition. For, suppose a relation of
separation to exist, and let a; b; c; d; e be five terms of the set to
which the relation applies. Then, considering a; b; c as fixed,
and d and e as variable, twelve cases may arise. In virtue of
the five fundamental properties, wemay introduce the symbol
abcde to denote that, striking out any one of these five letters,
the remaining four have the relation of separation which is in-
dicated by the resulting symbol. Thus by the fifth property,
abcd and acde imply abcde*. Thus the twelve cases arise from
permuting d and e, while keeping a; b; c fixed. (It should be ob-
served that it makes no difference whether a letter appears at
the end or the beginning: i.e. abcde is the same case as eabcd.
We may therefore decide not to put either d or e before a.) Of
these twelve cases, six will have d before e, and six will have
e before d. In the first six cases, we say that, with respect to
the sense abc, d precedes e; in the other six cases, we say that
e precedes d. In order to deal with limiting cases, we shall say
*The argument is somewhat tedious, and I therefore omit it. It will be
found in Vailati, loc. cit.
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further that a precedes every other term, and that b precedes
c†. We shall then find that the relation of preceding is asym-
metrical and transitive, and that every pair of terms of our set
is such that one precedes and the other follows. In this way
our relation of separation is reduced, formally at least, to the
combination of “a precedes b,” “b precedes c,” and “c precedes
d.”
The above reduction is for many reasons highly interesting.
In the first place, it shows the distinction between open and
closed series to be somewhat superficial. For although our se-
ries may initially be of the sort which is called closed, it be-
comes, by the introduction of the above transitive relation, an
open series, having a for its beginning, but having possibly no 216
last term, and not in any sense returning to a. Again it is of
the highest importance inGeometry, since it shows howorder
may arise on the elliptic straight line, by purely projective con-
siderations, in a manner which is far more satisfactory than
that obtained from von Staudt’s construction*. And finally,
it is of great importance as unifying the two sources of order,
between and separation; since it shows that transitive asym-
metrical relations are always present where either occurs, and
that either implies the other. For, by the relation of preceding,
we can say that one term is between two others, although we
started solely from separation of pairs.
205. At the same time, the above reduction (and also, it
would seem, the corresponding reduction in the case of be-
tween) cannot be allowed to be more than formal. That is, the
three terms a; b; c by relation towhich our transitive asymmet-
rical relation was defined, are essential to the definition, and
†Pieri, op. cit. p. 32.
*The advantages of this method are evident from Pieri’s work quoted
above, where many things which seemed incapable of projective proof are
rigidly deduced from projective premisses. See Part VI, Chap. xlv.
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cannot be omitted. The reduction shows no reason for sup-
posing that there is any transitive asymmetrical relation inde-
pendent of all other terms than those related, though it is arbi-
trary what other terms we choose. And the fact that the term
a, which is not essentially peculiar, appears as the beginning
of the series, illustrates this fact. Where there are transitive
asymmetrical relations independent of all outside reference,
our series cannot have an arbitrary beginning, though it may
have none at all. Thus the four-term relation of separation re-
mains logically prior to the resulting two-term relation, and
cannot be analyzed into the latter.
206. But whenwe have said that the reduction is formal, we
have not said that it is irrelevant to the genesis of order. On
the contrary, it is just because such a reduction is possible that
the four-term relation leads to order. The resulting asymmet-
rical transitive relation is in reality a relation of five terms; but
when three of these are kept fixed, it becomes asymmetrical
and transitive as regards the other two. Thus although between
applies to such series, and although the essence of order con-
sists, here as elsewhere, in the fact that one term has, to two
others, converse relations which are asymmetrical and transi-
tive, yet such an order can only arise in a collection containing
at least five terms, because five terms are needed for the char-
acteristic relation. And it should be observed that all series,
when thus explained, are open series, in the sense that there
is some relation between pairs of terms, no power of which is
equal to its converse, or to identity.
207. Thus finally, to sum up this long and complicated dis-
cussion: The six methods of generating series enumerated in
Chapter xxiv are all genuinely distinct; but the second is the
only onewhich is fundamental, and theother five agree in this, 217
that they are all reducible to the second. Moreover, it is solely
in virtue of their reducibility to the second that they give rise
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to order. The minimum ordinal proposition, which can al-
ways be made wherever there is an order at all, is of the form:
“y is between x and z”; and this proposition means; “There is
some asymmetrical transitive relation which holds between x
and y andbetween y and z.” This very simple conclusionmight
have been guessed from the beginning; but it was only by dis-
cussing all the apparently exceptional cases that the conclu-
sion could be solidly established.
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chapter xxvi
ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONS
208. We have now seen that all order depends upon tran- 218
sitive asymmetrical relations. As such relations are of a kind
which traditional logic is unwilling to admit, and as the refusal
to admit them is one of themain sources of the contradictions
which the Critical Philosophy has found in mathematics, it
will be desirable, before proceeding further, tomake an excur-
sion into pure logic, and to set forth the grounds which make
the admission of such relations necessary. At a later stage (in
Part VI, Chap. li), I shall endeavour to answer the general ob-
jections of philosophers to relations; for the present, I am con-
cerned only with asymmetrical relations.
Relationsmaybedivided into four classes, accordingas they
do or do not possess either of two attributes, transitiveness*
and symmetry. Relations such that xRy always implies yRx
are called symmetrical; relations such that xRy, yRz together al-
ways imply xRz are called transitive. Relations which do not
possess the first property I shall call not symmetrical; relations
which do possess the opposite property, i.e. for which xRy al-
ways excludes yRx, I shall call asymmetrical. Relations which
do not possess the second property I shall call not transitive;
thosewhich possess the property that xRy, yRz always exclude
*This term appears to have been first used in the present sense by De
Morgan; seeCamb. Phil. Trans. ix, p. 104; x, p. 346. The term is now in gen-
eral use.
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xRz I shall call intransitive. All these cases may be illustrated
from human relationships. The relation brother or sister is sym-
metrical, and is transitive if we allow that a man may be his
ownbrother, and awomanher own sister. The relation brother
is not symmetrical, but is transitive. Half-brother or half-sister
is symmetrical but not transitive. Spouse is symmetrical but
intransitive; descendant is asymmetrical but transitive. Half-
brother is not symmetrical and not transitive; if thirdmarriages
were forbidden, it would be intransitive. Son-in-law is asym-
metrical and not transitive; if second marriages were forbid-
den, it would be intransitive. Brother-in-law is not symmet-
rical and not transitive. Finally, father is both asymmetrical 219
and intransitive. Of not-transitive but not intransitive rela-
tions there is, so far as I know, only one important instance,
namely diversity; of not-symmetrical but not asymmetrical
relations there seems to be similarly only one important in-
stance, namely implication. In other cases, of the kind that usu-
ally occur, relations are either transitive or intransitive, and
either symmetrical or asymmetrical.
209. Relations which are both symmetrical and transitive
are formally of the nature of equality. Any term of the field
of such a relation has the relation in question to itself, though
it may not have the relation to any other term. For denoting
the relation by the sign of equality, if a be of the field of the
relation, there is some term b such that a = b. If a and b be
identical, thena = a. But if not, then, since the relation is sym-
metrical, b = a; since it is transitive, and we have a = b, b = a,
it follows that a = a. The property of a relation which insures
that it holds between a term and itself is called by Peano re-
flexiveness, and he has shown, contrary to what was previously
believed, that this property cannot be inferred from symme-
try and transitiveness. For neither of these properties asserts
that there is a b such that a = b, but only what follows in case
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there is such a b; and if there is no such b, then the proof of
a = a fails*. This property of reflexiveness, however, intro-
duces some difficulty. There is only one relation of which it
is true without limitation, and that is identity. In all other
cases, it holds only of the terms of a certain class. Quantita-
tive equality, for example, is only reflexive as applied to quan-
tities; of other terms, it is absurd to assert that they have quan-
titative equality with themselves. Logical equality, again, is
only reflexive for classes, or propositions, or relations. Simul-
taneity is only reflexive for events, and so on. Thus, with
any given symmetrical transitive relation, other than identity,
we can only assert reflexiveness within a certain class: and of
this class, apart from the principle of abstraction (alreadymen-
tioned in Part III, Chap. xix, and shortly to be discussed at
length), there need be no definition except as the extension
of the transitive symmetrical relation in question. And when
the class is so defined, reflexiveness within that class, as we
have seen, follows from transitiveness and symmetry.
210. By introducing what I have called the principle of
abstraction†, a somewhat better account of reflexiveness be-
comes possible. Peano has defined‡ a process which he calls
definition by abstraction, of which, as he shows, frequent use
ismade inMathematics. This process is as follows: when there 220
is any relation which is transitive, symmetrical and (within its
field) reflexive, then, if this relation holds between u and v, we
define a new entity φ(u), which is to be identical with φ(v).
Thus our relation is analyzed into sameness of relation to the
*See e.g. Revue deMathématiques, T. vii, p. 22;Notations de LogiqueMath-
ématique, Turin, 1894, p. 45, F. 1901, p. 193.
†An axiom virtually identical with this principle, but not stated with
the necessary precision, and not demonstrated, will be found in De Mor-
gan,Camb. Phil. Trans.Vol. x, p. 345.
‡Notations de Logique Mathématique, p. 45.
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new term φ(u) or φ(v). Now the legitimacy of this process, as
set forth by Peano, requires an axiom, namely the axiom that,
if there is any instance of the relation in question, then there
is such an entity as φ(u) or φ(v). This axiom is my principle
of abstraction, which, precisely stated, is as follows: “Every
transitive symmetrical relation, of which there is at least one
instance, is analyzable into joint possession of a new relation
to a new term, the new relation being such that no term can
have this relation tomore than one term, but that its converse
does not have this property.” This principle amounts, in com-
mon language, to the assertion that transitive symmetrical re-
lations arise from a common property, with the addition that
this property stands, to the termswhichhave it, in a relation in
which nothing else stands to those terms. It gives the precise
statement of the principle, often applied by philosophers, that
symmetrical transitive relations always spring from identity of
content. Identity of content is, however, an extremely vague
phrase, to which the above proposition gives, in the present
case, a precise signification, but one which in no way answers
the purpose of the phrase, which is, apparently, the reduction
of relations to adjectives of the related terms.
It is now possible to give a clearer account of the reflexive
property. Let R be our symmetrical relation, and let S be the
asymmetrical relation which two terms having the relation R
must have to some third term. Then the proposition xRy is
equivalent to this: “There is some term a such that xSa and
ySa.” Hence it follows that, if x belongs to what we have called
the domain of S, i.e. if there is any term a such that xSa, then
xRx; for xRx is merely xSa and xSa. It does not of course follow
that there is any other term y such that xRy, and thus Peano’s
objections to the usual proof of reflexiveness are valid. But by
means of the analysis of symmetrical transitive relations, we
obtain the proof of the reflexive property, together with the
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exact limitation to which it is subject.
211. We can now see the reason for excluding from our ac-
counts of the methods of generating series a seventh method,
which some readers may have expected to find. This is the
method inwhichposition ismerely relative—amethodwhich,
in Chap. xix, §154, we rejected as regards quantity. As the
whole philosophyof space and time is boundupwith theques-
tion as to the legitimacy of this method, which is in fact the
question as to absolute and relative position, it may be well to
give an account of it here, and to show how the principle of
abstraction leads to the absolute theory of position.
Ifwe consider such a series as that of events, and ifwe refuse
to allow absolute time, we shall have to admit three fundamen- 221
tal relations among events, namely, simultaneity, priority, and
posteriority. Such a theory may be formally stated as follows:
Let there be a class of terms, such that any two, x and y, have ei-
ther an asymmetrical transitive relationP, or the converse rela-
tion P, or a symmetrical transitive relation R. Also let xRy, yPz
imply xPz, and let xPy, yRz imply xPz. Then all the terms can
be arranged in a series, in which, however, there may be many
terms which have the same place in the series. This place, ac-
cording to the relational theory of position, is nothing but the
transitive symmetrical relation R to a number of other terms.
But it follows from the principle of abstraction that there is
some relation S, such that, if xRy, there is some one entity t for
which xSt, ySt. We shall then find that the different entities t,
corresponding to different groups of our original terms, also
form a series, but one in which any two different terms have
an asymmetrical relation (formally, the product SRS). These
terms t will then be the absolute positions of our x’s and y’s,
and our supposed seventh method of generating series is re-
duced to the fundamental secondmethod. Thus there will be
no series having only relative position, but in all series it is the
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positions themselves that constitute the series*.
212. We are now in a position to meet the philosophic dis-
like of relations. Thewhole account of order given above, and
thepresent argument concerning abstraction,will benecessar-
ily objected to by those philosophers—and they are, I fear, the
major part—who hold that no relations can possess absolute
and metaphysical validity. It is not my intention here to en-
ter upon the general question, butmerely to exhibit the objec-
tions to any analysis of asymmetrical relations.
It is a commonopinion—often held unconsciously, and em-
ployed in argument, even by those who do not explicitly ad-
vocate it—that all propositions, ultimately, consist of a sub-
ject and a predicate. When this opinion is confronted by a
relational proposition, it has two ways of dealing with it, of
which the one may be called monadistic, the other monistic.
Given, say, the proposition aRb, where R is some relation, the
monadistic viewwill analyse this into twopropositions,which
we may call ar1 and br2, which give to a and b respectively ad-
jectives supposed to be together equivalent to R. The monis-
tic view, on the contrary, regards the relation as a property of
the whole composed of a and b, and as thus equivalent to a
proposition which we may denote by (ab)r. Of these views,
the first is represented by Leibniz and (on the whole) by Lotze,
the second by Spinoza and Mr Bradley. Let us examine these
views successively, as applied to asymmetrical relations; and 222
for the sake of definiteness, let us take the relations of greater
and less.
213. The monadistic view is stated with admirable lucidity
by Leibniz in the following passage*:
“The ratio or proportion between two lines L andMmay be
*A formal treatment of relative position is given by Schröder, Sur une
extension de l’idée d’ordre,Congrès, Vol. iii, p. 235.
*Phil. Werke, Gerhardt’s ed., Vol. vii, p. 401.
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conceived three several ways; as a ratio of the greater L to the
lesserM; as a ratio of the lesserM to the greaterL; and lastly, as
something abstracted fromboth, that is, as the ratio betweenL
andM, without consideringwhich is the antecedent, orwhich
the consequent; which the subject, and which the object, ….
In the first way of considering them, L the greater, in the sec-
ondM the lesser, is the subject of that accident which philoso-
phers call relation. But which of them will be the subject, in
the thirdway of considering them? It cannot be said that both
of them, L andM together, are the subject of such an accident;
for if so, we should have an accident in two subjects, with one
leg in one, and the other in the other; which is contrary to the
notion of accidents. Therefore we must say that this relation,
in this thirdway of considering it, is indeed out of the subjects;
but being neither a substance nor an accident, it must be a
mere ideal thing, the consideration of which is nevertheless
useful.”
214. The third of the above ways of considering the relation
of greater and less is, roughly speaking, thatwhich themonists
advocate, holding, as they do, that the whole composed of L
and M is one subject, so that their way of considering ratio
does not compel us, as Leibniz supposed, to place it among
bipeds. For the present our concern is only with the first two
ways. In the first way of considering the matter, we have “L
is (greater than M),” the words in brackets being considered
as an adjective of L. But when we examine this adjective it is
at once evident that it is complex: it consists, at least, of the
parts greater andM, and both these parts are essential. To say
that L is greater does not at all convey our meaning, and it is
highly probable that M is also greater. The supposed adjec-
tive of L involves some reference toM; but what can bemeant
by a reference the theory leaves unintelligible. An adjective
involving a reference toM is plainly an adjective which is rel-
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ative toM, and this is merely a cumbrous way of describing a
relation. Or, to put the matter otherwise, if L has an adjective
corresponding to the fact that it is greater thanM, this adjec-
tive is logically subsequent to, and is merely derived from, the
direct relation of L to M. Apart from M, nothing appears in
the analysis of L to differentiate it from M; and yet, on the
theory of relations in question, L should differ intrinsically
from M. Thus we should be forced, in all cases of asymmet-
rical relations, to admit a specific difference between the re-
lated terms, although no analysis of either singly will reveal
any relevant property which it possesses and the other lacks. 223
For the monadistic theory of relations, this constitutes a con-
tradiction; and it is a contradiction which condemns the the-
ory from which it springs*.
Let us examine further the application of the monadistic
theory to quantitative relations. The proposition “A is greater
thanB” is tobe analyzable into twopropositions, onegiving an
adjective toA, the other giving one to B. The advocate of the
opinion inquestionwill probablyhold thatA andB arequanti-
ties, not magnitudes, and will say that the adjectives required
are the magnitudes of A and B. But then he will have to ad-
mit a relation between the magnitudes, which will be as asym-
metrical as the relation which themagnitudes were to explain.
Hence the magnitudes will need new adjectives, and so on ad
*See a paper on “The Relations of Number and Quantity,” Mind, N.S.
No. 23. This paper was written while I still adhered to the monadistic the-
ory of relations: the contradiction in question, therefore, was regarded as
inevitable. The following passage from Kant raises the same point: “Die
rechteHand ist der linken ähnlich und gleich, undwennman blos auf eine
derselben allein sieht, auf die Proportion der Lage der Theile unter einan-
der und auf die Grösse des Ganzen, so muss eine vollständige Beschrei-
bung der einen in allen Stücken auch von der andern gelten.” (Von dem
ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, ed. Hart. Vol. ii, p.
389.)
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infinitum; and the infinite process will have to be completed
before any meaning can be assigned to our original proposi-
tion. This kind of infinite process is undoubtedly objection-
able, since its sole object is to explain themeaning of a certain
proposition, and yet none of its steps bring it any nearer to
that meaning†. Thus we cannot take themagnitudes ofA and
B as the required adjectives. But further, if we take any ad-
jectives whatever except such as have each a reference to the
other term, we shall not be able, even formally, to give any ac-
count of the relation,without assuming just such a relationbe-
tween the adjectives. For the mere fact that the adjectives are
different will yield only a symmetrical relation. Thus if our
two terms have different colours we find that A has to B the
relation of differing in colour, a relation which no amount of
careful handling will render asymmetrical. Or if we were to
recur to magnitudes, we could merely say that A and B differ
in magnitude, which gives us no indication as to which is the
greater. Thus the adjectives ofA andBmust be, as in Leibniz’s
analysis, adjectives having a reference each to the other term.
The adjective ofAmust be “greater thanB,” and that ofBmust
be “less than A.” Thus A and B differ, since they have differ-
ent adjectives—B is not greater than B, andA is not less than
A—but the adjectives are extrinsic, in the sense that A’s ad-
jective has reference to B, and B’s to A. Hence the attempted
analysis of the relation fails, and we are forced to admit what 224
the theory was designed to avoid, a so-called “external” rela-
tion, i.e. one implying no complexity in either of the related
terms.
The same result may be proved of asymmetrical relations
generally, since it depends solely upon the fact that both iden-
†Where an infinite process of this kind is required we are necessarily
dealing with a propositionwhich is an infinite unity, in the sense of Part II,
Chap. xvii.
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tity and diversity are symmetrical. Let a and b have an asym-
metrical relation R, so that aRb and bRa. Let the supposed ad-
jectives (which, as we have seen, must each have a reference to
the other term) be denoted by β and α respectively. Thus our
terms become aβ and bα. α involves a reference to a, and β to
b; and α and β differ, since the relation is asymmetrical. But a
and b have no intrinsic differences corresponding to the rela-
tion R, and prior to it; or, if they have, the points of difference
must themselves have a relation analogous to R, so that noth-
ing is gained. Either α or β expresses a difference between a
and b, but one which, since either α or β involves reference to
a term other than that whose adjective it is, so far from being
prior to R, is in fact the relation R itself. And since α and β
both presuppose R, the difference between α and β cannot be
used to supply an intrinsic difference between a and b. Thus
we have again a difference without a prior point of difference.
This shows that some asymmetrical relationsmust beultimate,
and that at least one such ultimate asymmetrical relationmust
be a component in any asymmetrical relation that may be sug-
gested.
It is easy to criticize the monadistic theory from a general
standpoint, by developing the contradictions which spring
from the relations of the terms to the adjectives intowhichour
first relation has been analyzed. These considerations, which
haveno special connectionwith asymmetry, belong to general
philosophy, and have been urged by advocates of the monis-
tic theory. Thus Mr Bradley says of the monadistic theory*:
“We, in brief, are led by a principle of fission which conducts
us to no end. Every quality in relation has, in consequence, a
diversity within its own nature, and this diversity cannot im-
mediately be asserted of the quality. Hence the quality must
exchange its unity for an internal relation. But, thus set free,
*Appearance and Reality, 1st edition, p. 31.
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the diverse aspects, because each something in relation, must
each be something also beyond. This diversity is fatal to the
internal unity of each; and it demands a new relation, and so
on without limit.” It remains to be seen whether the monistic
theory, in avoiding this difficulty, does not become subject to
others quite as serious.
215. The monistic theory holds that every relational propo-
sition aRb is to be resolved into a proposition concerning
the whole which a and b compose—a proposition which we
may denote by (ab)r. This view, like the other, may be exam-
ined with special reference to asymmetrical relations, or from 225
the standpoint of general philosophy. We are told, by those
who advocate this opinion, that the whole contains diversity
within itself, that it synthesizes differences, and that it per-
forms other similar feats. For my part, I am unable to attach
any precise significance to these phrases. But let us do our
best.
The proposition “a is greater than b,” we are told, does not
really say anything about either a or b, but about the two to-
gether. Denoting the whole which they compose by (ab) it
says, we will suppose, “(ab) contains diversity of magnitude.”
Now to this statement—neglecting for the present all general
arguments—there is a special objection in the case of asym-
metry, (ab) is symmetrical with regard to a and b, and thus
the property of the whole will be exactly the same in the case
where a is greater than b as in the case where b is greater than
a. Leibniz, who did not accept the monistic theory, and had
therefore no reason to render it plausible, clearly perceived
this fact, as appears from the above quotation. For, in his third
way of regarding ratio, we do not consider which is the an-
tecedent, which the consequent; and it is indeed sufficiently
evident that, in the whole (ab) as such, there is neither an-
tecedent nor consequent. In order to distinguish a whole (ab)
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from a whole (ba), as we must do if we are to explain asym-
metry, we shall be forced back from the whole to the parts
and their relation. For (ab) and (ba) consist of precisely the
same parts, and differ in no respect whatever save the sense
of the relation between a and b. “a is greater than b” and “b is
greater than a” are propositions containing precisely the same
constituents, and giving rise therefore to precisely the same
whole; their difference lies solely in the fact that greater is, in
the first case, a relation of a to b, in the second, a relation of
b to a. Thus the distinction of sense, i.e. the distinction be-
tween an asymmetrical relation and its converse, is one which
the monistic theory of relations is wholly unable to explain.
Arguments of a more general nature might be multiplied
almost indefinitely, but the following argument seems pecu-
liarly relevant. The relation ofwhole and part is itself an asym-
metrical relation, and the whole—as monists are peculiarly
fond of telling us—is distinct from all its parts, both severally
and collectively. Hence when we say “a is part of b,” we re-
ally mean, if the monistic theory be correct, to assert some-
thing of the whole composed of a and b, which is not to be
confounded with b. If the proposition concerning this new
whole be not one of whole and part there will be no true judg-
ments of whole and part, and it will therefore be false to say
that a relation between the parts is really an adjective of the
whole. If the new proposition is one of whole and part, it will
require a new one for its meaning, and so on. If, as a desper-
ate measure, the monist asserts that the whole composed of
a and b is not distinct from b, he is compelled to admit that a
whole is the sum (in the sense of Symbolic Logic) of its parts,
which, besides being an abandonment of his whole position, 226
renders it inevitable that the whole should be symmetrical as
regards its parts—a view which we have already seen to be fa-
tal. And hence we find monists driven to the view that the
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only true whole, the Absolute, has no parts at all, and that no
propositions in regard to it or anything else are quite true—a
viewwhich, in themere statement, unavoidably contradicts it-
self. And surely an opinionwhich holds all propositions to be
in the end self-contradictory is sufficiently condemned by the
fact that, if it be accepted, it also must be self-contradictory.
216. We have now seen that asymmetrical relations are un-
intelligible on both the usual theories of relation*. Hence,
since such relations are involved in Number, Quantity, Or-
der, Space, Time, and Motion, we can hardly hope for a sat-
isfactory philosophy of Mathematics so long as we adhere to
the view that no relation can be “purely external.” As soon,
however, as we adopt a different theory, the logical puzzles,
which have hitherto obstructed philosophers, are seen to be
artificial. Among the terms commonly regarded as relational,
those that are symmetrical and transitive—such as equality
and simultaneity—are capable of reduction to what has been
vaguely called identity of content, but this in turnmust be an-
alyzed into sameness of relation to some other term. For the
so-called properties of a term are, in fact, only other terms to
which it stands in some relation; and a common property of
two terms is a term to which both stand in the same relation.
The present long digression into the realm of logic is neces-
sitated by the fundamental importance of order, and by the to-
tal impossibility of explaining order without abandoning the
most cherished and widespread of philosophic dogmas. Ev-
erything depends, where order is concerned, upon asymmetry
and difference of sense, but these two concepts are unintelli-
gible to the traditional logic. In the next chapter we shall have
to examine the connection of difference of sense with what
appears in Mathematics as difference of sign. In this exami-
*The grounds of these theories will be examined from a more general
point of view in Part VI, Chap. li.
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nation, though some pure logic will still be requisite, we shall
approach again to mathematical topics; and these will occupy
us wholly throughout the succeeding chapters of this Part.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 326
chapter xxvii
DIFFERENCEOF SENSEAND
DIFFERENCEOF SIGN
217. Wehavenowseen that order dependsuponasymmetri- 227
cal relations, and that these always have two senses, as before
and after, greater and less, east and west, etc. The difference
of sense is closely connected (though not identical) with the
mathematical difference of sign. It is a notion of fundamen-
tal importance in Mathematics, and is, so far as I can see, not
explicable in terms of any other notions. The first philoso-
pher who realized its importance would seem to be Kant. In
the Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grösse in die Weltweisheit
einzuführen (1763), we findhim aware of the difference between
logical opposition and the opposition of positive and negative.
In the discussion Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der
Gegenden im Raume (1768), we find a full realization of the im-
portance of asymmetry in spatial relations, and a proof, based
on this fact, that space cannot be wholly relational*. But it
seems doubtful whether he realized the connection of this
asymmetry with difference of sign. In 1763 he certainly was
not aware of the connection, since he regarded pain as a neg-
ative amount of pleasure, and supposed that a great pleasure
and a small pain can be added to give a less pleasure†—a view
which seems both logically and psychologically false. In the
*See especially ed. Hart, Vol. II, pp. 386, 391.
†Ed. Hart, Vol. II, p. 83.
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Prolegomena (§13), as is well known, he made the asymmetry of
spatial relations a ground for regarding space as a mere form
of intuition, perceiving, as appears fromthediscussionof 1768,
that space could not consist, as Leibniz supposed, of mere re-
lations among objects, and being unable, owing to his adher-
ence to the logical objection to relations discussed in the pre-
ceding chapter, to free from contradiction the notion of abso-
lute space with asymmetrical relations between its points. Al-
though I cannot regard this later and more distinctively Kan-
tian theory as an advance upon that of 1768, yet credit is un-
doubtedly due to Kant for having first called attention to the
logical importance of asymmetrical relations.
218. By difference of sense I mean, in the present discussion 228
at least, the difference between an asymmetrical relation and
its converse. It is a fundamental logical fact that, given any re-
lation R, and any two terms a, b, there are two propositions to
be formed of these elements, the one relating a to b (which I
call aRb), the other (bRa) relating b to a. These two proposi-
tions are always different, though sometimes (as in the case of
diversity) either implies the other. In other cases, such as log-
ical implication, the one does not imply either the other or its
negation; while in a third set of cases, the one implies the nega-
tion of the other. It is only in cases of the third kind that I shall
speak of difference of sense. In these cases, aRb excludes bRa.
But here another fundamental logical fact becomes relevant.
In all cases where aRb does not imply bRa there is another re-
lation, related to R, which must hold between b and a. That
is, there is a relation R such that aRb implies bRa; and further,
bRa implies aRb. The relation of R to R is difference of sense.
This relation is one-one, symmetrical, and intransitive. Its ex-
istence is the source of series, of the distinction of signs, and
indeed of the greater part of mathematics.
219. A question of considerable importance to logic, and es-
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pecially to the theory of inference, may be raised with regard
to difference of sense. Are aRb and bRa really different propo-
sitions, or do they only differ linguistically? Itmay beheld that
there is only one relationR, and that all necessary distinctions
can be obtained from that between aRb and bRa. It may be
said that, owing to the exigencies of speech andwriting,we are
compelled to mention either a or b first, and that this gives a
seeming difference between “a is greater than b” and “b is less
than a”; but that, in reality, these two propositions are iden-
tical. But if we take this view we shall find it hard to explain
the indubitable distinctionbetween greater and less. These two
words have certainly each a meaning, even when no terms are
mentioned as related by them. And they certainly have dif-
ferent meanings, and are certainly relations. Hence if we are
to hold that “a is greater than b” and “b is less than a” are the
same proposition, we shall have to maintain that both greater
and less enter into each of these propositions, which seems ob-
viously false; or else we shall have to hold that what really oc-
curs is neither of the two, but that third abstract relationmen-
tioned by Leibniz in the passage quoted above. In this case the
difference between greater and lesswould be one essentially in-
volving a reference to the terms a and b. But this view can-
not be maintained without circularity; for neither the greater
nor the less is inherently the antecedent, and we can only say
that, when the greater is the antecedent, the relation is greater;
when the less, the relation is less. Hence, it would seem, we
must admit that R and R are distinct relations. We cannot es-
cape this conclusion by the analysis into adjectives attempted
in the last chapter. We there analyzed aRb into aβ and bα. But, 229
corresponding to every b, there will be two adjectives, β and
β, and corresponding to every a there will also be two, α and
α. Thus if R be greater, α will be “greater than A” and α “less
thanA,” or vice versâ. But the difference between α and α pre-
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 329
supposes that between greater and less, between R and R, and
therefore cannot explain it. Hence R and R must be distinct,
and “aRb implies bRa” must be a genuine inference.
I come now to the connection between difference of sense
and difference of sign. We shall find that the latter is deriva-
tive from the former, being a difference which only exists be-
tween termswhich either are, or are correlatedwith, asymmet-
rical relations. But in certain cases we shall find some compli-
cations of detail which will demand discussion.
The difference of signs belongs, traditionally, only to num-
bers and magnitudes, and is intimately associated with addi-
tion. It may be allowed that the notation cannot be usefully
employedwhere there is no addition, and even that, where dis-
tinction of sign is possible, addition in some sense is in general
also possible. But we shall find that the difference of sign has
no very intimate connection with addition and subtraction.
To make this clear, we must, in the first place, clearly realize
that numbers andmagnitudeswhichhaveno sign are radically
different from such as are positive. Confusion on this point is
quite fatal to any just theory of signs.
220. Taking first finite numbers, the positive and negative
numbers arise as follows*. Denoting byR the relation between
two integers in virtueofwhich the second is next after thefirst,
the propositionmRn is equivalent towhat is usually expressed
by m + 1 = n. But the present theory will apply to progres-
sions generally and does not depend upon the logical theory
of cardinals developed in Part II. In the proposition mRn, the
integersm and n are considered, as when they result from the
logical definition, to be wholly destitute of sign. If now mRn
and nRp, we put mR2p; and so on for higher powers. Every
power of R is an asymmetrical relation, and its converse is eas-
*I give the theory briefly here, as it will be dealt with more fully and
generally in the chapter on Progressions, §233.
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ily shown to be the same power of R as it is itself of R. Thus
mRaq is equivalent to qRam. These are the two propositions
which are commonly writtenm+ a = q and q  a = m. Thus
the relations Ra, Ra are the true positive and negative integers;
and these, though associated with a, are both wholly distinct
from it. Thus in this case the connection with difference of
sense is obvious and straightforward.
221. As regards magnitudes, several cases must be distin-
guished. We have (1) magnitudes which are not either rela-
tions or, stretches, (2) stretches, (3) magnitudes which are re-
lations.
(1) Magnitudes of this class are themselves neither positive 230
nor negative. But two such magnitudes, as explained in Part
III, determine either a distance or a stretch, and these are al-
ways positive or negative. These are moreover always capable
of addition. But since our original magnitudes are neither re-
lations nor stretches, the new magnitudes thus obtained are
of a different kind from the original set. Thus the difference
of two pleasures, or the collection of pleasures intermediate
between two pleasures, is not a pleasure, but in the one case a
relation, in the other a class.
(2) Magnitudes of divisibility in general have no sign, but
when theyaremagnitudesof stretches theyacquire signbycor-
relation. A stretch is distinguished from other collections by
the fact that it consists of all the terms of a series intermedi-
ate between two given terms. By combining the stretch with
one sense of the asymmetrical relation which must exist be-
tween its end-terms, the stretch itself acquires sense, and be-
comes asymmetrical. That is, we can distinguish (1) the collec-
tion of terms between a and bwithout regard to order, (2) the
terms from a to b, (3) the terms from b to a. Here (2) and (3)
are complex, being compounded of (1) and one sense of the
constitutive relation. Of these two, one must be called posi-
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tive, the other negative. Where our series consists of magni-
tudes, usage and the connection with addition have decided
that, if a is less than b, (2) is positive and (3) is negative. But
where, as in Geometry, our series is not composed of magni-
tudes, it becomes wholly arbitrary which is to be positive and
which negative. In either case, we have the same relation to
addition, which is as follows. Any pair of collections can be
added to form a new collection, but not any pair of stretches
can be added to form a new stretch. For this to be possible the
endof one stretchmust be consecutive to the beginning of the
other. In thisway, the stretches ab, bc canbe added to form the
stretch ac. If ab, bc have the same sense, ac is greater than ei-
ther; if they have different senses, ac is less than one of them.
In this second case the addition of ab and bc is regarded as the
subtraction of ab and cb, bc and cb being negative and positive
respectively. If our stretches are numericallymeasurable, addi-
tion or subtraction of their measures will give the measure of
the result of adding or subtracting the stretches, where these
are such as to allow addition or subtraction. But the whole op-
position of positive and negative, as is evident, depends upon
the fundamental fact that our series is generated by an asym-
metrical relation.
(3) Magnitudes which are relations may be either symmetri-
cal or asymmetrical relations. In the former case, if a be a term
of the field of one of them, the other terms of the various fields,
if certain conditions are fulfilled*, may be arranged in series
according as their relations to a are greater or smaller. This ar-
rangement may be different when we choose some term other 231
than a; for the present, therefore, we shall suppose a to be cho-
sen once for all. When the terms have been arranged in a se-
ries, it may happen that some or all places in the series are oc-
*Cf. §245.
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cupied bymore than one term; but in any case the assemblage
of terms between a and some other term m is definite, and
leads to a stretch with two senses. We may then combine the
magnitude of the relation of a tomwith one or other of these
two senses, and so obtain an asymmetrical relation of a to m,
which, like the original relation, will have magnitude. Thus
the case of symmetrical relations may be reduced to that of
asymmetrical relations. These latter lead to signs, and to addi-
tion and subtraction, in exactly the sameway as stretcheswith
sense; the only difference being that the addition and subtrac-
tion are now of the kindwhich, in Part III, we called relational.
Thus in all cases of magnitudes having sign, the difference be-
tween the two senses of an asymmetrical relation is the source
of the difference of sign.
Thecasewhichwediscussed in connectionwith stretches is
of fundamental importance inGeometry. Wehavehere amag-
nitude without sign, an asymmetrical relation without magni-
tude, and some intimate connection between the two. The
combination of both then gives a magnitude which has sign.
All geometrical magnitudes having sign arise in this way. But
there is a curious complication in the case of volumes. Vol-
umes are, in the first instance, signless quantities; but in an-
alytical Geometry they always appear as positive or negative.
Here the asymmetrical relations (for there are two) appear as
terms, between which there is a symmetrical relation, but one
whichyethas anopposite of a kindvery similar to the converse
of an asymmetrical relation. This relation, as an exceptional
case, must be here briefly discussed.
222. The descriptive straight line is a serial relation in virtue
of which the points of the line form a series*. Either sense of
the descriptive straight line may be called a ray, the sense be-
ing indicated by an arrow. Any two non-coplanar rays have
*See Part VI.
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one or other of two relations, which may be called right and
left-handedness respectively†. This relation is symmetrical
but not transitive, and is the essence of the usual distinction
of right and left. Thus the relation of the upward vertical to
a line from north to east is right-handed, and to a line from
south to east is left-handed. But though the relation is sym- 232
metrical, it is changed into its opposite by changing either of
the terms of the relation into its converse. That is, denoting
right-handedness by R, left-handedness by L (which is not R),
if A and B be two rays which are mutually right-handed, we
shall have
ARB, ALB,ALB, ARB, BRA, BLA, BLA, BRA.
That is, every pair of non-coplanar straight lines gives rise to
eight such relations, of which four are right-handed, and four
left-handed. The difference between L and R, though not, as
it stands, a difference of sense, is, nevertheless, the difference
of positive and negative, and is the reasonwhy the volumes of
tetrahedra, as given by determinants, always have signs. But
there is no difficulty in following the plain man’s reduction of
right and left to asymmetrical relations. The plain man takes
one of the rays (say A) as fixed—when he is sober, he takes
A to be the upward vertical—and then regards right and left
as properties of the single ray B, or, what comes to the same
†The two cases are illustrated in the figure. The difference is the same
as that between the two sorts of coordinate axes.
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thing, as relations of any two points which determine B. In
this way, right and left become asymmetrical relations, and
even have a limited degree of transitiveness, of the kind ex-
plained in the fifth way of generating series (in Chapter xxiv).
It is to be observed that what is fixedmust be a ray, not a mere
straight line. For example, two planes which are not mutually
perpendicular are not one right and the other left with regard
to their line of intersection, but only with regard to either of
the rays belonging to this line.* Butwhen this is borne inmind,
and when we consider, not semi-planes, but complete planes,
through the ray in question, right and left become asymmetri-
cal and each other’s converses. Thus the signs associatedwith
right and left, like all other signs, depend upon the asymmetry
of relations. This conclusion, therefore, may now be allowed
to be general.
223. Difference of sense is, of course, more general than dif-
ference of sign, since it exists in cases with which mathemat-
ics (at least at present) is unable to deal. And difference of
sign seems scarcely applicable to relations which are not tran-
sitive, or are not intimately connected with some transitive re-
lation. It would be absurd, for example, to regard the relation
of an event to the time of its occurrence, or of a quantity to its
magnitude, as conferring a difference of sign. These relations
are what Professor Schröder calls erschöpft†, i.e. if they hold be-
tween a and b, they can never hold between b and some third
term. Mathematically, their square is null. These relations,
then, do not give rise to difference of sign.
Allmagnitudeswith sign, so the above account has led us to 233
believe, are either relations or compound concepts intowhich
*This requires that the passage from the one plane to the other should
be made viâ one of the acute angles made by their intersection.
†Algebra der Logik, Vol. III, p. 328. Professor Peirce calls such relations
non-repeating (reference in Schröder, ib.).
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relations enter. Butwhat arewe to sayof theusual instances of
opposites: good and evil, pleasure and pain, beauty and ugli-
ness, desire and aversion? The last pair are very complex, and
if I were to attempt an analysis of them, I should emit some
universally condemned opinions. With regard to the others,
they seem tome to have an opposition of a very different kind
from that of two mutually converse asymmetrical relations,
and analogous rather to the opposition of red and blue, or of
two different magnitudes of the same kind. From these op-
positions, which are constituted by what may be called syn-
thetic incompatibility*, the oppositions above mentioned dif-
fer only in the fact that there are only two incompatible terms,
instead of a whole series. The incompatibility consists in the
fact that two terms which are thus incompatible cannot coex-
ist in the same spatio-temporal place, or cannot be predicates
of the same existent, or, more generally, cannot both enter
into true propositions of a certain form, which differ only in
the fact that one contains one of the incompatibles while the
other contains the other. This kind of incompatibility (which
usually belongs, with respect to some class of propositions, to
the terms of a given series) is a most important notion in gen-
eral logic, but is by no means to be identified with the differ-
ence between mutually converse relations. This latter is, in
fact, a special case of such incompatibility; but it is the special
case only that gives rise to the difference of sign. All differ-
ence of sign—sowemay conclude our argument—is primarily
derived from transitive asymmetrical relations, from which it
may be extended by correlation to terms variously related to
such relations†; but such extensions are always subsequent to
*See The Philosophy of Leibniz, by the present author (Cambridge 1900),
pp. 19, 20.
†Thus in mathematical Economics, pleasure and pain may be taken as
positive and negative without logical error, by the theory (whose psycho-
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the original opposition derived from difference of sense.
logical correctness we need not examine) that a man must be paid to en-
dure pain, and must pay to obtain pleasure. The opposition of pleasure
and pain is thus correlated with that of money paid and money received,
which is an opposition of positive and negative in the sense of elementary
Arithmetic.
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chapter xxviii
ONTHEDIFFERENCE
BETWEENOPENAND
CLOSED SERIES
224. We have now come to the end of the purely logical 234
discussions concerned with order, and can turn our attention
with a free mind to the more mathematical aspects of the sub-
ject. As the solution of the most ancient and respectable con-
tradictions in the notion of infinity depends mainly upon a
correct philosophy of order, it has been necessary to go into
philosophical questions at some length—not somuchbecause
they are relevant, as becausemost philosophers think them so.
Butwe shall reap our reward throughout the remainder of this
work.
The question to be discussed in this chapter is this: Canwe
ultimately distinguish open from closed series, and if so, in
what does the distinction consist? We have seen that, math-
ematically, all series are open, in the sense that all are gener-
ated by an asymmetrical transitive relation. But philosophi-
cally, we must distinguish the different ways in which this re-
lationmay arise, and especiallywemust not confound the case
where this relation involves no reference to other terms with
that where such terms are essential. And practically, it is plain
that there is some difference between open and closed series—
between, for instance, a straight line and a circle, or a pedigree
and a mutual admiration society. But it is not quite easy to
express the difference precisely.
225. Where the number of terms in the series is finite, and
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 338
the series is generated in the first of the ways explained in
Chapter xxiv, the method of obtaining a transitive relation
out of the intransitive relation with which we start is radically
different according as the series is open or closed. If R be the
generating relation, andnbe thenumber of terms in our series,
two cases may arise. Denoting the relation of any term to the
next but one by R2, and so on for higher powers, the relation
Rn can have only one of two values, zero and identity. (It is as-
sumed that R is a one-one relation.) For starting with the first
term, if there be one, Rn 1 brings us to the last term; and thus
Rn gives no new term, and there is no instance of the relation
Rn. On the other hand, it may happen that, starting with any
term, Rn brings us back to that term again. These two are the 235
only possible alternatives. In the first case, we call the series
open; in the second,wecall it closed. In thefirst case, the series
has a definite beginning and end; in the second case, like the
angles of a polygon, it has no peculiar terms. In the first case,
our transitive asymmetrical relation is the disjunctive relation
“a power of R not greater than the (n   1)th.” By substituting
this relation, which we may call R0, for R, our series becomes
of the second of the six types. But in the second case no such
simple reduction to the second type is possible. For now, the
relation of any two terms a and m of our series may be just as
well taken to be a power of R as a power ofR, and the question
which of any three terms is between the other two becomes
wholly arbitrary. Wemight now introduce, first the relation of
separation of four terms, and then the resulting five-term rela-
tion explained in Chapter xxv. We should then regard three
of the terms in the five-term relation as fixed, and find that the
resulting relation of the other two is transitive and asymmet-
rical. But here the first term of our series is wholly arbitrary,
which was not the case before; and the generating relation is,
in reality, one of five terms, not one of two. There is, how-
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ever, in the case contemplated, a simpler method. This may
be illustrated as follows: In an open series, any two terms a
andm define two senses in which the series may be described,
the one in which a comes beforem, and the other in whichm
comes before a. We can then say of any two other terms c and
g that the sense of the order from c to g is the same as that of
the order from a tom, or different, as the case may be. In this
way, considering a and m fixed, and c and g variable, we get
a transitive asymmetrical relation between c and g, obtained
froma transitive symmetrical relationof thepair c; g to thepair
a;m (or m; a, as the case may be). But this transitive symmet-
rical relation can, by the principle of abstraction, be analyzed
into possession of a common property, which is, in this case,
the fact that a;m and c; g have the generating relationwith the
same sense. Thus the four-term relation is, in this case, not
essential. But in a closed series, a andm do not define a sense
of the series, even when we are told that a is to precedem: we
can start from a and get tom in either direction. But if nowwe
take a third term d, and decide that we are to start from a and
reach m taking d on the way, then a sense of the series is de-
fined. The stretch adm includes one portion of the series, but
not the other. Thus we may go from England to New Zealand
either by the east or by the west; but if we are to take India on
the way, we must go by the east. If now we consider any other
term, say k, this will have some definite position in the series
which starts with a and reaches m by way of d. In this series,
k will come either between a and d, or between d and m, or
after m. Thus the three-term relation of a; d;m seems in this
case sufficient to generate a perfectly definite series. Vailati’s
five-term relation will then consist in this, that with regard to
the order adm, k comes before (or after) any other term l of 236
the collection. But it is not necessary to call in this relation in
the present case, since the three-term relation suffices. This
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three-term relationmay be formally defined as follows. There
is between any two terms of our collection a relation which is
a power of R less than the nth. Let the relation between a and
d beRx, that between a andmRy. Then if x is less than y, we as-
sign one sense to adm; if x is greater than y, we assign the other.
Therewill be also betweena and d the Rn x, andbetweena and
m the relation Rn y. If x is less than y, then n x is greater than
n   y; hence the asymmetry of the two cases corresponds to
that of R and R. The terms of the series are simply ordered
by correlation with their numbers x and y, those with smaller
numbers preceding those with larger ones. Thus there is here
no need of the five-term relation, everything being effected by
the three-term relation, which is itself reduced to an asymmet-
rical transitive relation of two numbers. But the closed series
is still distinguished from the open one by the fact that its first
term is arbitrary.
226. A very similar discussion will apply to the case where
our series is generated by relations of three terms. To keep
the analogy with the one-one relation of the above case, we
will make the following assumptions. Let there be a relation B
of one term to two others, and let the one, term be called the
mean, the two others the extremes. Let the mean be uniquely
determined when the extremes are given, and let one extreme
be uniquely determined by the mean and the other extreme.
Further let each term that occurs as mean occur also as ex-
treme, and each term that occurs as extreme (with at most two
exceptions) occur also as mean. Finally, if there be a relation
in which c is mean, and b and d are extremes, let there be al-
ways (exceptwhen b or d is one of the twopossible exceptional
terms) a relation in which b is the mean and c one of the ex-
tremes, and another in which d is the mean and c one of the
extremes. Then b and c will occur together in only two rela-
tions. This fact constitutes a relation between b and c, and
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only one other term besides b will have this new relation to c.
By means of this relation, if there are two exceptional terms,
or if, our collection being infinite, there is only one, we can
construct an open series. If our two-term relation be asym-
metrical, this is sufficiently evident; but the same result can
be proved if our two-term relation is symmetrical. For there
will be at either end, say a, an asymmetrical relation of a to the
only term which is the mean between a and some other term.
This relationmultiplied by the nth power of our two-term rela-
tion, where n + 1 is any integer less than the number of terms
in our collection, will give a relation which holds between a
and a number (not exceeding n+ 1) of terms of our collection,
of which terms one and only one is such that no number less
thann gives a relationofa to this term. Thusweobtain a corre-
lation of our termswith the natural numbers, which generates 237
an open series with a for one of its ends. If, on the other hand,
our collection has no exceptional terms, but is finite, then we
shall obtain a closed series. Let our two-termrelationbeP, and
first suppose it symmetrical. (It will be symmetrical if our orig-
inal three-term relationwas symmetricalwith regard to the ex-
tremes.) Then every term c of our collectionwill have the rela-
tionP to two others, whichwill have to each other the relation
P2. Of all the relations of the formPmwhich hold between two
given terms, there will be one in whichm is least: this may be
called the principal relation of our two terms. Let the number
of terms of the collection be n. Then every term of our collec-
tion will have to every other a principal relation Px, where x
is some integer not greater than n=2. Given any two terms c
and g of the collection, provided we do not have cPn=2g (a case
whichwill not arise if n be odd), let us have cPxg, where x is less
than n=2. This assumption defines a sense of the series, which
may be shown as follows. If cPyk, where y is also less than n=2,
three cases may arise, assuming y is greater than x. We may
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have gPy zk, or, if x+ y is less than n=2, wemay have gPx+yk, or,
if x+ y is greater than n=2, wemay have gPn2 x yk. (We choose
always the principal relation.) These three cases are illustrated
in the accompanying figure. We shall say, in these three cases,
c
g
k
c0
c
gk
c0
c
gk
c0
that, with regard to the sense cg, (1) k comes after c and g, (2)
and (3) k comes before c and g. If y is less than x, and kPx yg, we
shall say that k is between c and g in the sense cg. If n is odd,
this covers all possible cases. But if n is even, we have to con-
sider the term c0, which is such that cPn=2c0. This term is, in a
certain sense, antipodal to c; we may define it as the first term
in the series when the above method of definition is adopted.
If n is odd, the first termwill be that term of class (3) for which
cP(n 1)=2k. Thus the series acquires a definite order, but one in
which, as in all closed series, the first term is arbitrary.
227. The only remaining case is that where we start from
four-term relations, and the generating relation has, strictly
speaking, five terms. This is the case of projective Geometry.
Here the series is necessarily closed; that is, in choosing our
three fixed terms for the five-term relation, there is never any
restriction upon our choice; and any one of these three may
be defined to be the first.
228. Thus, to sum up: Every series being generated by a 238
transitive asymmetrical relation between any two terms of the
series, a series is open when it has either no beginning, or a
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beginning which is not arbitrary; it is closed when it has an ar-
bitrary beginning. Now if R be the constitutive relation, the
beginning of the series is a term having the relation R but not
the relation R. Whenever R is genuinely a two-term relation,
the beginning, if it exists, must be perfectly definite. It is only
when R involves some other term (which may be considered
fixed) besides the two with regard to which it is transitive and
asymmetrical (which are to be regarded as variable), that the
beginning can be arbitrary. Hence in all cases of closed se-
ries, though there may be an asymmetrical one-one relation if
the series is discrete, the transitive asymmetrical relation must
be one involving one or more fixed terms in addition to the
two variable termswith regard to which it generates the series.
Thus although,mathematically, every closed series can be ren-
deredopen, andeveryopen series closed, yet there is, in regard
to the nature of the generating relation, a genuine distinction
between them—adistinction, however, which is of philosoph-
ical rather than mathematical importance.
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chapter xxix
PROGRESSIONSAND
ORDINALNUMBERS
229. It is now time to consider the simplest type of infinite 239
series, namely that to which the natural numbers themselves
belong. I shall postpone to the next Part all the supposed dif-
ficulties arising out of the infinity of such series, and concern
myself here only to give the elementary theory of them in a
form not presupposing numbers*.
The series now to be considered are those which can be cor-
related, term for term, with the natural numbers, without re-
quiring any change in the order of the terms. But since the
natural numbers are a particular case of such series, and since
thewhole ofArithmetic andAnalysis can be developed out of
any one such series, without any appeal to number, it is better
to give a definition of progressions which involves no appeal
to number.
A progression is a discrete series having consecutive terms,
and a beginning but no end, and being also connected. The
meaning of connection was explained in Chapter xxiv by
means of number, but this explanation cannot be given now.
Speaking popularly, when a series is not connected it falls into
two ormore parts, each being a series for itself. Thus numbers
*The present chapter closely follows Peano’s Arithmetic. See Formu-
laire de Mathématiques, Vol. 11, §2. I have given a mathematical treatment
of the subject in RdM, Vols. VII and VIII. The subject is due, in the main,
to Dedekind and Georg Cantor.
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and instants together form a series which is not connected,
and so do two parallel straight lines. Whenever a series is orig-
inally given bymeans of a transitive asymmetrical relation, we
can express connection by the condition that any two terms
of our series are to have the generating relation. But progres-
sions are series of the kind thatmay be generated in the first of
our six ways, namely, by an asymmetrical one-one relation. In
order to pass from this to a transitive relation, we before em-
ployed numbers, defining the transitive relation as any power
of the one-one relation. This definition will not serve now,
since numbers are to be excluded. It is one of the triumphs of
modern mathematics to have adapted an ancient principle to
the needs of this case.
The definition which we want is to be obtained frommath- 240
ematical induction. This principle, which used to be regarded
as a mere subterfuge for eliciting results of which no other
proof was forthcoming, has gradually grown in importance as
the foundations ofmathematics have beenmore closely inves-
tigated. It is now seen to be the principle upon which depend,
so far as ordinals are concerned, the commutative law and one
form of the distributive law*. This principle, which gives the
widest possible extension to the finite, is the distinguishing
mark of progressions. It may be stated as follows:
Given any class of terms s, to which belongs the first term
of any progression, and to which belongs the term of the pro-
gression next after any term of the progression belonging to s,
then every term of the progression belongs to s.
We may state the same principle in another form. Let φ(x)
be a propositional function, which is a determinate proposi-
tion as soon as x is given. Thenφ(x) is a function of x, andwill
*Namely (α+ β)γ = αγ+ βγ. The other form, α(β+ γ) = αβ+ αγ, holds
also for infinite ordinal numbers, and is thus independent ofmathematical
induction.
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in general be true or false according to the value of x. If x be a
member of a progression, let seq x denote the term next after
x. Let φ(x) be true when x is the first term of a certain progres-
sion, and let φ(seq x) be true whenever φ(x) is true, where x is
any term of the progression. It then follows, by the principle
of mathematical induction, that φ(x) is always true if x be any
term of the progression in question.
The complete definition of a progression is as follows. LetR
be any asymmetrical one-one relation, and u a class such that
every term of u has the relation of R to some term also belong-
ing to the class u. Let there be at least one term of the class
u which does not have the relation R to any term of u. Let
s be any class to which belongs at least one of the terms of
u which do not have the relation R to any term of u, and to
which belongs also every term of u which has the relation R
to some term belonging to both u and s; and let u be such as
to be wholly contained in any class s satisfying the above con-
ditions. Then u, considered as ordered by the relation R, is a
progression†.
230. Of such progressions, everything relevant to finite
Arithmetic canbeproved. In thefirst place,we showthat there
can only be one term of u which does not have the relation R
to any term of u. We then define the term to which x has the
relation R as the successor of x (x being a u), which may be
written seq x. The definitions and properties of addition, sub-
traction, multiplication, division, positive and negative terms, 241
and rational fractions are easily given; and it is easily shown
that between any two rational fractions there is always a third.
From this point it is easy to advance to irrationals and the real
†It should be observed that a discrete open series generated by a tran-
sitive relation can always be reduced, as we saw in the preceding chapter,
to one generated by an asymmetrical one-one relation, provided only that
the series is finite or a progression.
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numbers*.
Apart from the principle of mathematical induction, what
is chiefly interesting about this process is, that it shows that
only the serial or ordinal properties of finite numbers are used
by ordinary mathematics, what may be called the logical prop-
erties being wholly irrelevant. By the logical properties of
numbers, I mean their definition by means of purely logical
ideas. This process, which has been explained in Part II, may
be here briefly recapitulated. We show, to begin with, that
a one-one correlation can be effected between any two null
classes, or between any two classes u; vwhich are such that, if
x is a u, and x0 differs from x, then x0 cannot be a u, with a like
condition for v. The possibility of such one-one correlation
we call similarity of the two classes u; v. Similarity, being sym-
metrical and transitive, must be analyzable (by the principle of
abstraction) into possession of a common property. This we
define as the number of either of the classes. When the two
classes u; v have the above-defined property, we say their num-
ber is one; and so on for higher numbers; the general defini-
tion of finite numbers demandingmathematical induction, or
the non-similarity of whole and part, but being always given
in purely logical terms.
It is numbers so defined that are used in daily life, and that
are essential to any assertion of numbers. It is the fact that
numbers have these logical properties thatmakes them impor-
tant. But it is not these properties that ordinary mathematics
employs, and numbers might be bereft of them without any
injury to the truth of Arithmetic and Analysis. What is rele-
vant tomathematics is solely the fact that finite numbers form
a progression. This is the reason why mathematicians—e.g.
Helmholtz, Dedekind, and Kronecker—have maintained that
ordinal numbers are prior to cardinals; for it is solely the or-
*See my article on the Logic of Relations, RdM, VII.
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dinal properties of number that are relevant. But the conclu-
sion that ordinals are prior to cardinals seems to have resulted
froma confusion. Ordinals and cardinals alike form a progres-
sion, and have exactly the same ordinal properties. Of either,
all Arithmetic can be proved without any appeal to the other,
the propositions being symbolically identical, but different in
meaning. In order to prove that ordinals are prior to cardinals,
it would be necessary to show that the cardinals can only be
defined in terms of the ordinals. But this is false, for the log-
ical definition of the cardinals is wholly independent of the
ordinals†. There seems, in fact, to be nothing to choose, as re-
gards logical priority, between ordinals and cardinals, except
that the existence of the ordinals is inferred from the series of 242
cardinals. The ordinals, as we shall see in the next paragraph,
can be defined without any appeal to the cardinals; but when
defined, they are seen to imply the cardinals. Similarly, the car-
dinals can be defined without any appeal to the ordinals; but
they essentially form a progression, and all progressions, as I
shall now show, necessarily imply the ordinals.
231. The correct analysis of ordinals has been prevented
hitherto by the prevailing prejudice against relations. People
speak of a series as consisting of certain terms taken in a cer-
tain order, and in this idea there is commonly a psychological
element. All sets of terms have, apart from psychological con-
siderations, all orders of which they are capable; that is, there
are serial relations, whose fields are a given set of terms, which
arrange those terms in any possible order. In some cases, one
or more serial relations are specially prominent, either on ac-
count of their simplicity, or of their importance. Thus the
order of magnitude among numbers, or of before and after
among instants, seems emphatically the natural order, and
†Professor Peano, who has a rare immunity from error, has recognized
this fact. See Formulaire, 1898, 210, note (p. 39).
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any other seems to be artificially introduced by our arbitrary
choice. But this is a sheer error. Omnipotence itself cannot
give terms an order which they do not possess already: all that
is psychological is the consideration of such and such an order.
Thus when it is said that we can arrange a set of terms in any
order we please, what is really meant is, that we can consider
any of the serial relations whose field is the given set, and that
these serial relationswill givebetween themanycombinations
of before and after that are compatiblewith transitiveness and
connection. From this it results that an order is not, properly
speaking, a property of a given set of terms, but of a serial re-
lation whose field is the given set. Given the relation, its field
is given with it; but given the field, the relation is by nomeans
given. The notion of a set of terms in a given order is the no-
tion of a set of terms considered as the field of a given serial re-
lation; but the consideration of the terms is superfluous, and
that of the relation alone is quite sufficient.
Wemay, then, regard an ordinal number as a commonprop-
erty of sets of serial relations which generate ordinally similar
series. Such relations have what I shall call likeness, i.e. if P;Q
be two such relations, their fields can be so correlated term for
term that two terms of which the first has to the second the
relation P will always be correlated with two terms of which
the first has to the second the relationQ, and vice versâ. As in
the case of cardinal numbers*, so here, wemay, in virtue of the
principle of abstraction, define the ordinal number of a given
finite serial relation as the class of like relations. It is easy to
show that the generating relations of progressions are all alike;
the class of such relations will be the ordinal number of the fi-
nite integers in order of magnitude. When a class is finite, all
series that can be formed of its terms are ordinally similar, and 243
*Cf. §111.
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are ordinally different from series having a different cardinal
number of terms. Hence there is a one-one correlation of fi-
nite ordinals and cardinals, for which, as we shall see in Part
V, there is no analogy in respect of infinite numbers. Wemay
therefore define the ordinal number n as the class of serial rela-
tions whose domains have n terms, where n is a finite cardinal.
It is necessary, unless 1 is to be excluded, to take domains in-
stead of fields here, for no relationwhich implies diversity can
have one term in its field, though it may have none. This has a
practical inconvenience, owing to the fact thatn+1must beob-
tained by adding one term to the field; but the point involved
is one for conventions as to notation, and is quite destitute of
philosophical importance.
232. The above definition of ordinal numbers is direct and
simple, but does not yield the notion of “nth,” which would
usually be regarded as the ordinal number. This notion is far
more complex: a term is not intrinsically the nth, and does not
become so by the mere specification of n   1 other terms. A
term is the nth in respect of a certain serial relation, when, in
respect of that relation, the term inquestionhasn 1 predeces-
sors. This is the definition of “nth,” showing that this notion
is relative, not merely to predecessors, but also to a specified
serial relation. By induction, the various finite ordinals can be
defined without mentioning the cardinals. A finite serial rela-
tion is one which is not like (in the above sense) any relation
implying it but not equivalent to it; and a finite ordinal is one
consisting of finite serial relations. If n be a finite ordinal, n+ 1
is an ordinal such that, if the last term* of a series of the type
n+ 1 be cut off, the remainder, in the same order, is of the type
n. Inmore technical language, a serial relation of the type n+ 1
*The last term of a series (if it exists) is the term belonging to the con-
verse domain but not to the domain of the generating relation, i.e. the term
which is after but not before other terms.
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is one which, when confined to its domain instead of its field,
becomes of the type n. This gives by induction a definition
of every particular finite ordinal, in which cardinals are never
mentioned. Thus we cannot say that ordinals presuppose car-
dinals, though they are more complex, since they presuppose
both serial and one-one relations, whereas cardinals only pre-
suppose one-one relations.
Of the ordinal number of the finite ordinals in order ofmag-
nitude, several equivalent definitions may be given. One of
the simplest is, that this number belongs to any serial relation,
which is such that any class contained in its field and not null
has a first term, while every term of the series has an immedi-
ate successor, and every termexcept the first has an immediate
predecessor. Here, again, cardinal numbers are in no way pre-
supposed.
Throughout the above discussions our serial relations are
taken to be transitive, not one-one. The one-one relations
are easily derived from the transitive ones, while the converse 244
derivation is somewhat complicated. Moreover the one-one
relations are only adequate to define finite series, and thus
their use cannot be extended to the study of infinite series un-
less they are taken as derivative from the transitive ones.
233. A fewwords concerning positive and negative ordinals
seem to be here in place. If the first n terms of a progression
be taken away (n being any finite number), the remainder still
form a progression. With regard to the new progression, neg-
ative ordinals may be assigned to the terms that have been ab-
stracted; but for this purpose it is convenient to regard the be-
ginning of the smaller progression as the 0th term. In order to
have a series giving any positive or negative ordinal, we need
what may be called a double progression. This is a series such
that, choosing any term xout of it, twoprogressions start from
x, the one generated by a serial relation R, the other by R. To
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xwe shall then assign the ordinal 0, and to the other terms we
shall assign positive or negative ordinals according as they be-
long to the one or the other of the two progressions starting
from x. The positive and negative ordinals themselves form
such a double progression. They express essentially a relation
to the arbitrarily chosen origin of the two progressions, and
+n and  n express mutually converse relations. Thus they
have all the properties which we recognize in Chapter xxvii
as characterizing terms which have signs.
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chapter xxx
DEDEKIND’S THEORYOF
NUMBER
234. The theory of progressions and of ordinal numbers, 245
withwhichwehavebeenoccupied in the last chapter, is due in
the main to two men—Dedekind and Cantor. Cantor’s con-
tributions, being specially concerned with infinity, need not
be considered at present; andDedekind’s theory of irrationals
is also to be postponed. It is his theory of integers of which I
wishnow to give an account-—the theory, that is to say, which
is contained in his “Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?”* In
reviewing this work, I shall not adhere strictly to Dedekind’s
phraseology. He appears to have been, at the time of writing,
unacquainted with symbolic logic; and although he invented
as much of this subject as was relevant to his purpose, he nat-
urally adopted phrases which were not usual, and were not al-
ways so convenient as their conventional equivalents.
The fundamental ideas of the pamphlet in question are
these†: (1) the representation (Abbildung) of a system (21); (2)
the notion of a chain (37); (3) the chain of an element (44); (4)
the generalized form of mathematical induction (59); (5) the
definition of a singly infinite system (71). From these five no-
*2nd ed. Brunswick, 1893 (1st ed. 1887). The principal contents of this
book, expressed by the Algebra of Relations, will be found inmy article in
RdM, VII, 2, 3.
†The numbers in brackets refer, not to pages, but to the small sections
into which the work is divided.
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tions Dedekind deduces numbers and ordinary Arithmetic.
Let us first explain the notions, and then examine the deduc-
tion.
235. (1) A representation of a class u is any law by which, to ev-
ery term of u, say x, corresponds some one and only one term
φ(x). No assumption ismade, to beginwith, as towhetherφ(x)
belongs to the class u, or as to whether φ(x) may be the same
as φ(y) when x and y are different terms of u. The definition
thus amounts to this:
A representationof a class u is amany-one relation, whose do-
main contains u, by which terms, which may or may not also
belong to u, are correlated one with each of the terms of u*. 246
The representation is similar when, if x differs from y, both be-
ingu’s, thenφ(x)differs fromφ(y); that is, when the relation in
question is one-one. He shows that similarity between classes
is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive, and remarks (34) that
classes can be classified by similarity to a given class—a sugges-
tion of an idea which is fundamental in Cantor’s work.
236. (2) If there exists a relation, whether one-one or many-
one, which correlates with a class u only terms belonging to
that class, then this relation is said to constitute a represen-
tation of u in itself (36), and with respect to this relation u is
called a chain (37). That is to say, any class u is, with respect
to any many-one relation, a chain, if u is contained in the do-
main of the relation, and the correlate of a u is always itself
a u. The collection of correlates of a class is called the image
(Bild) of the class. Thus a chain is a class whose image is part
or thewhole of itself. For the benefit of the non-mathematical
*A many-one relation is one in which, as in the relation of a quantity
to its magnitude, the right-hand term, towhich the relation is, is uniquely
determinedwhen the left-hand term is given. Whether the converse holds
is left undecided. Thus aone-one relation is aparticular caseof amany-one
relation.
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reader, it may be not superfluous to remark that a chain with
regard to a one-one relation, provided it has any term not be-
longing to the image of the chain, cannot be finite, for such a
chainmust contain the same number of terms as a proper part
of itself†.
237. (3) If a be any term or collection of terms, there may
be, with respect to a given many-one relation, many chains in
which a is contained. The common part of all these chains,
which is denoted by a0, is what Dedekind calls the chain of a
(44). For example, if a be the number n, or any set of numbers
ofwhichn is the least, the chainofawith regard to the relation
“less by 1” will be all numbers not less than n.
238. (4) Dedekind nowproceeds (59) to a theoremwhich is a
generalized form of mathematical induction. This theorem is
as follows: Letabe any termor set of terms contained in a class
s, and let the image of the common part of s and the chain of a
be also contained in s; then it follows that the chain of a is con-
tained in s. This somewhat complicated theoremmay become
clearer by being put in other language. Let us call the relation
by which the chain is generated (or rather the converse of this
relation) succession, so that the correlate or image of a term
will be its successor. Let a be a term which has a successor, or
a collection of such terms. A chain in general (with regard to
succession) will be any set of terms such that the successor of
any one of them also belongs to the set. The chain of a will
be the common part of all the chains containing a. Then the 247
data of the theorem inform us that a is contained in s, and, if
any term of the chain of a be an s, so is its successor; and the
conclusion is, that every term in the chain of a is an s. This
theorem, as is evident, is very similar to mathematical induc-
tion, from which it differs, first by the fact that a need not be
†A proper part (Echter Theil) is a phrase analogous to “proper fraction”;
it means a part not the whole.
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a single term, secondly by the fact that the constitutive rela-
tion need not be one-one, but may be many-one. It is a most
remarkable fact that Dedekind’s previous assumptions suffice
to demonstrate this theorem.
239. (5) I come next to the definition of a singly infinite sys-
tem or class (71). This is defined as a class which can be rep-
resented in itself by means of a one-one relation, and which
is further such as to be the chain, with regard to this one-one
relation, of a single term of the class not contained in the im-
age of the class. Calling the classN, and the one-one relation
R, there are, as Dedekind remarks, four points in this defini-
tion. (1)The imageofN is contained inN; that is, every term to
which anN has the relationR is anN. (2)N is the chain of one
of its terms. (3)This one term is such that noNhas the relation
R to it, i.e. it is not the image of any other term ofN. (4) The re-
lation R is one-one, in other words, the representation is sim-
ilar. The abstract system, defined simply as possessing these
properties, is defined byDedekind as the ordinal numbers (73).
It is evident that his singly infinite system is the same as what
we called a progression, and he proceeds to deduce the various
properties of progressions, in particular mathematical induc-
tion (80), which follows from the above generalized form. One
number m is said to be less than another n, when the chain
of n is contained in the image of the chain of m (89); and it is
shown (88, 90) that of two different numbers, one must be the
less. From this point everything proceeds simply.
240. The only further point that seems important for our
present purpose is the definition of cardinals. It is shown (132)
that all singly infinite systems are similar to each other and to
the ordinals, and that conversely (133) any systemwhich is sim-
ilar to a singly infinite system is singly infinite. When a system
is finite, it is similar to some system Zn, where Zn means all the
numbers from 1 to n both inclusive; and vice versâ (160). There
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is only one number nwhich has this property in regard to any
given finite system, and when considered in relation to this
property it is called a cardinal number, and is said tobe thenum-
ber of elements of which the said system consists (161). Here at
lastwe reach the cardinal numbers. Their dependenceonordi-
nals, if I may venture to interpret Dedekind, is as follows: ow-
ing to the order of the ordinals, every ordinal n defines a class
of ordinals Zn, consisting of all that do not succeed it. They
may be defined as all that are not contained in the image of
the chain of n. This class of ordinalsmay be similar to another
class, which is then said to have the cardinal number n. But it 248
is only because of the order of the ordinals that each of them
defines a class, and thus this order is presupposed in obtaining
cardinals.
241. Of themerits of the above deduction it is not necessary
for me to speak, for they are universally acknowledged. But
some points call for discussion. In the first case, Dedekind
proves mathematical induction, while Peano regards it as an
axiom. This gives Dedekind an apparent superiority, which
must be examined. In the second place, there is no reason,
merely because the numbers which Dedekind obtains have an
order, to hold that they are ordinal numbers; in the third place,
his definition of cardinals is unnecessarily complicated, and
the dependence of cardinals upon order is only apparent. I
shall take these points in turn.
As regards the proof of mathematical induction, it is to be
observed that it makes the practically equivalent assumption
that numbers form the chain of one of them. Either can be
deduced from the other, and the choice as to which is to be
an axiom, which a theorem, is mainly a matter of taste. On
the whole, though the consideration of chains is most inge-
nious, it is somewhat difficult, and has the disadvantage that
theorems concerning the finite class of numbers not greater
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than n as a rule have to be deduced from corresponding theo-
rems concerning the infinite class of numbers greater than n.
For these reasons, and not because of any logical superiority,
it seems simpler to begin with mathematical induction. And
it should be observed that, in Peano’s method, it is only when
theorems are to be proved concerning any number that math-
ematical induction is required. The elementary Arithmetic
of our childhood, which discusses only particular numbers,
is wholly independent of mathematical induction; though to
prove that this is so for every particular number would itself
require mathematical induction. In Dedekind’s method, on
the other hand, propositions concerning particular numbers,
like general propositions, demand the consideration of chains.
Thus there is, in Peano’s method, a distinct advantage of sim-
plicity, and a clearer separation between the particular and the
general propositions of Arithmetic. But from a purely logical
point of view, the two methods seem equally sound; and it is
to be remembered that, with the logical theory of cardinals,
both Peano’s and Dedekind’s axioms become demonstrable*.
242. On the second point, there is some deficiency of clear-
ness in what Dedekind says. His words are (73): “If in the con-
templation of a singly infinite system N, ordered by a repre-
sentationφ, we disregard entirely the peculiar nature of the el-
ements, retaining only the possibility of distinguishing them,
and considering only the relations in which they are placed by
the ordering representation φ, then these elements are called
natural numbers or ordinal numbers or simply numbers.” Now it 249
is impossible that this account should be quite correct. For
it implies that the terms of all progressions other than the or-
dinals are complex, and that the ordinals are elements in all
such terms, obtainable by abstraction. But this is plainly not
*Cf. Chap. xiii.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 359
the case. A progression can be formed of points or instants,
or of transfinite ordinals, or of cardinals, in which, as we shall
shortly see, the ordinals are not elements. Moreover it is im-
possible that the ordinals should be, as Dedekind suggests,
nothing but the terms of such relations as constitute a progres-
sion. If they are to be anything at all, theymust be intrinsically
something; theymust differ from other entities as points from
instants, or colours fromsounds. WhatDedekind intended to
indicate was probably a definition by means of the principle
of abstraction, such as we attempted to give in the preceding
chapter. But a definition so made always indicates some class
of entities having (or being) a genuinenature of their own, and
not logically dependent upon the manner in which they have
been defined. The entities defined should be visible, at least to
themind’s eye; what the principle asserts is that, under certain
conditions, there are such entities, if only we knew where to
look for them. But whether, when we have found them, they
will be ordinals or cardinals, or even something quite differ-
ent, is not to be decided off-hand. And in any case, Dedekind
does not show us what it is that all progressions have in com-
mon, nor give any reason for supposing it to be the ordinal
numbers, except that all progressions obey the same laws as
ordinals do, which would prove equally that any assigned pro-
gression is what all progressions have in common.
243. This brings us to the third point, namely the defini-
tion of cardinals by means of ordinals. Dedekind remarks
in his preface (p. ix) that many will not recognize their old
friends the natural numbers in the shadowy shapes which he
introduces to them. In this, it seems to me, the supposed per-
sons are in the right—in other words, I am one among them.
What Dedekind presents to us is not the numbers, but any
progression: what he says is true of all progressions alike, and
his demonstrations nowhere—not even where he comes to
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cardinals—involve anypropertydistinguishingnumbers from
other progressions. No evidence is brought forward to show
that numbers are prior to other progressions. We are told,
indeed, that they are what all progressions have in common;
but no reason is given for thinking that progressions have any-
thing in common beyond the properties assigned in the defi-
nition, which do not themselves constitute a new progression.
The fact is that all depends upon one-one relations, which
Dedekind has been using throughoutwithout perceiving that
they alone suffice for the definition of cardinals. The relation
of similarity between classes, which he employs consciously,
combined with the principle of abstraction, which he implic-
itly assumes, suffice for the definition of cardinals; for the def-
inition of ordinals these do not suffice; we require, as we saw 250
in the preceding chapter, the relation of likeness betweenwell-
ordered serial relations. The definition of particular finite or-
dinals is effected explicitly in terms of the corresponding car-
dinals: if n be a finite cardinal number, the ordinal number n is
the class of serial relationswhich have n terms in their domain
(or in their field, if we prefer this definition). In order to de-
fine the notion of “nth,” we need, besides the ordinal number
n, the notion of powers of a relation, i.e. of the relative prod-
uct of a relation multiplied into itself a finite number of times.
Thus if R be any one-one serial relation, generating a finite se-
ries or a progression, the first term of the field ofR (which field
we will call r) is the term belonging to the domain, but not to
the converse domain, i.e., having the relation R but not the re-
lation R. If r has n or more terms, where n is a finite number,
the nth term of r is the term to which the first term has the
relation Rn 1 or, again, it is the term having the relation Rn 1
but not the relation Rn. Through the notion of powers of a re-
lation, the introduction of cardinals is here unavoidable; and
as powers are defined by mathematical induction, the notion
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of nth, according to the above definition, cannot be extended
beyond finite numbers. We can however extend the notion by
the following definition: If P be a transitive aliorelative gener-
ating a well-ordered series p, the nth term of p is the term x
such that, if P0 be the relation P limited to x and its predeces-
sors, then P0 has the ordinal number n. Here the dependence
upon cardinals results from the fact that the ordinal n can, in
general, only be defined by means of the cardinal n.
It is important to observe that no set of terms has inher-
ently one order rather than another, and that no term is the
nth of a set except in relation to a particular generating rela-
tionwhose field is the set or part of the set. For example, since
in any progression, any finite number of consecutive terms in-
cluding the first may be taken away, and the remainder will
still form a progression, the ordinal number of a term in a pro-
gressionmay be diminished to any smaller number we choose.
Thus the ordinal number of a term is relative to the series to
which it belongs. This may be reduced to a relation to the
first term of the series; and lest a vicious circle should be sus-
pected, it may be explained that the first term can always be de-
fined non-numerically. It is, in Dedekind’s singly infinite sys-
tem, the only term not contained in the image of the system;
and generally, in any series, it is the only term which has the
constitutive relation with one sense, but not with the other*.
Thus the relation expressed by nth is not only a relation to n,
but also to the first term of the series; and first itself depends
upon the terms included in the series, and upon the relation 251
by which they are ordered, so that what was first may cease to
be so, and what was not first may become so. Thus the first
term of a series must be assigned, as is done in Dedekind’s
*Though when the series has two ends, we have to make an arbitrary
selection as to which we will call first, which last. The obviously non-
numerical nature of last illustrates that of its correlative, first.
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view of a progression as the chain of its first term. Hence nth
expresses a four-cornered relation, between the term which
is nth, an assigned term (the first), a generating serial relation,
and the cardinal number n. Thus it is plain that ordinals, ei-
ther as classes of like serial relations, or as notions like “nth,”
aremore complex than cardinals; that the logical theory of car-
dinals is wholly independent of the general theory of progres-
sions, requiring independent development in order to show
that the cardinals form a progression; and that Dedekind’s or-
dinals are not essentially either ordinals or cardinals, but the
members of any progression whatever. I have dwelt on this
point, as it is important, and my opinion is at variance with
that of most of the best authorities. If Dedekind’s view were
correct, itwouldhavebeena logical error tobegin, as thiswork
does, with the theory of cardinal numbers rather than with
order. For my part, I do not hold it an absolute error to be-
gin with order, since the properties of progressions, and even
most of the properties of series in general, seem to be largely
independent of number. But the properties of number must
be capable of proof without appeal to the general properties
of progressions, since cardinal numbers can be independently
defined, and must be seen to form a progression before theo-
rems concerning progressions can be applied to them. Hence
thequestion,whether tobeginwithorder orwithnumbers, re-
solves itself into one of convenience and simplicity; and from
this point of view, the cardinal numbers seemnaturally to pre-
cede the very difficult considerations as to series which have
occupied us in the present Part.
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chapter xxxi
DISTANCE
244. The notion of distance is one which is often supposed 252
essential to series*, but which seldom receives precise defini-
tion. An emphasis on distance characterizes, generally speak-
ing, those who believe in relative position. Thus Leibniz, in
the course of his controversy with Clarke, remarks:
“As for the objection, that space and time are quantities, or
rather things endowed with quantity, and that situation and
order are not so: I answer, that order also has its quantity;
there is that in it which goes before, and that which follows;
there is distance or interval. Relative things have their quan-
tity, as well as absolute ones. For instance, ratios or propor-
tions inmathematics have their quantity, and aremeasured by
logarithms; and yet they are relations. And therefore, though
time and space consist in relations, yet they have their quan-
tity†.”
In this passage, the remark: “There is that which goes be-
fore, and that which follows; there is distance or interval,”
if considered as an inference, is a non sequitur; the mere fact
of order does not prove that there is distance or interval. It
proves, as we have seen, that there are stretches, that these
are capable of a special form of addition closely analogous to
*E.g. byMeinong, op. cit. §17.
†Phil. Werke, Gerhardt’s ed. Vol. vii, p. 404.
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what I have called relational addition, that they have sign, and
that (theoretically at least) stretches which fulfil the axioms of
Archimedes and of linearity are always capable of numerical
measurement. But the idea, as Meinong rightly points out, is
entirely distinct from that of stretch. Whether any particular
series does or does not contain distances, will be, inmost com-
pact series (i.e. such as have a term between any two), a ques-
tion not to be decided by argument. In discrete series there
must be distance; in others, there may be—unless, indeed,
they are series obtained from progressions as the rationals or
the real numbers are obtained from the integers, inwhich case 253
there must be distance. But we shall find that stretches are
mathematically sufficient, and that distances are complicated
and unimportant.
245. Thedefinitionof distance, to beginwith, is no easymat-
ter. What has been done hitherto towards this end is chiefly
due to non-Euclidean Geometry*; something also has been
done towards settling the definition byMeinong†. But in both
these cases, there ismore concern for numericalmeasurement
of distance than for its actual definition. Nevertheless, dis-
tance is by nomeans indefinable. Let us endeavour to general-
ize the notion as much as possible. In the first place, distance
neednot be asymmetrical; but the other properties of distance
always allow us to render it so, and wemay therefore take it to
be so. Secondly, a distance need not be a quantity or a magni-
tude; although it is usually taken to be such, we shall find the
taking it so to be irrelevant to its other properties, and in par-
ticular to its numerical measurement. Thirdly, when distance
is taken asymmetrically, theremust be only one term towhich
a given term has a given distance, and the converse relation to
*See e.g.Whitehead,UniversalAlgebra, Cambridge, 1898, Bookvi,Chap.
i.
†Op. cit. Section iv.
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the given distancemust be a distance of the same kind. (It will
be observed that we must first define a kind of distance, and
proceed thence to the general definition of distance.) Thus
every distance is a one-one relation; and in respect to such re-
lations it is convenient to respect the converse of a relation as
its  1th power. Further the relative product of two distances
of a kind must be a distance of the same kind. When the two
distances aremutually converse, their productwill be identity,
which is thus one among distances (their zero, in fact), and
must be the only one which is not asymmetrical. Again the
product of two distances of a kind must be commutative‡. If
the distances of a kind be magnitudes, they must form a kind
of magnitude—i.e. any two must be equal or unequal. If they
are not magnitudes, they must still form a series generated
in the second of our six ways, i.e. every pair of different dis-
tancesmust have a certain asymmetrical relation, the same for
all pairs except as regards sense. And finally, if Q be this re-
lation, and R1QR2 (R1;R2; being distances of the kind), then if
R3 be any other distance of the kind, wemust haveR1R3QR2R3.
All these properties, so far as I can discover, are independent;
and we ought to add a property of the field, namely this: any
two terms, each of which belongs to the field of some distance
of the kind (not necessarily the same for both), have a relation
which is a distance of the kind. Having now defined a kind of
distance, a distance is any relation belonging to some kind of
distance; and thus the work of definition seems completed.
The notion of distance, it will be seen, is enormously com-
plex. The properties of distances are analogous to those of
stretches with sign, but are far less capable of mutual deduc- 254
tion. The properties of stretches corresponding to many of
the above properties of distances are capable of proof. The
‡This is an independent property; consider for instance the difference
between “maternal grandfather” and “paternal grandmother.”
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difference is largely due to the fact that stretches can be added
in the elementary logical (not arithmetical) way, whereas dis-
tances require what I have called relational addition, which is
much the same as relative multiplication.
246. The numerical measurement of distances has already
been partially explained in Part III. It requires, as we saw, for
its full application, two further postulates, which, however, do
not belong to the definition of distances, but to certain kinds
of distances only. These are, the postulate of Archimedes:
given any two distances of a kind, there exists a finite integer
n such that the nth power of the first distance is greater than
the second distance; and Du Bois Reymond’s postulate of lin-
earity: Any distance has an nth root, where n is any integer (or
any prime, whence the result follows for any integer). When
these twopostulates are satisfied, we can find ameaning forRx,
where R is a distance of the kind other than identity, and x is
any real number*. Moreover, any distance of the kind is of the
formRx, for somevalue of x. And x is, of course, the numerical
measure of the distance.
In the case of series generated in the first of our sixways, the
various powers of the generating relation R give the distances
of terms. These various powers, as the reader can see for him-
self, verify all the above characteristics of distances. In the case
of series generated from progressions as rationals or real num-
bers from integers, there are always distances; thus in the case
of the rationals themselves, which are one-one relations, their
differences, which are again rationals, measure or indicate re-
*The powers of distances are here understood in the sense resulting
from relativemultiplication; thus if a and bhave the same distance as b and
c, this distance is the square root of the distance of a and c. The postulate
of linearity, whose expression in ordinary language is: “every linear quan-
tity can be divided into n equal parts, where n is any integer,” will he found
inDuBois Reymond’sAllgemeine Functionentheorie (Tübingen, 1882), p. 46.
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lations between them, and these relations are of the nature of
distances. And we shall see, in Part V, that these distances
have some importance in connection with limits. For numeri-
calmeasurement in some form is essential to certain theorems
about limits, and the numerical measurement of distances is
apt to be more practically feasible than that of stretches.
247. On the general question, however, whether series un-
connected with number—for instance spatial and temporal
series—are such as to contain distances, it is difficult to speak
positively. Some things may be said against this view. In the
first place, there must be stretches, and these must be magni-
tudes. It then becomes a sheer assumption—which must be
set up as an axiom—that equal stretches correspond to equal
distances. This may, of course, be denied, and we might even
seek an interpretation of non-Euclidean Geometry in the de- 255
nial. We might regard the usual coordinates as expressing
stretches, and the logarithms of their anharmonic ratios as ex-
pressing distances; hyperbolic Geometry, at least, might thus
find a somewhat curious interpretation. Herr Meinong, who
regards all series as containing distances, maintains an analo-
gous principle with regard to distance and stretch in general.
The distance, he thinks, increases only as the logarithm of the
stretch. It may be observed that, where the distance itself is
a rational number (which is possible, since rationals are one-
one relations), the opposite theory can be made formally con-
venient by the following fact. The square of a distance, as
we saw generally, is said to be twice as great as the distance
whose square it is. We might, where the distance is a ratio-
nal, say instead that the stretch is twice as great, but that the
distance is truly the square of the former distance. For where
the distance is already numerical, the usual interpretation of
numerical measurement conflicts with the notation R2. Thus
we shall be compelled to regard the stretch as proportional to
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 368
the logarithm of the distance. But since, outside the theory
of progressions, it is usually doubtful whether there are dis-
tances, and since, in almost all other series, stretches seem ad-
equate for all the results that are obtainable, the retention of
distance adds a complication for which, as a rule, no necessity
appears. It is therefore generally better, at least in a philoso-
phy of mathematics, to eschew distances except in the theory
of progressions, and to measure them, in that theory, merely
by the indices of the powers of the generating relation. There
is no logical reason, so far as I know, to suppose that there are
distances elsewhere, except in a finite space of twodimensions
and in a projective space; and if there are, they are not math-
ematically important. We shall see in Part VI how the theory
of space and timemaybe developedwithout presupposing dis-
tance; the distances which appear in projective Geometry are
derivative relations, not required in defining the properties of
our space; and in PartVwe shall see how few are the functions
of distancewith regard to series in general. And as against dis-
tance it may be remarked that, if every series must contain dis-
tances, an endless regress becomes unavoidable, since every
kind of distance is itself a series. This is not, I think, a logi-
cal objection, since the regress is of the logically permissible
kind; but it shows that great complications are introduced by
regarding distances as essential to every series. On the whole,
then, it seemsdoubtfulwhether distances in general exist; and
if they do, their existence seems unimportant and a source of
very great complications.
248. We have now completed our review of order, in so far
as is possible without introducing the difficulties of continu-
ity and infinity. We have seen that all order involves asym-
metrical transitive relations, and that every series as such is
open. But closed series, we found, could be distinguished by
themode of their generation, and by the fact that, though they 256
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always have a first term, this term may always be selected ar-
bitrarily. We saw that asymmetrical relations must be some-
times unanalyzable, and thatwhen analyzable, other asymmet-
rical relations must appear in the analysis. The difference of
sign, we found, depends always upon the difference between
an asymmetrical relation and its converse. In discussing the
particular type of series which we called progressions, we saw
how all Arithmetic applies to every such series, and how fi-
nite ordinals may be defined by means of them. But though
we found this theory to be to a certain extent independent of
the cardinals, we saw no reason to agree with Dedekind in re-
garding cardinals as logically subsequent to ordinals. Finally,
we agreed that distance is a notion which is not essential to
series, and of little importance outside Arithmetic. With this
equipment, we shall be able, I hope, to dispose of all the diffi-
culties which philosophers have usually found in infinity and
continuity. If this can be accomplished, one of the greatest of
philosophical problems will have been solved. To this prob-
lem Part V is to be devoted.
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PARTV
INFINITYAND
CONTINUITY
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 371
chapter xxxii
THECORRELATIONOF
SERIES
249. We come now to what has been generally consid- 259
ered the fundamental problem of mathematical philosophy—
I mean, the problem of infinity and continuity. This problem
has undergone, through the labours of Weierstrass and Can-
tor, a complete transformation. Since the time ofNewton and
Leibniz, the nature of infinity and continuity had been sought
in discussions of the so-called Infinitesimal Calculus. But it
has been shown that this Calculus is not, as a matter of fact,
in any way concerned with the infinitesimal, and that a large
and most important branch of mathematics is logically prior
to it. The problem of continuity, moreover, has been to a
great extent separated from that of infinity. It was formerly
supposed—and herein lay the real strength of Kant’s math-
ematical philosophy—that continuity had an essential refer-
ence to space and time, and that the Calculus (as the word
fluxion suggests) in some way presupposed motion or at least
change. In this view, the philosophy of space and time was
prior to that of continuity, the Transcendental Aesthetic pre-
ceded the Transcendental Dialectic, and the antinomies (at
least the mathematical ones) were essentially spatio-temporal.
All this has been changed by modern mathematics. What is
called the arithmetization of mathematics has shown that all
the problems presented, in this respect, by space and time,
are already present in pure arithmetic. The theory of infin-
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ity has two forms, cardinal and ordinal, of which the former
springs from the logical theory of number; the theory of con-
tinuity is purely ordinal. In the theory of continuity and the
ordinal theory of infinity, the problems that arise are not spe-
cially concerned with numbers, but with all series of certain
types which occur in arithmetic and geometry alike. What
makes the problems in question peculiarly easy to deal with
in the case of numbers is, that the series of rationals, which
is what I shall call a compact series, arises from a progression,
namely that of the integers, and that this fact enables us to
give a proper name to every term of the series of rationals—a
point in which this series differs from others of the same type.
But theorems of the kind which will occupy us in most of the 260
following chapters, though obtained in arithmetic, have a far
wider application, since they are purely ordinal, and involve
none of the logical properties of numbers. That is to say, the
idea which the Germans call Anzahl, the idea of the number
of terms in some class, is irrelevant, save only in the theory of
transfinite cardinals—an important but very distinct part of
Cantor’s contributions to the theory of infinity. We shall find
it possible to give a general definition of continuity, in which
no appeal is made to the mass of unanalyzed prejudice which
Kantians call “intuition”; and in Part VI we shall find that no
other continuity is involved in space and time. And we shall
find that, by a strict adherence to the doctrine of limits, it is
possible todispense entirelywith the infinitesimal, even in the
definition of continuity and the foundations of the Calculus.
250. It is a singular fact that, in proportion as the infinites-
imal has been extruded from mathematics, the infinite has
been allowed a freer development. From Cantor’s work it ap-
pears that there are two respects inwhich infinite numbers dif-
fer from those that are finite. The first, which applies to both
cardinals and ordinals, is, that they do not obey mathematical
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 373
induction—or rather, they do not formpart of a series of num-
bers beginning with 1 or 0, proceeding in order of magnitude,
containing all numbers intermediate in magnitude between
any two of its terms, and obeying mathematical induction.
The second, which applies only to cardinals, is, that a whole
of an infinite number of terms always contains a part consist-
ing of the same number of terms. The first respect constitutes
the true definition of an infinite series, or rather of what we
may call an infinite term in a series: it gives the essence of the
ordinal infinite. The second gives the definition of an infinite
collection, and will doubtless be pronounced by the philoso-
pher tobeplainly self-contradictory. But if hewill condescend
to attempt to exhibit the contradiction, he will find that it can
only be proved by admitting mathematical induction, so that
he has merely established a connection with the ordinal infi-
nite. Thus he will be compelled to maintain that the denial
of mathematical induction is self-contradictory; and as he has
probably reflected little, if at all, on this subject, hewill dowell
to examine the matter before pronouncing judgment. And
when it is admitted that mathematical induction may be de-
niedwithout contradiction, the supposed antinomies of infin-
ity and continuity one and all disappear. This I shall endeav-
our to prove in detail in the following chapters.
251. Throughout this Part we shall often have occasion for
a notion which has hitherto been scarcely mentioned, namely
the correlation of series. In the preceding Part we examined
the nature of isolated series, but we scarcely considered the re-
lations between different series. These relations, however, are
of an importancewhichphilosophers havewholly overlooked,
and mathematicians have but lately realized. It has long been 261
knownhowmuch could be done inGeometry bymeans of ho-
mography, which is an example of correlation; and it has been
shownbyCantor how important it is to knowwhether a series
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is denumerable, and how similar two series capable of correla-
tion are. But it is not usually pointed out that a dependent
variable and its independent variable are, in most mathemati-
cal cases, merely correlated series, nor has the general idea of
correlation been adequately dealt with. In the present work
only the philosophical aspects of the subject are relevant.
Two series s; s0 are said to be correlated when there is a one-
one relation R coupling every term of s with a term of s0, and
vice versâ, andwhen, if x, y be terms of s, and x precedes y, then
their correlates x0, y0 in s0 are such that x0 precedes y0. Two
classes or collections are correlated whenever there is a one-
one relation between the terms of the one and the terms of the
other, none being left over. Thus two series may be correlated
as classes without being correlated as series; for correlation as
classes involves only the samecardinal number,whereas corre-
lation as series involves also the same ordinal type—a distinc-
tion whose importance will be explained hereafter. In order
to distinguish these cases, it will be well to speak of the corre-
lation of classes as correlation simply, and of the correlation
of series as ordinal correlation. Thus whenever correlation is
mentioned without an adjective, it is to be understood as be-
ing not necessarily ordinal. Correlated classes will be called
similar; correlated series will be called ordinally similar; and
their generating relations will be said to have the relation of
likeness.
Correlation is a method by which, when one series is given,
others may be generated. If there be any series whose gener-
ating relation is P, and any one-one relation which holds be-
tween any term x of the series and some term which we may
call xR, then the class of terms xR, will form a series of the same
type as the class of terms x. For suppose y to be any other term
ofouroriginal series, andassume xPy. Thenwehave xRRx, xPy,
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and yRyR. Hence xRRPRyR. Now it may be shown* that, if P be
transitive and asymmetrical, so is RPR; hence the correlates of
terms of the P-series form a series whose generating relation
is RPR. Between these two series there is ordinal correlation,
and the series have complete ordinal similarity. In this way a
new series, similar to the original one, is generated by any one-
one relationwhose field includes the original series. It can also
be shown that, conversely, if P, P0 be the generating relations
of two similar series, there is a one-one relation R, whose do-
main is the field of P, which is such that P0 = RPR.
252. We can now understand a distinction of great impor- 262
tance, namely that between self-sufficient or independent se-
ries, and series by correlation. In the case just explained there
is perfect mathematical symmetry between the original series
and the series by correlation; for, if we denote by Q the rela-
tion RPR, we shall find P = RQR. Thuswemay take either the
Q-series or the P-series as the original, and regard the other as
derivative. But if it shouldhappen thatR, insteadof beingone-
one, ismany-one, the terms of the field ofQ, whichwewill call
q, will have anorder inwhich there is repetition, the same term
occurring in different positions corresponding to its different
correlates in the field of P, which we will call p. This is the
ordinary case of mathematical functions which are not linear.
It is owing to preoccupation with such series that most math-
ematicians fail to realize the impossibility, in an independent
series, of any recurrenceof the same term. In every sentenceof
print, for example, the letters acquire an order by correlation
with the points of space, and the same letter will be repeated
in different positions. Here the series of letters is essentially
derivative, for we cannot order the points of space by relation
to the letters: this would give us several points in the same po-
sition, instead of one letter in several positions. In fact, if P be
*See my article in RdM, Vol. viii, No. 2.
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a serial relation, andRbe amany-one relationwhosedomain is
the field of P, andQ = RPR, thenQ has all the characteristics
of a serial relation except that of implying diversity; but RQR
is not equivalent to P, and thus there is a lack of symmetry. It
is for this reason that inverse functions in mathematics, such
as sin 1 x, are genuinely distinct from direct functions, and re-
quire some device or convention before they become unam-
biguous. Series obtained from a many-one correlation as q
was obtained above will be called series by correlation. They
are not genuine series, and it is highly important to eliminate
them from discussions of fundamental points.
253. The notion of likeness corresponds, among relations,
to similarity among classes. It is defined as follows: Two re-
lations P;Q are like when there is a one-one relation S such
that the domain of S is the field of P, and Q = SPS. This no-
tion is not confined to serial relations, but may be extended
to all relations. We may define the relation-number of a rela-
tion P as the class of all relations that are like P; and we can
proceed to a very general subject whichmay be called relation-
arithmetic. Concerning relation-numbers we can prove those
of the formal laws of addition andmultiplication that hold for
transfinite ordinals, and thus obtain an extension of a part of
ordinal arithmetic to relations in general. By means of like-
ness we can define a finite relation as one which is not like any
proper part of itself—a proper part of a relation being a rela-
tion which implies it but is not equivalent to it. In this way
we can completely emancipate ourselves from cardinal arith-
metic. Moreover the properties of likeness are in themselves
interesting and important. One curious property is that, if S 263
be one-one and have the field of P for its domain, the above
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equationQ = SPS is equivalent to SQ = PS or toQS = SP*.
254. Since the correlation of series constitutes most of the
mathematical examples of functions, and since function is a
notion which is not often clearly explained, it will be well at
this point to say something concerning the nature of this no-
tion. In its most general form, functionality does not differ
from relation. For the present purpose it will be well to recall
two technical terms, which were defined in Part I. If x has a
certain relation to y, I shall call x the referent, and y the relatum,
with regard to the relation in question. If now x be defined as
belonging to some class contained in the domain of the rela-
tion, then the relation defines y as a function of x. That is to
say, an independent variable is constituted by a collection of
terms, each of which can be referent in regard to a certain re-
lation. Then each of these terms has one or more relata, and
any one of these is a certain function of its referent, the func-
tion being defined by the relation. Thus father defines a func-
tion, provided the independent variable be a class contained
in that ofmale animals who have orwill have propagated their
kind; and ifA be the father of B, B is said to be a function ofA.
What is essential is an independent variable, i.e. any term of
some class, and a relation whose extension includes the vari-
able. Then the referent is the independent variable, and its
function is any one of the corresponding relata.
But this most general idea of a function is of little use in
mathematics. There are two principal ways of particularizing
the function: first, we may confine the relations to be consid-
ered to such as are one-one ormany-one, i.e. such as give to ev-
ery referent a unique relatum; secondly, we may confine the
independent variable to series. The second particularization
is very important, and is specially relevant to our present top-
ics. But as it almost wholly excludes functions from Symbolic
*On this subject see my article in RdM, Vol. viii, especially Nos. 2, 6.
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Logic, where series have little importance, wemay aswell post-
pone it for a moment while we consider the first particulariza-
tion alone.
The idea of function is so important, and has been so of-
ten considered with exclusive reference to numbers, that it is
well to fill our minds with instances of non-numerical func-
tions. Thus a very important class of functions are proposi-
tions containing a variable† . Let there be some proposition in
which the phrase “any a” occurs, where a is some class. Then
in place of “any a” we may put x, where x is an undefined
member of the class a—in other words, any a. The proposi-
tion then becomes a function of x, which is unique when x is
given. This proposition will, in general, be true for some val-
ues of x and false for others. Thevalues forwhich the function 264
is true form what might be called, by analogy with Analytic
Geometry, a logical curve. This general view may, in fact, be
made to include that ofAnalyticGeometry. The equation of a
plane curve, for example, is a propositional function which is
a function of two variables x and y, and the curve is the assem-
blage of points which give to the variables values that make
the proposition true. A proposition containing the word any
is the assertion that a certain propositional function is true for
all values of the variable for which it is significant. Thus “any
man is mortal” asserts that “x is a man implies x is a mortal” is
true for all values of x for which it is significant, whichmay be
called the admissible values. Propositional functions, such as
“x is a number,” have the peculiarity that they look like propo-
sitions, and seem capable of implying other propositional func-
tions, while yet they are neither true nor false. The fact is, they
are propositions for all admissible values of the variable, but
not while the variable remains a variable, whose value is not
†These are what in Part I we called propositional functions.
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assigned; and although they may, for every admissible value
of the variable, imply the corresponding value of some other
propositional function, yetwhile thevariable remains as a vari-
able they can imply nothing. The question concerning the na-
ture of a propositional function as opposed to a proposition,
and generally of a function as opposed to its values, is a diffi-
cult one, which can only be solved by an analysis of the nature
of the variable. It is important, however, to observe that propo-
sitional functions, as was shown in Chapter vii, are more fun-
damental than other functions, or even than relations. For
most purposes, it is convenient to identify the function and
the relation, i.e., if y = f(x) is equivalent to xRy, where R is
a relation, it is convenient to speak of R as the function, and
this will be done in what follows; the reader, however, should
remember that the idea of functionality is more fundamental
than that of relation. But the investigation of these points has
been already undertaken in Part I, and enough has been said
to illustrate how a propositionmay be a function of a variable.
Other instances of non-numerical functions are afforded by
dictionaries. The French for a word is a function of the En-
glish, and vice versâ, and both are functions of the term which
both designate. The press-mark of a book in a library cata-
logue is a function of the book, and a number in a cipher is
a function of the word for which it stands. In all these cases
there is a relation by which the relatum becomes unique (or,
in the case of languages, generally unique) when the referent
is given; but the termsof the independent variable donot form
a series, except in the purely external order resulting from the
alphabet.
255. Let us now introduce the second specification, that our
independent variable is to be a series. The dependent variable
is then a series by correlation, and may be also an indepen-
dent series. For example, the positions occupied by a material
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point at a series of instants form a series by correlation with 265
the instants, of which they are a function; but in virtue of the
continuity of motion, they also form, as a rule, a geometrical
series independent of all reference to time. Thus motion af-
fords an admirable example of the correlation of series. At
the same time it illustrates a most important mark by which,
when it is present, we can tell that a series is not independent.
When the time is known, the position of a material particle
is uniquely determined; but when the position is given, there
may be several moments, or even an infinite number of them,
corresponding to the given position. (Therewill be an infinite
number of such moments if, as is commonly said, the particle
has been at rest in the position in question. Rest is a loose and
ambiguous expression, but I defer its consideration to Part
VII.) Thus the relation of the time to the position is not strictly
one-one, but may bemany-one. This was a case considered in
our general account of correlation, as giving rise to dependent
series. We inferred, it will be remembered, that two correlated
independent series are mathematically on the same level, be-
cause if P;Q be their generating relations, and R the correlat-
ing relation, we infer P = RQR fromQ = RPR. But this infer-
ence fails as soon asR is not strictly one-one, since thenwe no
longer have RR contained in 1’, where 1’ means identity. For
example, my father’s son need not be myself, thoughmy son’s
fathermust be. This illustrates the fact that, ifRbe amany-one
relation,RR and RRmust be carefully distinguished: the latter
is contained in identity, but not the former. Hence whenever
R is a many-one relation, it may be used to form a series by
correlation, but the series so formed cannot be independent.
This is an important point, which is absolutely fatal to the rela-
tional theory of time*. For the present let us return to the case
* See my article “Is position in Time and Space absolute or relative?”
Mind, July 1901.
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of motion. When a particle describes a closed curve, or one
which has double points, or when the particle is sometimes
at rest during a finite time, then the series of points which
it occupies is essentially a series by correlation, not an inde-
pendent series. But, as I remarked above, a curve is not only
obtainable by motion, but is also a purely geometrical figure,
which can be defined without reference to any supposed ma-
terial point. When, however, a curve is so defined, it must not
containpoints of rest: thepathof amaterial pointwhich some-
times moves, but is sometimes at rest for a finite time, is differ-
ent when considered kinematically and when considered ge-
ometrically; for geometrically the point in which there is rest
is one, whereas kinematically it corresponds to many terms in
the series.
The above discussion of motion illustrates, in a non-
numerical instance, a case which normally occurs among the
functions of pure mathematics. These functions (when they
are functions of a real variable) usually fulfil the following con- 266
ditions: Both the independent and the dependent variable are
classes of numbers, and the defining relation of the function is
many-one*. This case covers rational functions, circular and
elliptic functions of a real variable, and the great majority of
thedirect functions of puremathematics. In all such cases, the
independent variable is a series of numbers, which may be re-
stricted in any way we please—to positive numbers, rationals,
integers, primes, or any other class. The dependent variable
consists also of numbers, but the order of these numbers is de-
termined by their relation to the corresponding term of the in-
dependent variable, not by that of thenumbers forming thede-
pendent variable themselves. In a large class of functions the
two orders happen to coincide; in others, again, where there
*I omit for the present complex variables, which, by introducing dimen-
sions, lead to complications of an entirely distinct kind.
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are maxima and minima at finite intervals, the two orders co-
incide throughout a finite stretch, then they become exactly
opposite throughout another finite stretch, and so on. If x be
the independent variable, y the dependent variable, and the
constitutive relation be many-one, the same number ywill, in
general, be a function of, i.e. correspond to, several numbers x.
Hence the y-series is essentially by correlation, and cannot be
taken as an independent series. If, then, we wish to consider
the inverse function,which is definedby the converse relation,
we need certain devices if we are still to have correlation of se-
ries. One of these, which seems the most important, consists
in dividing the values of x corresponding to the same value of
y into classes, so that (what may happen) we can distinguish
(say) n different x’s, each of which has a distinct one-one rela-
tion to y, and is therefore simply reversible. This is the usual
course, for example, in distinguishing positive and negative
square roots. It is possible wherever the generating relation of
our original function is formally capable of exhibition as a dis-
junction of one-one relations. It is plain that the disjunctive
relation formedof none-one relations, eachofwhich contains
in its domain a certain class u, will, throughout the class u, be
an n-one relation. Thus it may happen that the independent
variable canbedivided into n classes, within eachofwhich the
defining relation is one-one, i.e. within each of which there is
only one x having the defining relation to a given y. In such
cases, which are usual in pure mathematics, our many-one re-
lation can be made into a disjunction of one-one relations,
each of which separately is reversible. In the case of complex
functions, this is, mutatis mutandis, the method of Riemann
surfaces. But it must be clearly remembered that, where our
function is not naturally one-one, the y which appears as de-
pendent variable is ordinally distinct from the ywhich appears
as independent variable in the inverse function.
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The above remarks,whichwill receive illustration aswepro-
ceed, have shown, I hope, how intimately the correlation of se- 267
ries is associated with the usual mathematical employment of
functions. Many other cases of the importance of correlation
willmeet us asweproceed. Itmaybeobserved that everydenu-
merable class is related by a one-valued function to the finite
integers, and vice versâ. As ordered by correlation with the in-
tegers, such a class becomes a series having the type of order
which Cantor calls ω. The fundamental importance of corre-
lation to Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers will appear
when we come to the definition of the transfinite ordinals.
256. In connection with functions, it seems desirable to
say something concerning the necessity of a formula for def-
inition. A function was originally, after it had ceased to be
merely a power, essentially something that could be expressed
by a formula. It was usual to start with some expression con-
taining a variable x, and to saynothing tobeginwith as towhat
xwas to be, beyond a usually tacit assumption that xwas some
kind of number. Any further limitations upon xwere derived,
if at all, from the formula itself; and it was mainly the desire
to remove such limitations which led to the various general-
izations of number. This algebraical generalization* has now
been superseded by a more ordinal treatment, in which all
classes of numbers are defined by means of the integers, and
formulae are not relevant to the process. Nevertheless, for the
use of functions, where both the independent and the depen-
dent variables are infinite classes, the formula has a certain im-
portance. Let us see what is its definition.
A formula, in its most general sense, is a proposition, or
more properly a propositional function, containing one or
more variables, a variable being any termof somedefined class,
*Of which an excellent account will be found in Couturat, De l’Infini
Mathématique, Paris, 1896, Part I, Book II.
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or even any term without restriction. The kind of formula
which is relevant in connectionwith functions of a single vari-
able is a formula containing twovariables. If both variables are
defined, sayone as belonging to the classu, theother as belong-
ing to the class v, the formula is true or false. It is true if every
u has to every v the relation expressed by the formula; other-
wise it is false. But if one of the variables, say x, be defined as
belonging to the class u, while the other, y, is only defined by
the formula, then the formula may be regarded as defining y
as a function of x. Let us call the formula Pxy. If in the class u
there are terms x such that there is no term ywhich makes Pxy
a true proposition, then the formula, as regards those terms, is
impossible. We must therefore assume that u is a class every
term of which will, for a suitable value of y, make the propo-
sition Pxy true. If, then, for every term x of u, there are some
entities y, whichmake Pxy true, and others which do not do so,
then Pxy correlates to every x a certain class of terms y. In this
way y is defined as a function of x.
But the usual meaning of formula in mathematics involves 268
another element, which may also be expressed by the word
law. It is difficult to say precisely what this element is, but
it seems to consist in a certain degree of intensional simplic-
ity of the proposition Pxy. In the case of two languages, for
example, it would be said that there is no formula connecting
them, except in such cases asGrimm’s law. Apart from thedic-
tionary, the relation which correlates words in different lan-
guages is sameness of meaning; but this gives no method by
which, given a word in one language, we can infer the corre-
sponding word in the other. What is absent is the possibil-
ity of calculation. A formula, on the other hand (say y = 2x),
gives themeans, whenwe know x, of discovering y. In the case
of languages, only enumeration of all pairs will define the de-
pendent variable. In the case of an algebraical formula, the
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independent variable and the relation enable us to know all
about the dependent variable. If functions are to extend to in-
finite classes, this state of things is essential, for enumeration
has become impossible. It is therefore essential to the correla-
tion of infinite classes, and to the study of functions of infinite
classes, that the formula Pxy should be one in which, given x,
the class of terms y satisfying the formula should be onewhich
we can discover. I am unable to give a logical account of this
condition, and I suspect it of being purely psychological. Its
practical importance is great, but its theoretical importance
seems highly doubtful.
There is, however, a logical condition connected with the
above, though perhaps not quite identical with it. Given any
two terms, there is some relation which holds between those
two terms and no others. It follows that, given any two classes
of terms u; v, there is a disjunctive relationwhich any one term
ofuhas to at least one termof v, andwhichno termnot belong-
ing to u has to any term. By this method, when two classes
are both finite, we can carry out a correlation (which may be
one-one, many-one, or one-many) which correlates terms of
these classes and no others. In this way any set of terms is
theoretically a function of any other; and it is only thus, for
example, that diplomatic ciphers are made up. But if the num-
ber of terms in the class constituting the independent variable
be infinite, we cannot in this way practically define a func-
tion, unless the disjunctive relation consists of relations devel-
oped one from the other by a law, in which case the formula is
merely transferred to the relation. This amounts to saying that
the defining relation of a function must not be infinitely com-
plex, or, if it be so, must be itself a function defined by some
relation of finite complexity. This condition, though it is it-
self logical, has again, I think, only psychological necessity, in
virtue of which we can only master the infinite by means of a
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law of order. The discussion of this point, however, would in-
volve a discussion of the relation of infinity to order—a ques-
tion which will be resumed later, but which we are not yet in 269
a position to treat intelligently. In any case, we may say that
a formula containing two variables and defining a function
must, if it is to be practically useful, give a relationbetween the
two variables by which, when one of them is given, all the cor-
responding values of the other can be found; and this seems
to constitute the mathematical essence of all formulae.
257. There remains an entirely distinct logical notion of
much importance in connection with limits, namely the no-
tion of a complete series. If R be the defining relation of a se-
ries, the series is complete when there is a term x belonging to
the series, such that every other termwhich has to x either the
relationR or the relation R belongs to the series. It is connected
(as was explained in Part IV) when no other terms belong to
the series. Thus a complete series consists of those terms, and
only those terms, which have the generating relation or its
converse to someone term, togetherwith that one term. Since
the generating relation is transitive, a series which fulfils this
condition for one of its terms fulfils it for all of them. A se-
ries which is connected but not complete will be called incom-
plete or partial. Instances of complete series are the cardinal
integers, the positive and negative integers and zero, the ratio-
nal numbers, the moments of time, or the points on a straight
line. Any selection from such a series is incomplete with re-
spect to the generating relations of the above complete series.
Thus the positive numbers are an incomplete series, and so are
the rationals between 0 and 1. When a series is complete, no
term can come before or after any term of the series without
belonging to the series; when the series is incomplete, this is
no longer the case. A series may be complete with respect to
one generating relation, but notwith respect to another. Thus
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the finite integers are a complete series when the series is de-
fined by powers of the relation of consecutiveness, as in the
discussion of progressions in Part IV; but when they are or-
dered by correlation with whole and part, they form only part
of the series of finite and transfinite integers, as we shall see
hereafter. A complete series may be regarded as the exten-
sion of a term with respect to a given relation, together with
this term itself; and owing to this fact it has, as we shall find,
some important differences from ordinally similar incomplete
series. But it can be shown, by the Logic of Relations, that any
incomplete series can be rendered complete by a change in the
generating relation, and vice versâ. The distinction between
complete and incomplete series is, therefore, essentially rela-
tive to a given generating relation.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 388
chapter xxxiii
REALNUMBERS
258. The philosopher may be surprised, after all that has al- 270
ready been said concerning numbers, to find that he is only
now to learn about real numbers; and his surprise will be
turned tohorrorwhenhe learns that real is opposed to rational.
But hewill be relieved to learn that real numbers are really not
numbers at all, but something quite different.
The series of real numbers, as ordinarily defined, consists of
the whole assemblage of rational and irrational numbers, the
irrationals being defined as the limits of such series of ratio-
nals as have neither a rational nor an infinite limit. This def-
inition, however, introduces grave difficulties, which will be
considered in the next chapter. For my part I see no reason
whatever to suppose that there are any irrational numbers in
the above sense; and if there are any, it seems certain that they
cannot be greater or less than rational numbers. When math-
ematicians have effected a generalization of number they are
apt to be unduly modest about it—they think that the differ-
ence between the generalized and the original notions is less
than it really is. We have already seen that the finite cardinals
are not to be identifiedwith the positive integers, nor yet with
the ratios of the natural numbers to 1, both of which express
relations, which the natural numbers do not. In like manner
there is a real number associated with every rational number,
but distinct from it. A real number, so I shall contend, is noth-
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ing but a certain class of rational numbers. Thus the class of
rationals less than 12 is a real number, associated with, but ob-
viously not identical with, the rational number 12 . This theory
is not, so far as I know, explicitly advocated by any other au-
thor, though Peano suggests it, andCantor comes very near to
it*. My grounds in favour of this opinion are, first, that such
classes of rationals have all the mathematical properties com-
monly assigned to real numbers, secondly, that the opposite
theory presents logical difficulties which appear to me insu-
perable. The second point will be discussed in the next chap-
ter; for the present I shall merely expound my own view, and 271
endeavour to show that real numbers, so understood, have all
the requisite characteristics. It will be observed that the fol-
lowing theory is independent of the doctrine of limits, which
will only be introduced in the next chapter.
259. The rational numbers in order of magnitude form a se-
ries in which there is a term between any two. Such series,
which inPart IIIweprovisionally called continuous,must now
receive another name, since we shall have to reserve the word
continuous for the sense which Cantor has given to it. I pro-
pose to call such series compact*. The rational numbers, then,
form a compact series. It is to be observed that, in a compact
series, there are an infinite number of terms between any two,
there are no consecutive terms, and the stretch between any
two terms (whether these be included or not) is again a com-
pact series. If now we consider any one rational number†, say
r, we can define, by relation to r, four infinite classes of ratio-
nals: (1) those less than r, (2) those not greater than r, (3) those
*Cf. Cantor,Math. Annalen, Vol. xlvi, §10; Peano,
*Such series are called by Cantor überall dicht.
†I shall for simplicity confine myself entirely to rationals without sign.
The extension to such as are positive or negative presents no difficulty
whatever.
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greater than r, (4) those not less than r. (2) and (4) differ from (1)
and (3) respectively solely by the fact that the former contain
r, while the latter do not. But this fact leads to curious differ-
ences of properties. (2) has a last term, while (1) has none; (1)
is identical with the class of rational numbers less than a vari-
able termof (1), while (2) does not have this characteristic. Sim-
ilar remarks apply to (3) and (4), but these two classes have less
importance in the present case than in (1) and (2). Classes of
rationals having the properties of (1) are called segments. A seg-
ment of rationals may be defined as a class of rationals which
is not null, nor yet coextensive with the rationals themselves
(i.e. which contains some but not all rationals), and which is
identical with the class of rationals less than a (variable) term
of itself, i.e.with the class of rationals x such that there is a ra-
tional yof the said class such that x is less than y‡. Nowwe shall
find that segments are obtained by the abovemethod, not only
from single rationals, but also from finite or infinite classes of
rationals, with the proviso, for infinite classes, that theremust
be some rational greater than anymember of the class. This is
very simply done as follows.
Let u be any finite or infinite class of rationals. Then four
classes may be defined by relation to u§, namely (1) those less
than every u, (2) those less than a variable u, (3) those greater
than every u, (4) those greater than a variable u, i.e. those such
that for each a term of u can be found which is smaller than it.
If u be a finite class, it must have a maximum and a minimum
term; in this case the former alone is relevant to (2) and (3), the
latter alone to (1) and (4). Thus this case is reduced to the for-
mer, in which we had only a single rational. I shall therefore
assume in future that u is an infinite class, and further, to pre- 272
vent reduction to our former case, I shall assume, in consider-
‡See Formulaire de Mathématiques, Vol. ii. Part iii, §61 (Turin, 1899).
§Eight classesmay be defined, but four are all that we need.
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ing (2) and (3), that u has nomaximum, that is, that every term
of u is less than some other term of u; and in considering (1)
and (4), I shall assume that u has nominimum. For the present
I confine myself to (2) and (3), and I assume, in addition to the
absence of amaximum, the existence of rationals greater than
any u, that is, the existence of the class (3). Under these cir-
cumstances, the class (2) will be a segment. For (2) consists of
all rationals which are less than a variable u; hence, in the first
place, since u has nomaximum, (2) contains the whole of u. In
the second place, since every term of (2) is less than some u,
which in turn belongs to (2), every term of (2) is less than some
other term of (2); and every term less than some term of (2) is
a fortiori less than some u, and is therefore a term of (2). Hence
(2) is identical with the class of terms less than some term of
(2), and is therefore a segment.
Thuswehave the following conclusion: Ifube a single ratio-
nal, or a class of rationals all of which are less than some fixed
rational, then the rationals less than u, if u be a single term, or
less than a variable term of u, if u be a class of terms, always
form a segment of rationals. My contention is, that a segment
of rationals is a real number.
260. So far, the method employed has been one which may
be employed in any compact series. In what follows, some of
the theorems will depend upon the fact that the rationals are
a denumerable series. I leave for the present the disentangling
of the theorems dependent upon this fact, and proceed to the
properties of segments of rationals.
Some segments, aswehave seen, consist of the rationals less
than some given rational. Some, it will be found, though not
so defined, are nevertheless capable of being so defined. For
example, the rationals less than a variable term of the series
·9, ·99, ·999, etc., are the same as the rationals less than 1. But
other segments, which correspond to what are usually called
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irrationals, are incapable of any such definition. How this fact
has led to irrationals we shall see in the next chapter. For the
present I merely wish to point out the well-known fact that
segments are not capable of a one-one correlation with ratio-
nals. There are classes of rationals defined as being composed
of all terms less than a variable term of an infinite class of ratio-
nals, which are not definable as all the rationals less than some
onedefinite rational*. Moreover there aremore segments than
rationals, and hence the series of segments has continuity of
a higher order than the rationals. Segments form a series in
virtue of the relation of whole and part, or of logical inclusion
(excluding identity). Any two segments are such that one of
them is wholly contained in the other, and in virtue of this
fact they form a series. It can be easily shown that they form
a compact series. What is more remarkable is this: if we apply
the above process to the series of segments, forming segments 273
of segments by reference to classes of segments, we find that
every segment of segments can be defined as all segments con-
tained in a certain definite segment. Thus the segment of seg-
ments defined by a class of segments is always identical with
the segment of segments defined by some one segment. Also
every segment defines a segment of segments which can be de-
fined by an infinite class of segments. These two properties
render the series of segments perfect, inCantor’s language; but
the explanation of this term must be left till we come to the
doctrine of limits.
Wemight have defined our segments as all rationals greater
than some term of a class u of rationals. If we had done this,
and inserted the conditions that u was to have no minimum,
and that therewere to be rationals less than every u, we should
have obtained what may be called upper segments, as distin-
*Cf. Part I, chap. v, p. 60.
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guished from the former kind, which may be called lower seg-
ments. We should then have found that, corresponding to ev-
ery upper segment, there is a lower segment which contains
all rationals not contained in the upper segment, with the oc-
casional exception of a single rational. There will be one ra-
tional not belonging to either the upper or the lower segment,
when the upper segment can be defined as all rationals greater
than a single rational. In this case, the corresponding lower
segment will consist of all rationals less than this single ratio-
nal, which will itself belong to neither segment. Since there is
a rational between any two, the class of rationals not greater
than a given rational cannot ever be identical with the class of
rationals less than some other; and a class of rationals having
a maximum can never be a segment. Hence it is impossible, in
the case in question, to find a lower segment containing all the
rationals not belonging to the given upper segment. Butwhen
the upper segment cannot be defined by a single rational, it
will always be possible to find a lower segment containing all
rationals not belonging to the upper segment.
Zero and infinitymay be introduced as limiting cases of seg-
ments, but in the case of zero the segment must be of the
kind which we called (1) above, not of the kind (2) hitherto
discussed. It is easy to construct a class of rationals such that
some term of the class will be less than any given rational. In
this case, the class (1) will contain no terms, and will be the
null-class. This is the real number zero, which, however, is
not a segment, since a segment was defined as a class which
is not null. In order to introduce zero as a class of the kind
whichwe called (2), we should have to start with a null class of
rationals. No rational is less than a term of a null class of ra-
tionals, and thus the class (2), in such a case, is null. Similarly
the real number infinity may be introduced. This is identical
with the whole class of rationals. If we have any class u of ra-
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tionals such that no rational is greater than all u’s, then every
rational is contained in the class of rationals less than some
u. Or again, if we have a class of rationals of which a term is 274
less than any assigned rational, the resulting class (4) (of terms
greater than some u) will contain every rational, and will thus
be the real number infinity. Thus both zero and infinity may
be introduced as extreme terms among the real numbers, but
neither is a segment according to the definition.
261. A given segment may be defined by many different
classes of rationals. Two such classes u and vmay be regarded
as having the segment as a common property. Two infinite
classes u and vwill define the same lower segment if, given any
u, there is a v greater than it, and given any v, there is a u greater
than it. If each class has no maximum, this is also a necessary
condition. The classes u and v are then what Cantor calls co-
herent (zusammengehörig). It can be shown, without consider-
ing segments, that the relation of being coherent is symmetri-
cal and transitive*, whencewe should infer, by the principle of
abstraction, that both have to some third term a common rela-
tion which neither has to any other term. This third term, as
we see from the preceding discussion, may be taken to be the
segment which both define. Wemay extend the word coherent
to two classes u and v, of which one defines an upper segment,
the other a lower segment, which between them include all ra-
tionals with at most one exception. Similar remarks, mutatis
mutandis, will still apply in this case.
We have now seen that the usual properties of real num-
bers belong to segments of rationals. There is therefore no
mathematical reason for distinguishing such segments from
real numbers. It remains to set forth, first the nature of a limit,
then the current theories of irrationals, and then the objec-
*Cf. Cantor, Math. Annalen, xlvi, and Rivista di Matematica, v, pp. 158,
159.
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tions which make the above theory seem preferable.
Note. The above theory is virtually contained in Professor
Peano’s article already referred to (“Sui Numeri Irrazionali,”
Rivista di Matematica, vi, pp. 126–140), and it was from this ar-
ticle, as well as from the Formulaire de Mathématiques, that I
was led to adopt the theory. In this article, separate definitions
of real numbers (§2, No. 5) and of segments (§8, ·0) are given,
which makes it seem as though the two were distinguished.
But after the definition of segments, we find the remark (p.
133): “Segments so defined differ only in nomenclature from
real numbers.” Professor Peano proceeds first to give purely
technical reasons for distinguishing the two by the notation,
namely that the addition, subtraction, etc. of real numbers is
to be differently conducted from analogous operations which
are to be performed on segments. Hence it would appear that
the whole of the view I have advocated is contained in this ar-
ticle. At the same time, there is some lack of clearness, since
it appears from the definition of real numbers that they are
regarded as the limits of classes of rationals, whereas a seg-
ment is in no sense a limit of a class of rationals. Also it is 275
nowhere suggested—indeed, from the definition of real num-
bers the opposite is to be inferred—that no real number can
be a rational, and no rational can be a real number. And this
appearswhere he points out (p. 134) that 1 differs from the class
of proper fractions (which is no longer the case as regards the
real number 1, when this is distinguished both from the inte-
ger 1 and from the rational number 1 : 1), or that we say 1 is less
thanp2, (in which case, I should say, 1 must be interpreted as
the class of proper fractions, and the assertion must be taken
to mean: the proper fractions are some, but not all, of the ra-
tionals whose square is less than 2). And again he says (ib.):
“The real number, although determined by, and determining,
a segment u, is commonly regarded as the extremity, or end, or
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upper limit, of the segment”; whereas there is no reason to sup-
pose that segments not having a rational limit have a limit at
all. Thus although he confesses (ib.) that a complete theory of
irrationals can be constructed by means of segments, he does
not seem to perceive the reasons (which will be given in the
next chapter) why this must be done—reasons which, in fact,
are rather philosophical than mathematical.
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chapter xxxiv
LIMITS AND IRRATIONAL
NUMBERS
262. Themathematical treatmentof continuity restswholly 276
upon the doctrine of limits. It has been thought by somemath-
ematicians and some philosophers that this doctrine had been
superseded by the Infinitesimal Calculus, and that this has
shown true infinitesimals to be presupposed in limits*. But
modern mathematics has shown, conclusively as it seems to
me, that such a view is erroneous. The method of limits has
more and more emerged as fundamental. In this Chapter, I
shall first set forth the general definition of a limit, and then
examine its application to the creation of irrationals.
A compact series we defined as one in which there is a term
between any two. But in such a series it is always possible to
find two classes of terms which have no term between them,
and it is always possible to reduce one of these classes to a sin-
gle term. For example, ifP be the generating relation and x any
term of the series, then the class of terms having to x the rela-
tion P is one betweenwhich and x there is no term†. The class
of terms so defined is one of the two segments determined by
x; the idea of a segment is one which demands only a series in
*This is the view, for instance, of Cohen, Das Princip der Infinitesimal-
Methode und seine Geschichte, Berlin, 1883; see pp. 1, 2.
†It is perhaps superfluous to explain that a term is between two classes
u; v, when it has the relationP to every termof u, and the relation P to every
term of v, or vice versâ.
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general, not necessarily a numerical series. In this case, if the
series be compact, x is said to be the limit of the class; when
there is such a term as x, the segment is said to be terminated,
and thus every terminated segment in a compact series has its
defining term as a limit. But this does not constitute a defini-
tion of a limit. To obtain the general definition of a limit, con-
sider any class u contained in the series generated by P. Then
the class u will in general, with respect to any term x not be-
longing to it, be divisible into two classes, that whose terms
have to x the relationP (which I shall call the class of terms pre-
ceding x), and thatwhose terms have to x the relation P (which
I shall call the class of terms following x). If x be itself a term of
u, we consider all the terms of u other than x, and these are still 277
divisible into the above two classes, whichwemay call πwx and
πwx respectively. If, now, πwx be such that, if y be any term pre-
ceding x, there is a term of πwx following y, i.e. between x and y,
then x is a limit of πwx. Similarly if πwx be such that, if z be any
term after x, there is a term of πwx between x and z, then x is a
limit of πwx. We nowdefine that x is a limit of u if it is a limit of
either πwxor πwx. It is to beobserved thatumayhavemany lim-
its, and that all the limits together form a new class contained
in the series generated by P. This is the class (or rather this,
by the help of certain further assumptions, becomes the class)
which Cantor designates as the first derivative of the class u.
263. Before proceeding further, it may bewell tomake some
general remarks of an elementary character on the subject of
limits. In the first place, limits belong usually to classes con-
tained in compact series—classes which may, as an extreme
case, be identical with the compact series in question. In the
second place, a limit may or may not belong to the class u of
which it is a limit, but it always belongs to some series inwhich
u is contained, and if it is a termof u, it is still a limit of the class
consisting of all terms of u except itself. In the third place, no
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class can have a limit unless it contains an infinite number of
terms. For, to revert to our former division, if u be finite, πwx
and πwx will both be finite. Hence each of them will have a
term nearest to x, and between this term and x no term of u
will lie. Hence x is not a limit of u; and since x is any term
of the series, uwill have no limits at all. It is common to add a
theorem that every infinite class, provided its terms are all con-
tained between two specified terms of the series generated by
P, must have at least one limit; but this theorem, we shall find,
demands an interpretation in terms of segments, and is not
true as it stands. In the fourth place, if u be co-extensive with
the whole compact series generated by P, then every term of
this series is a limit of u. There can be no other terms that are
limits in the same sense, since limits have only been defined
in relation to this compact series. To obtain other limits, we
should have to regard the series generated byP as forming part
of some other compact series—a case which, as we shall see,
may arise. In any case, if u be any compact series, every term
of u is a limit of u; whether u has also other limits, depends
upon further circumstances. A limit may be defined generally
as a term which immediately follows (or precedes) some class
of terms belonging to an infinite series, without immediately
following (or preceding, as the case may be) any one term of
the series. In this way, we shall find, limitsmay be defined gen-
erally in all infinite series which are not progressions—as, for
instance, in the series of finite and transfinite integers.
264. We may now proceed to the various arithmetical theo-
ries of irrationals, all of which depend upon limits. We shall
find that, in the exact form in which they have been given by 278
their inventors, they all involve an axiom, for which there are
no arguments, either of philosophical necessity or of mathe-
matical convenience; to which there are grave logical objec-
tions; and of which the theory of real numbers given in the
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preceding Chapter is wholly independent.
Arithmetical theories of irrationals could not be treated in
Part II, since they depend essentially upon the notion of or-
der. It is only by means of them that numbers become con-
tinuous in the sense now usual among mathematicians; and
we shall find in Part VI that no other sense of continuity is
required for space and time. It is very important to realize
the logical reasons for which an arithmetical theory of irra-
tionals is imperatively necessary. In the past, the definition of
irrationals was commonly effected by geometrical considera-
tions. This procedure was, however, highly illogical; for if the
application of numbers to space is to yield anything but tau-
tologies, the numbers appliedmust be independently defined;
and if none but a geometrical definition were possible, there
would be, properly speaking, no such arithmetical entities as
the definition pretended to define. The algebraical definition,
in which irrationals were introduced as the roots of algebraic
equations having no rational roots, was liable to similar objec-
tions, since it remained to be shown that such equations have
roots; moreover this method will only yield the so-called alge-
braic numbers, which are an infinitesimal proportion of the
real numbers, and do not have continuity in Cantor’s sense,
or in the sense required by Geometry. And in any case, if it is
possible, without any further assumption, to pass fromArith-
metic to Analysis, from rationals to irrationals, it is a logical
advance to show how this can be done. The generalizations
of number—with the exception of the introduction of imagi-
naries, which must be independently effected—are all neces-
sary consequences of the admission that the natural numbers
form a progression. In every progression the terms have two
kinds of relations, the one constituting the general analogue
of positive and negative integers, the other that of rational
numbers. The rational numbers form a denumerable compact
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series; and segments of a denumerable compact series, as we
saw in the preceding Chapter, form a series which is contin-
uous in the strictest sense. Thus all follows from the assump-
tion of a progression. But in the present Chapter we have to
examine irrationals as based on limits; and in this sense, we
shall find that they do not follow without a new assumption.
There are several somewhat similar theories of irrational
numbers. I will begin with that of Dedekind*.
265. Although rational numbers are such that, between any
two, there is always a third, yet there aremanywaysofdividing
all rational numbers into two classes, such that all numbers of 279
one class come after all numbers of the other class, and no ra-
tional number lies between the two classes, while yet the first
class has no first term and the second has no last term. For ex-
ample, all rational numbers, without exception, may be clas-
sified according as their squares are greater or less than 2. All
the terms of both classes may be arranged in a single series,
in which there exists a definite section, before which comes
one of the classes, and after which comes the other. Continu-
ity seems to demand that some term should correspond to this
section. Anumberwhich lies between the two classesmust be
a new number, since all the old numbers are classified. This
new number, which is thus defined by its position in a series,
is an irrational number. When these numbers are introduced,
not only is there always a number between any two numbers,
but there is a number between any two classes of which one
comes wholly after the other, and the first has no minimum,
while the second has no maximum. Thus we can extend to
numbers the axiom by which Dedekind defines the continu-
ity of the straight line (op. cit. p. 11):—
“If all the points of a line can be divided into two classes
*Sletigkeit und irrationale Zahlen, 2nd ed., Brunswick, 1892.
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such that every point of one class is to the left of every point
of the other class, then there exists one and only one point
which brings about this division of all points into two classes,
this section of the line into two parts.”
266. This axiom of Dedekind’s is, however, rather loosely
worded, and requires an emendation suggested by the deriva-
tionof irrational numbers. If all the points of a line are divided
into two classes, no point is left over to represent the section.
If all be meant to exclude the point representing the section,
the axiom no longer characterizes continuous series, but ap-
plies equally to all series, e.g. the series of integers. The ax-
iom must be held to apply, as regards the division, not to all
the points of the line, but to all the points forming some com-
pact series, and distributed throughout the line, but consist-
ingonly of a portionof thepoints of the line. When this emen-
dation ismade, the axiombecomes admissible. If, from among
the termsof a series, somecanbe chosenout to formacompact
serieswhich is distributed throughout theprevious series; and
if this new series can always be divided inDedekind’s manner
into two portions, between which lies no term of the new se-
ries, but one and only one term of the original series, then the
original series is continuous in Dedekind’s sense of the word.
The emendation, however, destroys entirely the self-evidence
upon which alone Dedekind relies (p. 11) for the proof of his
axiom as applied to the straight line.
Another somewhat less complicated emendation may be
made, which gives, I think, what Dedekind meant to state in
his axiom. A series, we may say, is continuous in Dedekind’s
sense when, and only when, if all the terms of the series, with-
out exception, be divided into two classes, such that thewhole 280
of the first class precedes the whole of the second, then, how-
ever the division be effected, either the first class has a last
term, or the second class has a first term, but never both. This
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term, which comes at one end of one of the two classes, may
then be used, in Dedekind’s manner, to define the section. In
discrete series, such as that of finite integers, there is both a
last term of the first class and a first term of the second class*;
while in compact series such as the rationals, where there is
not continuity, it sometimes happens (though not for every
possible division) that the first class has no last term and the
last class has no first term. Both these cases are excluded by
the above axiom. But I cannot see any vestige of self-evidence
in such an axiom, either as applied to numbers or as applied
to space.
267. Leaving aside, for the moment, the general problem
of continuity, let us return to Dedekind’s definition of irra-
tional numbers. The first question that arises is this: What
right havewe to assume the existence of such numbers? What
reason havewe for supposing that theremust be a position be-
tween two classes of which one is wholly to the right of the
other, and of which one has no minimum and the other no
maximum? This is not true of series in general, since many
series are discrete. It is not demanded by the nature of order.
And, as we have seen, continuity in a certain sense is possible
without it. Why then should we postulate such a number at
all? It must be remembered that the algebraical and geometri-
cal problems, which irrationals are intended to solve,must not
here be brought into the account. The existence of irrationals
has, in the past, been inferred from such problems. The equa-
tion x2   2 = 0 must have a root, it was argued, because, as x
grows from0 to 2, x2 2 increases, and is first negative and then
positive; if x changes continuously, so does x2 2; hence x2 2
must assume thevalue inpassing fromnegative topositive. Or
*If the series contains a proper part which is a progression, it is only
true in general, not without exception, that the first class must have a last
term.
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again, it was argued that the diagonal of unit square has evi-
dently a precise and definite length x, and that this length is
such that x2   2 = 0. But such arguments were powerless to
show that x is truly a number. They might equally well be re-
garded as showing the inadequacy of numbers to Algebra and
Geometry. The present theory is designed to prove the arith-
metical existence of irrationals. In its design, it is preferable to
the previous theories; but the execution seems to fall short of
the design.
Let us examine in detail the definition ofp2 by Dedekind’s
method. It is a singular fact that, although a rational num-
ber lies between any two single rational numbers, two classes
of rational numbers may be defined so that no rational num-
ber lies between them, though all of one class are higher than 281
all of the other. It is evident that one at least of these classes
must consist of an infinite number of terms. For if not, we
could pick out the two of opposite kinds which were nearest
together, and insert a new number between them. This one
would be between the two classes, contrary to the hypothesis.
But when one of the classes is infinite, we may arrange all or
some of the terms in a series of terms continually approach-
ing the other class, without reaching it, and without having a
last term. Let us, for the moment, suppose our infinite class
to be denumerable. We then obtain a denumerable series of
numbers an, all belonging to the one class, but continually ap-
proaching the other class. LetB be a fixed number of the other
class. Then between an and B there is always another rational
number; but this may be chosen to be another of the a’s, say
an+1; and since the series of a’s is infinite, we do not necessar-
ily obtain, in this way, any number not belonging to the series
of a’s. In the definition of irrationals, the series of b’s is also
infinite. Moreover, if the b’s, also be denumerable, any ratio-
nal number between an and bm, for suitable values of p and q,
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either is an+p or bm+q, or else lies between an+p and an+p+1 or
between bm+q and bm+q+1. In fact, an+p always lies between an
and bm. By successive steps, no term is obtained which lies be-
tween all the b’s and all the a’s. Nevertheless, both the a’s and
the b’s are convergent. For, let the a’s increase, while the b’s
diminish. Then bn   an and bn   an+1 continually diminish,
and therefore an+1   an, which is less than either, is less than
a continually diminishing number. Moreover this number di-
minishes without limit; for if bn   an had a limit ε, the num-
ber an + ε=2 would finally lie between the two classes. Hence
an+1 an becomes finally less than any assigned number. Thus
the a’s and b’s are both convergent. Since, moreover, their dif-
ference may be made less than any assigned number ε, they
have the same limit, if they have any. But this limit cannot be
a rational number, since it lies betweenall thea’s and all the b’s.
Such seems to be the argument for the existence of irrationals.
For example, if
x =p2+1, x2   2x  1 = 0.
x = 2+ 1=x = 2+ 12+ 1x , and x  1 = 1+ 12+ 12+ 1x = etc.
The successive convergents to the continued fraction
1+ 12+ 12+ 12+…are such that all theoddconvergents are less than
all the even convergents, while the odd convergents continu-
ally grow, and the even ones continually diminish. Moreover
the difference between the odd and the next even convergent
continually diminishes. Thus both series, if they have a limit,
have the same limit, and this limit is defined asp2.
But the existence of a limit, in this case, is evidently a sheer
assumption. In the beginning of thisChapter, we saw that the
existence of a limit demands a larger series of which the limit 282
forms part. To create the limit by means of the series whose
limit is to be found would therefore be a logical error. It is es-
sential that the distance from the limit should diminish indef-
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initely. But here, it is only the distance of consecutive terms
which is known to diminish indefinitely. Moreover all the a’s
are less than bn. Hence they continually differ less and less
from bn. But whatever nmay be, bn cannot be the limit of the
a’s, for bn+1 lies between bn and all the a’s. This cannot prove
that a limit exists, but only that, if it existed, it would not be
any one of the a’s or b’s, nor yet any other rational number.
Thus irrationals are not proved to exist, but may be merely
convenient fictions to describe the relations of the a’s and b’s.
268. The theory of Weierstrass concerning irrationals is
somewhat similar to that of Dedekind. In Weierstrass’s the-
ory, we have a series of terms a1; a2; : : : ; an; : : : ; such thatX
an, for all values of n, is less than some given number. This
case is presented, e.g., by an infinite decimal. The fraction
3·14159…, howevermany termswe take, remains less than 3·1416.
In this method, as Cantor points out*, the limit is not created
by the summation, but must be supposed to exist already in
order that
1X
1
an may be defined by means of it. This is the
same state of things as we found in Dedekind’s theory: series
of rational numbers cannot prove the existence of irrational
numbers as their limits, but can only prove that, if there is a
limit, it must be irrational.
Thus the arithmetical theory of irrationals, in either of the
above forms, is liable to the following objections. (1) No proof
is obtained from it of the existence of other than rational
numbers, unless we accept some axiom of continuity differ-
ent from that satisfied by rational numbers; and for such an
axiom we have as yet seen no ground. (2) Granting the exis-
tence of irrationals, they are merely specified, not defined, by
*Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, p. 22. I quoteWeierstrass’s theory from the ac-
count in Stolz,Vorlesungen über allgemeine Arithmetik, i.
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the series of rational numbers whose limits they are. Unless
they are independently postulated, the series in question can-
not be known tohave a limit; and aknowledgeof the irrational
number which is a limit is presupposed in the proof that it is
a limit. Thus, although without any appeal to Geometry, any
given irrational number can be specified bymeans of an infinite
series of rational numbers, yet, from rational numbers alone,
no proof can be obtained that there are irrational numbers at
all, and their existence must be proved from a new and inde-
pendent postulate.
Another objection to the above theory is that it supposes
rationals and irrationals to form part of one and the same se-
ries generated by relations of greater and less. This raises the
same kind of difficulties as we found to result, in Part II, from
the notion that integers are greater or less than rationals, or 283
that some rationals are integers. Rationals are essentially rela-
tions between integers, but irrationals are not such relations.
Given an infinite series of rationals, theremay be two integers
whose relation is a rational which limits the series, or there
may be no such pair of integers. The entity postulated as the
limit, in this latter case, is no longer of the same kind as the
terms of the series which it is supposed to limit; for each of
them is, while the limit is not, a relation between two integers.
Of such heterogeneous terms, it is difficult to suppose that
they can have relations of greater and less; and in fact, the con-
stitutive relation of greater and less, from which the series of
rationals springs, has to receive a new definition for the case
of two irrationals, or of a rational and an irrational. This def-
inition is, that an irrational is greater than a rational, when
the irrational limits a series containing terms greater than the
given rational. But what is really given here is a relation of
the given rational to a class of rationals, namely the relation
of belonging to the segment defined by the series whose limit
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is the given irrational. And in the case of two irrationals, one
is defined to be greater than the other when its defining series
contains terms greater than any terms of the defining series of
the other—a condition which amounts to saying that the seg-
ment corresponding to the one contains as a proper part the
segment corresponding to the other. These definitions define
a relation quite different from the inequality of two rationals,
namely the logical relation of inclusion. Thus the irrationals
cannot formpart of the series of rationals, butnewtermscorre-
sponding to the rationals must be found before a single series
can be constructed. Such terms, as we saw in the last chap-
ter, are found in segments; but the theories of Dedekind and
Weierstrass leave them still to seek.
269. The theory of Cantor, though not expressed, philo-
sophically speaking, with all the requisite clearness, lends it-
self more easily to the interpretation which I advocate, and is
specially designed to prove the existence of limits. He remarks*
that, in his theory, the existence of the limit is a strictly demon-
strable proposition; and he strongly emphasizes the logical er-
ror involved in attempting to deduce the existence of the limit
from the series whose limit it is (ib., p. 22)†. Cantor starts by
considering what he calls fundamental series (which are the
same as what I have called progressions) contained in a larger
series. Eachof these fundamental series is to bewholly ascend-
ing or wholly descending. Two such series are called coherent
(zusammengehörig) under the following circumstances:—
(1) If both are ascending, and after any term of either there 284
is always a term of the other;
*Op. cit., p. 24.
†Cantor’s theory of irrationalswill be found in op. cit., p. 23, and inStolz,
Vorlesungen über allgemeine Arithmetik, i, 7. I shall follow, to begin with, a
later account, which seems to me clearer; this forms §10 in an article con-
tained inMath. Annalen, xlvi, and in Rivista di Matematica, v.
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(2) If both are descending, and before any term of either
there is always a term of the other;
(3) If one is ascending, the other descending, and the one
wholly precedes the other, and there is at most one termwhich
is between the two fundamental series.
The relation of being coherent is symmetrical, in virtue of
the definition; and Cantor shows that it is transitive. In the
article from which the above remarks are extracted. Cantor
is dealing with more general topics than the definition of irra-
tionals. But the above general account of coherent series will
help us to understand the theory of irrationals. This theory is
set forth as follows in theMannichfaltigkeitslehre (p. 23ff.):—
A fundamental series of rationals is defined as a denumer-
able series such that, given any number ε, there are at most
a finite number of terms in the series the absolute values of
whose differences from subsequent terms exceed ε. That is to
say, given any number ε, however small, any two terms of the
series which both come after a certain term have a difference
which lies between +ε and ε. Such series must be of one of
three kinds: (1) Any number ε being mentioned, the absolute
values of the terms, from some term onwards, will all be less
than ε, whatever ε may be; (2) from some term onwards, all
the terms may be greater than a certain positive number ρ; (3)
from some term onwards, all the terms may be less than a cer-
tain negative number ρ. A real number b is to be defined by
the fundamental series, and is said in the first case to be zero,
in the second to be positive, and in the third to be negative.
To define the addition, etc., of these new real numbers, we ob-
serve that, if aν, aν0 be the νth terms of two fundamental series,
the series whose νth term is aν+aν0 or aν aν0 or aνaν0 is also
a fundamental series; while if the real number defined by the
series (aν)* is not zero, (aν0=aν) also defines a fundamental se-
*The symbol (aν) denotes thewhole serieswhose νth term is aν, not this
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ries. If b; b0 be the real numbers defined by the series (aν), (aν0),
the real numbers defined by (aν + aν0), (aν  aν0), (aν aν0) and
(aν=aν0) are defined to be b + b0, b   b0, b  b0 and b0=b respec-
tively. Hence we proceed to the definitions of equal, greater
and less among real numbers. We define that b = b0 means
b b0 = 0; b > b0means that b b0 is positive; and b < b0means
that b   b0 is negative—all terms which have been already de-
fined. Cantor remarks further that in these definitions one of
the numbers may be rational. This may be formally justified,
in part, by the remark that a denumerable series whose terms
are all one and the same rational number is a fundamental se-
ries, according to the definition; hence in constructing the dif- 285
ferences aν   aν0, by which b  b0 is defined, we may put some
fixed rational a in place of aν0 for all values of ν. But the conse-
quence that we can define b   a does not follow, and that for
the following reason. There is absolutely nothing in the above
definition of the real numbers to show that a is the real num-
ber defined by a fundamental series whose terms are all equal
to a. The only reason why this seems self-evident is, that the
definition by limits is unconsciously present, making us think
that, since a is plainly the limit of a series whose terms are all
equal toa, thereforeamustbe the real numberdefinedby such
a series. Since, however, Cantor insists—rightly, as I think—
that his method is independent of limits, which, on the con-
trary, are to be deduced from it (pp. 24–5), we must not allow
this preconception to weigh with us. And the preconception,
if I am not mistaken, is in fact erroneous. There is nothing
in the definitions above enumerated to show that a real num-
ber and a rational number can ever be either equal or unequal,
and there are very strong reasons for supposing the contrary.
Hence also we must reject the proposition (p. 24) that, if b be
the real number defined by a fundamental series (aν), then
term alone.
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lim
ν=1
aν = b.
Cantor is proud of the supposed fact that his theory renders
this proposition strictly demonstrable. But, as we have seen,
there is nothing to show that a rational can be subtracted from
a real number, and hence the supposed proof is fallacious.
What is true, and what has all the mathematical advantages
of the above theorem, is this: Connected with every rational
a there is a real number, namely that defined by the fundamen-
tal series whose terms are all equal to a; if b be the real number
defined by a fundamental series (aν) and if bν be the real num-
ber defined by a fundamental series whose terms are all equal
to aν, then (bν) is a fundamental series of real numbers whose
limit is b. But from thiswe cannot infer, asCantor supposes (p.
24), that Lim aν exists; this will only be true in the case where
(aν) has a rational limit. The limit of a series of rationals ei-
ther does not exist, or is rational; in no case is it a real number.
But in all cases a fundamental series of rationals defines a real
number, which is never identical with any rational.
270. Thus to sum up what has been said on Cantor’s the-
ory: By proving that two fundamental series may have the
relation of being coherent, and that this relation is symmet-
rical and transitive, Cantor shows, by the help of the princi-
ple of abstraction (which is tacitly assumed), that two such se-
ries both have some one relation to one third term, and to no
other. This term, when our series consist of rationals, we de-
fine as the real number which both determine. We can then
define the rules of operation for real numbers, and the rela-
tions of equal, greater and less between them. But the princi-
ple of abstraction leaves us in doubt as to what the real num- 286
bers really are. One thing, however, seems certain. They can-
not form part of any series containing rationals, for the ratio-
nals are relations between integers, while the real numbers are
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not so; and the constitutive relation in virtue of which ratio-
nals form a series is defined solely by means of the integers be-
tween which they are relations, so that the same relation can-
not hold between two real numbers, or between a real and a ra-
tional number. In this doubt as to what real numbers may be,
we find that segments of rationals, as defined in the preceding
chapter, fulfil all the requirements laid down in Cantor’s def-
inition, and also those derived from the principle of abstrac-
tion. Hence there is no logical ground for distinguishing seg-
ments of rationals from real numbers. If they are to be distin-
guished, it must be in virtue of some immediate intuition, or
of some wholly new axiom, such as, that all series of rationals
must have a limit. But this would be fatal to the uniform de-
velopment ofArithmetic andAnalysis from the five premisses
which Peano has found sufficient, and would be wholly con-
trary to the spirit of those who have invented the arithmetical
theory of irrationals. The above theory, on the contrary, re-
quires no new axiom, for if there are rationals, there must be
segments of rationals; and it removes what seems, mathemat-
ically, a wholly unnecessary complication, since, if segments
will do all that is required of irrationals, it seems superfluous
to introduce anewparallel serieswithprecisely the samemath-
ematical properties. I conclude, then, that an irrational actu-
ally is a segment of rationalswhichdoes not have a limit; while
a real number which would be commonly identified with a ra-
tional is a segment which does have a rational limit; and this
applies, e.g., to the real number defined by a fundamental se-
ries of rationals whose terms are all equal. This is the theory
which was set forth positively in the preceding Chapter, and
to which, after examining the current theories of irrationals,
we are again brought back. The greater part of it applies to
compact series in general; but some of the uses of fundamen-
tal series, as we shall see hereafter, presuppose either numeri-
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 413
cal measurement of distances or stretches, or that a denumer-
able compact series is contained in our series in a certain man-
ner*. The whole of it, however, applies to any compact series
obtained fromaprogression as the rationals are obtained from
the integers; andhence no property of numbers is involved be-
yond the fact that they form a progression.
*See Chapter xxxvi.
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chapter xxxv
CANTOR’S FIRSTDEFINITION
OFCONTINUITY
271. The notion of continuity has been treated by philoso- 287
phers, as a rule, as though it were incapable of analysis. They
have said many things about it, including the Hegelian dic-
tum that everything discrete is also continuous and vice versâ*.
This remark, as being anexemplificationofHegel’s usual habit
of combining opposites, has been tamely repeated by all his
followers. But as to what they meant by continuity and dis-
creteness, they preserved a discreet and continuous silence;
only one thing was evident, that whatever they did mean
could not be relevant to mathematics, or to the philosophy of
space and time.
In the last chapter of Part III, we agreed provisionally to call
a series continuous if it had a term between any two. This def-
inition usually satisfied Leibniz†, and would have been gen-
erally thought sufficient until the revolutionary discoveries
of Cantor. Nevertheless there was reason to surmise, before
the time of Cantor, that a higher order of continuity is pos-
sible. For, ever since the discovery of incommensurables in
Geometry—a discovery of which is the proof set forth in the
tenth Book of Euclid—itwas probable that space had continu-
ity of a higher order than that of the rational numbers, which,
*Logic, Wallace’s Translation, p. 188;Werke, v, p. 201.
†Phil. Werke, Gerhardt’s ed., Vol. ii, p. 515. But cf. Cassirer, Leibniz’ Sys-
tem, Berlin, 1901, p. 183.
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nevertheless, have the kind of continuity defined in Part III.
The kind which belongs to the rational numbers, and con-
sists in having a term between any two, we have agreed to call
compactness; and to avoid confusion, I shall never again speak
of this kind as continuity. But that other kind of continuity,
which was seen to belong to space, was treated, as Cantor re-
marks‡, as a kind of religious dogma, and was exempted from
that conceptual analysis which is requisite to its comprehen-
sion. Indeed it was often held to show, especially by philoso-
phers, that any subject-matter possessing it was not validly an-
alyzable into elements. Cantor has shown that this view ismis-
taken, by a precise definition of the kind of continuity which 288
must belong to space. This definition, if it is to be explana-
tory of space, must, as he rightly urges*, be effected without
any appeal to space. We find, accordingly, in his final defi-
nition, only ordinal notions of a general kind, which can be
fully exemplified in Arithmetic. The proof that the notion so
defined is precisely the kind of continuity belonging to space,
must be postponed to Part VI. Cantor has given his definition
in two forms, of which the earlier is not purely ordinal, but in-
volves also either number or quantity. In the present chapter,
I wish to translate this earlier definition into language as sim-
ple and untechnical as possible, and then to show how series
which are continuous in this sense occur in Arithmetic, and
generally in the theory of any progressionwhatever. The later
definition will be given in the following Chapter.
272. In order that a series should be continuous, it must
have two characteristics: it must be perfect and cohesive
(zusammenhängend, bien enchaînée)†. Both these terms have
a technical meaning requiring considerable explanation. I
‡Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, p. 28.
*Acta Math. ii, p. 403.
†Acta Math. ii, pp. 405, 406;Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, p. 31.
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shall begin with the latter.
(1) Speaking popularly, a series is cohesive, or has cohesion,
when it contains no finite gaps. The precise definition, as
given by Cantor, is as follows: “We call T a cohesive collection
of points, if for any two points t and t0 of T, for a number ε
given in advance and as small as we please, there are always,
in several ways, a finite number of points t1; t2; : : : tν, belong-
ing to T, such that the distances tt1; t1t2:t2t3; : : : tνt0 are all less
than ε.”‡ This condition, it will be seen, has essential refer-
ence to distance. It is not necessary that the collection consid-
ered should consist of numbers, nor that ε shouldbe anumber.
All that is necessary is, that the collection should be a series in
which there are distances obeying the axiom of Archimedes
and having nominimum, and that ε should be an arbitrary dis-
tance of the kind presented by the series. If the series be the
whole field of some asymmetrical transitive relation, or if it be
the whole of the terms having a certain asymmetrical transi-
tive relation to a given term, wemay substitute stretch for dis-
tance; and even if the series be only part of such a series, we
may substitute the stretch in the complete series of which our
series forms part. Butwemust, in order to give anymeaning to
cohesion, have something numerically measurable. How far
this condition is necessary, and what can be done without it, I
shall show at a later stage. It is through this condition that our
discussions of quantity and measurement, in Part III, become
relevant to the discussion of continuity.
If the distances or stretches in our series do not obey the ax- 289
iom of Archimedes, there are some among them that are in-
capable of a finite numerical measure in terms of some oth-
ers among them. In this case, there is no longer an analogy
of the requisite kind with either the rational or the real num-
‡The words “in several ways” seem superfluous. They are omitted by
Vivanti: see Formulaire de Mathématiques, Vol. i, vi, §1, No. 22.
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bers, and the series is necessarily not cohesive. For let δ; d
be two distances; let them be such that, for any finite num-
ber n, nδ is less than d. In this case, if δ be the distance ε,
and d be the distance tt0, it is plain that the condition of cohe-
sion cannot be satisfied. Such cases actually occur, and—what
seems paradoxical—they can be created by merely interpolat-
ing terms in certain cohesive series. For example, the series
of segments of rationals is cohesive; andwhen these segments
have rational limits, the limits are not contained in them. Add
now to the series what may be called the completed segments,
i.e. the segments having rational limits together with their lim-
its. These are new terms, forming part of the same series,
since they have the relation of whole and part to the former
terms. But now the difference between a segment and the cor-
responding completed segment consists of a single rational,
while all other differences in the series consist of an infinite
number of rationals. Thus the axiomofArchimedes fails, and
the new series is not cohesive.
The condition that distances in the series are to have no
minimum is satisfied by real or rational numbers; and it is
necessary, if cohesion is to be extended to non-numerical se-
ries, that, when any unit distance is selected, there should be
distances whose numerical measure is less than ε, where ε is
any rational number. For, if there be a minimum distance,
we cannot make our distances tt1; t1t2 : : : less than this mini-
mum, which is contrary to the definition of cohesion. And
there must not only be no minimum to distances in general,
but there must be no minimum to distances from any given
term. Hence every cohesive series must be compact, i.e.must
have a term between any two.
Itmust not be supposed, however, that every compact series
is cohesive. Consider, for example, the series formed of 0 and
2 m=n, wherem; n are any integers such thatm is less than n.
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Here there is a term between any two, but the distance from 0
cannot bemade less than 1. Hence the series, though compact,
is not cohesive. This series, however, is not complete, being
part only of the series of rationals, by means of which its dis-
tances are measured. In a complete series, the conditions are
somewhat different. We must distinguish two cases, accord-
ing as there are or are not distances, (a) If there are distances,
and equal distances do not correspond to equal stretches, it
may happen that, though the series is compact, the distances
from some term never become less than some finite distance.
This case would be presented by magnitudes, if we were to ac-
cept Meinong’s opinion that the distance of any finite magni-
tude from zero is always infinite (op:cit: p. 84). It is presented
by numbers, if we measure distances (as there are many rea- 290
sons for doing) by log x=y. Thus in this case, with regard to
distances, the series is not cohesive, though it is complete and
compact. (b) If there are no distances, but only stretches, then,
assuming the axiom of Archimedes, any stretch will be less
than nε, for a suitable value of n. Hence, dividing the stretch
into n parts, one at least of these will be less than ε. But there
is no way of proving that all can be made less than ε, unless
we assume either the axiom of linearity (that any stretch can
be divided into n equal parts), or amore complicated butmore
general axiom, to the effect that a stretch d can be divided into
n parts, each of which is greater than d=(n + 1) and less than
d=(n   1), whatever integer n may be. With this axiom and
the axiom of Archimedes, a complete compact series must be
cohesive; but these two axioms together render completeness
superfluous and compactness redundant. Thus we see that
cohesion is in almost all cases a condition distinct from com-
pactness. Compactness is purely serial, while cohesion has es-
sential reference to numbers or to the conditions of numer-
ical measurement. Cohesion implies compactness, but com-
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pactness never implies cohesion, except in the sole case of the
complete series of rationals or real numbers.
273. (2) To explain what is meant by a perfect series is more
difficult. A series is perfect when it coincides with its first
derivative*. To explain this definition, we must examine the
notion of the derivatives of a series†, and this demands an ex-
planation of a limiting-point of a series. Speaking generally, the
terms of a series are of two kinds, those which Cantor calls
isolated points, and those which he calls limiting-points. A fi-
nite series has only isolated points; an infinite series must de-
fine at least one limiting-point, though this need not belong
to the series. A limiting-point of a series is defined by Can-
tor to be a term such that, in any interval containing the term,
there are an infinite number of terms of the series (ib. p. 343).
The definition is given in terms of the points on a line, but it
has no essential reference to space. The limiting-point may
or may not be a term of the original series. The assemblage
of all limiting-points is called the first derivative of the series.
The first derivative of the first derivative is called the second
derivative, and so on. Peano gives the definition of the first
derivative of a class of real numbers as follows: Let u be a class
of real numbers, and let x be a real number (whichmay or may
not be a u) such that the lower limit of the absolute values of
the differences of x from terms of u other than x is zero; then
the class of terms x satisfying this condition is the first deriva-
tive of u‡. This definition is virtually identical with that of
Cantor, but it brings outmore explicitly the connection of the
derivative with limits. A series, then, is perfect, when it con-
sists of exactly the same terms as its first derivative; i.e. when 291
all its points are limiting-points, and all its limiting-points be-
*Acta Math. ii, p. 405.
†Ib. pp. 341–4.
‡Formulaire, Vol. ii, No. 3 (1899), §71, 1·0 and 4·0.
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long to it.
274. But with regard to the latter point, namely, that all
limiting-points of the series must belong to it, some expla-
nation is necessary. Take, for example, the series of rational
numbers. Every rational number is the limit of some series
of rational numbers, and thus the rationals are contained in
their first derivative. But as regards those series of rationals
which do not have a rational limit, we agreed in the preceding
chapter that they do not have a limit at all. Hence all series of
rationals which have a limit have a rational limit, and there-
fore, by the letter of the definition, the rationals should form
a perfect series. But this is not the case. Cantor, as we saw in
connectionwith irrationals, believes, whatwewere compelled
to regard as erroneous, that every series fulfilling certain con-
ditions, which may be called the conditions of convergency,
must have a limit. Hence he regards those series of rationals
which have no rational limit as having an irrational limit, and
as therefore having a limit not belonging to the series of ratio-
nals; and therefore the series of rationals does not contain all
the terms of its first derivative. In fact, the first derivative of
the rational numbers is held to be the real numbers. But when
we regard the real numbers as segments of rationals, it is im-
possible to take this view; and when we deny the existence-
theorem for limits, it is necessary to modify Cantor’s defini-
tion of perfection*. This modification we must now examine.
What we must say is, that a series is perfect when all its
points are limiting-points, and when further, any series being
chosen out of our first series, if this new series is of the sort
which is usually regarded as defining a limit, then it actually
has a limit belonging to our first series. Tomake this statement
precise, wemust examinewhat are the conditions usually con-
*This point is ably discussed by Couturat, Revue de Mét. et de Morale,
March, 1900, p. 167.
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sidered as defining a limit. In the case of denumerable series,
they are simple, and have already been set forth. They come
to this, that, given any distance ε, however small, all the terms
of our series after some definite term, say the mth, are such
that any two of them have a difference whose absolute value
is less than ε. This statement, it will be seen, involves either
number or quantity, i.e. it is not purely ordinal. It is a curious
fact that, though the supposed condition for the existence of
a limit cannot, by our presentmethod, be stated in purely ordi-
nal terms, the limit of adenumerable series, if therebeone, can
always be defined in purely ordinal terms. I shall distinguish
Cantor’s fundamental series in a compact series into progres-
sions and regressions, according as earlier terms have to later
ones always the relation P, or always the relation P (where P is
the generating relation of the compact series inwhich the said
progressions and regressions are contained). The compact se- 292
ries is further assumed to be complete. A term x is then the
limit of a progression, if every term of the progression has to
x the relation P, while every term which has to x the relation
P also has this relation to some term of the progression. This
definition, it will be seen, is purely ordinal; and a similar defi-
nition will apply to a regression.
Let us examine next what are the usual conditions for the
existence of a limit to a non-denumerable series. When we
come to examine non-numerical series, we shall find it incon-
venient to be restricted to denumerable series, and therefore
it will be well to consider other series at once. Here, of course,
if any denumerable series contained in our larger series fulfils
the conditions for a limit, there will be a corresponding defini-
tion of a limiting-point in our larger series. And the upper or
lower limit of the whole or part of our larger series, if there is
one, may be defined exactly as in the case of a progression or a
regression. But general conditions for the existence of a limit
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cannot be laid down, except by reference to denumerable se-
ries contained in our larger series. And itwill be observed that
Cantor’s definition of a limiting-point assumes the existence
of such a point, and cannot be turned into a definition of the
conditions underwhich there are such points. This illustrates
the great importance of Cantor’s fundamental series.
Themethodof segmentswill, however, throw some light on
this matter. We saw in Chapter xxxiii that any class of terms
in a series defines a segment, and that this segment sometimes
can, but sometimes cannot, be defined by a single term. When
it can be so defined, this term is its upper limit; and if this term
does not belong to the class bywhich the segmentwas defined,
then it is also the upper limit of that class. But when the seg-
ment has no upper limit, then the class by which the segment
was defined also has no upper limit. In all cases, however—
and this is one of the chief virtues of segments—the segment
defined by an infinite class which has no upper limit is the up-
per limit of the segments defined by the several members of
the class. Thus, whether or not the class has an upper limit,
the segmentswhich its various terms define always have one—
provided, that is, that the compact series in which the class is
contained has terms coming after all terms of the class.
Wecannowexpress, without assuming the existence of lim-
its in cases where this is not demonstrable, what is meant by a
series containing its first derivative. When any class of terms
is contained in a compact series, the conditionswhich are com-
monly said to insure the existence of an upper limit to the
class, though they do not insure this, do insure an upper limit
to the class of segments defined by the several members of the
class. And as regards lower limits, the same proposition holds
concerningwhatwe called upper segments. Hencewemay de-
fine: A class u of terms forming the whole or part of a series
is perfect when each of the terms of u is the upper or lower 293
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limit of some class contained in u, and when, if v be any class
contained in u, and the lower segments defined by the several
members of v have an upper limit, or the upper segments have
a lower limit, this limiting segment is one of those that can be
definedby a single termofu, i.e.have a termofu for their upper
or lower limit respectively. This definition, it must be admit-
ted, is more complicated than Cantor’s, but it is free from the
unjustifiable assumption of the existence of limits.
We may repeat the definition of perfection in what is per-
haps less difficult language. Given any series, and any class of
terms u contained in this series, there are an upper and a lower
segment corresponding to every term of u. Any infinite set
of terms v being chosen out of u, there are certain conditions
which are commonly said to insure that v has an upper limit,
which, it is admitted, may belong neither to u, nor to the se-
ries in which u is contained. What these conditions do insure,
however, is that the class of lower segments corresponding to v
has an upper limit. If the series is perfect, vwill have an upper
limit whenever the corresponding class of segments has one,
and this upper limit of v will be a term of u. The definition of
perfection requires that this should hold both for upper and
lower limits, and for any class v contained in u.
275. As the question concerning the existence of limits,
which has necessitated the above complication, is one of some
philosophical importance, I shall repeat the arguments against
assuming the existence of limits in the class of series to which
the rational numbers belong. Where a series is imperfect,
while its first derivative is perfect, there the first derivative is
logically prior to its own formation. That is to say, it is only by
presupposing the perfect series that it can be shown to be the
derivative of the imperfect series. We have already seen that
this is the case with individual irrational numbers; it is easy
to see that the principle is general. Wherever the derivative
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contains a term not belonging to the original series, that term
is the limit of some denumerable series forming an integral
part of the first series. If this series with a limit have the gen-
eral term an, then—wording the definition so as not to apply
only to series of numbers—there is always a definite number
m, for any specified distance ε, however small, such that, if n is
greater than m, the distance between an+p, and an is less than
ε, whatever positive integer pmay be. From this it is inferred
that the series (an) has a limit, and it is shown that, in many
cases, this limit cannot belong to the series out of which the
series (an) was chosen. But the inference that there is a limit is
precarious. It may be supported either by previous knowledge
of the term which is the limit, or by some axiom necessitat-
ing the existence of such a term. When the term which is the
limit is independently known, itmay be easily shown to be the
limit. But when it is not known, it cannot be proved to exist 294
at all, unless we introduce some axiom of continuity. Such an
axiom is introduced by Dedekind, but we saw that his axiom
is unsatisfactory. The principle of abstraction, which shows
that two coherent series have something in common, is fully
satisfied by segments. And in some cases, amongwhich is that
of the rationals, it seems that the constitutive relation of the
imperfect series cannot hold between any termsnot belonging
to this series, so that the existence of limits not belonging to
the series is wholly impossible. For a limit must have a certain
position in a series of which the series which it limits forms
part, and this requires some constitutive relation of which the
limit, as well as the terms limited, must be capable. An inde-
pendent complete series, such as the rationals, cannot, in fact,
have any limiting-points not belonging to it. For, if R be the
constitutive relation, and two terms a; b, have the relation R,
any third term c, which has this relation or its converse to ei-
ther, and therefore both, of the terms a; b, belongs to the same
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series as a and b. But the limit, if it exists, must have the con-
stitutive relation to the terms which it limits; hence it must
belong to the complete series to which they belong. Hence
any series which has actual limiting-points not belonging to
it is only part of some complete series; and a complete series
which is not perfect is one in which the limits defined in the
usual way, but not belonging to the series, do not exist at all.
Hence, in any complete series, either some definable limits do
not exist, or the series contains its first derivative.
In order to render the arbitrariness of assuming the exis-
tence of limits still more evident, let us endeavour to set up
an axiom of continuity more irreproachable than Dedekind’s.
We shall find that it can still be denied with perfect impunity.
When a number of positions in a series continually differ
less and less from each other, and are known to be all on one
side of some given position, there must exist (so our axiom
might run) some position to which they approximate indefi-
nitely, so that no distance can be specified so small that they
will not approach nearer than by this distance. If this axiom
be admitted, it will follow that all imperfect series, whose first
derivatives are perfect, presuppose these first derivatives, and
are to be regarded as selections from them. Let us examine the
consequences of denying our axiom in the case of a series of
numbers. In this case, the unwarymight suppose, the position
next to all the terms an, but not belonging to them, would be
(say) p, where p   an is greater than ε, for a suitable value of ε,
whatever nmay be. But if our series is compact, there is a term
between p and p ε, say p0. Thus p0 an is less than p an, what-
ever n may be. Thus p0 is nearer all the a’s than p is, contrary
to the hypothesis. But the above denial was not direct, and
the fact that it seemed correct illustrates the fallacies which in
this subject are hard to avoid. The axiom is: There is a term
to which the a’s approach as near as we like. The denial was: 295
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There is a term nearest to the a’s, but at a finite distance. The
denial should have been: There is no term to which the a’s ap-
proach as near as we like. In other words, whatever term we
specify, say p, there is some finite distance ε, such that p an is
greater than ε, whatever an may be. This is true in the case of
series of rational numberswhichhaveno rational limit. In this
case, there is no term nearest to the a’s, but at a finite distance,
while also, whatever term beyond all the a’s we specify (except
where our series has a rational limit), none of the a’s approach
nearer to this term than by a certain finite distance ε. Every
term beyond the a’s is at more than some finite distance from
all of them, but there is no finite distance which every term
beyond the a’s exceeds. The introduction of irrationals intro-
duces symmetry into this odd state of things, so that there is a
term to which the a’s approach indefinitely, as well as a series
of terms indefinitely approaching the a’s. When irrationals
are not admitted, if we have a term p after all the a’s, and a
small distance ε, then, if ε be specified, p can be chosen so that
p   an is less than ε, whatever n may be; but if p be specified,
an ε can always be found (except when the limit is rational) so
that p   an is greater than ε, whatever nmay be. This state of
things, though curious, is not self-contradictory. The admis-
sionof irrationals, as opposed to segments, is thus logically un-
necessary; as it is alsomathematically superfluous, and fatal to
the theory of rationals, there are no reasons in its favour, and
strong reasons against it. Hence, finally, any axiom designed
to show the existence of limits in cases where they cannot oth-
erwise be shown to exist, is to be rejected; andCantor’s defini-
tion of perfectionmust bemodified as above. This conclusion
will, in future, be regarded as established.
Having now analyzedCantor’s earlier definition of continu-
ity, I shall proceed to examine his later ordinal definition, and
the application of its various portions to series more general
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 427
than those of numbers, showing, if possible, the exact points
in which these various portions are required.
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chapter xxxvi
ORDINALCONTINUITY*
276. The definition of continuity which we examined in 296
the preceding chapter was, as we saw, not purely ordinal; it
demanded, in at least two points, some reference to either
numbers, or numerically measurable magnitudes. Neverthe-
less continuity seems like a purely ordinal notion; and this has
led Cantor to construct a definition which is free from all el-
ements extraneous to order†. I shall now examine this defini-
tion, as well as others which may be suggested. We shall find
that, so long as all references to number and quantity are ex-
cluded, there are theorems of great importance, especially as
regards fundamental series, which, with any suggested ordi-
nal definition except that of Cantor, remain indemonstrable,
and are presumably sometimes false‡—a fact from which the
merits of Cantor’s definition, now to be given, are apparent.
277. Cantor’s definition of the continuum in his later ar-
ticle§ is as follows. We start (§9) from the type of series pre-
*The present chapter deals with the same subject as M. Couturat’s ar-
ticle, “Sur la définition du Continu,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,
March, 1900. I agree in the main with this article, in which much of what I
said in the preceding chapter, and shall say in this, will be found.
†Math. Annalen, xlvi.
‡Mathematical proofs of such theorems as are not already well known
will be found in RdM, vii, 3.
§Math. Annalen, xlvi, §11.
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sented by the rational numbers greater than 0 and less than
1, in their order of magnitude. This type we call η. A series
of this type we define by the following marks. (1) It is denu-
merable, that is, by taking its terms in a suitable order (which,
however, must be different from that in which they are given),
we can give them a one-one correspondence with the finite in-
tegers. (2)The series hasnofirst or last term. (3)There is a term
between any two, i.e. the series is compact (überall dicht). It is
then proved that these three characteristics completely define
the typeof orderpresentedby the rationals, that is to say, there
is a one-one correspondence, between any two series having
these three properties, in which earlier terms correspond to
earlier terms, and later ones to later ones. This is established
by the use of mathematical induction, which is applicable in
virtueof the fact that series of this type aredenumerable. Thus 297
all series which are denumerable, endless*, and compact, are
ordinally similar. We now proceed (§10) to the consideration
of fundamental series contained in any one-dimensional se-
riesM. We show (as has been already explained)what ismeant
by calling two fundamental series coherent, andwe give anordi-
nal definition of the limit of a fundamental series, namely, in
the case of a progression, the limit comes after the whole pro-
gression, but every term before the limit comes before some
term of the progression; with a corresponding definition for
the limit of a regression,We prove that no fundamental series
canhavemore than one limit, and that, if a fundamental series
has a limit, this is also the limit of all coherent series; also that
two fundamental series, of which one is part of the other, are
coherent. Any termofMwhich is the limit of some fundamen-
tal series inM is called a principal term ofM. If all the terms of
M are principal terms,M is called condensed in itself (insichdicht).
*I.e. having neither a beginning nor an end.
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If every fundamental series inM has a limit inM, M is called
closed (abgeschlossen)†. If M is both closed and condensed in
itself, it is perfect. All these properties, if they belong toM, be-
long to any series which is ordinally similar toM. With these
preparations, we advance at last to the definition of the con-
tinuum (§11). Let θ be the type of the series to which belong
the real numbers from 0 to 1, both inclusive. Then θ, as we
know, is a perfect type. But this alone does not characterize θ.
It has further the property of containing within itself a series
of the type η, to which the rationals belong, in such a way that
between any two terms of the θ-series there are terms of the
η-series. Hence the following definition of the continuum:
A one-dimensional continuumM is a series which (1) is per-
fect, (2) contains within itself a denumerable series S of which
there are terms between any two terms ofM.
In this definition, it is not necessary to add the other prop-
erties which are required to show that S is of the type η. For
if S had a first or last term, this would be also the first or last
termofM; hencewe could take it away from S, and the remain-
ing series would still satisfy the condition (2), but would have
no first or last term; and the condition (2) together with (1) in-
sures that S is a compact series. Cantor proves that any series
M satisfying the above conditions is ordinally similar to the
number-continuum, i.e. the real numbers from 0 to 1, both in-
clusive; andhence it follows that the above definition includes
precisely the same class of series as those thatwere included in
his former definition. He does not assert that his new defini-
tion is purely ordinal, and it might be doubted, at first sight,
whether it is so. Let us see for ourselves whether any extra-
ordinal notions are contained in it.
278. The only point as to which any doubt could arise is 298
†Not to be confoundedwith the elementary sense of a closed series dis-
cussed in Part IV.
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with regard to the condition of being denumerable. To be a de-
numerable collection is to be a collection whose terms are all
the terms of some progression. This notion, so far, is purely
ordinal. But in the case supposed, that of the rationals or of
any ordinally similar series, the terms forming the series must
be capable of two orders, in one of which they form a com-
pact series, while in the other they form a progression. To dis-
cover whether or not a given set of terms is capable of these
two orders, will in general demand other than ordinal condi-
tions; nevertheless, the notion itself is purely ordinal. Now
we know, from the similarity of all such series to the series of
rationals (which involves only ordinal ideas), that no such se-
ries is perfect. But it remains to be seen whether we can prove
this without appealing to the special properties of the ratio-
nals which result from there being a series in which there is
distance. We know, as a matter of fact, that no denumerable
series can be perfect*, but we want here a purely ordinal proof
of this theorem. Such a proof, however, is easily given. For
take the terms of our denumerable compact series S in the or-
der in which they form a progression, and in this order call
them u. Starting with the first in this order, which we will call
x0, there must be one which, in the other order S, follows this
term. Take the first such term, x1, as the second in a funda-
mental series v. This term has a finite number of predecessors
in the progression u, and therefore has successors in S which
are also successors in u; for the number of successors in S is al-
ways infinite. Take the first of these common successors, say
x2, as the third term of our fundamental series v. Proceeding
in this way, we can construct an ascending fundamental se-
ries in S, the terms of which have the same order in u as in S.
This series cannot have a limit in S, for each term xn succeeds,
in S, every term which precedes it in u. Hence any term of S
*Acta Mathematica, ii, p. 409.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 432
will be surpassed by some term xn of our fundamental series
v, and hence this fundamental series has no limit in S. The
theorem that a denumerable endless series cannot be perfect
is, therefore, purely ordinal. From this point onwards there is
no difficulty, and our former theory of segments enables us to
state the matter simply. Given a denumerable, endless, com-
pact series S, construct all the segments defined by fundamen-
tal series in S. These form a perfect series, and between any
two terms of the series of segments there is a segment whose
upper (or lower) limit is a term of S. Segments of this kind,
whichmay be called rational segments, are a series of the same
type as S, and are contained in the whole series of segments in
the requiredmanner. Hence the ordinal definition of the con-
tinuum is complete.
279. It must not be supposed that continuity as above de-
fined can only be exemplified, in Arithmetic, by the devious
course from integers to rationals, and thence to real numbers.
On the contrary, the integers themselves can be made to illus- 299
trate continuity. Consider all possible infinite classes of inte-
gers, and let them be arranged on the following plan. Of two
classes u; v, of which the smallest number in u is less than the
smallest in v, u comes first. If the first n terms of u and v are
identical, but the (n + 1)th terms are different, that which has
the smaller (n+ 1)th term is to come first. This series has a first
term, namely, the whole class of the integers, but no last term.
Any completed segment of the series, however, is a continu-
ous series, as the reader can easily see for himself. The denu-
merable compact series contained in it is composed of those
infinite classes which contain all numbers greater than some
number, i.e. those containing all but a finite number of num-
bers. Thus classes of finite integers alone suffice to generate
continuous series.
280. The above definition, it will be observed, depends
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upon progressions. As progressions are the very essence of
discreteness, it seemsparadoxical thatwe should require them
in defining continuity*. And, after all, as it is certain that peo-
ple have not in the past associated any precise idea with the
word continuity, the definition we adopt is, in some degree, ar-
bitrary. Series having the properties enumerated in Cantor’s
definitionwould generally be called continuous, but sowould
many others which his definition excludes. In any case it will
be a valuable inquiry to ask what can be done by compact se-
ries without progressions.
Let u be any endless compact series, whose generating re-
lation is P, and concerning which nothing further is known.
Then, by means of any term or any class of terms in u, we can
define a segment of u. Let us denote byU the class of all lower
segments of u. A lower segment, it may be well to repeat, is
a class v of terms contained in u, not null, and not coexten-
sive with u, and such that v has no last term, and every term
preceding a v is a v. In the converse case, when v has no first
term, and every term following a v is a v, v is called an upper
segment. It is then easy to prove that every segment consists of
all the terms preceding (or following) either some single term
of u, or a variable term of some class of terms of u; and that
every single term, and every class of terms, defines an upper
and a lower segment in this manner. Then, if V denote the
class of upper segments, it is easy to prove that bothU andV
are again endless compact series, whose generating relation is
that of whole or part; while if u has one or two ends, so have
*Mr Whitehead has shown that the following simpler definition is
equivalent to Cantor’s. A series is continuous when (1) every segment,
upper or lower, has a limit, and the series has a first and a last term; (2) a
denumerable compact series is contained in it in such a way that there are
terms of this latter series between any two terms of our original series. In
this definition, progressions are relevant only in defining a denumerable
series.
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U andV, though the end-terms are not segments according to
the definition. If we now proceed to the consideration of seg-
ments inU orV (U say), we shall find that the segment ofU’s 300
defined by any class whatever ofU’s can always be defined by
a singleU, which, if the class is infinite and has no last term, is
the upper limit of the class, and which, in all cases, is the log-
ical sum of all the members of the class—members which, it
must be remembered, are all themselves classes contained in
u*. Hence all classes contained in U and having no last term
have an upper limit inU; and also (what is a distinct proposi-
tion) all classes contained inU and having no first term have a
lower limit inU, except in the casewhere the lower limit is the
logical zero or null-class; and the lower limit is always the logi-
cal product of all the classes composing the class which it lim-
its. Thus by adding toU the null-class, we insure thatU shall
be a closed series. There is a sense in whichU is condensed in
itself, namely, this: every term ofU is the upper limit of a suit-
ably chosen class contained in U, for every term is the upper
limit of the segment of U’s which it defines; and every term
of U is a lower limit of the class of those U’s of which it is a
proper part. But there is absolutely no proof, so far at least as
I have been able to discover, that every term ofU is the upper
or lower limit of a fundamental series. There is no à priori rea-
son why, in any series, the limit of any class should always be
also the limit of a fundamental series; this seems, in fact, to
be a prerogative of series of the types to which rationals and
real numbers respectively belong. In our present case, at least,
though our series is, in the above general sense, condensed in
*The definition of the logical sum of the members of a class of classes,
in a form not involving finitude, is, I believe, due to Peano. It is as follows:
Let w be a class of classes; then the logical sum of the members of w is the
class of terms x such that there is some class belonging to w, to which x
belongs. See Formulaire, Vol. ii, Part I (1897), No. 461.
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itself, there seems no reason for supposing its terms to be all
of them limits of fundamental series, and in this special sense
the series may not be condensed in itself.
281. It is instructive to examine the result of confining the
terms ofU to such segments as can be defined by fundamental
series. In this case it is well to consider, in addition to upper
and lower segments, their supplements, as they may be called,
of which I shall shortly give the definition. Let a compact se-
ries v be given, generated by a transitive asymmetrical relation
P, and let u be any fundamental series in v. If earlier terms of
u have to later ones the relation P, I shall call u a progression; if
the relation P, I shall call u a regression. If now w be any class
whatever contained in v, w defines, as we have already seen,
four other classes in v, namely (1) the class of terms before ev-
ery w, which I shall call wπ; (2) the class of terms after every
w, which I shall call wπ; (3) the class of terms before some w,
which I shall call πw; (4) the class of terms after somew, which
I shall call πw. The classes (3) and (4) are lower and upper seg-
ments respectively; the classes (1) and (2) are supplements to 301
(4) and (3) respectively, and I shall call them supplemental seg-
ments. When w has an upper limit, this is the first term of wπ,
and thus wπ is not a segment, since no upper segment has a
first term. But when w has no upper limit, then, whether w
be finite or infinite, wπ is a segment. Similar remarks apply to
lower limits. Ifwhas a last term, this belongs neither to πwnor
to wπ, but all other terms of v belong to one or other class; if
w has no last term, all terms of v belong to πw or wπ. Similar
remarks apply to wπ and πw. Applying these general defini-
tions to the cases of progressions and regressions,we shall find
that, for a progression, only the classes (2) and (3) are impor-
tant; for a regression, only the classes (1) and (4). The question
where a progression begins or a regression ends is quite unim-
portant. Since a progression has no last term, and a regression
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no first term, the segment defined by either, together with its
supplement, contains every term of v. Whether progressions
and regressions in v have limits always, sometimes, or never,
there seems no way of deciding from the given premisses. I
have not been able to discover an instance of a compact series
where they never have limits, but I cannot find any proof that
such an instance is impossible.
Proceeding now to classes of segments, as we proceeded be-
fore to our classU, we have here four such classes to consider,
namely: (1) The class vπ, each of whose terms is the class uπ de-
finedby some regression u, i.e., the terms of vwhich comebefore
all the terms of some regression in v; (2) the class vπ, consist-
ing of all the classes uπ defined by progressions u; (3) the class πv,
whose terms are πu, where u is some progression; (4) the class vπ,
whose terms are uπ, where u is some regression. Each of these
four classes is a class of classes, for its terms are classes con-
tained in v. Each of the four is itself a compact series. There is
no way of proving, so far as I know, that (1) and (3), or (2) and
(4), have any common terms. Each pair would have a common
term if v contained a progression and a regression which were
coherent, and had no limit in v, but there is no way of discov-
ering whether this case ever arises in the given series v.
When we come to examine whether the four classes thus
defined are condensed in themselves, we obtain the most cu-
rious results. Every fundamental series in any one of the four
classes has a limit, but not necessarily in the series of which
its terms are composed, and conversely, every term of each of
our four classes is the limit of a fundamental series, but not
necessarily of a series contained in the same class towhich the
limiting termbelongs. The state of things, in fact, is as follows:
Every progression in vπ or πv has a limit in πv.
Every progression in vπ or πv has a limit in πv.
Every regression in vπ or πv has a limit in vπ.
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Every regression in vπ or πv has a limit in vπ.
Every term of vπ is the limit of a regression in vπ and of one
in πv.
Every term of vπ is the limit of a regression in vπ and of one 302
in πv.
Every termof πv is the limit of a progression in vπ andof one
in πv.
Every termof πv is the limit of a progression in vπ andof one
in πv.
Hence vπ is identical with the class of limits of regressions
in vπ or πv;
vπ is identical with the class of limits of regressions in vπ or
πv;
πv is identical with the class of limits of progressions in vπ
or πv;
πv is identical with the class of limits of progressions in πv
or vπ.
Thus each of our four classes has a kind of one-sided perfec-
tion; two of the four are perfect on one side, the other two on
theother. But I cannotproveof anyoneof the four classes that
it is wholly perfect. We might attempt the combination of vπ
and πv, and also of vπ and πv. For vπ and πv together form one
series, whose generating relation is still whole and part. This
series will be perfect, and will contain the limits alike of pro-
gressions and of regressions in itself. But this series may not
be compact; for if there be any progression u and regression u0
in v, which both have the same limit in v (a case which, as we
know, occurs in some compact series), then πu and u0πwill be
consecutive terms of the series formed of πv and vπ together,
for u0π will contain the common limit, while πu will not con-
tain it, but all other terms of vwill belong to both or to neither.
Hence when our series is compact, we cannot show that it is
perfect; and when we have made it perfect, we can show that
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it may not be compact. And a series which is not compact can
hardly be called continuous.
Although we can prove that, in our original compact series
v, there are an infinite number of progressions coherentwith a
given progression and having no term in common with it, we
cannot prove that there is even one regression coherent with
a given progression; nor can we prove that any progression or
regression in v has a limit, or that any term of v is a limit of a
progression or regression. We cannot prove that any progres-
sion u and regression u0 are such that πu = u0π, nor yet that
πu and u0π may differ by only a single term of v. Nor, finally,
canwe prove that any single progression in vπ has a limit in vπ,
with similar propositions concerning the other three classes
vπ, πv, πv. At least, I am unable to discover any way of proving
any of these theorems, though in the absence of instances of
the falsity of some of them it seems not improbable that these
may be demonstrable.
If it is the fact—as it seems to be—that, starting only from
a compact series, so many of the usual theorems are indemon-
strable, we see how fundamental is the dependence of Can-
tor’s ordinal theory upon the condition that the compact se-
ries fromwhich we start is to be denumerable. As soon as this
assumption is made, it becomes easy to prove all those of the
above propositions which hold concerning the types η and θ
respectively. This is a fact which is obviously of considerable 303
philosophical importance; and it is with a view of bringing
it out clearly that I have dwelt so long upon compact series
which are not assumed to be denumerable.
282. The remark which we made just now, that two com-
pact series may be combined to form one which sometimes
has consecutive terms, is rather curious, and applies equally to
continuity as defined by Cantor. Segments of rationals form
a continuous series, and so do completed segments (i.e. seg-
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ments together with their limits); but the two together form
a series which is not compact, and therefore not continuous.
It is certainly contrary to the usual idea of continuity that a
continuous series should cease to be so merely by the inter-
polation of new terms between the old ones. This should, ac-
cording to the usual notions,make our series stillmore contin-
uous. It might be suggested that, philosophically speaking, a
series cannot be called continuous unless it is complete, i.e. con-
tains a certain term together with all the terms having to the
given term a specified asymmetrical transitive relation or its
converse. If we add this condition, the series of segments of ra-
tionals is not completewith regard to the relation bywhichwe
havehitherto regarded it as generated, since it doesnot consist
of all classes of rationals to which a given segment has the re-
lation of whole and part, and each of which contains all terms
less than any one of its terms—this condition is also satisfied
by completed segments. But every series is complete with re-
gard to some relation, simple or complex. This is the reason
why completeness need not, from a mathematical standpoint,
be mentioned in the definition of continuity, since it can al-
ways be insured by a suitable choice of the generating relation.
We have now seen in what Cantor’s definition of continu-
ity consists, and we have seen that, while instances fulfilling
the definition may be found in Arithmetic, the definition it-
self is purely ordinal—the only datum required is a denumer-
able compact series. Whether or not the kind of series which
Cantor defines as continuous is thought to be the most simi-
lar towhat has hitherto beenvaguely denotedby theword, the
definition itself, and the steps leading to it, must be acknowl-
edged to be a triumph of analysis and generalization.
Before entering upon the philosophical questions raised by
the continuum, it will be well to continue our review of Can-
tor’s most remarkable theorems, by examining next his trans-
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finite cardinal and ordinal numbers. Of the two problems
with which this Part is concerned, we have hitherto consid-
ered only continuity; it is now time to consider what mathe-
matics has to say concerning infinity. Onlywhen this has been
accomplished, shall we be in a position adequately to discuss
the closely allied philosophical problems of infinity and conti-
nuity.
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chapter xxxvii
TRANSFINITE CARDINALS
283. Themathematical theoryof infinitymay almost be said 304
to begin with Cantor. The Infinitesimal Calculus, though it
cannot wholly dispense with infinity, has as few dealings with
it as possible, and contrives to hide it away before facing the
world. Cantor has abandoned this cowardly policy, and has
brought the skeleton out of its cupboard. He has been em-
boldened in this course by denying that it is a skeleton. In-
deed, like many other skeletons, it was wholly dependent on
its cupboard, and vanished in the light of day. Speaking with-
outmetaphor. Cantor has established a new branch ofMathe-
matics, inwhich, bymere correctness of deduction, it is shown
that the supposed contradictions of infinity all depend upon
extending, to the infinite, results which, while they can be
proved concerning finite numbers, are in no sense necessarily
true of all numbers. In this theory, it is necessary to treat sep-
arately of cardinals and ordinals, which are far more diverse
in their properties when they are transfinite than when they
are finite. Following the same order as previously—the order
which seems tome to be alone philosophically correct—I shall
begin with transfinite cardinals*.
284. The transfinite cardinals, which are also called powers,
*This is the order followed inMath. Annalen, xlvi, but not in theMan-
nichfaltigkeitslehre.
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may be defined in the first place so as to include the finite car-
dinals, leaving it to be investigated in what respects the finite
and the transfinite are distinguished. Thus Cantor gives the
following definition†.
“We call the power or cardinal number of M that general
idea which, by means of our active faculty of thought, is de-
duced from the collection M, by abstracting from the nature
of its diverse elements and from the order in which they are
given.”
This, it win be seen, is merely a phrase indicating what is to
be spoken of, not a true definition. It presupposes that every
collection has some such property as that indicated—a prop- 305
erty, that is to say, independent of the nature of its terms and
of their order; depending, we might feel tempted to add, only
upon their number. In fact, number is taken byCantor to be a
primitive idea, and it is, in his theory, a primitive proposition
that every collection has a number. He is therefore consistent
in giving a specification of number which is not a formal defi-
nition.
By means, however, of the principle of abstraction, we can
give, as we saw in Part II, a formal definition of cardinal num-
bers. This method, in essentials, is given by Cantor imme-
diately after the above informal definition. We have already
seen that, if two classes be called similar when there is a one-
one relation which couples every term of either with one and
only one term of the other, then similarity is symmetrical and
transitive, and is reflexive for all classes. A one-one relation,
it should be observed, can be defined without any reference
to number, as follows: A relation is one-one when, if x has
the relation to y, and x0 differs from x, y0 from y, then it fol-
lows that x0 does not have the relation to y, nor x to y0. In this
†Math. Annalen, xlvi, §1.
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there is no reference to number; and the definition of similar-
ity also is therefore free from such reference. Since similarity
is reflexive, transitive, and symmetrical, it can be analyzed into
the product of a many-one relation and its converse, and in-
dicates at least one common property of similar classes. This
property, or, if there be several, a certain one of these proper-
ties, wemay call the cardinal numberof similar classes, and the
many-one relation is that of a class to the number of its terms.
In order to fix upon one definite entity as the cardinal number
of a given class, we decide to identify the number of a class
with the whole class of classes similar to the given class. This
class, taken as a single entity, has, as the proof of the principle
of abstraction shows, all the properties required of a cardinal
number. The method, however, is philosophically subject to
the doubt resulting from the contradiction set forth in Part I,
Chapter x.*
In this way we obtain a definition of the cardinal number
of a class. Since similarity is reflexive for classes, every class
has a cardinal number. Itmight be thought that this definition
would only apply to finite classes, since, to prove that all terms
of one class are correlated with all of another, complete enu-
meration might be thought necessary. This, however, is not
the case, as may be seen at once by substituting any for all—
aword which is generally preferable where infinite classes are
concerned. Twoclassesu, v are similarwhen there is someone-
one relation R such that, if x be any u, there is some term y of
v such that xRy; and if y0 be any v, there is some term x0 of u
such that x0Ry0. Here there is no need whatever of complete
enumeration, but only of propositions concerning any u and
any v. For example, the points on a given line are similar to
the lines through a given point andmeeting the given line; for 306
*See Appendix.
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any point on the given line determines one and only one line
through the given point, and any line through the given point
meeting the given line determines one and only one point on
the given line. Thus where our classes are infinite, we need
some general proposition about any term of either class to es-
tablish similarity, but we do not need enumeration. And in
order to prove that every (or any) class has a cardinal number,
weneed only the observation that any termof any class is iden-
tical with itself. No other general proposition about the terms
of a class is requisite for the reflexive property of similarity.
285. Let us now examine the chief properties of cardinal
numbers. I shall not give proofs of any of these properties,
since I should merely repeat what has been said by Cantor.
Considering first their relations to classes, we may observe
that, if there be two sets of classes which are similar in pairs,
and no two of the one set have any common part, nor yet any
two of the other set, then the logical sum of all the classes
of one set is similar to the logical sum of all the classes of
the other set. This proposition, familiar in the case of finite
classes, holds also of infinite classes. Again, the cardinal num-
ber of a class u is said to be greater than that of a class v, when
no part of v is similar to u, but there is a part of uwhich is simi-
lar to v. In this case, also, the number of v is said to be less than
that of u. It can be proved that, if there is a part of u which is
similar to v, and a part of v which is similar to u, then u and
v are similar*. Thus equal, greater, and less are all incompati-
ble with each other, all transitive, and the last two asymmetri-
cal. We cannot prove at all simply—and it seems more or less
doubtful whether we can prove at all—that of two different
*Bernstein and Schröder’s theorem; for proofs see Borel, Leçons sur la
théorie des fonctions, Paris, 1898, Note I, and Zermelo, Göttinger Nachrichten,
1901, pp. 34–38.
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cardinal numbers one must be greater and the other less†. It
is to be observed that the definition of greater contains a con-
dition not required in the case of finite cardinals. If the num-
ber of v be finite, it is sufficient that a proper part of u should
be similar to v. But among transfinite cardinals this is not suf-
ficient. For the general definition of greater, therefore, both
parts are necessary. This difference between finite and transfi-
nite cardinals results from the defining difference of finite and
infinite, namely that when the number of a class is not finite,
it always has a proper part which is similar to the whole; that
is, every infinite class contains a part (and therefore an infi-
nite number of parts) having the same number as itself. Cer-
tainparticular cases of this propositionhave longbeenknown,
and have been regarded as constituting a contradiction in the
notion of infinite number. Leibniz, for example, points out‡
that, since every number can be doubled, the number of num- 307
bers is the same as the number of even numbers, whence he
deduces that there is no such thing as infinite number. The
first to generalize this property of infinite collections, and to
treat it as not contradictory, was, so far as I know, Bolzano*.
But the strict proof of the proposition, when the finite cardi-
nals are defined by means of mathematical induction, as well
as the demonstration that it is not contradictory, are due to
Cantor andDedekind. The proposition itself may be taken as
the definitionof the transfinite among cardinal numbers, for it
is a property belonging to all of them, and to none of the finite
†Cantor’s grounds for holding that this is so are vague, and do not ap-
pear to me to me valid. They depend upon the postulate that every class
is the field of some well-ordered relation. See Cantor,Math. Annalen, xlvi,
note to §2.
‡Gerhardt’s ed. I, p. 338.
*Paradoxien des Unendlichen, §21.
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cardinals†. Before examining this property further, however,
we must acquire a more intimate acquaintance with the other
properties of cardinal numbers.
286. I comenow to the strictly arithmetical properties of car-
dinals, i.e. their addition, multiplication, etc.‡ The addition of
numbers is defined, when they are transfinite, exactly as it was
defined in the case of finite numbers, namely by means of log-
ical addition. The number of the logical sum of two classes
which have no common term is the sum of the numbers of the
two classes. This can be extended by successive steps to any fi-
nite number of classes; for an infinite number of classes, form-
ing a class of classes, the sum of their numbers, if no two have
any common term, is still the number of their logical sum—
and the logical sum of any class of classes, finite or infinite, is
logically definable. For sums of two or three numbers, so de-
fined, the commutative and associative laws still hold, i.e. we
still have
a+ b = b+ a and a+ (b+ c) = (a+ b) + c.
The multiplication of two numbers is thus defined by Cantor:
IfM andN be two classes, we can combine any element ofM
with any element ofN to form a couple (m; n); the number of
all such couples is the product of the numbers of M and N.
If we wish to avoid the notion of a couple in the definition,
we may substitute the following§: Let u be a class of classes, a
in number; let each of these classes belonging to u contain b
terms; and let no two of these classes have any common term;
then ab is the number of the logical sum of all these classes.
This definition is still purely logical, and avoids the notion of
†See Dedekind,Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? No. 64.
‡Cantor,Math. Annalen, xlvi, §3;Whitehead,American Journal ofMath.
Vol. xxiv, No. 4.
§Vivanti,Théorie des Ensembles, Formulaire deMathématiques, Vol. i, Part
vi, §2, No. 4.
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a couple. Multiplication so defined obeys the commutative,
associative, and distributive laws, i.e.we have
ab = ba; a(bc) = (ab)c; a(b+ c) = ab+ ac.
Hence addition and multiplication of cardinals, even when
these are transfinite, satisfy all the elementary rules of Arith-
metic.
The definition of powers of a number (ab) is also effected 308
logically (ib. §4). For this purpose,Cantor first defineswhat he
calls a covering (Belegung) of one classN by anotherM. This is
a law by which, to every element n ofN is joined one and only
one element n of M, but the same element m may be joined
to many elements ofN. That is, a Belegung is a many-one rela-
tion, whose domain includesN, andwhich correlateswith the
terms ofN always terms ofM. If a be the number of terms in
M, b the number inN, then the number of all such many-one
relations is defined to be ab. It is easy to see that, for finite num-
bers, this definition agrees with the usual one. For transfinite
numbers, indices have still the usual properties, i.e.
abac = ab+c, acbc = (ab)c, (ab)c = abc
In the case where a = 2, ab is capable of a simpler definition,
deduced from the above. If a = 2, 2b will be the number of
ways in which b terms can be related each to one of two terms.
Nowwhen thosewhich are related to one of the two are given,
the rest are related to the other. Hence it is enough, in each
case, to specify the class of terms related to one of the two.
Hence we get in each case a class chosen out of the b terms,
and in all cases we get all such classes. Hence 2b is the number
of classes that can be formed out of b terms, or the number
of combinations of b things any number at a time—a familiar
theorem when b is finite, but still true when b is transfinite.
Cantor has a proof that 2b is always greater than b—a proof
which, however, leads to difficulties when b is the number of
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all classes, or, more generally, when there is some collection
of b terms in which all the sets chosen out of the b terms are
themselves single terms of b*.
The definitions of multiplication given by Cantor and Vi-
vanti require that the number of factors in a product should
be finite; and this makes it necessary to give a new and inde-
pendent definition of powers, if the exponent is allowed to be
infinite. Mr A.N. Whitehead† has given a definition of mul-
tiplication which is free from this restriction, and therefore
allows powers to be defined in the ordinary way as products.
He has also found proofs of the formal laws when the number
of summands, brackets, or factors is infinite. The definition
of a product is as follows: Let k be a class of classes, no two
of which have any terms in common. Choose out, in every
possible way, one term and only one from each of the classes
composing k. By doing this in all possible ways, we get a class
of classes, called the multiplicative class of k. The number of
terms in this class is defined to be the product of the numbers
of terms in the various classeswhich aremembers of k. Where
k has a finite number of members, it is easy to see that this
agrees with the usual definition. Let u; v;w be the members
of k, and let them have respectively α; β; γ terms. Then one
term can be chosen out of u in α ways: for every way there 309
are βways of choosing one term out of v, and for every way of
choosing one term out of u and one out of v, there are γ ways
of choosing one out of w. Hence there are αβγ ways of choos-
ing one term out of each, when multiplication is understood
in its usual sense. The multiplicative class is an important no-
tion, bymeans ofwhich transfinite cardinalArithmetic can be
carried a good deal further than Cantor has carried it.
287. All the above definitions apply to finite and transfinite
*See Chapter xliii, infra.
†American Journal of Mathematics, loc. cit.
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integers alike, and, as we see, the formal laws of Arithmetic
still hold. Transfinite integers differ fromfinite ones, however,
both in the properties of their relation to the classes of which
they are the numbers, and also in regard to the properties of
classes of the integers themselves. Classes of numbers have,
in fact, very different properties according as the numbers are
all finite or are in part at least transfinite.
Among transfinite cardinals, some are particularly impor-
tant, especially the number of finite numbers, and the num-
ber of the continuum. The number of finite numbers, it is
plain, is not itself a finite number; for the class finite number
is similar to the class even finite number, which is a part of itself.
Or again the same conclusionmay be proved bymathematical
induction—a principle which also serves to define finite num-
bers, but which, being of a more ordinal nature, I shall not
consider until the next chapter. The number of finite num-
bers, then, is transfinite. This number Cantor denotes by the
Hebrew Aleph with the suffix 0; for us it will be more conve-
nient to denote it by α0. Cantor proves that this is the least
of all the transfinite cardinals. This results from the following
theorems (loc. cit. §6):
(A) Every transfinite collection contains others as parts
whose number is α0.
(B) Every transfinite collection which is part of one whose
number is α0, also has the number α0.
(C) No finite collection is similar to any proper part of itself.
(D) Every transfinite collection is similar to some proper
part of itself*.
From these theorems it follows that no transfinite number
is less than the number of finite numbers. Collections which
have this number are said to be denumerable, because it is al-
*TheoremsC andD require that the finite should be defined bymathe-
matical induction, or else they become tautologous.
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ways possible to count such collections, in the sense that, given
any term of such a collection, there is some finite number n
such that the given term is the nth. This ismerely anotherway
of saying that all the terms of a denumerable collection have
a one-one correlation with the finite numbers, which again is
equivalent to saying that the number of the collection is the
same as that of the finite numbers. It is easy to see that the
even numbers, the primes, the perfect squares, or any other
class of finite numbers having nomaximum, will form a denu- 310
merable series. For, arranging any such class in order of mag-
nitude, therewill be a finite number of terms, say n, before any
given term,whichwill thus be the (n+1)th term. What ismore
remarkable is, that all the rationals, and even all real roots of
equations of a finite degree and with rational coefficients (i.e.
all algebraic numbers), form a denumerable series. And even
an n-dimensional series of such terms, where n is a finite num-
ber, or the smallest transfinite ordinal, is still denumerable*.
That the rational numbers are denumerable can be easily seen,
by arranging them in the order in which those with smaller
sum of numerator and denominator precede those with larger
sum, and of those with equal sums, those with the smaller nu-
merators precede those with larger ones. Thus we get the se-
ries
1; 1=2; 2; 1=3; 3; 1=4; 2=3; 3=2; 4; 1=5 : : :
This is a discrete series, with a beginning and no end; every
rational number will occur in this series, and will have a finite
number of predecessors. In the other cases the proof is rather
more difficult.
All denumerable series have the same cardinal number α0,
however different they may appear. But it must not be sup-
posed that there is no number greater than α0. On the con-
*SeeActa Mathematica, ii, pp. 306, 313, 326.
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trary, there is an infinite series of such numbers†. The transfi-
nite cardinals are asserted by Cantor to be well-ordered, that
is, such that every one of them except the last of all (if there
be a last) has an immediate successor, and so has every class
of themwhich has any numbers at all after it. But they do not
all have an immediate predecessor; for example, α0 itself has
no immediate predecessor. For if it had one, this would have
to be the last of the finite numbers; but we know that there is
no last finite number. But Cantor’s grounds for his assertion
that the cardinals are well-ordered seem insufficient, so that
for the present this must remain an open question.
288. Of the transfinite numbers other than α0, the most im-
portant is the number of the continuum. Cantor has proved
that this number is not α0‡, and hopes to prove that it is α1§—
a hope which, though he has long cherished it, remains un-
fulfilled. He has shown that the number of the continuum is
2α0k—a most curious theorem; but it must still remain doubt-
ful whether this number is α1, though there are reasons which
rendered this probable¶. As to the definition of α1 and of 311
†See Jahresbericht der deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung I, 1892; Rivista
di Matematica, II, pp. 165–7. Cantor’s assertion that there is no greatest
transfinite cardinal is open to question. See Chap. xliii, infra.
‡Acta Math. II, p. 308.
§Ib. p. 404. α1 is the number next after α0.
kMath. Annalen, xlvi, §4, note.
¶See Couturat,De l’Infini Mathématique, Paris, 1896, p. 655. The ground
alleged by Cantor for identifying the second power with that of the con-
tinuum is, that every infinite linear collection of points has either the first
power, or that of the continuum, whence it would seem to follow that the
power of the continuum must be the next after the first. (Math. Annalen,
23, p. 488; see alsoActa Math. vii.) But the inference seems somewhat pre-
carious. Consider for example, the following analogy: in a compact series,
the stretch determined by two terms consists either of an infinite number
of terms, or, when the two terms coincide, of one term only, and never of
a finite number of terms other than one. But finite stretches are presented
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the whole succession of transfinite cardinals, this is a matter
which is better postponed until we have discussed the trans-
finite ordinals. It must not be supposed that we can obtain a
new transfinite cardinal by merely adding one to it, or even by
adding any finite number or α0. On the contrary, such puny
weapons cannot disturb the transfinite cardinals. It is known
that in the case of α0 and a certain class of transfinite cardinals,
a number is equal to its double; also that in the case of α0 and a
presumably different class of transfinite cardinals, a number is
equal to its square. The sum of two numbers belonging to the
former of these classes is equal to the greater of the two num-
bers. It is not known whether all transfinite cardinals belong
to one or both of these classes*.
289. It may be asked: Inwhat respect do the finite and trans-
finite cardinals together form a single series? Is not the series
of finite numbers complete in itself, without the possibility
of extending its generating relation? If we define the series
of integers by means of the generating relation of differing by
one—the method which is most natural when the series is to
be considered as a progression—then, it must be confessed,
the finite integers form a complete series, and there is no pos-
sibility of adding terms to them. But if, as is appropriate in the
by other types of series, e.g. progressions.
The theorem that thenumber of the continuum is 2α0 results very simply
from the proposition of Chapter xxxvi, that infinite classes of finite inte-
gers form a continuous series. The number of all classes of finite integers
is 2α0 (vide supra), and the number of finite classes is α0. Hence the number
of all infinite classes of finite integers is 2α0 for the subtraction of α0 does
not diminish any number greater than α0; 2α0 is therefore the number of
the continuum. To prove that this number is α1 it would therefore be suf-
ficient to show that the number of infinite classes of finite integers is the
same as the number of types of series that can be formed of all the finite
integers; for the latter number, as we shall see in the next chapter, is α1.
*Cf.Whitehead, loc. cit. pp. 392–4.
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theory of cardinals, we consider the series as arising by corre-
lation with that of whole and part among classes of which the
integers can be asserted, thenwe see that this relation does ex-
tend beyond finite numbers. There are an infinite number of
infinite classes inwhich any givenfinite class is contained; and
thus, by correlation with these, the number of the given finite
class precedes that of any one of the infinite classes. Whether
there is any other sense in which all integers, finite and trans-
finite, form a single series, I leave undecided; the above sense
would be sufficient to show that there is no logical error in re-
garding themas a single series, if itwere known that of any two
cardinals one must be the greater. But it is now time to turn
our attention to the transfinite ordinals.
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chapter xxxviii
TRANSFINITEORDINALS
290. The transfinite ordinals are, if possible, even more in- 312
teresting and remarkable than the transfinite cardinals. Un-
like the latter, theydonot obey the commutative law, and their
arithmetic is therefore quite different from elementary arith-
metic. For every transfinite cardinal, or at any rate for any one
of a certain class, there is an infinite collection of transfinite
ordinals, although the cardinal number of all ordinals is the
same as or less than that of all cardinals. The ordinals which
belong to series whose cardinal number is α0 are called the sec-
ond class of ordinals; those corresponding to α1 are called the
third class, and so on. The ordinal numbers are essentially
classes of series, or better still, classes of generating relations
of series; they are defined, for the most part, by some relation
to mathematical induction. The finite ordinals, also, may be
conceived as types of series: for example, the ordinal number
n may be taken to mean “a serial relation of n terms;” or, in
popular language, n terms in a row. This is an ordinal notion,
distinct from “nth,” and logically prior to it*. In this sense, n
is the name of a class of serial relations. It is this sense, not
that expressed by “nth,” which is generalized by Cantor so as
to apply to infinite series.
291. Let us begin with Cantor’s definition of the second
*Cf. supra Part IV, Chap. xxix, §§231, 232.
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class of ordinal numbers†.
“It is now to be shown,” he says, “how we are led to the def-
initions of the new numbers, and in what way are obtained
the natural sections, which I call classes of numbers, in the abso-
lutely endless series of real integers…. The series (1) of positive
real whole numbers 1; 2; 3; : : : ν; : : : arises from repeated posit-
ing and combination of units which are presupposed and re-
garded as equal; the number ν is the expression both for a cer-
tain finite amount (Anzahl) of such successive positings, and
for the combination of the units posited into a whole. Thus
the formation of finite real whole numbers rests on the addi- 313
tion of a unit to a number which has already been formed;
I call this moment, which, as we shall see immediately, also
plays an essential part in the formation of the higher integers,
the first principle of formation. The amount (Anzahl) of possi-
ble numbers ν of the class (1) is infinite, and there is no great-
est among them. Thus however contradictory it would be to
speak of a greatest number of the class (1), there is yet nothing
objectionable in imagining a new number, which we will call
ω, which is to express that the whole collection (1) is given by
its law in its natural order of succession. (In the same way as ν
expresses the combination of a certain finite amount of units
into a whole.) It is even permissible to think of the newly cre-
ated number ω as a limit, towards which the numbers ν tend,
if by this nothing else is understood but thatω is the first inte-
ger which follows all the numbers ν, i.e. is to be called greater
than each of the numbers ν. By allowing further additions of
units to follow the positing of the numberωwe obtain, by the
help of first principle of formation, the further numbers
ω+ 1;ω+ 2; : : : : : : : : :ω+ ν; : : : : : : : : :;
Since here again we come to no greatest number, we imagine
†Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, §11, pp. 32, 33.
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a new one, which we may call 2ω, and which is to be the first
after all previous numbers ν and ω+ ν.
“The logical function which has given us the two numbers
ω and 2ω is evidently different from the first principle of for-
mation; I call it the second principle of formation of real integers,
and define it more exactly as follows: If we have any determi-
nate succession of defined real integers, among which there is
no greatest number, by means of this second principle of for-
mation a new number is created, which is regarded as the limit
of those numbers, i.e. is defined as the next number greater
than all of them.”
The twoprinciples of formationwill bemade clearer by con-
sidering that an ordinal number is merely a type or class of se-
ries, or rather of their generating relations. Thus if we have
any series which has no last term, every part of such a series
which can be defined as all the terms up to and including a
certain term of the series will have a last term. But since the
series itself has no last term, it is of a different type from any
such part or segment of itself. Hence the ordinal number rep-
resenting the series as a wholemust be different from that rep-
resenting any such segment of itself, and must be a number
having no immediate predecessor, since the series has no last
term. Thus ω is simply the name of the class progression, or
of the generating relations of series of this class. The second
principle of formation, in short, is that by which we define a
certain type of series having no last term. Considering the or-
dinals preceding any ordinal α which is obtained by the sec-
ond principle as representing segments of a series represented 314
by α, the ordinal α itself represents the limit of such segments;
and as we saw before, the segments always have a limit (pro-
vided they have no maximum), even when the original series
has none*.
*On the segments of well-ordered series see Cantor’s article in Math.
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In order to define a class among transfinite ordinals (of
which, as is evident, the succession is infinite). Cantor intro-
duces what he calls a principle of limitation (Hemmungsprin-
cip)†. According to this principle, the second class of ordinals
is to consist only of thosewhose predecessors, from 1upwards,
forma series of the first power, i.e. a serieswhose cardinal num-
ber is α0, or one whose terms, in a suitable order, have a one-
one relation to the finite integers. It is then shown that the
power, or cardinal number, of the second class of ordinals as a
whole, is different from α0 (p. 35), and is further the very next
cardinal number afterα0 (p. 37). What ismeant by the next car-
dinal number to α0 results clearly from the following proposi-
tion (p. 38): “IfM be any well-defined collection of the power
of the second class of numbers, and if any infinite portionM0
ofM be taken, then either the collectionM0 can be considered
as a simply infinite series, or it is possible to establish a unique
and reciprocal correspondence between M and M0.” That is
to say, any part of a collection of the second power is either fi-
nite, or of the first power, or of the second; and hence there is
no power between the first and second.
292. Before proceeding to the addition, multiplication, etc.,
of ordinals, it will be well to take the above propositions, as
far as possible, out of their mathematical dress, and to state,
in ordinary language, exactly what it is they mean. As for the
ordinalω, this is simply the name for the class of generating re-
lations of progressions. We have seen how a progression is de-
fined: it is a series which has a first term, and a term next after
Annalen, xlix, §13. It is important to observe that the ordinals above ex-
plained are analogous, in their genesis, to the real numbers considered as
segments (vide Chap. xxxiii, supra). Here, as there, the existence of ω is
not open to questionwhen the segment-theory is adopted, whereas on any
other theory the existence-theorem is indemonstrable and unplausible.
†Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, p. 34.
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each term, andwhichobeysmathematical induction. Bymath-
ematical induction itself we can show that every part of a pro-
gression, if it has a last term, has some finite ordinal number n,
where n denotes the class of series consisting of n terms in or-
der; while every part which has no last term is itself a progres-
sion; also we can show (what is indeed obvious) that no finite
ordinal will represent a progression. Now progressions are a
perfectly definite class of series, and the principle of abstrac-
tion shows that there is some entity towhich all of themhave a
relationwhich they have to nothing else—for all progressions
are ordinally similar (i.e. have a one-one relation such that ear- 315
lier terms are correlatedwith earlier ones, and later with later),
and ordinal similarity is symmetrical, transitive, and (among
series) reflexive. This entity, to which the principle of abstrac-
tion points, may be taken to be the type or class of serial re-
lations, since no series can belong to more than one type of
series. The type to which progressions belong, then, is what
Cantor calls ω. Mathematical induction, starting from any fi-
nite ordinal, can never reachω, sinceω is not a member of the
class of finite ordinals. Indeed, we may define the finite ordi-
nals or cardinals—and where series are concerned, this seems
the best definition—as those which, starting from 0 or 1, can
be reached by mathematical induction. This principle, there-
fore, is not to be taken as an axiom or postulate, but as the
definition of finitude. It is to be observed that, in virtue of
the principle that every number has an immediate successor,
we can prove that any assigned number, say, 10,937, is finite—
provided, of course, that the number assigned is a finite num-
ber. That is to say, every proposition concerning 10,937 can
be proved without the use of mathematical induction, which,
as most of us can remember, was not mentioned in the Arith-
metic of our childhood. There is therefore no kind of logical
error in using the principle as a definition of the class of finite
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numbers, nor is there a shadow of a reason for supposing that
the principle applies to all ordinal or all cardinal numbers.
At this point, a word to the philosophers may be in season.
Most of them seem to suppose that the distinction between
the finite and the infinite is onewhosemeaning is immediately
evident, and they reason on the subject as though no precise
definitions were needed. But the fact is, that the distinction
of the finite from the infinite is by no means easy, and has
only been brought to light by modern mathematicians. The
numbers 0 and 1 are capable of logical definition, and it can
be shown logically that every number has a successor. We can
nowdefine finite numbers either by the fact thatmathematical
induction can reach them, starting from0or 1—inDedekind’s
language, that they form the chain of 0 or 1—or by the fact that
they are the numbers of collections such that no proper part
of them has the same number as the whole. These two con-
ditions may be easily shown to be equivalent. But they alone
precisely distinguish the finite from the infinite, and any dis-
cussion of infinity which neglects them must be more or less
frivolous.
293. With regard to numbers of the second class other than
ω, we may make the following remark. A collection of two or
more terms is always, except possibly for some very large infi-
nite collections, the field ofmore thanone serial relation. Men
may be arranged by their rank, age, wealth, or in alphabetical
order: all these relations amongmen generate series, and each
places mankind in a different order. But when a collection is
finite, all possible orders give one and the same ordinal num- 316
ber, namely that corresponding to the cardinal number of the
collection. That is to say, all series which can be formed of a
certain finite number of terms are ordinally similar. With in-
finite series, this is quite different. An infinite collection of
terms which is capable of different orders may belong, in its
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various orders, to quite different types. We have already seen
that the rationals, in one order, form a compact series with no
beginning or end, while in another order they form a progres-
sion. These are series of entirely different types; and the same
possibility extends to all infinite series. The ordinal type of
a series is not changed by the interchange of two consecutive
terms, nor, consequently, in virtue ofmathematical induction,
by any finite number of such interchanges. The general prin-
ciple is, that the type of a series is not changed bywhatmay be
called a permutation. That is, if P be a serial relation by which
the terms of u are ordered,R a one-one relationwhose domain
and whose converse domain are both u, then RPR is a serial
relation of the same type as P; and all serial relations whose
field is u, and which are of the same type as P, are of the above
form RPR. But by a rearrangement not reducible to a permuta-
tion, the type, in general, is changed. Consider, for example,
the natural numbers, first in their natural order, and then in
the order in which 2 comes first, then all the higher numbers
in their natural order, and last of all 1. In the first order, the
natural numbers form a progression; in the second, they form
a progression together with a last term. In the second form,
mathematical induction no longer applies; there are proposi-
tions which hold of 2, and of every subsequent finite number,
but not of 1. The first form is the type of any fundamental se-
ries of the kindwe considered inChapter xxxvi; the second is
the type of any such series together with its limit. Cantor has
shown that every denumerable collection can be given an or-
der which corresponds to any assigned ordinal number of the
second class*. Hence the second class of ordinal numbersmay
be defined as all the types of well-ordered series in which any
onegivendenumerable collectioncanbe arrangedbymeansof
different generating relations. The possibility of such differ-
*Acta Math. ii, p. 394.
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ent types depends upon the fundamental property of infinite
collections, that an infinite part of an infinite collection can al-
ways be found, whichwill have a one-one correlationwith the
whole. If the original collection was a series, the part, by this
correlation, becomes a series ordinally similar to the whole:
the remaining terms, if added after all the terms of the infinite
part, will then make the whole ordinally different from what
it was†.
Wemay assimilate the theory of ordinals to that of cardinals 317
as follows. Two relations will be said to be likewhen there is a
one-one relation S, whose domain is the field of one of them
(P), and which is such that the other relation is SPS. If P be a
well-ordered relation. i.e. one which generates a well-ordered
series, the class of relations like P may be defined as the ordi-
nal number of P. Thus ordinal numbers result from likeness
among relations as cardinals from similarity among classes.
294. We can now understand the rules for the addition and
multiplication of transfinite ordinals. Both operations obey
the associative, but not the commutative law. The distributive
law is true, in general, only in the form
γ(α+ β) = γα+ γβ,
where α+ β; α; β are multipliers*. That addition does not obey
the commutative law may be easily seen. Take for example
ω + 1 and 1 + ω. The first denotes a progression followed by
a single term: this is the type presented by a progression and
its limit, which is different from a simple progression. Hence
†The remaining terms, if they be finite in number, will often not alter
the type if added at the beginning; but if they be infinite, they will in gen-
eral alter it even then. This will soon be more fully explained.
*Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, p. 39; α+βwill be the type of a series consisting
of two parts, namely a part of the type α followed by a part of the type β; γα
will be the type of a series consisting of a series of the type α of series of the
type γ. Thus a series composed of two progressions is of the type ω : 2.
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ω + 1 is a different ordinal from ω. But 1 + ω denotes a pro-
gression preceded by a single term, and this is again a progres-
sion. Hence 1 + ω = ω, but 1 + ω does not equal ω + 1†. The
numbers of the second class are, in fact, of two kinds, (1) those
which have an immediate predecessor, (2) those which have
none. Numbers such as ω;ω : 2;ω : 3; : : :ω2;ω3 : : :ωω … have
no immediate predecessor. If any of these numbers be added
to a finite number, the same transfinite number reappears; but
if a finite number be added to any of these numbers, we get
a new number. The numbers with no predecessor represent
series which have no end, while those which have a predeces-
sor represent series which have an end. It is plain that terms
added at the beginning of a series with no end leave it endless;
but the addition of a terminating series after an endless one
produces a terminating series, and therefore a new type of or-
der. Thus there is nothing mysterious about these rules of ad-
dition, which simply express the type of series resulting from
the combination of two given series.
Hence it is easy to obtain the rules of subtraction‡. If α is
less than β, the equation
α+ ξ = β
has always one and only one solution in ξ, which we may rep-
resent by β α. This gives the type of series thatmust be added
after α to produce β. But the equation
ξ+ α = β
will sometimes have no solution, and at other times an infinite 318
number of solutions. Thus the equation
ξ+ ω = ω+ 1
has no solution at all: no number of terms added at the begin-
ning of a progressionwill produce a progression togetherwith
†Math. Annalen, xlvi, §8.
‡Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, p. 39.
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a last term. In fact, in the equation ξ + α = β, if α represents
an endless type, while β represents a terminating type, it is suf-
ficiently evident that terms added before α can never produce
a terminating type, and therefore can never produce the type
β. On the other hand, if we consider the equation
ξ+ ω = ω : 2
this will be satisfied by ξ = ω+ n, where n is zero or any finite
number. For n before the second ω will coalesce with this to
form ω, and thus ω + n + ω = ω : 2. In this case, therefore,
ξ has an infinite number of values. In all such cases, however,
the possible values of ξ have a minimum, which is a sort of
principal value of the difference between β and α. Thus sub-
traction is of two kinds, according as we seek a number which,
added to α, will give β, or a number to which αmay be added
so as to give β. In the first case, provided α is less than β, there
is always a unique solution; in the second case, there may be
no solution, and there may be an infinite number of solutions.
295. The multiplication of ordinals is defined as follows*.
LetM andN be two series of the types α and β. InN, in place
of each element n, substitute a seriesMn of the type α; and let
S be the series formed of all the terms of all series Mn, taken
in the following order: (1) any two elements of Swhich belong
to the same seriesMn are to preserve the order they had inMn;
two elements which belong to different series Mn, Mn0 are to
have the order which n and n0 have in N. Then the type of S
depends only upon α and β, and is defined to be their product
αβ, where α is the multiplicand, and β the multiplicator. It is
easy to see that products do not always obey the commutative
law. For example, 2 : ω is the type of series presented by
e1; f1; e2; f2; e3; f3; : : : eν; fν; : : : : : :
which is a progression, so that 2 : ω = ω. But ω : 2 is the type
*Math. Annalen, xlvi, §8.
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e1; e2; e3 : : : eν; : : : ; f1; f2; f3 : : : fν; : : :
which is a combination of two progressions, but not a single
progression. In the former series, there is only one term, e1,
which has no immediate predecessor; in the latter there are
two, e1 and f1.
Of division, as of subtraction, two kinds must be distin-
guished†. If there are three ordinals α; β; γ, such that β = αγ,
then the equationβ = αξhasnoother solution than ξ = γ, and
wemay therefore denote γ by β=α*. But the equation β = ξα, if 319
soluble at all, may have several or even an infinity of roots; of
which, however, one is always the smallest. This smallest root
is denoted by β==α.
Multiplication of ordinals is the process of representing a
series of series as a single series, each series being taken as a
whole, and preserving its place in the series of series. Divi-
sion, on the other hand, is the process of splitting up a single
series into a series of series, without altering the order of its
terms. Both these processes have some importance in connec-
tion with dimensions. Division, as is plain, is only possible
with some types of series; those with which it is not possible
may be called primes. The theory of primes is interesting, but
it is not necessary for us to go into it†.
296. Every rational integral or exponential function of ω is
a number of the second class, even when such numbers as ωω,
ωω2 , etc., occur‡. But it must not be supposed that all types of
denumerable series are capable of such a form. For example,
†Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, p. 40.
*Cantor has changed his notation in regard tomultiplication: formerly,
in α : β, αwas the multiplicator, and β the multiplicand; now, the opposite
order is adopted. In following older works, except in actual quotations, I
have altered the order to that now adopted.
†SeeMannichfaltigkeitslehre, p. 40.
‡On the exponential function, seeMath. Annalen, xlix, §§18–20.
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the type η, which represents the rationals in order of magni-
tude§, is wholly incapable of expression in terms of ω. Such
a type is not called by Cantor an ordinal number. The term or-
dinal number is reserved for well-ordered series, i.e. such as have
the following two propertiesk:
I. There is in the series F a first term.
II. If F0 is a part of F, and if F possesses one or more terms
which come after all the terms of F0, then there is a term
f 0 of F which immediately follows F0, so that there is no
term of F before f 0 and after all terms of F0.
All possible functions of ω and finite ordinals only, to the ex-
clusion of other types such as that of the rationals, represent
well-ordered series, though the converse does not hold. In
every well-ordered series, there is a term next after any given
term, except the last term if there be one; and provided the se-
ries is infinite, it always contains parts which are progressions.
A term which comes next after a progression has no immedi-
ate predecessor, and the type of the segment formed of its pre-
decessors is of what is called the second species. The other
terms have immediate predecessors, and the types of the seg-
ments formed of their predecessors are said to be of the first
species.
297. The consideration of series which are not well-ordered 320
is important, though the results have far less affinity to Arith-
metic than in the case ofwell-ordered series. Thus the type η is
not expressible as a function ofω, since all functions ofω rep-
resent series with a first term, whereas η has no first term, and
all functions of ω represent series in which every term has an
§Math. Annalen, xlvi, §9.
kMath. Annalen, xlix, §12. The definition may be replaced by the fol-
lowing, which is equivalent to it: a series is well-ordered if every class con-
tained in the series (except of course the null-class) has a first term.
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immediate successor, which again is not the case with η. Even
the series of negative and positive integers and zero cannot
be expressed in terms of ω, since this series has no beginning.
Cantor defines for this purpose a serial type *ω, whichmay be
taken as the type of a regression (ib. §7). The definition of a pro-
gression, as we have seen, is relative to some one-one aliorela-
tiveP†. When Pgenerates aprogression, this progressionwith
respect to P is a regression with respect to P, and its type, con-
sidered as generated by P, is denoted by *ω. Thus the whole
series of negative and positive integers is of the type ω + ω.
Such a series can be divided anywhere into two progressions,
generated by converse relations; but in regard to one relation,
it is not reducible to any combination of progressions. Such
a series is completely defined, by the methods of Part IV, as
follows: P is a one-one aliorelative; the field of P is identical
with that of P; the disjunctive relation “some finite positive
power of P” is transitive and asymmetrical; and the series con-
sists of all terms having this relation or its converse to a given
term together with the given term. The class of series corre-
sponding to any transfinite ordinal type may always be thus
defined by themethods of Part IV; but where a type cannot be
expressed as a function of ω or *ω to or both, it will usually
be necessary, if we are to define our type completely, either to
bring in a reference to some other relation, in regard to which
the terms of our series form a progression, or to specify the
behaviour of our series with respect to limits. Thus the type
of the series of rationals is not defined by specifying that it is
compact, and has no beginning or end; this definition applies
also, for example, to what Cantor calls the semi-continuum,
i.e. the continuumwith its ends cut off. Wemust add that the
rationals are denumerable, i.e. that, with respect to another re-
†Analiorelative is a relationwhichno term canhave to itself. This term
is due to Pierce. See Schröder,Algebra u. Logik der Relative, p. 131.
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lation, they form a progression. I doubt whether, in this case,
the behaviour of the rationalswith regard to limits canbeused
for definition. Their chief characteristics in this respect are: (1)
that they are condensed in themselves, i.e. every term of them
is the limit of certain progressions and regressions; (2) in any
interval, a progression or a regression which has no limit is
contained. But both these characteristics belong to the series
of irrational numbers, i.e. to the series obtained by omitting all
rationals from the series of real numbers; yet this series is not
denumerable. Thus it would seem that we cannot define the 321
type η, towhich the rationals belong, without reference to two
generating relations. The type η is that of endless compact se-
ries whose terms, with reference to another relation, form a
progression.
From the last remark, we see clearly the importance of the
correlation of series, with which we began the discussions of
Part V. For it is only by means of correlation that the type of
the rationals, and hence the continuum, can be defined. Until
we bring in some other relation than that by which the order
of magnitude among rationals arises, there is nothing to dis-
tinguish the type of the rationals from that of the irrationals.
298. The consideration of ordinals not expressible as func-
tions of ω shows clearly that ordinals in general are to be
considered—as I suggested at the beginning of this chapter—
as classes or types of serial relations, and to this view Cantor
himself nowapparently adheres; for in the article in theMathe-
matische Annalen, Vol. xlvi, he speaks of them always as types
of order, not as numbers, and in the following article (Math.
Annalen, xlix, §12), he definitely restricts ordinal numbers to
well-ordered series. Inhis earlierwritings, he confinedhimself
more to functions of ω, which bear many analogies to more
familiar kinds of numbers. These are, in fact, types of order
whichmaybepresentedby series of finite and transfinite cardi-
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nals which beginwith some cardinal. But other types of order,
as we have now seen, have very little resemblance to numbers.
299. It is worth while to repeat the definitions of gen-
eral notions involved in terms of what may be called relation-
arithmetic*. If P;Q be two relations such that there is a one-
one relation Swhose domain is the field ofP andwhich is such
thatQ = SPS, thenP andQ are said to be like. The class of rela-
tions like P, which I denote by λP, is called P’s relation-number.
If the fields ofP andQhaveno common terms,P+Q is defined
to be P orQ or the relation which holds between any term of
the field of P and any term of the field of Q, and between no
other terms. ThusP+Q is not equal toQ+P. Again λP+λQ is
defined as λ(P+Q). For the summation of an infinite number
of relations, we require an aliorelativewhose field is composed
of relations whose fields are mutually exclusive. Let P be such
a relation, p its field, so that p is a class of relations. Then ΣPp
is to denote either one of the relations of the class p or the re-
lation of any term belonging to the field of some relation Q
of the class p to a term belonging to the field of another rela-
tion R (of the class p) to whichQ has the relation P. (If P be a
serial relation, and p a class of serial relations, ΣPp will be the
generating relation of the sum of the various series generated
by terms of p taken in the order generated by P.) We may de-
fine the sum of the relation-numbers of the various terms of 322
p as the relation-number of ΣPp. If all the terms of p have the
same relation-number, say α, and if β be the relation-number
of P, a  β will be defined to be the relation-number of ΣPp.
Proceeding in this way, it is easy to prove generally the three
formal laws which hold of well-ordered series, namely:
*Cf. Part IV, Chap. xxix, §231.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 469
(α+ β) + γ = α+ (β+ γ)
α(β+ γ) = αβ+ αγ
(αβ)γ = α(βγ):
The proofs are very closely analogous to those discovered by
Mr Whitehead for cardinal numbers (Amer. Journal of Math.,
Vol. xxiv); but they differ by the fact that no method has yet
been discovered for defining an infinite product of relation-
numbers, or even of ordinal numbers.
300. It is to be observed that the merit of the above method
is that it allows no doubt as to existence-theorems—a point in
whichCantor’swork leaves something tobedesired. As this is
an importantmatter, and one inwhich philosophers are apt to
be sceptical, I shall here repeat the argument in outline. It may
be shown, to beginwith, that nofinite class embraces all terms:
this results, with a little care, from the fact that, since 0 is a car-
dinal number, the number of numbers up to and including a
finite number n is n+ 1. Further, if n be a finite number, n+ 1 is
a new finite number different from all its predecessors. Hence
finite cardinals form a progression, and therefore the ordinal
number ω and the cardinal number α0 exist (in the mathemat-
ical sense). Hence, by mere rearrangements of the series of fi-
nite cardinals, we obtain all ordinals of Cantor’s second class.
Wemay nowdefine the ordinal numberω1 as the class of serial
relations such that, if u be a class contained in the field of one
of them, to say that u has successors implies and is implied by
saying that u has α0 terms or a finite number of terms; and it
is easy to show that the series of ordinals of the first and sec-
ond classes in order of magnitude is of this type. Hence the
existence of ω1 is proved; and α1 is defined to be the number
of terms in a series whose generating relation is of the type ω1.
Hence we can advance to ω2 and α2 and so on, and even to ωω
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andαω, whose existence canbe similarlyproved: ωωwill be the
type of generating relation of a series such that, if u be a class
contained in the series, to say that u has successors is equiva-
lent to saying that u is finite or has, for a suitable finite value of
n, αn terms. This process gives us a one-one correlation of or-
dinals with cardinals: it is evident that, by extending the pro-
cess, we can make each cardinal which can belong to a well-
ordered series correspond to one and only one ordinal. Can-
tor assumes as an axiom that every class is the field of some
well-ordered series, and deduces that all cardinals can be cor-
related with ordinals by the above method. This assumption 323
seems to me unwarranted, especially in view of the fact that
no one has yet succeeded in arranging a class of 2α0 terms in a
well-ordered series. We do not know that of any two different
cardinal numbers one must be the greater, and it may be that
2α0 is neither greater nor less than α1 and α2 and their succes-
sors, whichmay be called well-ordered cardinals because they
apply to well-ordered classes.
301. There is a difficulty as regards the type of the whole
series of ordinal numbers. It is easy to prove that every seg-
ment of this series is well-ordered, and it is natural to suppose
that the whole series is also well-ordered. If so, its type would
have to be the greatest of all ordinal numbers, for the ordinals
less than a given ordinal form, in order of magnitude, a series
whose type is the given ordinal. But there cannot be a greatest
ordinal number, because every ordinal is increased by the ad-
dition of 1. From this contradiction, M. Burali-Forti, who dis-
covered it*, infers that of two different ordinals, as of two dif-
ferent cardinals, it is not necessary that one should be greater
and the other less. In this, however, he consciously contra-
*“Una questione sui numeri transfiniti,” Rendiconti del circolo Matem-
atico di Palermo, Vol. xi (1897).
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dicts a theoremofCantor’swhich affirms theopposite†. I have
examined this theorem with all possible care, and have failed
to find any flaw in the proof‡. But there is another premiss in
M.Burali-Forti’s argument, which appears tomemore capable
of denial, and that is, that the series of all ordinal numbers is
well-ordered. This does not follow from the fact that all its seg-
ments are well-ordered, and must, I think, be rejected, since,
so far as I know, it is incapable of proof. In this way, it would
seem, the contradiction in question can be avoided.
302. We may now return to the subject of the successive
derivatives of a series, already briefly discussed in Chapter
xxxvi. This forms one of the most interesting applications of
those ordinalswhich are functions ofω, andmay evenbe used
as an independent method of defining them. We have already
seen how, from a series P, its first derivative is obtained§. The
first derivative of P, which is denoted by P0, is the class of its
limiting points. P00, the second derivative of P, consists of the
limiting-points of P0, and so on. Every infinite collection has
at least one limiting-point: for example, ω is the limit of the
finite ordinals. By induction we can define any derivative of
finite order Pν. If Pν consists of a finite number of points, Pν+1
vanishes; if this happens for any finite number ν, P is said to
be of the 1st genus and the νth species. But it may happen that 324
no Pν vanishes, and in this case all finite derivatives may have
common points. The points which all have in common form
a collection which is defined as Pω. It is to be observed that Pω
†TheoremN of §13 of Cantor’s article inMath. Annalen, Vol. xlix.
‡I have reproduced theproof in symbolic form, inwhicherrors aremore
easily detected, in RdM, Vol. viii, Prop. 5.47 of my article.
§What follows is extracted from Acta Math. ii, pp. 341–360. I shall as-
sume for simplicity that all definable limits exists i.e. that a series has a limit
whenever the corresponding segments have one. I have shown inChapter
xxxvi how to state results so as to avoid this assumption; but the necessary
circumlocution is tiresome.
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is thus defined without requiring the definition of ω. A term
x belongs to Pω if, whatever finite integer νmay be, x belongs
to Pν. It is to be observed that, though P0 may contain points
not belonging to P, yet subsequent derivatives introduce no
new points. This illustrates the creative nature of the method
of limits, or rather of segments: when it is first applied, it may
yield new terms, but later applications give no further terms.
That is, there is an intrinsic difference between a series which
has been, ormayhave been, obtained as the derivative of some
other series, and one not so obtainable. Every series which
contains its first derivative is itself the derivative of an infi-
nite number of other series*. The successive derivatives, like
the segments determined by the various terms of a regression,
form a series in which each term is part of each of its predeces-
sors; hence Pω, if it exists, is the lower limit of all the deriva-
tives of finite order. From Pω it is easy to go on to Pω+ν, Pω:2,
etc. Series can be actually constructed in which any assigned
derivative, finite or transfinite of the second class, is the first to
vanish. When none of the finite derivatives vanishes, P is said
to be of the second genus. It must not be inferred, however,
that P is not denumerable. On the contrary, the first deriva-
tive of the rationals is the number-continuum, which is per-
fect, so that all its derivatives are identical with itself; yet the
rationals, asweknow, are denumerable. ButwhenPν vanishes,
P is always denumerable, if ν be finite or of the second class.
The theory of derivatives is of great importance to the the-
ory of real functions†, where it practically enables us to ex-
tend mathematical induction to any ordinal of the second
class. But for philosophy, it seems unnecessary to say more
of it than is contained in the above remarks and in those of
*Formulaire de Mathématiques, Vol. ii, Part iii, §71, 4–8.
†See Dini, Theorie der Functionen, Leipzig, 1892; esp. Chap. xiii and
Translator’s preface.
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Chapter xxxvi. Popularly speaking, the first derivative con-
sists of all points in whose neighbourhood an infinite num-
ber of terms of the collection are heaped up; and subsequent
derivatives give, as it were, different degrees of concentration
in any neighbourhood. Thus it is easy to see why derivatives
are relevant to continuity: to be continuous, a collectionmust
be as concentrated as possible in every neighbourhood con-
taining any terms of the collection. But such popular modes
of expression are incapable of the precision which belongs to
Cantor’s terminology.
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chapter xxxix
THE INFINITESIMAL
CALCULUS
303. The Infinitesimal Calculus is the traditional name for 325
the differential and integral calculus together, and as such I
have retained it; although, as we shall shortly see, there is no
allusion to, or implication of, the infinitesimal in any part of
this branch of mathematics.
The philosophical theory of the Calculus has been, ever
since the subject was invented, in a somewhat disgraceful
condition. Leibniz himself—who, one would have supposed,
should have been competent to give a correct account of his
own invention—had ideas, upon this topic, which can only be
described as extremely crude. He appears to have held that, if
metaphysical subtleties are left aside, the Calculus is only ap-
proximate, but is justified practically by the fact that the errors
towhich it gives rise are less than thoseof observation*. When
hewas thinking ofDynamics, his belief in the actual infinitesi-
mal hindered him from discovering that the Calculus rests on
the doctrine of limits, and made him regard his dx and dy as
neither zero, nor finite, normathematical fictions, but as really
representing the units to which, in his philosophy, infinite di-
visionwas supposed to lead†. And inhismathematical exposi-
tions of the subject, he avoided giving careful proofs, content-
*Cf.Mathematical Works, Gerhardt’s ed. iv, pp. 91–93; Phil. Works, Ger-
hardt’s ed. ii, p. 282.
†SeeMath. Works, Gerhardt’s ed. vi, pp. 235, 247, 252.
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ing himself with the enumeration of rules‡. At other times,
it is true, he definitely rejects infinitesimals as philosophically
valid§; but he failed to show how, without the use of infinites-
imals, the results obtained by means of the Calculus could
yet be exact, and not approximate. In this respect, Newton
is preferable to Leibniz: his Lemmask give the true foundation
of the Calculus in the doctrine of limits, and, assuming the
continuity of space and time inCantor’s sense, they give valid
proofs of its rules so far as spatio-temporalmagnitudes are con- 326
cerned. But Newton was, of course, entirely ignorant of the
fact that his Lemmasdependupon themodern theoryof conti-
nuity;moreover, the appeal to time andchange,which appears
in the word fluxion, and to space, which appears in the Lem-
mas, was wholly unnecessary, and served merely to hide the
fact that no definition of continuity had been given. Whether
Leibniz avoided this error, seems highly doubtful; it is at any
rate certain that, in his first published account of theCalculus,
he defined the differential coefficient by means of the tangent
to a curve. And by his emphasis on the infinitesimal, he gave a
wrong direction to speculation as to the Calculus, which mis-
led all mathematicians beforeWeierstrass (with the exception,
perhaps, of De Morgan), and all philosophers down to the
present day. It is only in the last thirty or forty years thatmath-
ematicians have provided the requisite mathematical founda-
tions for a philosophy of theCalculus; and these foundations,
as is natural, are as yet little known among philosophers, ex-
cept in France*. Philosophical works on the subject, such as
‡SeeMath. Works, Gerhardt’s ed., Vol. v, pp. 220ff.
§E.g. Phil. Works, Gerhardt’s ed., ii, p. 305. Cf. Cassirer, Leibniz’ System
(Marburg, 1902), pp. 206–7.
kPrincipia, Part I, Section i.
*See Couturat,De l’Infini Mathématique, passim.
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Cohen’s Princip der Infinitesimalmethode und seine Geschichte†,
are vitiated, as regards the constructive theory, by an undue
mysticism, inherited fromKant, and leading to such results as
the identification of intensive magnitude with the extensive
infinitesimal‡. I shall examine in the next chapter the concep-
tion of the infinitesimal, which is essential to all philosoph-
ical theories of the Calculus hitherto propounded. For the
present, I am only concerned to give the constructive theory
as it results frommodern mathematics.
304. The differential coefficient depends essentially upon
the notion of a continuous function of a continuous variable.
The notion to be defined is not purely ordinal; on the con-
trary, it is applicable, in the first instance, only to series of num-
bers, and thence, by extension, to series in which distances or
stretches are numerically measureable. But first of all wemust
define a continuous function.
Wehave already seen (Chap. xxxii)what ismeant by a func-
tion of a variable, and what is meant by a continuous variable
(Chap. xxxvi). If the function is one-valued, and is only or-
dered by correlationwith the variable, then, when the variable
is continuous, there is no sense in asking whether the func-
tion is continuous; for such a series by correlation is always
ordinally similar to its prototype. But when, as where the vari-
able and the field of the function are both classes of numbers,
the function has an order independent of correlation, it may
ormaynot happen that the values of the function, in the order
obtained by correlation, form a continuous series in the inde-
pendent order. When they do so in any interval, the function
is said to be continuous in that interval. The precise defini- 327
tions of continuous and discontinuous functions, where both
†Berlin, 1883. The historical part of this work, it should be said, is ad-
mirable.
‡Op. cit. p. 15.
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x and f(x) are numerical, are given by Dini* as follows. The in-
dependent variable x is considered to consist of the real num-
bers, or of all the real numbers in a certain interval; f(x), in
the interval considered, is to be one-valued, even at the end-
points of the interval, and is to be also composed of real num-
bers. We then have the following definitions, the function be-
ing defined for the interval between α and β, and a being some
real number in this interval.
“We call f(x) continuous for x = a, or in the point a, inwhich
it has the value f(a), if for every positive number σ, different
from 0, but as small as we please, there exists a positive num-
ber ε, different from 0, such that, for all values of δ which are
numerically less than ε, the difference f(a+δ)  f(a) is numeri-
cally less than σ. In otherwords, f(x) is continuous in thepoint
x = a, where it has the value f(a), if the limit of its values to
the right and left of a is the same, and equal to f(a).”
“Again, f(x) is discontinuous for x = a, if, for any† posi-
tive value of σ, there is no corresponding positive value of ε
such that, for all values of δ which are numerically less than
ε, f(a + δ)   f(a) is always less than σ; in other words, f(x) is
discontinuous for x = a, when the values f(a + h) of f(x) to
the right of a, and the values f(a h) of f(x) to the left of a, the
one and the other, have no determinate limits, or, if they have
such, these are different on the two sides of a; or, if they are
the same, they differ from the value f(a), which the function
has in the point a.”
These definitions of the continuity and discontinuity of a
function, it must be confessed, are somewhat complicated;
but it seems impossible to introduce any simplification with-
out loss of rigour. Roughly, we may say that a function is con-
tinuous in the neighbourhood of a, when its values as it ap-
*Op. cit. §30, pp. 50, 51.
†TheGerman (not the Italian) has every instead of any, but this is a slip.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 478
proachesa approach thevalue f(a), andhave f(a) for their limit
both to left and right. But the notion of the limit of a function
is a somewhat more complicated notion than that of a limit
in general, with which we have been hitherto concerned. A
function of a perfectly general kind will have no limit as it ap-
proaches anygivenpoint. Inorder that it shouldhave a limit as
x approaches a from the left, it is necessary and sufficient that,
if anynumber εbementioned, any twovalues of f(x), when x is
sufficiently near to a, but less than a, will differ by less than ε;
in popular language, the value of the function does not make
any sudden jumps as x approaches a from the left. Under simi-
lar circumstances, f(x)will have a limit as it approaches a from
the right. But these two limits, evenwhenboth exist, neednot
be equal either to each other, or to f(a), the value of the func-
tion when x = a. The precise condition for a determinate 328
finite limit may be thus stated*:
“In order that the values of y to the right or left of a finite
number a (for instance to the right) should have a determinate
and finite limit, it is necessary and sufficient that, for every ar-
bitrarily small positive number σ, there should be a positive
number ε, such that the difference ya+ε   ya+δ between the
value ya+ε of y for x = a + ε, and the value ya+δ which cor-
responds to the value a + δ of x, should be numerically less
than σ, for every δwhich is greater than 0 and less than ε.”
It is possible, instead of thus defining the limit of a func-
tion, and then discussing whether it exists, to define generally
a whole class of limits†. In this method, a number z belongs to
the class of limits of y for x = a, if, within any interval contain-
ing a, however small, y will approach nearer to z than by any
given difference. Thus, for example, sin 1=x, as x approaches
*Dini, op. cit. p. 38.
†See Peano, Rivista di Matematica, ii, pp. 77–79; Formulaire, Part iii, §73;
1.0.
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zero, will take every value from  1 to +1 (both inclusive) in
every finite interval containing zero, however small. Thus the
interval from  1 to +1 forms, in this case, the class of limits
for x = 0. This method has the advantage that the class of lim-
its always exists. It is then easy to define the limit as the only
member of the class of limits, in case this class should happen
to have only onemember. This method seems at once simpler
and more general.
305. Being now agreed as to the meaning of a continuous
function, and of the limit of a function, we can attack the
question of the derivative of a function, or differential coeffi-
cient. It was formerly supposed that all continuous functions
couldbedifferentiated, but this is nowknown tobe erroneous.
Some can be differentiated everywhere, others everywhere ex-
cept in one point, others have everywhere a differential on the
right, but sometimes none on the left, others contain an infi-
nite number of points, in any finite interval, inwhich they can-
not be differentiated, though in an infinitely greater number
of points they can be differentiated, others lastly—and these
are properly the most general class—cannot be differentiated
anywhere at all‡. But the conditions under which a function
may be differentiated, though they are of some importance to
the philosophy of space and of motion, need not greatly con-
cern us here; and in any case, wemust first knowwhat a differ-
ential is.
If f(x) be a function which is finite and continuous at the
point x, then it may happen that the fraction
ff(x+ δ)  f(x)g=δ
has a definite limit as δ approaches to zero. If this does hap-
pen, the limit is denoted by f 0(x), and is called the derivative 329
‡SeeDini, op. cit.Chaps. x, xi, xii;Encyklopädie der math. Wissenschaften,
Band ii, Heft i (Leipzig, 1899), esp. pp. 20–22.
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or differential of f(x) in the point x. If, that is to say, there be
some number z such that, given any number ε however small,
if δ be any number less than somenumber η, but positive, then
fffx δ)  f(x)g= δ differs from z by less than ε, then z is the
derivative of f(x) in the point x. If the limit in question does
not exist, then f(x) has no derivative at the point x. It f(x) be
not continuous at this point, the limit does not exist; if f(x) be
continuous, the limit may or may not exist.
306. The only point which it is important to notice at
present is, that there is no implication of the infinitesimal in
this definition. The number δ is always finite, and in the def-
inition of the limit there is nothing to imply the contrary. In
fact, ff(x+ δ)  f(x)g=δ, regarded as a function of δ, is wholly
indeterminate when δ = 0. The limit of a function for a given
value of the independent variable is, as we have seen, an en-
tirely different notion from its value for the said value of the
independent variable, and the twomay ormaynot be the same
number. In the present case, the limit may be definite, but the
value for δ = 0 can have no meaning. Thus it is the doctrine
of limits that underlies the Calculus, and not any pretended
use of the infinitesimal. This is the only point of philosophic
importance in the present subject, and it is only to elicit this
point that I have dragged the reader through so much mathe-
matics.
307. Before examining the infinitesimal on its own account,
it remains to define the definite integral, and to show that this,
too, does not involve the infinitesimal. The indefinite integral,
which is the mere converse of the differential, is of no impor-
tance to us; but the definite integral has an independent defi-
nition, which must be briefly examined.
Just as the derivative of a function is the limit of a fraction,
so the definite integral is the limit of a sum*. The definite in-
*The definition of the definite integral differs little in different modern
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tegral may be defined as follows: Let f(x) be a function which
is one-valued and finite in the interval α to β (both inclusive).
Divide this interval into any n portions bymeans of the (n  1)
points x1; x2; : : : xn 1, and denote by δ1; δ2; : : : δn the n intervals
x1   α; x1   x2; : : : β   xn+1. In each of these intervals, δS, take
any one of the values, say f(ζS), which f(x) assumes in this in-
terval, andmultiply this valueby the interval δS. Now form the
sum
nX
1
f(ζS)δS. This sumwill always be finite. If now, as n in-
creases, this sum tends to one definite limit, however f(ζS)may 330
be chosen in its interval, and however the intervals be chosen
(provided only that all are less than any assigned number for
sufficiently great values of n)—then this one limit is called the
definite integral of f(x) from α to β. If there is no such limit,
f(x) is not integrable from α to β.
308. As in the case of the derivative, there is only one im-
portant remark to make about this definition. The definite in-
tegral involves neither the infinite nor the infinitesimal, and is
itself not a sum, but only and strictly the limit of a sum. All
the terms which occur in the sum whose limit is the definite
integral are finite, and the sum itself is finite. If we were to
suppose the limit actually attained, it is true, the number of
intervals would be infinite, and the magnitude of each would
be infinitesimal; but in this case, the sum becomes meaning-
less. Thus the sum must not be regarded as actually attaining
its limit. But this is a respect in which series in general agree.
Any series which always ascends or always descends and has
works. Cp. Dini, op. cit. §§178–181; Jordan, Cours d’Analyse, Vol. i (Paris,
1893), Chap. i, §§41–58;Encyklopädie der mathematischenWissenchaften, ii, A.
2, § 31. Thedefinition as the limit of a sum ismore consonantwithLeibniz’s
views than that as the inverseof aderivative, butwasbanishedbyBernoulli
and Euler, and only brought back by Cauchy. See references in the last-
mentioned place.
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no last term cannot reach its limit; other infinite series may
have a term equal to their limit, but if so, this is a mere acci-
dent. The general rule is, that the limit does not belong to the
series which it limits; and in the definition of the derivative
and the definite integral we have merely another instance of
this fact. The so-called infinitesimal calculus, therefore, has
nothing to do with the infinitesimal, and has only indirectly
to dowith the infinite—its connectionwith the infinite being,
that it involves limits, and only infinite series have limits.
The above definitions, since they involve multiplication
and division, are essentially arithmetical. Unlike the defini-
tions of limits and continuity, they cannot be rendered purely
ordinal. But it is evident that theymay be at once extended to
any numerically measurable magnitudes, and therefore to all
series in which stretches or distances can be measured. Since
spaces, times, and motions are included under this head, the
Calculus is applicable to Geometry and Dynamics. As to the
axioms involved in the assumption that geometrical and dy-
namical functions can be differentiated and integrated, I shall
have something to say at a later stage. For the present, it is time
to make a critical examination of the infinitesimal on its own
account.
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chapter xl
THE INFINITESIMALANDTHE
IMPROPER INFINITE
309. Until recent times, it was universally believed that con- 331
tinuity, the derivative, and the definite integral, all involved
actual infinitesimals, i.e. that even if the definitions of these
notions could be formally freed from explicit mention of the
infinitesimal, yet, where the definitions applied, the actual in-
finitesimal must always be found. This belief is now gener-
ally abandoned. The definitions which have been given in
previous chapters do not in any way imply the infinitesimal,
and this notion appears to have become mathematically use-
less. In the present chapter, I shall first give a definition of the
infinitesimal, and then examine the cases where this notion
arises. I shall end by a critical discussion of the belief that con-
tinuity implies the infinitesimal.
The infinitesimal has, in general, been very vaguely defined.
It has been regarded as a number ormagnitudewhich, though
not zero, is less than any finite number or magnitude. It has
been the dx or dy of theCalculus, the time during which a ball
thrown vertically upwards is at rest at the highest point of its
course, the distance between a point on a line and the next
point, etc., etc. But none of these notions are at all precise.
The dx and dy, as we saw in the last chapter, are nothing at all:
dy=dx is the limit of a fraction whose numerator and denomi-
nator are finite, but is not itself a fraction at all. The time dur-
ing which a ball is at rest at its highest point is a very complex
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notion, involving the whole philosophic theory of motion: in
Part VII we shall find, when this theory has been developed,
that there is no such time. The distance between consecu-
tive points presupposes that there are consecutive points—a
view which there is every reason to deny. And so with most
instances—they afford no precise definition of what is meant
by the infinitesimal.
310. There is, so far as I know, only one precise definition,
which renders the infinitesimal a purely relative notion, cor-
relative to something arbitrarily assumed to be finite. When,
instead, we regard what had been taken to be infinitesimal
as finite, the correlative notion is what Cantor calls the im-
proper infinite (Uneigentlich-Unendliches). The definition of 332
the relation in question is obtained by denying the axiom of
Archimedes, just as the transfinite was obtained by denying
mathematical induction. If P;Q be any two numbers, or any
two measurable magnitudes, they are said to be finite with re-
spect to each other when, if P be the lesser, there exists a finite
integer n such that nP is greater thanQ. The existence of such
an integer constitutes the axiom of Archimedes and the def-
inition of relative finitude. It will be observed that it presup-
poses the definition of absolute finitude among numbers—a
definition which, as we have seen, depends upon two points,
(1) the connection of 1 with the logical notion of simplicity, or
of 0 with the logical notion of the null-class; (2) the principle
of mathematical induction. The notion of relative finitude is
plainly distinct from that of absolute finitude. The latter ap-
plies only to numbers, classes and divisibilities, whereas the
former applies to any kind ofmeasurablemagnitude. Any two
numbers, classes, or divisibilities, which are both absolutely fi-
nite are also relatively finite; but the converse does not hold.
For example, ω and ω : 2, an inch and a foot, a day and a
year, are relatively finite pairs, thoughall three consist of terms
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which are absolutely infinite.
Thedefinition of the infinitesimal and the improper infinite
is then as follows. If P;Q be two numbers, or two measurable
magnitudes of the same kind, and if, n being any finite inte-
ger whatever, nP is always less than Q, then P is infinitesimal
with respect to Q, and Q is infinite with respect to P. With
regard to numbers, these relative terms are not required; for
if, in the case supposed, P is absolutely finite, then Q is abso-
lutely infinite; while if it were possible for Q to be absolutely
finite, P would be absolutely infinitesimal—a case, however,
which we shall see reason to regard as impossible. Hence I
shall assume in future that P and Q are not numbers, but are
magnitudes of a kind of which some, at least, are numerically
measurable. It should be observed that, as regardsmagnitudes,
the axiom of Archimedes is the only way of defining, not only
the infinitesimal, but the infinite also. Of a magnitude not nu-
merically measurable, there is nothing to be said except that
it is greater than some of its kind, and less than others; but
from such propositions infinity cannot be obtained. Even if
there be a magnitude greater than all others of its kind, there
is no reason for regarding it as infinite. Finitude and infinity
are essentially numerical notions, and it is only by relation to
numbers that these terms can be applied to other entities.
311. The next question to be discussed is. What instances
of infinitesimals are to be found? Although there are far fewer
instances thanwas formerly supposed, there are yet some that
are important. To begin with, if we have been right in regard-
ing divisibility as a magnitude, it is plain that the divisibility
of any whole containing a finite number of simple parts is in-
finitesimal as compared with one containing an infinite num- 333
ber. The number of parts being taken as the measure, every
infinite whole will be greater than n times every finite whole,
whatever finite number nmay be. This is therefore a perfectly
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clear instance. But it must not be supposed that the ratio of
the divisibilities of two wholes, of which one at least is transfi-
nite, can be measured by the ratio of the cardinal numbers of
their simple parts. There are two reasons why this cannot be
done. The first is, that two transfinite cardinals do not have
any relation strictly analogous to ratio; indeed, the definition
of ratio is effected by means of mathematical induction. The
relation of two transfinite cardinals α; γ expressed by the equa-
tion αβ = γ bears a certain resemblance to integral ratios, and
αβ = γδ may be used to define other ratios. But ratios so de-
fined are not very similar to finite ratios. The other reason
why infinite divisibilities must not be measured by transfinite
numbers is, that the whole must always have more divisibility
than the part (provided the remaining part is not relatively in-
finitesimal), though it may have the same transfinite number.
In short, divisibilities, like ordinals, are equal, so long as the
wholes are finite, when and only when the cardinal numbers
of the wholes are the same; but the notion of magnitude of
divisibility is distinct from that of cardinal number, and sepa-
rates itself visibly as soon as we come to infinite wholes.
Two infinitewholesmaybe such that one is infinitely less di-
visible than the other. Consider, for example, the length of a
finite straight line and the area of the square upon that straight
line; or the length of a finite straight line and the length of
the whole straight line of which it forms part (except in fi-
nite spaces); or an area and a volume; or the rational num-
bers and the real numbers; or the collection of points on a
finite part of a line obtainable by von Staudt’s quadrilateral
construction, and the total collection of points on the said
finite part*. All these are magnitudes of one and the same
kind, namely divisibilities, and all are infinite divisibilities;
but they are of many different orders. The points on a lim-
*See Part VI, Chap. xlv.
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ited portion of a line obtainable by the quadrilateral construc-
tion form a collection which is infinitesimal with respect to
the said portion; this portion is ordinally infinitesimal† with
respect to any bounded area; any bounded area is ordinally
infinitesimal with respect to any bounded volume; and any
bounded volume (except in finite spaces) is ordinally infinites-
imal with respect to all space. In all these cases, the word in-
finitesimal is used strictly according to the above definition, ob-
tained from the axiom ofArchimedes. Whatmakes these var-
ious infinitesimals somewhat unimportant, from amathemati-
cal standpoint, is, thatmeasurement essentially dependsupon
the axiomofArchimedes, and cannot, in general, be extended
by means of transfinite numbers, for the reasons which have
just been explained. Hence two divisibilities, of which one 334
is infinitesimal with respect to the other, are regarded usually
as different kinds of magnitude; and to regard them as of the
same kind gives no advantage save philosophic correctness.
All of them, however, are strictly instances of infinitesimals,
and the series of themwell illustrates the relativity of the term
infinitesimal.
An interesting method of comparing certain magnitudes,
analogous to the divisibilities of any infinite collections of
points, with those of continuous stretches is given by Stolz*,
and a very similar but more general method is given by Can-
tor†. These methods are too mathematical to be fully ex-
plained here, but the gist of Stolz’s method may be briefly ex-
plained. Let a collection of points x0 be contained in some fi-
nite interval a to b. Divide the interval into any number n of
parts, and divide each of these parts again into any number of
† See Part VI, Chap. xlvii, §397.
*Math. Annalen, 23, “Ueber einen zu einer unendlichen Punktmenge
gehörigen Grenzwerth.”
†Ib. “Ueber unendliche lineare Punktmannigfaltigkeiten,” No. 6.
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parts, and so on; and let the successive divisions be so effected
that all parts become in time less than any assigned number δ.
At each stage, add together all the parts that contain points of
x0. At the mth stage, let the resulting sum be Sm. Then subse-
quent divisions may diminish this sum, but cannot increase
it. Hence as the number of divisions increases, Sm must ap-
proach a limit L. If x0 is compact throughout the interval, we
shall have L = b   a; if any finite derivative of x0 vanishes,
L = 0. L obviously bears an analogy to a definite integral; but
no conditions are required for the existence of L. But L can-
not be identifiedwith the divisibility; for some compact series,
e.g. that of rationals, are less divisible than others, e.g. the con-
tinuum, but give the same value of L.
312. The case in which infinitesimals were formerly sup-
posed to be peculiarly evident is that of compact series. In
this case, however, it is possible to prove that there can be no
infinitesimal segments‡, provided numerical measurement be
possible at all—and if it benotpossible, the infinitesimal, aswe
have seen, is not definable. In the first place, it is evident that
the segment contained between two different terms is always
infinitely divisible; for since there is a term c between any two
a and b, there is another d between a and c, and so on. Thus no
terminated segment can contain a finite number of terms. But
segments defined by a class of terms may (as we saw in Chap-
ter xxxiv) have no limiting term. In this case, however, pro-
vided the segment does not consist of a single term a, it will
contain some other term b, and therefore an infinite number
of terms. Thus all segments are infinitely divisible. The next
point is to define multiples of segments. Two terminated seg-
ments can be added by placing a segment equal to the one at
the end of the other to form a new segment; and if the two
were equal, the new one is said to be double of each of them. 335
‡See Peano, Rivista di Matematica, Vol. ii, pp. 58–62.
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But if the two segments are not terminated, this process can-
not be employed. Their sum, in this case, is defined by Pro-
fessor Peano as the logical sum of all the segments obtained
by adding two terminated segments contained respectively in
the two segments to be added*. Having defined this sum, we
can define any finite multiple of a segment. Hence we can de-
fine the class of terms contained in some finite multiple of our
segment, i.e. the logical sum of all its finite multiples. If, with
respect to all greater segments, our segment obeys the axiom
of Archimedes, then this new class will contain all terms that
come after the origin of our segment. But if our segment be in-
finitesimalwith respect to any other segment, then the class in
questionwill fail to contain some points of this other segment.
In this case, it is shown that all transfinitemultiples of our seg-
ment are equal to each other. Hence it follows that the class
formedby the logical sumof all finitemultiples of our segment,
whichmay be called the infinitemultiple of our segment,must
be a non-terminated segment, for a terminated segment is al-
ways increased by being doubled. “Each of these results,” so
Professor Peano concludes, “is in contradictionwith the usual
notion of a segment. And from the fact that the infinitesimal
segment cannot be rendered finite bymeans of any actually in-
finite multiplication, I conclude, with Cantor, that it cannot
be an element in finite magnitudes” (p. 62). But I think an
even stronger conclusion is warranted. For we have seen that,
in compact series, there is, corresponding to every segment,
a segment of segments, and that this is always terminated by
its defining segment; further that the numerical measurement
of segments of segments is exactly the same as that of simple
segments; whence, by applying the above result to segments
of segments, we obtain a definite contradiction, since none of
themcanbe unterminated, and an infinitesimal one cannot be
*Loc. cit. p. 61, No. 9.
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terminated.
In the case of the rational or the real numbers, the com-
plete knowledge which we possess concerning them renders
the non-existence of infinitesimals demonstrable. A rational
number is the ratio of two finite integers, and any such ratio
is finite. A real number other than zero is a segment of the se-
ries of rationals; hence if x be a real number other than zero,
there is a class u, not null, of rationals such that, if y is a u, and
z is less than y, z is an x, i.e. belongs to the segment which is
x. Hence every real number other than zero is a class contain-
ing rationals, and all rationals are finite; consequently every
real number is finite. Consequently if it were possible, in any
sense, to speak of infinitesimal numbers, it would have to be
in some radically new sense.
313. I come now to a very difficult question, on which I
would gladly say nothing—I mean, the question of the orders
of infinity and infinitesimality of functions. On this question
the greatest authorities are divided: Du Bois Reymond, Stolz, 336
andmanyothers,maintaining that these forma special class of
magnitudes, in which actual infinitesimals occur, while Can-
tor holds strongly that the whole theory is erroneous*. To
put the matter as simply as possible, consider a function f(x)
whose limit, as x approaches zero, is zero. It may happen that,
for some finite real number α, the ratio f(x)=xα has a finite limit
as x approaches zero. There can be only one such number, but
there may be none. Then α, if there is such a number, may
be called the order to which f(x) becomes infinitesimal, or the
order of smallness of f(x) as x approaches zero. But for some
functions, e.g. 1/log x, there is no such number α. If α be any
finite real number, the limit of 1=xα log x, as x approaches zero,
*See Du Bois Reymond, Allgemeine Functionentheorie (1882), p. 279ff.;
Stolz,AllgemeineArithmetik, Part i (Leipzig, 1885), Section ix, Anhang; Can-
tor, Rivista di Matematica, v, pp. 104–8.
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is infinite. That is, when x is sufficiently small, 1=xα log x is
very large, and may be made larger than any assigned number
by making x sufficiently small—and this whatever finite num-
ber αmay be. Hence, to express the order of smallness of 1/log
x, it is necessary to invent a new infinitesimal number, which
may be denoted by 1=g. Similarly we shall need infinitely great
numbers to express the order of smallness of (say) e 1=x as x ap-
proaches zero. And there is no end to the succession of these
orders of smallness: that of 1/log (log x), for example, is in-
finitely smaller than that of 1/log x, and so on. Thus we have
a whole hierarchy of magnitudes, of which all in any one class
are infinitesimal with respect to all in any higher class, and of
which one class only is formed of all the finite real numbers.
In this development. Cantor finds a vicious circle; and
though the question is difficult, it would seem that Cantor is
in the right. He objects (loc. cit.) that such magnitudes can-
not be introduced unless we have reason to think that there
are such magnitudes. The point is similar to that concerning
limits; and Cantor maintains that, in the present case, defi-
nite contradictions may be proved concerning the supposed
infinitesimals. If therewere infinitesimal numbers j, then even
for them we should have
Limx=0 1/(log x : xj) = 0
since xjmustultimately exceed 12 . Andhe shows that even con-
tinuous, differentiable, and uniformly growing functions may
have an entirely ambiguousorder of smallness or infinity: that,
in fact, for some such functions, this order oscillates between
infinite and infinitesimal values, according to the manner in
which the limit is approached. Hence we may, I think, con-
clude that these infinitesimals are mathematical fictions. And
this may be reinforced by the consideration that, if there were
infinitesimal numbers, there would be infinitesimal segments
of the number-continuum, which we have just seen to be im-
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possible.
314. Thus to sum up what has been said concerning the 337
infinitesimal, we see, to begin with, that it is a relative term,
and that, as regards magnitudes other than divisibilities, or di-
visibilities of wholes which are infinite in the absolute sense,
it is not capable of being other than a relative term. But
where it has an absolute meaning, there this meaning is in-
distinguishable from finitude. We saw that the infinitesimal,
though completely useless in mathematics, does occur in cer-
tain instances—for example, lengths of bounded straight lines
are infinitesimal as compared to areas of polygons, and these
again as compared to volumes of polyhedra. But such gen-
uine cases of infinitesimals, as we saw, are always regarded by
mathematics as magnitudes of another kind, because no nu-
merical comparison is possible, even by means of transfinite
numbers, between an area, and a length, or a volume and an
area. Numerical measurement, in fact, is wholly dependent
upon the axiom of Archimedes, and cannot be extended as
Cantor has extended numbers. And finally we saw that there
are no infinitesimal segments in compact series, and—what is
closely connected—that orders of smallness of functions are
not to be regarded as genuine infinitesimals. The infinitesi-
mal, therefore—so we may conclude—is a very restricted and
mathematically very unimportant conception, of which infin-
ity and continuity are alike independent.
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chapter xli
PHILOSOPHICAL
ARGUMENTSCONCERNING
THE INFINITESIMAL
315. We have now completed our summary review of what 338
mathematics has to say concerning the continuous, the infi-
nite, and the infinitesimal. And here, if no previous philoso-
phers had treated of these topics, we might leave the discus-
sion, and apply our doctrines to space and time. For I hold the
paradoxical opinion that what can be mathematically demon-
strated is true. As, however, almost all philosophers disagree
with this opinion, and as many have written elaborate ar-
guments in favour of views different from those above ex-
pounded, it will be necessary to examine controversially the
principal types of opposing theories, and to defend, as far as
possible, the points in which I differ from standard writers.
For this purpose, the work of Cohen already referred to will
be speciallyuseful, notonlybecause it deals explicitlywithour
present theme, but also because, largely owing to its historical
excellence, certain very importantmathematical errors, which
it appears tome to contain, have led astray other philosophers
who have not an acquaintance with modern mathematics at
first hand*.
316. In the above exposition, the differential appeared as
a philosophically unimportant application of the doctrine of
*For example, Mr Latta, in his article “On the Relations of the Philoso-
phy of Spinoza and that of Leibniz,”Mind, N.S. No 31.
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limits. Indeed, but for its traditional importance, it would
scarcely have deserved even mention. And we saw that its
definition nowhere involves the infinitesimal. The dx and dy
of a differential are nothing in themselves, and dy=dx is not
a fraction. Hence, in modern works on the Calculus, the no-
tation f 0(x) has replaced dy=dx, since the latter form suggests
erroneous notions. The notation f 0(x), it may be observed, is
more similar to Newton’s _y, and its similarity is due to the fact
that, on this point, modern mathematics is more in harmony
with Newton than with Leibniz. Leibniz employed the form
dy=dx because he believed in infinitesimals; Newton, on the
other hand, definitely asserts that his fluxion is not a fraction.
“Those ultimate ratios,” he says, “with which quantities van- 339
ish are not truly the ratios of ultimate quantities, but limits to-
wards which the ratios of quantities decreasing without limit
do always converge, and to which they approach nearer than
by any given difference*.”
But when we turn to such works as Cohen’s, we find the dx
and the dy treated as separate entities, as real infinitesimals, as
the intensively real elements of which the continuum is com-
posed (pp. 14, 28, 144, 147). The view that theCalculus requires
infinitesimals is apparently not thought open to question; at
any rate, no arguments whatever are brought up to support it.
This view is certainly assumed as self-evident bymost philoso-
phers who discuss the Calculus. Let us see for ourselves what
kind of grounds can be urged in its favour.
317. Many arguments in favour of the view in ques-
tion are derived by most writers from space and motion—
arguments which Cohen to some extent countenances (pp.
34, 37), though he admits that the differential can be obtained
*Principia, Bk i, Section i, Lemma xi, Scholium. The whole Scholium
is highly important, though portions of it are less free from error than the
passage quoted in the text.
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from numbers alone, which however, following Kant, he re-
gards as implying time (pp. 20, 21). Since the analysis of space
and motion is still to come, I shall confine myself for the
present to such arguments as can be derived from purely nu-
merical instances. For the sake of definiteness, I shall as far as
possible extract the opinions to be controverted fromCohen.
318. Cohen begins (p. 1) by asserting that the problem of
the infinitesimal is not purely logical: it belongs rather to Epis-
temology, which is distinguished, I imagine, by the fact that
it depends upon the pure intuitions as well as the categories.
This Kantian opinion is wholly opposed to the philosophy
which underlies the present work; but it would take us too far
from our theme to discuss it here, and I mention it chiefly to
explain the phraseology of the work we are examining. Co-
hen proceeds at once to reject the view that the infinitesimal
calculus can be independently derived by mathematics from
the method of limits. This method, he says (p. 1), “consists
in the notion that the elementary conception of equalitymust
be completed by the exact notion of the limit. Thus in the first
place the conception of equality is presupposed …. Again, in
the second place, the method of limits presupposes the con-
ception of magnitude …. But in the presupposed conception
of magnitude the limiting magnitude is at the same time pre-
supposed. The equality which is defined in the elementary
doctrine ofmagnitude pays no attention to these limitingmag-
nitudes. For it, magnitudes count as equal if and although
their difference consists in a limiting magnitude. Hence the
elementary conception of equalitymust be—this is the notion
of themethod of limits—not somuch completed as corrected by 340
the exact conception of the limit. Equality is to be regarded as
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an earlier stage of the limiting relation*.”
319. I have quoted this passage in full, because its errors are
typical of those towhichnon-mathematicians are liable in this
question. In the first place, equality has no relevance to lim-
its. I imagine that Cohen has in mind such cases as a circle
and the inscribed polygon, wherewe cannot say that the circle
is equal to any of the polygons, but only that it is their limit;
or, to take an arithmetical instance, a convergent series whose
sum is π orp2. But in all such instances there is much that is
irrelevant and adventitious, and there are many unnecessary
complications. The absolutely simplest instance of a limit isω
considered as the limit of the ordinal numbers. There is here
certainly no kind of equality. Yet in all cases where limits are
defined by progressions—and these are the usual cases—we
have a series of the type presented by the finite ordinals to-
gether withω. Consider, for example, the series 2  1n together
with 2, the n being capable of all positive integral finite values.
Here the series is of the same type as before, and here, as be-
fore, 2 is the limit of the series. But here—and this is what has
misled Cohen—the difference between 2 and the successive
terms of the series becomes less than any assigned magnitude,
and thus we seem to have a sort of extended quality between
2 and the late terms of the series 2  1n . But let us examine this.
In the first place, it depends upon the fact that rationals are
a series in which we have distances which are again rationals.
Butwe know that distances are unnecessary to limits, and that
stretches are equally effective. Now considering stretches, 2 is
the limit of 2  1n because no rational comes between 2 and all
terms of the series 2  1n precisely the sense in which ω is the
limit of the finite integers. And it is only because 2  1n forms a
progression, i.e. is similar to the series of finite integers, thatwe
know its limit to be 2. The fact that the terms, as we advance,
*Or ratio: the German isGrenzverhältniss.
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differ little from 2, depends either upon our having a series
in which there is distance, which is a fortuitous and irrelevant
circumstance, or upon the fact that the successive stretches up
to 2may bemade less than any assigned stretch up to 2, which
follows from the notion of a limit, but has nothing to do with
equality. And whenever our series which is to have a limit is
part of a series which is a function of ω, the stretch from any
term to the limit is always infinite in the only sense in which
such series have infinite stretches; and in a very real sense the
stretch grows no smaller as we approach the limit, for both the 341
ordinal and the cardinal number of its terms remain constant.
We have seen so fully already in what sense, and how far,
magnitude is involved in limits, that it seems unnecessary to
say much on this subject here. Magnitude is certainly not in-
volved in the sense, which is undoubtedly that intended by
Cohen, that the limit and the terms limited must be magni-
tudes. Every progression which forms part of a series which
is a function of ω, and in which there are terms after the
progression, has a limit, whatever may be the nature of the
terms. Every endless series of segments of a compact series
has a limit, whatever may be the nature of the compact series.
Nowof course in all series we havemagnitudes, namely the di-
visibilities of stretches; but it is not of these that we find the
limit. Even in the case of segments, the limit is an actual seg-
ment, not the magnitude of a segment; and what is relevant is
only that the segments are classes, not that they are quantities.
But the distinction of quantities and magnitudes is, of course,
wholly foreign to Cohen’s order of ideas.
320. But we now come to a greater error. The conception
of magnitude, Cohen says, which is presupposed in limits,
in turn presupposes limiting magnitudes. By limiting magni-
tudes, as appears from the context, he means infinitesimals,
the ultimate differences, I suppose, between the terms of a se-
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ries and its limit. What he means seems to be, that the kinds
ofmagnitudewhich lead to limits are compact series, and that,
in compact series, wemust have infinitesimals. Every point in
this opinion is mistaken. Limits, we have just seen, need not
be limits of magnitudes; segments of a compact series, as we
saw in the preceding chapter, cannot be infinitesimal; and lim-
its do not in any way imply that the series in which they occur
are compact. These points have been so fully proved already
that it is unnecessary to dwell upon them.
321. But the crowning mistake is the supposition that lim-
its introduce a new meaning of equality. Among magnitudes,
equality, as we saw in Part III, has an absolutely rigid and
unique meaning: it applies only to quantities, and means that
theyhave the samemagnitude. There is noquestionof approx-
imation here: what is meant is simply absolute logical identity
of magnitude. Among numbers (which Cohen probably re-
gards asmagnitudes), there is no such thing as equality. There
is identity, and there is the relationwhich is usually expressed
by the sign of equality, as in the equation 2  3 = 6. This
relation had puzzled those who endeavoured to philosophize
about Arithmetic, until it was explained by Professor Peano*.
When one term of the equation is a single number, while the
other is an expression composed of two ormore numbers, the
equationexpresses the fact that the class definedby the expres- 342
sion contains only one term, which is the single number on
the other side of the equation. This definition again is abso-
lutely rigid: there is nothing whatever approximate in it, and
it is incapable of any modification by infinitesimals. I imagine
that what Cohenmeans may be expressed as follows. In form-
ing a differential coefficient, we consider two numbers x and
x+ dx, and two others y and y+ dy. In elementary Arithmetic,
*See e.g. Riv. di Mat. vii, p. 35.
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x and x + dx would count as equal, but not in the Calculus.
There are, in fact, two ways of defining equality. Two terms
may be said to be equal when their ratio is unity, or when their
difference is zero. But when we allow real infinitesimals dx, x
and x + dxwill have the ratio unity, but will not have zero for
their difference, since dx is different from absolute zero. This
view, which I suggest as equivalent toCohen’s, depends upon
a misunderstanding of limits and the Calculus. There are in
theCalculus no suchmagnitudes as dx and dy. There are finite
differences Δx and Δy, but no view, however elementary, will
make x equal to x + Δx. There are ratios of finite differences,
Δy=Δx, and in cases where the derivative of y exists, there is
one real number to which Δy=Δx can be made to approach as
near aswe likebydiminishingΔx andΔy. This single real num-
ber we choose to denote by dy=dx; but it is not a fraction, and
dx and dy are nothing but typographical parts of one symbol.
There is no correction whatever of the notion of equality by
the doctrine of limits; the only new element introduced is the
consideration of infinite classes of terms chosenout of a series.
322. As regards thenature of the infinitesimal, we are told (p.
15) that the differential, or the inextensive, is to be identified
with the intensive, and the differential is regarded as the em-
bodiment ofKant’s category of reality. This view (in so far as it
is independent of Kant) is quoted with approval from Leibniz;
but to me, I must confess, it seems destitute of all justification.
It is to be observed that dx and dy, if we allow that they are enti-
ties at all, arenot tobe identifiedwith single termsofour series,
nor yet with differences between consecutive terms, but must
be always stretches containing an infinite number of terms, or
distances corresponding to such stretches. Here a distinction
must be made between series of numbers and series in which
we have only measurable distances or stretches. The latter
is the case of space and time. Here dx and dy are not points
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or instants, which alone would be truly inextensive; they are
primarily numbers, and hence must correspond to infinitesi-
mal stretches or distances—for it would be preposterous to
assign a numerical ratio to two points, or—as in the case of
velocity—to a point and an instant. But dx and dy cannot rep-
resent the distances of consecutive points, nor yet the stretch
formed by two consecutive points. Against this we have, in
the first place, the general ground that our series must be re-
garded as compact, which precludes the idea of consecutive
terms. To evade this, if we are dealing with a series in which 343
there are only stretches, not distances, would be impossible:
for to say that there are always an infinitenumberof intermedi-
ate points exceptwhen the stretch consists of a finitenumberof
terms would be a mere tautology. But when there is distance,
it might be said that the distance of two termsmay be finite or
infinitesimal, and that, as regards infinitesimal distances, the
stretch is not compact, but consists of a finite number of terms.
This being allowed for themoment, our dx and dymaybemade
to be the distances of consecutive points, or else the stretches
composed of consecutive points. But now the distance of con-
secutive points, supposing for example that both are on one
straight line, would seem to be a constant, which would give
dy=dx = 1. We cannot suppose, in cases where x and y are
both continuous, and the function y is one-valued, as the Cal-
culus requires, that x and x+dx are consecutive, but not y and
y+dy; for every value of ywill be correlatedwith one and only
one value of x, and vice versâ; thus y cannot skip any supposed
intermediate values between y and y + dy. Hence, given the
values of x and y, even supposing the distances of consecutive
terms to differ from place to place, the value of dy=dx will be
determinate; and any other function y0 which, for some value
of x, is equal to y, will, for that value, have an equal derivative,
which is an absurd conclusion. And leaving these mathemati-
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cal arguments, it is evident, from the fact that dy and dx are to
have a numerical ratio, that if they be intensivemagnitudes, as
is suggested, they must be numerically measurable ones: but
how thismeasurement is effected, it is certainly not easy to see.
This point may be made clearer by confining ourselves to the
fundamental case in which both x and y are numbers. If we re-
gard x and x+ dx as, consecutive, wemust suppose either that
y and y+ dy are consecutive, or that they are identical, or that
there are a finite number of terms between them, or that there
are an infinite number. If we take stretches to measure dx and
dy, it will follow that dy=dxmust be always zero, or integral, or
infinite, which is absurd. It will even follow that, if y is not
constant, dy=dxmust be1. Take for example y = x2, where x
and y are positive real numbers. As x passes from one number
to the next, ymust do so likewise; for to every value of y corre-
sponds one of x, and y grows as x grows. Hence if y skipped the
number next to any one of its values, it could never come back
to pick it up; but we know that every real number is among
the values of y. Hence y and y + dy must be consecutive, and
dy=dx = 1. If we measure by distances, not stretches, the dis-
tance dy must be fixed when y is given, and the distance dx
when x is given. Now if x = 1; y = 1; dy=dx = 2; but, since x
and y are the samenumber, dx and dymust be equal, since each
is the distance to the next number: therefore dy=dx = 1, which
is absurd. Similarly, if we take for y a decreasing function, we
shall find dy=dx =  1. Hence the admission of consecutive
numbers is fatal to the Calculus; and since the Calculus must 344
be maintained, the Calculus is fatal to consecutive numbers.
323. The notion that there must be consecutive numbers
is reinforced by the idea of continuous change, which is em-
bodied in calling x and y “variables.” Change in time is a
topic which we shall have to discuss at a later stage, but
which has, undoubtedly, greatly influenced the philosophy of
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the Calculus. People picture a variable to themselves—often
unconsciously—as successively assuming a series of values, as
might happen in a dynamical problem. Thus they might say:
How can x pass from x1 to x2, without passing through all in-
termediate values? And in this passage, must there not be a
next value, which it assumes on first leaving the value x1? Ev-
erything is conceived on the analogy of motion, in which a
point is supposed to pass through all intermediate positions
in its path. Whether or not this view of motion is correct, I
do not now decide: at any rate it is irrelevant where a funda-
mental point in the theory of continuous series is concerned,
since time and the path of motion must both be continuous
series, and the properties of such series must be decided be-
fore appealing tomotion to confirm our views. Formy part, to
return to Cohen, I must confess, it seems evident that inten-
sive magnitude is something wholly different from infinitesi-
mal extensivemagnitude: for the lattermust always be smaller
than finite extensivemagnitudes, andmust therefore be of the
same kind with them; while intensive magnitudes seem never
in any sense smaller than any extensivemagnitudes. Thus the
metaphysical theory by which infinitesimals are to be rescued
seems, both mathematically and philosophically, destitute of
grounds in its favour.
324. We cannot, then, agree with the following summary of
Cohen’s theory (p. 28): “That Imay be able to posit an element
in and for itself, is the desideratum, to which corresponds the in-
strument of thought reality. This instrument of thought must
first be set up, in order to be able to enter into that combina-
tion with intuition, with the consciousness of being given, which
is completed in theprinciple of intensivemagnitude. This presup-
position of intensive reality is latent in all principles, andmust
therefore bemade independent. This presupposition is the mean-
ing of reality and the secret of the concept of the differential.” What
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we can agree to, and what, I believe, confusedly underlies the
above statement, is, that every continuummust consist of ele-
ments or terms; but these, as we have just seen, will not fulfil
the function of the dx and dywhich occur in old-fashioned ac-
counts of the Calculus. Nor can we agree that “this finite” (i.e.
thatwhich is the object of physical science) “can be thought as
a sum of those infinitesimal intensive realities, as a definite inte-
gral” (p. 144). The definite integral is not a sum of elements of
a continuum, although there are such elements: for example,
the lengthof a curve, as obtainedby integration, is not the sum
of its points, but strictly and only the limit of the lengths of
inscribed polygons. The only sense which can be given to the 345
sumof the points of the curve is the logical class towhich they
all belong, i.e. the curve itself, not its length. All lengths are
magnitudes of divisibility of stretches, and all stretches con-
sist of an infinite number of points; and any two terminated
stretches have a finite ratio to each other. There is no such
thing as an infinitesimal stretch; if there were, it would not be
an element of the continuum; the Calculus does not require
it, and to suppose its existence leads to contradictions. And
as for the notion that in every series there must be, consecu-
tive terms, that was shown, in the last Chapter of Part III, to
involve an illegitimate use of mathematical induction. Hence
infinitesimals as explaining continuitymust be regarded as un-
necessary, erroneous, and self-contradictory.
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chapter xlii
THE PHILOSOPHYOF THE
CONTINUUM
325. The word continuity has borne among philosophers, es- 346
pecially since the time of Hegel, a meaning totally unlike that
given to it by Cantor. Thus Hegel says*: “Quantity, as we saw,
has two sources: the exclusive unit, and the identification or
equalization of these units. When we look, therefore, at its
immediate relation to self, or at the characteristic of selfsame-
ness made explicit by abstraction, quantity isContinuousmag-
nitude; but when we look at the other characteristic, the One
implied in it, it is Discrete magnitude.” When we remember
that quantity and magnitude, in Hegel, both mean “cardinal
number,” we may conjecture that this assertion amounts to
the following: “Many terms, considered as having a cardinal
number, must all be members of one class; in so far as they are
each merely an instance of the class-concept, they are indis-
tinguishable one from another, and in this aspect the whole
which they compose is called continuous; but in order to their
maniness, theymust be different instances of the class-concept,
and in this aspect the whole which they compose is called dis-
crete.” Now I am far from denying—indeed I strongly hold—
that this opposition of identity and diversity in a collection
constitutes a fundamental problem of Logic—perhaps even
the fundamental problem of philosophy. And being funda-
*Smaller Logic, §100,Wallace’s Translation, p. 188.
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mental, it is certainly relevant to the studyof themathematical
continuum as to everything else. But beyond this general con-
nection, it has no special relation to the mathematical mean-
ing of continuity, as may be seen at once from the fact that it
has no reference whatever to order. In this chapter, it is the
mathematical meaning that is to be discussed. I have quoted
the philosophic meaning only in order to state definitely that
this is not here in question; and since disputes about words
are futile, Imust ask philosophers to divest themselves, for the
time, of their habitual associations with the word, and allow it
no signification but that obtained fromCantor’s definition.
326. In confining ourselves to the arithmetical continuum,
we conflict in another way with common preconceptions.
Of the arithmetical continuum, M. Poincaré justly remarks*: 347
“The continuum thus conceived is nothing but a collection of
individuals arranged in a certain order, infinite in number, it
is true, but external to each other. This is not the ordinary
conception, in which there is supposed to be, between the ele-
ments of the continuum, a sort of intimate bondwhichmakes
awhole of them, inwhich the point is not prior to the line, but
the line to the point. Of the famous formula, the continuum is
unity in multiplicity, the multiplicity alone subsists, the unity
has disappeared.”
It has always been held to be an open question whether the
continuum is composed of elements; and even when it has
been allowed to contain elements, it has been often alleged to
benot composedof these. This latter viewwasmaintained even
by so stout a supporter of elements in everything as Leibniz†.
But all these views are only possible in regard to such continua
as those of space and time. The arithmetical continuum is an
object selected by definition, consisting of elements in virtue
*Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Vol. i, p. 26.
†See The Philosophy of Leibniz, by the present author, Chap. ix.
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of the definition, and known to be embodied in at least one in-
stance, namely the segments of the rational numbers. I shall
maintain in Part VI that spaces afford other instances of the
arithmetical continuum. The chief reason for the elaborate
and paradoxical theories of space and time and their continu-
ity, which have been constructed by philosophers, has been
the supposed contradictions in a continuum composed of ele-
ments. The thesis of the present chapter is, that Cantor’s con-
tinuum is free from contradictions. This thesis, as is evident,
must be firmly established, before we can allow the possibility
that spatio-temporal continuity may be of Cantor’s kind. In
this argument, I shall assume as proved the thesis of the pre-
ceding chapter, that the continuity to be discussed does not
involve the admission of actual infinitesimals.
327. In this capricious world, nothing is more capricious
than posthumous fame. One of the most notable victims of
posterity’s lack of judgment is the Eleatic Zeno. Having in-
vented four arguments, all immeasurably subtle andprofound,
the grossness of subsequent philosophers pronounced him to
be a mere ingenious juggler, and his arguments to be one and
all sophisms. After two thousand years of continual refuta-
tion, these sophisms were reinstated, and made the founda-
tion of a mathematical renaissance, by a German professor,
who probably never dreamed of any connection between him-
self and Zeno. Weierstrass, by strictly banishing all infinites-
imals, has at last shown that we live in an unchanging world,
and that the arrow, at everymoment of its flight, is truly at rest.
The only point where Zeno probably erred was in inferring (if
he did infer) that, because there is no change, therefore the
worldmust be in the same state at one time as at another. This
consequence by no means follows, and in this point the Ger- 348
man professor is more constructive than the ingenious Greek.
Weierstrass, being able to embody his opinions in mathemat-
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ics, where familiarity with truth eliminates the vulgar preju-
dices of common sense, has been able to give to his proposi-
tions the respectable air of platitudes; and if the result is less
delightful to the lover of reason than Zeno’s bold defiance, it
is at any rate more calculated to appease the mass of academic
mankind.
Zeno’s arguments are specially concernedwithmotion, and
are not therefore, as they stand, relevant to our present pur-
pose. But it is instructive to translate them, so far as possible,
into arithmetical language*.
328. The first argument, that of dichotomy, asserts: “There
is no motion, for what moves must reach the middle of its
course before it reaches the end.” That is to say, whatever
motion we assume to have taken place, this presupposes an-
other motion, and this in turn another, and so on ad infinitum.
Hence there is an endless regress in the mere idea of any as-
signedmotion. This argument can be put into an arithmetical
form, but it appears then far less plausible. Consider a variable
x which is capable of all real (or rational) values between two
assigned limits, say 0 and 1. The class of its values is an infi-
nite whole, whose parts are logically prior to it: for it has parts,
and it cannot subsist if any of the parts are lacking. Thus the
numbers from 0 to 1 presuppose those from 0 to 1=2, these pre-
suppose thenumbers from0 to 1=4, and soon. Hence, itwould
seem, there is an infinite regress in the notion of any infinite
whole; but without such infinite wholes, real numbers cannot
be defined, and arithmetical continuity, which applies to an
*Not being a Greek scholar, I pretend to no first-hand authority as to
what Zeno really did say or mean. The form of his four arguments which I
shall employ is derived from the interesting article ofM. Noël, “Le mouve-
ment et les arguments de Zénon d’Elée,”Revue deMétaphysique et deMorale,
Vol. i, pp. 107–125. These arguments are in any case well worthy of consid-
eration, and as they are, to me, merely a text for discussion, their historical
correctness is of little importance.
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infinite series, breaks down.
This argument may be met in two ways, either of which, at
first sight, might seem sufficient, but both of which are really
necessary. First, we may distinguish two kinds of infinite re-
gresses, of which one is harmless. Secondly, we may distin-
guish two kinds of whole, the collective and the distributive,
and assert that, in the latter kind, parts of equal complexity
with the whole are not logically prior to it. These two points
must be separately explained.
329. An infinite regress may be of two kinds. In the objec-
tionable kind, two or more propositions join to constitute the
meaning of some proposition; of these constituents, there is
one at least whose meaning is similarly compounded; and so
on ad infinitum. This form of regress commonly results from
circular definitions. Such definitions may be expanded in a 349
manner analogous to that inwhich continued fractions are de-
veloped from quadratic equations. But at every stage the term
to be defined will reappear, and no definition will result. Take
for example the following: “Two people are said to have the
same idea when they have ideas which are similar; and ideas
are similarwhen they contain an identical part.” If an ideamay
have a part which is not an idea, such a definition is not logi-
cally objectionable; but if part of an idea is an idea, then, in
the second place where identity of ideas occurs, the definition
must be substituted; and so on. Thus wherever the meaning
of a proposition is in question, an infinite regress is objection-
able, since we never reach a proposition which has a definite
meaning. But many infinite regresses are not of this form. If
A be a proposition whose meaning is perfectly definite, andA
implies B, B implies C, and so on, we have an infinite regress
of a quite unobjectionable kind. This depends upon the fact
that implication is a synthetic relation, and that, although, if
A be an aggregate of propositions, A implies any proposition
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which is part ofA, it by nomeans follows that any proposition
which A implies is part of A. Thus there is no logical neces-
sity, as there was in the previous case, to complete the infinite
regress beforeA acquires a meaning. If, then, it can be shown
that the implication of the parts in the whole, when the whole
is an infinite class of numbers, is of this latter kind, the regress
suggested by Zeno’s argument of dichotomy will have lost its
sting.
330. In order to show that this is the case, we must distin-
guish wholes which are defined extensionally, i.e. by enumer-
ating their terms, from such as are defined intensionally, i.e. as
the class of terms having some given relation to some given
term, or, more simply, as a class of terms. (For a class of terms,
when it forms a whole, is merely all terms having the class-
relation to a class-concept*.) Now an extensional whole—at
least so far as human powers extend—is necessarily finite: we
cannot enumerate more than a finite number of parts belong-
ing to awhole, and if the number of parts be infinite, thismust
be known otherwise than by enumeration. But this is pre-
ciselywhat a class-concept effects: awholewhose parts are the
termsof a class is completely definedwhen the class-concept is
specified; and any definite individual either belongs, or does*
not belong, to the class in question. An individual of the class
is part of thewhole extension of the class, and is logically prior
to this extension taken collectively; but the extension itself
is definable without any reference to any specified individual,
and subsists as a genuine entity even when the class contains
no terms. And to say, of such a class, that it is infinite, is to
say that, though it has terms, the number of these terms is not
any finite number—a proposition which, again, may be estab-
lishedwithout the impossible process of enumeratingallfinite 350
*For precise statements, v. supra, Part I, Chaps. vi and x.
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numbers. And this is precisely the case of the real numbers
between 0 and 1. They form a definite class, whose meaning
is known as soon as we know what is meant by real number, 0,
1, and between. The particular members of the class, and the
smaller classes contained in it, are not logically prior to the
class. Thus the infinite regress consists merely in the fact that
every segment of real or rational numbers has parts which are
again segments; but these parts are not logically prior to it, and
the infinite regress is perfectly harmless. Thus the solution of
the difficulty lies in the theory of denoting and the intensional
definition of a class. With this an answer is made to Zeno’s
first argument as it appears in Arithmetic.
331. The second of Zeno’s arguments is the most famous:
it is the one which concerns Achilles and the tortoise. “The
slower,” it says, “will never be overtaken by the swifter, for
the pursuer must first reach the point whence the fugitive is
departed, so that the slower must always necessarily remain
ahead.” When this argument is translated into arithmetical
language, it is seen to be concerned with the one-one corre-
lation of two infinite classes. If Achilles were to overtake the
tortoise, then the course of the tortoise would be part of that
ofAchilles; but, since each is at eachmoment at some point of
his course, simultaneity establishes a one-one correlation be-
tween the positions ofAchilles and those of the tortoise. Now
it follows from this that the tortoise, in any given time, visits
just as many places as Achilles does; hence—so it is hoped we
shall conclude—it is impossible that the tortoise’s path should
be part of that of Achilles. This point is purely ordinal, and
maybe illustrated byArithmetic. Consider, for example, 1+2x
and 2+x, and let x lie between 0 and 1, both inclusive. For each
value of 1 + 2x there is one and only one value of 2 + x; and
vice versâ. Hence as x grows from 0 to 1, the number of values
assumed by 1+ 2xwill be the same as the number assumed by
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2+x. But 1+2x started from 1 and ends at 3, while 2+x started
from 2 and ends at 3. Thus there should be half asmany values
of 2 + x as of 1 + 2x. This very serious difficulty has been re-
solved, as we have seen, by Cantor; but as it belongs rather to
the philosophy of the infinite than to that of the continuum, I
leave its further discussion to the next chapter.
332. The third argument is concerned with the arrow. “If
everything is in rest or in motion in a space equal to itself,
and if what moves is always in the instant, the arrow in its
flight is immovable.” This has usually been thought so mon-
strous a paradox as scarcely to deserve serious discussion. To
my mind, I must confess, it seems a very plain statement of
a very elementary fact, and its neglect has, I think, caused the
quagmire inwhich the philosophyof changehas long been im-
mersed. In Part VII, I shall set forth a theory of change which
may be called static, since it allows the justice of Zeno’s remark.
For the present, I wish to divest the remark of all reference to 351
change. We shall then find that it is a very important and very
widely applicable platitude, namely: “Every possible value of
a variable is a constant.” If x be a variable which can take all
values from 0 to 1, all the values it can take are definite num-
bers, such as 1/2 or 1/3, which are all absolute constants. And
here a fewwordsmay be inserted concerning variables. Avari-
able is a fundamental concept of logic, as of daily life. Though
it is always connected with some class, it is not the class, nor
a particular member of the class, nor yet the whole class, but
anymember of the class. On the other hand, it is not the con-
cept “any member of the class,” but it is that (or those) which
this concept denotes. On the logical difficulties of this con-
ception, I need not now enlarge; enough has been said on this
subject in Part I. The usual x inAlgebra, for example, does not
stand for a particular number, nor for all numbers, nor yet for
the class number. This may be easily seen by considering some
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identity, say
(x+ 1)2 = x2 + 2x+ 1.
This certainly does not meanwhat it would become if, say, 391
were substituted for x, though it implies that the result of such
a substitution would be a true proposition. Nor does it mean
what results from substituting for x the class-concept number,
for we cannot add 1 to this concept. For the same reason, x
does not denote the concept any number: to this, too, 1 cannot
be added. It denotes the disjunction formed by the various
numbers; or at least this viewmay be taken as roughly correct*.
The values of x are then the terms of the disjunction; and each
of these is a constant. This simple logical fact seems to consti-
tute the essence of Zeno’s contention that the arrow is always
at rest.
333. But Zeno’s argument contains an element which is spe-
cially applicable to continua. In the case of motion, it denies
that there is such a thing as a state of motion. In the general
case of a continuous variable, itmaybe taken as denying actual
infinitesimals. For infinitesimals are an attempt to extend to
the values of a variable the variabilitywhich belongs to it alone.
When once it is firmly realized that all the values of a variable
are constants, it becomes easy to see, by taking any two such
values, that their difference is always finite, and hence that
there are no infinitesimal differences. If x be a variable which
may take all real values from 0 to 1, then, taking any two of
these values, we see that their difference is finite, although x
is a continuous variable. It is true the difference might have
been less than the one we chose; but if it had been, it would
still have been finite. The lower limit to possible differences is
zero, but all possible differences are finite; and in this there is
no shadow of contradiction. This static theory of the variable 352
*See Chap. viii, esp. §93.
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is due to themathematicians, and its absence in Zeno’s day led
him to suppose that continuous change was impossible with-
out a state of change, which involves infinitesimals and the
contradiction of a body’s being where it is not.
334. The last of Zeno’s arguments is that of the measure.
This is closely analogous to one which I employed in the pre-
ceding chapter, against those who regard dx and dy as dis-
tances of consecutive terms. It is only applicable, as M. Noël
points out (loc. cit. p. 116), against those who hold to indivis-
ibles among stretches, the previous arguments being held to
have sufficiently refuted the partisans of infinite divisibility.
We are now to suppose a set of discrete moments and discrete
places, motion consisting in the fact that at one moment a
body is in one of these discrete places, in another at another.
a b c d   
a0 b0 c0 d0   
a00 b00 c00 d00   
a b c d   
a0 b0 c0 d0   
a00 b00 c00 d00   
Imagine three parallel lines composed
of the points a, b, c, d; a0, b0, c0, d0; a00, b00,
c00, d00 respectively. Suppose the second
line, in one instant, tomove all its points
to the left by one place, while the third
moves them all one place to the right.
Then although the instant is indivisible,
c0, whichwas over c00, and is now over a00,
must have passed b00 during the instant;
hence the instant is divisible, contra hyp.
This argument is virtually that by which
I proved, in the preceding chapter, that,
if there are consecutive terms, then dx=dy = 1 always; or
rather, it is this argument together with an instance in which
dy=dx = 2. It may be put thus: Let y; z be two functions of x,
and let dy=dx = 1; dz=dx =  1. Then ddx(y  z) = 2, which con-
tradicts the principle that the value of every derivative must
be1. To the argument in Zeno’s form, M. Evellin, who is an
advocate of indivisible stretches, replies that a00 and b0 do not
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cross eachother at all*. For if instants are indivisible—and this
is the hypothesis—all we can say is, that at one instant a0 is
over a0, in the next, c0 is over a00. Nothing has happened be-
tween the instants, and to suppose that a00 and b0 have crossed
is to beg the question by a covert appeal to the continuity of
motion. This reply is valid, I think, in the case of motion;
both time and space may, without positive contradiction, be
held tobediscrete, by adhering strictly todistances in addition
to stretches. Geometry, Kinematics, and Dynamics become
false; but there is no very good reason to think them true. In
the case ofArithmetic, thematter is otherwise, since no empir-
ical question of existence is involved. And in this case, as we
see from the above argument concerning derivatives, Zeno’s 353
argument is absolutely sound. Numbers are entities whose na-
ture can be established beyondquestion; and amongnumbers,
the various forms of continuitywhich occur cannot be denied
without positive contradiction. For this reason the problem
of continuity is better discussed in connection with numbers
than in connection with space, time, or motion.
335. We have now seen that Zeno’s arguments, though they
prove a very great deal, donot prove that the continuum, aswe
have become acquainted with it, contains any contradictions
whatever. Since his day the attacks on the continuum have
not, so far as I know, been conducted with any new or more
powerful weapons. It only remains, therefore, to make a few
general remarks.
The notion to which Cantor gives the name of continuum
may, of course, be called by any other name in or out of the
dictionary, and it is open to every one to assert that he himself
means something quite different by the continuum. But these
verbal questions are purely frivolous. Cantor’s merit lies, not
*Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Vol. i, p. 386.
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in meaning what other people mean, but in telling us what he
means himself—an almost unique merit, where continuity is
concerned. He has defined, accurately and generally, a purely
ordinal notion, free, as we now see, from contradictions, and
sufficient for all Analysis, Geometry, and Dynamics. This no-
tion was presupposed in existing mathematics, though it was
not known exactly what it was that was presupposed. And
Cantor, by his almost unexampled lucidity, has successfully
analyzed the extremely complex nature of spatial series, by
which, as we shall see in Part VI, he has rendered possible a
revolution in the philosophy of space andmotion. The salient
points in the definition of the continuum are (1) the connec-
tion with the doctrine of limits, (2) the denial of infinitesimal
segments. These two points being borne in mind, the whole
philosophy of the subject becomes illuminated.
336. The denial of infinitesimal segments resolves an anti-
nomy which had long been an open scandal, I mean the anti-
nomy that the continuumbothdoes anddoes not consist of el-
ements. We seenow that bothmaybe said, though indifferent
senses. Every continuum is a series consisting of terms, and
the terms, if not indivisible, at any rate are not divisible into
new terms of the continuum. In this sense there are elements.
But if we take consecutive terms together with their asymmet-
rical relation as constitutingwhatmaybe called (thoughnot in
the sense of Part IV) an ordinal element, then, in this sense, our
continuum has no elements. If we take a stretch to be essen-
tially serial, so that it must consist of at least two terms, then
there are no elementary stretches; and if our continuum be
one in which there is distance, then likewise there are no el-
ementary distances. But in neither of these cases is there the
slightest logical ground for elements. The demand for consec-
utive terms springs, as we saw in Part III, from an illegitimate 354
use ofmathematical induction. And as regards distance, small
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distances are no simpler than large ones, but all, as we saw in
Part III, are alike simple. And large distances do not presup-
pose small ones: being intensive magnitudes, they may exist
where there are no smaller ones at all. Thus the infinite regress
from greater to smaller distances or stretches is of the harm-
less kind, and the lack of elements need not cause any logical
inconvenience. Hence the antinomy is resolved, and the con-
tinuum, so far at least as I am able to discover, is wholly free
from contradictions.
It only remains to inquire whether the same conclusion
holds concerning the infinite—an inquiry with which this
Fifth Part will come to a close.
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chapter xliii
THE PHILOSOPHYOF THE
INFINITE
337. Inour previousdiscussions of the infinitewehavebeen 355
compelled to go into so many mathematical points that there
has been no adequate opportunity for purely philosophical
treatment of the question. In the present chapter, I wish, leav-
ing mathematics aside, to inquire whether any contradiction
can be found in the notion of the infinite.
Those who have objected to infinity have not, as a rule,
thought it worth while to exhibit precise contradictions in it.
Tohavedone so is oneof thegreatmerits ofKant. Of themath-
ematical antinomies, the second, which is concerned, essen-
tially, with the question whether or not the continuum has
elements, was resolved in the preceding chapter, on the sup-
position that theremay be an actual infinite—that is, it was re-
duced to the question of infinite number. The first antinomy
is concerned with the infinite, but in an essentially temporal
form; forArithmetic, therefore, this antinomy is irrelevant, ex-
cept on the Kantian view that numbers must be schematized
in time. This view is supported by the argument that it takes
time to count, and therefore without time we could not know
the number of anything. By this argument we can prove that
battles always happennear telegraphwires, because if they did
notwe shouldnothear of them. In fact, we canprove generally
that we know what we know. But it remains conceivable that
we don’t know what we don’t know; and hence the necessity
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of time remains unproved.
Of other philosophers, Zeno has already been examined
in connection with the continuum; and the paradox which
underlies Achilles and the tortoise will be examined shortly.
Plato’s Parmenides—which is perhaps the best collection of
antinomies ever made—is scarcely relevant here, being con-
cerned with difficulties more fundamental than any that have
todowith infinity. Andas forHegel, he crieswolf sooften that
when he gives the alarm of a contradiction we finally cease to
be disturbed. Leibniz, as we have seen, gives as a contradic-
tion the one-one correlation of whole and part, which under-
lies theAchilles. This is, in fact, the only point onwhichmost 356
arguments against infinity turn. In what follows I shall put
the arguments in a form adapted to our present mathematical
knowledge; and this will prevent me from quoting them from
any classic opponents of infinity.
338. Let us first recapitulate briefly the positive theory of
the infinite to which we have been led. Accepting as indefin-
able the notion proposition and the notion constituent of a propo-
sition, we may denote by φ(a) a proposition in which a is a
constituent. We can then transform a into a variable x, and
consider φ(x), where φ(x) is any proposition differing from
φ(a), if at all, only by the fact that some other object appears
in the place of a; φ(x) is what we called a propositional function.
It will happen, in general, that φ(x) is true for some values of
x and false for others. All the values of x, for which φ(x) is
true, form what we called the class defined by φ(x); thus every
propositional function defines a class, and the actual enumer-
ation of the members of a class is not necessary for its defini-
tion. Again, without enumeration we can define the similar-
ity of two classes: two classes u; v are similar when there is a
one-one relation R such that “x is u” always implies “there is
a v to which x has the relation R,” and “y is a v” always implies
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“there is a uwhich has the relation R to y.” Further, R is a one-
one relation if xRy; xRz together always imply that y is identical
with z, and xRz; yRz together always imply that x is identical
with y; and “x is identical with y” is defined as meaning “every
propositional function which holds of x also holds of y.” We
now define the cardinal number of a class u as the class of all
classes which are similar to u; and every class has a cardinal
number, since “u is similar to v” is a propositional function of
v, if v be variable. Moreover u itself is a member of its cardinal
number, since every class is similar to itself. The above defini-
tionof a cardinal number, it shouldbeobserved, is basedupon
the notion of propositional functions, and nowhere involves
enumeration; consequently there is no reason to suppose that
there will be any difficulty as regards the numbers of classes
whose terms cannot be counted in the usual elementary fash-
ion. Classes can be divided into two kinds, according as they
are or are not similar to proper parts of themselves. In the for-
mer case they are called infinite, in the latter finite. Again, the
number of a class defined by a propositional function which
is always false is called 0; 1 is defined as the number of a class
u such that there is a term x, belonging to u, such that “y is a
u and y differs from x” is always false; and if n be any number,
n+ 1 is defined as the number of a class uwhich has a member
x such that the propositional function “y is a u and y differs
from x” defines a class whose number is n. If n is finite, n + 1
differs from n; if not, not. In this way, starting from 0, we ob-
tain a progression of numbers, since any number n leads to
a new number n + 1. It is easily proved that all the numbers
belonging to the progression which starts from 1 and is gener- 357
ated in this way are different; that is to say, if n belongs to this
progression, andm be any one of its predecessors, a class of n
terms cannot have a one-one correlation with one ofm terms.
The progression so defined is the series of finite numbers. But
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there is no reason to think that all numbers canbe so obtained;
indeed it is capable of formal proof that the number of the fi-
nite numbers themselves cannot be a term in the progression
of finite numbers. A number not belonging to this progres-
sion is called infinite. The proof that n and n + 1 are different
numbers proceeds from the fact that 0 and 1, or 1 and 2, are dif-
ferent numbers, bymeans of mathematical induction; if n and
n+1 be not terms of this progression, the proof fails; andwhat
is more, there is direct proof of the contrary. But since the pre-
vious proof depended upon mathematical induction, there is
not the slightest reason why the theorem should extend to in-
finite numbers. Infinite numbers cannot be expressed, like fi-
nite ones, by the decimal system of notation, but they can be
distinguished by the classes to which they apply. The finite
numbers being all defined by the above progression, if a class
u has terms, but not any finite number of terms, then it has an
infinite number. This is the positive theory of infinity.
339. That there are infinite classes is so evident that it will
scarcely be denied. Since, however, it is capable of formal
proof, it may be as well to prove it. A very simple proof is
that suggested in the Parmenides, which is as follows. Let it
be granted that there is a number 1. Then 1 is, or has Being,
and therefore there is Being. But 1 and Being are two: hence
there is a number 2; and so on. Formally, we have proved that
1 is not the number of numbers; we prove that n is the number
of numbers from 1 to n, and that these numbers together with
Being form a class which has a new finite number, so that n is
not the number of finite numbers. Thus 1 is not the number
of finite numbers; and if n  1 is not the number of finite num-
bers, nomore is n. Hence the finite numbers, bymathematical
induction, are all contained in the class of thingswhich arenot
the number of finite numbers. Since the relation of similarity
is reflexive for classes, every class has a number; therefore the
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 521
class of finite numbers has a number which, not being finite,
is infinite. A better proof, analogous to the above, is derived
from the fact that, if n be any finite number, the number of
numbers from 0 up to and including n is n + 1, whence it fol-
lows that n is not the number of numbers. Again, it may be
proved directly, by the correlation of whole and part, that the
number of propositions or concepts is infinite*. For of every
termor concept there is an idea, different from that ofwhich it
is the idea, but again a termor concept. On theotherhand, not
every term or concept is an idea. There are tables, and ideas of
tables; numbers, and ideas of numbers; and so on. Thus there 358
is a one-one relation between terms and ideas, but ideas are
only some among terms. Hence there is an infinite number of
terms and of ideas*.
340. The possibility that whole and part may have the
same number of terms is, it must be confessed, shocking to
common-sense. Zeno’s Achilles ingeniously shows that the
opposite view also has shocking consequences; for if whole
and part cannot be correlated term for term, it does strictly fol-
low that, if twomaterial points travel along the same path, the
one following the other, the one which is behind can never
catch up: if it did, we should have, correlating simultaneous
positions, a unique and reciprocal correspondence of all the
terms of a whole with all the terms of a part. Common-sense,
therefore, is here in a very sorry plight; itmust choose between
the paradox of Zeno and the paradox of Cantor. I do not pro-
pose to help it, since I consider that, in the face of proofs, it
ought to commit suicide in despair. But I will give the paradox
of Cantor a form resembling that of Zeno. Tristram Shandy,
*Cf. Bolzano, Paradoxien des Unendlichen, §13; Dedekind, Was sind und
was sollen die Zahlen? No. 66.
*It is not necessary to suppose that the ideas of all terms exist, or form
part of some mind; it is enough that they are entities.
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as we know, took two years writing the history of the first two
days of his life, and lamented that, at this rate, material would
accumulate faster than he could deal with it, so that he could
never come to an end. Now I maintain that, if he had lived
for ever, and not wearied of his task, then, even if his life had
continued as eventfully as it began, no part of his biography
would have remained unwritten. This paradox, which, as I
shall show, is strictly correlative to the Achilles, may be called
for convenience the Tristram Shandy.
In cases of this kind, no care is superfluous in rendering our
arguments formal. I shall therefore set forth both theAchilles
and the Tristram Shandy in strict logical shape.
I. (1) For every position of the tortoise there is one and only
one of Achilles; for every position of Achilles there is one and
only one of the tortoise.
(2) Hence the series of positions occupied byAchilles has
the same number of terms as the series of positions occupied
by the tortoise.
(3) A part has fewer terms than a whole in which it is con-
tained and with which it is not coextensive.
(4) Hence the series of positions occupied by the tortoise
is not a proper part of the series of positions occupied by
Achilles.
II. (1) Tristram Shandy writes in a year the events of a day.
(2) The series of days and years has no last term.
(3) The events of the nth day are written in the nth year.
(4) Any assigned day is the nth, for a suitable value of n.
(5) Hence any assigned day will be written about.
(6) Hence no part of the biographywill remain unwritten. 359
(7) Since there is a one-one correlation between the times
of happening and the times of writing, and the former are part
of the latter, the whole and the part have the same number of
terms.
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Let us express both these paradoxes as abstractly as possible.
For this purpose, let u be a compact series of any kind, and let
x be a variable which can take all values in u after a certain
value, which we will call 0. Let f(x) be a one-valued function
of x, and x a one-valued function of f(x); also let all the values
of f(x) belong to u. Then the arguments are the following.
I. Let f(0) be a term preceding 0; let f(x) grow as x grows, i.e.
if xPx0 (where P is the generating relation), let f(x)Pf(x0). Fur-
ther let f(x) take all values in u intermediate between any two
values of f(x). If, then, for some value a of x, such thatOPa, we
have f(a) = a, then the series of values of f(x)will be all terms
from f(0) to a, while that of xwill be only the terms from 0 to
a, which are a part of those from f(0) to a. Thus to suppose
f(a) = a is to suppose a one-one correlation, term for term, of
whole and part, which Zeno and common-sense pronounce
impossible.
II. Let f(x) be a function which is 0 when x is 0, and which
grows uniformly as x grows, our series being one in which
there ismeasurement. Then if x takes all values after 0, so does
f(x); and if f(x) takes all such values, so does x. The class of val-
ues of the one is therefore identical with that of the other. But
if at any time the value of x is greater than that of f(x), since
f(x) grows at a uniform rate, x will always be greater than f(x).
Hence for any assigned value of x, the class of values of f(x)
from 0 to f(x) is a proper part of the values of x from 0 to x.
Hence we might infer that all the values of f(x) were a proper
part of all the values of x; but this, as we have seen, is falla-
cious.
These two paradoxes are correlative. Both, by reference
to segments, may be stated in terms of limits. The Achilles
proves that two variables in a continuous series, which ap-
proach equality from the same side, cannot ever have a com-
mon limit; the Tristram Shandy proves that two variables
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which start from a common term, and proceed in the same di-
rection, but diverge more and more, may yet determine the
same limiting class (which, however, is not necessarily a seg-
ment, because segments were defined as having terms beyond
them). The Achilles assumes that whole and part cannot be
similar, and deduces a paradox; the other, starting from a
platitude, deduces that whole and part may be similar. For
common-sense, it must be confessed, this is a most unfortu-
nate state of things.
341. There is no doubt which is the correct course. The
Achilles must be rejected, being directly contradicted by
Arithmetic. The Tristram Shandy must be accepted, since it
does not involve the axiom that the whole cannot be similar 360
to the part. This axiom, as we have seen, is essential to the
proof of the Achilles; and it is an axiom doubtless very agree-
able to common-sense. But there is no evidence for the axiom
except supposed self-evidence, and its admission leads to per-
fectly precise contradictions. The axiom is not only useless,
but positively destructive, in mathematics, and against its re-
jection there is nothing to be set except prejudice. It is one of
the chief merits of proofs that they instil a certain scepticism
as to the result proved. As soon as it was found that the simi-
larity ofwhole and part could be proved to be impossible for ev-
ery finitewhole*, it became not unplausible to suppose that for
infinite wholes, where the impossibility could not be proved,
there was in fact no such impossibility. In fact, as regards the
numbers dealt with in daily life—in engineering, astronomy,
or accounts, even those of Rockefeller and the Chancellor of
the Exchequer—the similarity of whole and part is impossible;
and hence the supposition that it is always impossible is easily
explained. But the supposition rests on no better foundation
*The finite being here defined bymathematical induction, to avoid tau-
tology.
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than that formerly entertained by the inductive philosophers
of Central Africa, that all men are black.
342. It may be worth while, as helping to explain the dif-
ference between finite and infinite wholes, to point out that
whole and part are terms capable of two definitions where the
whole is finite, but of only one of these, at least practically,
where the whole is infinite†. A finite whole may be taken col-
lectively, as such and such individuals, A;B;C;D;E say. A
part of this whole may be obtained by enumerating some, but
not all, of the terms composing the whole; and in this way a
single individual is part of the whole. Neither the whole nor
its parts need be taken as classes, but each may be defined by
extension, i.e. by enumeration of individuals. On the other
hand, the whole and the parts may be both defined by inten-
sion, i.e. by class-concepts. Thus we know without enumer-
ation that Englishmen are part of Europeans; for whoever is
an Englishman is a European, but not vice versâ. Though this
might be established by enumeration, it need not be so estab-
lished. When we come to infinite wholes, this twofold defini-
tion disappears, and we have only the definition by intension.
The whole and the part must both be classes, and the defini-
tion of whole and part is effected by means of the notions of a
variable and of logical implication. If a be a class-concept, an
individual ofa is a termhaving toa that specific relationwhich
we call the class-relation. If now b be another class such that,
for all values of x, “x is an a” implies “x is a b,” then the exten-
sion of a (i.e. the variable x) is said to be part of the extension
of b‡. Here no enumeration of individuals is required, and the
relation of whole and part has no longer that simple meaning 361
which it had where finite parts were concerned. To say now
that a and b are similar, is to say that there exists someone-one
†Cf. §330.
‡See Peano, Rivista di Matematica, vii, or Formulaire, Vol. ii, Part I.
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relationR fulfilling the following conditions: if xbe an a, there
is a term y of the class b such that xRy; if y0 be a b, there is a term
x0 of the class a such that x0Ry0 . Although a is part of b, such a
state of things cannot be proved impossible, for the impossibil-
ity could only be proved by enumeration, and there is no rea-
son to suppose enumeration possible. The definition ofwhole
and part without enumeration is the key to the wholemystery.
The above definition, which is due to Professor Peano, is that
which is naturally and necessarily applied to infinite wholes.
For example, the primes are a proper part of the integers, but
this cannot be proved by enumeration. It is deduced from “if
x be a prime, x is a number,” and “if x be a number, it does
not follow that x is a prime.” That the class of primes should
be similar to the class of numbers only seems impossible be-
cause we imagine whole and part defined by enumeration. As
soon as we rid ourselves of this idea the supposed contradic-
tion vanishes.
343. It is very important to realize, as regards toω or α0, that
neither has a number immediately preceding it. This charac-
teristic they share with all limits, for the limit of a series is
never immediately preceded by any term of the series which
it limits. But ω is in some sense logically prior to other lim-
its, for the finite ordinal numbers together with ω present the
formal type of a progression together with its limit. When it
is forgotten that ω has no immediate predecessor, all sorts of
contradictions emerge. For supposen to be the last number be-
foreω; then n is a finite number, and the number of finite num-
bers is n+ 1. In fact, to say thatω has no predecessor is merely
to say that the finite numbers have no last term. Though ω is
preceded by all finite numbers, it is not preceded immediately
by any of them: there is none next to ω. Cantor’s transfinite
numbers have the peculiarity that, although there is one next
after any assignednumber, there is not always one next before.
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Thus there seem to be gaps in the series. We have the series
1; 2; 3; : : : ν; : : : ;which is infinite andhas no last term. Wehave
another seriesω;ω+ 1;ω+ 2; : : :ω+ ν; : : :which equally is in-
finite and has no last term. This second series comes wholly
after the first, though there is no one term of the first whichω
immediately succeeds. This state of things may, however, be
paralleled by very elementary series, such as the series whose
general terms are 1  1=ν and 2  1=ν, where νmay be any finite
integer. The second series comeswholly after thefirst, andhas
a definite first term, namely 1. But there is no term of the first
series which immediately precedes 1. What is necessary, in or-
der that the second series should come after the first, is that
there should be some series inwhich both are contained. If we
call an ordinal part of a series any series which can be obtained
by omitting some of the terms of our series without changing
the order of the remaining terms, then the finite and transfi- 362
nite ordinals all form one series, whose generating relation is
that of ordinal whole and part among the series to which the
various ordinals apply. If ν be any finite ordinal, series of the
type ν are ordinal parts of progressions; similarly every series
of the typeω+1 contains a progression as an ordinal part. The
relation ordinal part is transitive and asymmetrical, and thus
the finite and transfinite ordinals all belong to one series. The
existence of ω (in the mathematical sense of existence) is not
open to question, sinceω is the type of order presented by the
natural numbers themselves. To deny ω would be to affirm
that there is a last finite number—a view which, as we have
seen, leads at once to definite contradictions. And when this
is admitted,ω+ 1 is the type of the series of ordinals including
ω, i.e. of the series whose terms are all series of integers from
1 up to any finite number together with the whole series of in-
tegers. Hence all the infinite hierarchy of transfinite numbers
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easily follows.
344. The usual objections to infinite numbers, and classes,
and series, and the notion that the infinite as such is self-
contradictory, may thus be dismissed as groundless. There
remains, however, a very grave difficulty, connected with the
contradiction discussed inChapter x. This difficulty does not
concern the infinite as such, but only certain very large infinite
classes. Briefly, the difficulty may be stated as follows. Cantor
has given a proof* that there can be no greatest cardinal num-
ber, and when this proof is examined, it is found to state that,
if u be a class, the number of classes contained in u is greater
than the number of terms of u, or (what is equivalent), if α be
any number, 2α is greater than α. But there are certain classes
concerning which it is easy to give an apparently valid proof
that they have as many terms as possible. Such are the class
of all terms, the class of all classes, or the class of all proposi-
tions. Thus it would seem as thoughCantor’s proofmust con-
tain some assumption which is not verified in the case of such
classes. But when we apply the reasoning of his proof to the
cases in question, we find ourselves met by definite contradic-
tions, of which the one discussed inChapter x is an example†.
The difficulty arises whenever we try to deal with the class of
all entities absolutely, or with any equally numerous class; but
for the difficulty of such a view, one would be tempted to say
that the conception of the totality of things, or of the whole
universe of entities and existents, is in some way illegitimate
and inherently contrary to logic. But it is undesirable to adopt
so desperate a measure as long as hope remains of some less
heroic solution.
*He has, as a matter of fact, offered two proofs, but we shall find that
one of them is not cogent.
†It was in this way that I discovered this contradiction; a similar one is
given at the end of Appendix B.
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It may be observed, to begin with, that the class of numbers
is not, as might be supposed, one of those in regard to which 363
difficulties occur. Among finite numbers, if n were the num-
ber of numbers, we shouldhave to infer thatn 1was the great-
est of numbers, so that there would be no number n at all. But
this is a peculiarity of finite numbers. The number of num-
bers up to and including α0 is α0, but this is also the number of
numbers up to and including αβ, where β is any finite ordinal
or any ordinal applicable to a denumerablewell-ordered series.
Thus the number of numbers up to and including α, where α
is infinite, is usually less than α, and there is no reason to sup-
pose that the number of all numbers is the greatest number.
The number of numbers may be less than the greatest num-
ber, and no contradiction arises from the fact (if it be a fact)
that the number of individuals is greater than the number of
numbers.
But although the class of numbers causes no difficulty,
there are other classeswithwhich it is very hard to deal. Let us
first examineCantor’s proofs that there is no greatest cardinal
number, and then discuss the cases in which contradictions
arise.
345. In the first of Cantor’s proofs*, the argument depends
upon the supposed fact that there is a one-one correspon-
dence between the ordinals and the cardinals†. We saw that,
whenwe consider the cardinal number of the series of the type
represented by any ordinal, an infinite number of ordinals cor-
respond to one cardinal—for example, all ordinals of the sec-
ond class, which form a non-denumerable collection, corre-
spond to the single cardinal α0. But there is another method
of correlation, in which only one ordinal corresponds to each
cardinal. This method results from considering the series of
*Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, p. 44.
†Cf. supra, Chap. xxxviii, §300.
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cardinals itself. In this series, α0 corresponds to ω, α1 to ω + 1,
and so on: there is always one and only one ordinal to de-
scribe the type of series presented by the cardinals from 0 up
to any one of them. It seems to be assumed that there is a car-
dinal for every ordinal, and that no class can have so many
terms that no well-ordered series can have a greater number
of terms. For my part I do not see any grounds for either sup-
position, and I do see definite grounds against the latter. For
every term of a series must be an individual, andmust be a dif-
ferent individual (a point often overlooked) from every other
term of the series. It must be different, because there are no in-
stances of an individual: each individual is absolutely unique,
and in the nature of the case only one. But two terms in a se-
ries are two, and are therefore not one and the same individual.
This most important point is obscured by the fact that we do
not, as a rule, fully describe the terms of our series. When we
say: Consider a series a; b; c; d; b; d; e; a; : : :, where terms are re-
peated at intervals—such a series, for example, as is presented
by the digits in a decimal—we forget the theorem that where
there is repetition our series is only obtainable by correlation;
that is, the terms do not themselves have an order, but they 364
have a one-many (not one-one) relation to terms which have
an order*. Hence if we wish for a genuine series we must ei-
ther go back to the series with which our terms are correlated,
or we must form the complex terms compounded of those of
the original series and those of the correlated series in pairs.
But in either of these series there is no repetition. Hence ev-
ery ordinal numbermust correspond to a series of individuals,
each of which differs from each other. Now itmay be doubted
whether all individuals form a series at all: formypart I cannot
discover any transitive asymmetrical relation which holds be-
*See Chap. xxxii, supra.
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tween every pair of terms. Cantor, it is true, regards it as a law
of thought that every definite aggregate can be well-ordered;
but I see no ground for this opinion. But allowing this view,
the ordinals will have a perfectly definite maximum, namely
that ordinal which represents the type of series formed by all
terms without exception†. If the collection of all terms does
not form a series it is impossible to prove that there must be
a maximum ordinal, which in any case there are reasons for
denying‡. But in this case we may legitimately doubt whether
there are as many ordinals as there are cardinals. Of course,
if all cardinals form a well-ordered series, then there must be
an ordinal for each cardinal. But although Cantor professes
that he has a proof that of two different cardinals one must
be the greater (Math. Annalen, xlvi, §2), I cannot persuade my-
self that he does more than prove that there is a series, whose
terms are cardinals of which any one is greater or less than any
other. That all cardinals are in this series I see no reason to
think. There may be two classes such that it is not possible to
correlate either with a part of the other; in this case the cardi-
nal number of the one will be neither equal to, greater than,
nor less than, that of the other. If all terms belong to a single
well-ordered series, this is impossible; but if not, I cannot see
any way of showing that such a case cannot arise. Thus the
first proof that there is no cardinal which cannot be increased
seems to break down.
346. The second of the proofs above referred to§ is quite dif-
ferent, and is far more definite. The proof is interesting and
important on its own account, andwill be produced in outline.
†On the maximum ordinal, see Burali-Forti, “Una questione sui nu-
meri transfiniti,” Rendiconti del circolo matematico di Palermo, 1897. Also my
article in RdM, Vol. viii, p. 43 note.
‡Cf. Chap. xxxviii, §301.
§Jahresbericht der deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung, i. (1892), p. 77.
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The article inwhich it occurs consists of three points: (1) a sim-
ple proof that there are powers higher than the first, (2) the re-
mark that thismethodof proof canbe applied to anypower, (3)
the application of the method to prove that there are powers
higher than that of the continuumk. Let us examine the first 365
of the above points, and then see whether themethod is really
general.
Letm andw, Cantor says, be twomutually exclusive charac-
ters, and consider a collectionMof elementsE, where each ele-
ment E is a denumerable collection, x1; x2; : : : xn; : : : ; and each
x is either anmor aw. (The twocharactersm andwmaybe con-
sidered respectively as greater and less than some fixed term.
Thus the x’s may be rational numbers, each of which is an m
when it is greater than 1, and a w when it is less than 1. These
remarks are logically irrelevant, but they make the argument
easier to follow.) The collectionM is to consist of all possible
elements E of the above description. ThenM is not denumer-
able, i.e. is of a power higher than the first. For let us take any
denumerable collection of E’s, which are defined as follows:
E1 = (a11; a12; : : : a1n; : : :)
E2 = (a21; a22; : : : a2n; : : :)
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Ep = (ap1; ap2; : : : apn; : : :)
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
where the a’s are each anmor aw in somedeterminatemanner.
(For example, the first p terms of Ep might be m’s, the rest all
w’s. Or an other law might be suggested, which insures that
the E’s of our series are all different.) Then however our se-
ries of E’s be chosen, we can always find a term E0, belonging
kPower is synonymous with cardinal number: the first power is that of
the finite integers, i.e. α0.
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to the collectionM, but not to the denumerable series of E’s.
For let E0 be the series (b1; b2; : : : bn : : :), where, for every n, bn
is different from ann—i.e. if ann is anm, bn is a w, and vice versâ.
Then every one of our denumerable series of E’s contains at
least one term not identical with the corresponding term of
E0, and hence E0 is not any one of the terms of our denumer-
able series of E’s. Hence no such series can contain all the E’s,
and therefore the E’s are not denumerable, i.e. M has a power
higher than the first.
Weneed not stop to examine the proof that there is a power
higher than that of the continuum, which is easily obtained
from the above proof. We may proceed at once to the general
proof that, given any collection whatever, there is a collection
of a higher power. This proof is quite as simple as the proof of
the particular case. It proceeds as follows. Let u be any class,
and consider the class K of relations such that, if R be a rela-
tion of the class, every term of the class u has the relation R
either to 0 or to 1. (Any other pair of terms will do as well as
0 and 1.) Then the class K has a higher power than the class
u. To prove this, observe in the first place thatK has certainly
not a lower power; for, if x be any u, there will be a relation R
of the classK such that every u except x has the relationR to 0,
but x has this relation to 1. Relations of this kind, for the vari-
ous values of x, form a class having a one-one correlationwith
the terms of u, and contained in the class K. Hence K has at
least the same power as u. To prove thatK has a greater power, 366
consider any class contained in K and having a one-one cor-
relation with u. Then any relation of this class may be called
Rx, where x is some u—the suffix x denoting correlation with
x. Let us now define a relation R0 by the following conditions:
For every term x of u for which x has the relation Rx to 0, let
x have the relation R0 to 1; and for every term y of u for which
y has the relation Ry to 1, let y have the relation R0 to 0. Then
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R0 is defined for all terms of u, and is a relation of the class K;
but it is not any one of the relations Rx. Hence, whatever class
contained inK and of the same power as uwemay take, there
is always a term ofK not belonging to this class; and therefore
K has a higher power than u.
347. We may, to begin with, somewhat simplify this argu-
ment, by eliminating the mention of 0 and 1 and relations to
them. Each of the relations of the class K is defined when we
know which of the terms of u have this relation to 0, that is,
it is defined by means of a class contained in u (including the
null-class and u itself). Thus there is one relation of the class
K for every class contained in u, and the number of K is the
same as that of classes contained in u. Thus if k be any class
whatever, the logical product ku is a class contained in u, and
the number ofK is that of ku, where k is a variable which may
be any class. Thus the argument is reduced to this: that the
number of classes contained in any class exceeds the number
of terms belonging to the class*.
Another form of the same argument is the following. Take
any relationRwhich has the two properties (1) that its domain,
which we will call ρ, is equal to its converse domain, (2) that
no two terms of the domain have exactly the same set of re-
lata. Then by means of R, any term of ρ is correlated with a
class contained in ρ, namely the class of relata to which the
said term is referent; and this correlation is one-one. We have
to show that at least one class contained in ρ is omitted in this
correlation. The class omitted is the class wwhich consists of
all terms of the domain which do not have the relation R to
themselves, i.e. the class w which is the domain of the logical
product ofR and diversity. For, if y be any term of the domain,
and therefore of the converse domain, y belongs tow if it does
*The number of classes contained in a class which has αmembers is 2α
thus the argument shows that 2α is always greater than α.
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not belong to the class correlated with y, and does not belong
to w in the contrary case. Hence w is not the same class as the
correlate of y; and this applies to whatever term y we select.
Hence the class w is necessarily omitted in the correlation.
348. The above argument, it must be confessed, appears to
contain no dubitable assumption. Yet there are certain cases
inwhich the conclusion seems plainly false. To beginwith the
class of all terms. If we assume, as was done in §47, that every
constituent of every proposition is a term, then classes will be 367
only some among terms. And conversely, since there is, for ev-
ery term, a class consisting of that termonly, there is a one-one
correlation of all terms with some classes. Hence the number
of classes should be the same as the number of terms*. This
case is adequately met by the doctrine of types†, and so is the
exactly analogous case of classes and classes of classes. But if
we admit the notion of all objects‡ of every kind, it becomes
evident that classes of objects must be only some among ob-
jects, while yet Cantor’s argument would show that there are
more of them than there are objects. Or again, take the class
of propositions. Every object can occur in some proposition,
and it seems indubitable that there are at least as many propo-
sitions as there are objects. For, if u be a fixed class, “x is a u”
will be a different proposition for every different value of x; if,
according to the doctrine of types, we hold that, for a given u,
x has a restricted range if “x is a u” is to remain significant, we
only have to vary u suitably in order to obtain propositions of
this form for every possible x, and thus the number of proposi-
tions must be at least as great as that of objects. But classes of
*This results from the theorem of Schröder and Bernstein, according
to which, if u be similar to a part of v, and v to a part of u, then u and vmust
be similar. SeeBorel,Leçons sur laThéorie des Fonctions (Paris, 1898), p. 102ff.
†See Chapter x and Appendix B.
‡For the use of the word object see p. 55, note.
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propositions are only some among objects, yet Cantor’s argu-
ment shows that there are more of them than there are propo-
sitions. Again, we can easily prove that there are more propo-
sitional functions than objects. For suppose a correlation of
all objects and some propositional functions to have been af-
fected, and let φx be the correlate of x. Then “not-φx(x),” i.e.
“φx does not hold of x,” is a propositional function not con-
tained in the correlation; for it is true or false of x according as
φx is false or true of x, and therefore it differs from φx for ev-
ery value of x. But this case may perhaps be more or less met
by the doctrine of types.
349. It is instructive to examine in detail the application
of Cantor’s argument to such cases by means of an actual at-
tempted correlation. In the case of terms and classes, for ex-
ample, if x be not a class, let us correlate it with ιx, i.e. the class
whose only member is x, but if x be a class, let us correlate it
with itself. (This is not a one-one, but amany-one correlation,
for x and ιx are both correlated with ιx; but it will serve to il-
lustrate the point in question.) Then the class which, accord-
ing toCantor’s argument, should be omitted from the correla-
tion, is the class w of those classes which are not members of
themselves; yet this, being a class, should be correlatedwith it-
self. Butw, aswe saw inChapter x, is a self-contradictory class,
which both is and is not amember of itself. The contradiction,
in this case, can be solved by the doctrine of types; but the case
of propositions is more difficult. In this case, let us correlate
every class of propositions with the proposition which is its 368
logical product; by this means we appear to have a one-one re-
lation of all classes of propositions to some propositions. But
applyingCantor’s argument, we find that we have omitted the
class w of those propositions which are logical products, but
are not members of the classes of propositions whose logical
products they are. This class, according to the definition of
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our correlation, shouldbe correlatedwith its own logical prod-
uct, but on examining this logical product, we find that it both
is and is not a member of the class w whose logical product it
is.
Thus the application of Cantor’s argument to the doubtful
cases yields contradictions, though I have been unable to find
any point in which the argument appears faulty. The only so-
lution I can suggest is, to accept the conclusion that there is no
greatest number and the doctrine of types, and to deny that
there are any true propositions concerning all objects or all
propositions. Yet the latter, at least, seems plainly false, since
all propositions are at any rate true or false, even if they had
no other common properties. In this unsatisfactory state, I re-
luctantly leave the problem to the ingenuity of the reader.
350. To sum up the discussions of this Part: We saw, to be-
gin with, that irrationals are to be defined as those segments
of rationals which have no limit, and that in this way analy-
sis is able to dispense with any special axiom of continuity.
We saw that it is possible to define, in a purely ordinal man-
ner, the kind of continuity which belongs to real numbers,
and that continuity so defined is not self-contradictory. We
found that the differential and integral calculus has no need
of the infinitesimal, and that, though some forms of infinites-
imal are admissible, the most usual form, that of infinitesimal
segments in a compact series, is not implied by either compact-
ness or continuity, and is in fact self-contradictory. Finally we
discussed the philosophical questions concerning continuity
and infinity, and found that the arguments of Zeno, though
largely valid, raise no sort of serious difficulty. Having grasped
clearly the twofold definition of the infinite, as that which can-
not be reached bymathematical induction starting from 1, and
as that which has parts which have the same number of terms
as itself—definitions which may be distinguished as ordinal
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and cardinal respectively—we found that all the usual argu-
ments, both as to infinity and as to continuity, are fallacious,
and that no definite contradiction can be proved concerning
either, although certain special infinite classes do give rise to
hitherto unsolved contradictions.
It remains to apply to space, time, and motion, the three
chief results of this discussion, which are (1) the impossibility
of infinitesimal segments, (2) the definition of continuity, and
(3) the definition and the consistent doctrine of the infinite.
These applications will, I hope, persuade the reader that the
above somewhat lengthy discussions have not been superflu-
ous.
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chapter xliv
DIMENSIONSANDCOMPLEX
NUMBERS
351. The discussions of the preceding Parts have been con- 371
cerned with two main themes, the logical theory of numbers
and the theoryof one-dimensional series. In thefirst twoParts,
it was shown how, from the indispensable apparatus of gen-
eral logical notions, the theoryof finite integers andof rational
numbers without sign could be developed. In the third Part, a
particular case of order, namely the order of magnitude, was
examined on its own account, and it was found that most of
the problems arising in the theory of quantity are purely ordi-
nal. In the fourth Part, the general nature of one-dimensional
series was set forth, and it was shown that all the arithmetical
propositions obtained by means of the logical theory of finite
numbers could also be proved by assuming that the finite inte-
gers forma series of the kindwhichwe called a progression. In
the fifth Part, we examined the problems raised by endless se-
ries andby compact series—problemswhich, under thenames
of infinity and continuity, have defied philosophers ever since
the dawn of abstract thought. The discussion of these prob-
lems led to a combination of the logical and ordinal theories
ofArithmetic, and to the rejection, as universally valid, of two
connected principleswhich, followingCantor, we regarded as
definitions of the finite, not as applicable to all collections or
series. These two principles were: (1) If one class be wholly
contained in, but not coextensive with, another, then the one
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has not the same number of terms as the other; (2) mathemati-
cal induction,which is purely ordinal, andmaybe stated as fol-
lows: A series generated by a one-one relation, and having a
first term, is such that any property, belonging to the first term
and to the successor of any possessor of the property, belongs
to every term of the series. These two principles we regarded
as definitions of finite classes and of progressions or finite se-
ries respectively, but as inapplicable to some classes and some
series. This view, we found, resolves all the difficulties of in-
finity and continuity, except a purely logical difficulty as to
the notion of all classes. With this result, we completed the
philosophical theory of one-dimensional series.
352. But in all our previous discussions, large branches of 372
mathematics have remained unmentioned. One of the gen-
eralizations of number, namely complex numbers, has been
excluded completely, and no mention has been made of the
imaginary. The whole of Geometry, also, has been hitherto
foreign toour thoughts. These twoomissionswere connected.
Not that we are to accept a geometrical, i.e. spatial, theory of
complex numbers: this would be as much out of place as a
geometrical theory of irrationals. Although this Part is called
Space, we are to remain in the region of puremathematics: the
mathematical entities discussed will have certain affinities to
the space of the actual world, but they will be discussed with-
out any logical dependence upon these affinities. Geometry
may be considered as a pure à priori science, or as the study
of actual space. In the latter sense, I hold it to be an experi-
mental science, to be conducted by means of careful measure-
ments. But it is not in this latter sense that I wish to discuss
it. As a branch of pure mathematics, Geometry is strictly de-
ductive, indifferent to the choice of its premisses and to the
question whether there exist (in the strict sense) such entities
as its premisses define. Many different and even inconsistent
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sets of premisses lead to propositions which would be called
geometrical, but all such sets have a common element. This
element is wholly summed up by the statement that Geome-
try deals with series of more than one dimension. The ques-
tion what may be the actual terms of such series is indiffer-
ent to Geometry, which examines only the consequences of
the relations which it postulates among the terms. These rela-
tions are always such as to generate a series of more than one
dimension, but have, so far as I can see, no other general point
of agreement. Series of more than one dimension I shall call
multiple series: those of one dimension will be called simple.
What is meant by dimensions I shall endeavour to explain in
the course of the present chapter. At present, I shall set up, by
anticipation, the following definition: Geometry is the study of
series of two or more dimensions. This definition, it will be seen,
causes complex numbers to form part of the subject-matter of
Geometry, since they constitute a two-dimensional series; but
it does not show that complex numbers have any logical de-
pendence upon actual space.
The above definition of Geometry is, no doubt, somewhat
unusual, and will produce, especially upon Kantian philoso-
phers, an appearance ofwilfulmisuse ofwords. I believe, how-
ever, that it represents correctly the present usage of mathe-
maticians, though it is not necessary for them to give an ex-
plicit definition of their subject. How it has come to bear
thismeaning,may be explained by a brief historical retrospect,
which will illustrate also the difference between pure and ap-
plied mathematics.
353. Until the nineteenth century. Geometry meant Eu-
clidean Geometry, i.e. a certain system of propositions de-
duced from premisses which were supposed to describe the 373
space in which we live. The subject was pursued very largely
because (what is no doubt important to the engineer) its re-
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sults were practically applicable in the existent world, and
embodied in themselves scientific truths. But in order to be
sure that this was so, one of two things was necessary. Ei-
ther we must be certain of the truth of the premisses on their
own account, or we must be able to show that no other set
of premisses would give results consistent with experience.
The first of these alternatives was adopted by the idealists
and was especially advocated by Kant. The second alterna-
tive represents, roughly, the position of empiricists before the
non-Euclidean period (among whom we must include Mill).
But objections were raised to both alternatives. For the Kan-
tian view, it was necessary to maintain that all the axioms
are self-evident—a view which honest people found it hard
to extend to the axiom of parallels. Hence arose a search
for more plausible axioms, which might be declared à priori
truths. But, though many such axioms were suggested, all
could sanely be doubted, and the search only led to scepti-
cism. The second alternative—the view that no other axioms
would give results consistent with experience—could only be
tested by a greater mathematical ability than falls to the lot
of most philosophers. Accordingly the test was wanting un-
til Lobatchewsky and Bolyai developed their non-Euclidean
system. It was then proved, with all the cogency of mathemat-
ical demonstration, that premisses other than Euclid’s could
give results empirically indistinguishable, within the limits of
observation, from those of the orthodox system. Hence the
empirical argument for Euclid was also destroyed. But the
investigation produced a new spirit among Geometers. Hav-
ing found that the denial of Euclid’s axiom of parallels led
to a different system, which was self-consistent, and possibly
true of the actual world, mathematicians became interested
in the development of the consequences flowing from other
sets of axioms more or less resembling Euclid’s. Hence arose
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a large number of Geometries, inconsistent, as a rule, with
each other, but each internally self-consistent. The resem-
blance toEuclid required in a suggested set of axiomshas grad-
ually grown less, and possible deductive systems have been
more and more investigated on their own account. In this
way. Geometry has become (what it was formerly mistakenly
called) a branch of pure mathematics, that is to say, a subject
in which the assertions are that such and such consequences
follow from such and such premisses, not that entities such
as the premisses describe actually exist. That is to say, if Eu-
clid’s axioms be called A, and P be any proposition implied
by A, then, in the Geometry which preceded Lobatchewsky,
P itself would be asserted, since A was asserted. But now-a-
days, the geometer would only assert thatA implies P, leaving
A and P themselves doubtful. And he would have other sets
of axioms,A1;A2 : : : implying P1;P2 : : : respectively: the impli-
cations would belong to Geometry, but not A1 or P1 or any of 374
the other actual axioms and propositions. Thus Geometry no
longer throws any direct light on the nature of actual space.
But indirectly, the increased analysis and knowledge of pos-
sibilities, resulting from modern Geometry, has thrown im-
mense light upon our actual space. Moreover it is now proved
(what is fatal to the Kantian philosophy) that every Geometry
is rigidly deductive, and does not employ any forms of reason-
ing but such as apply toArithmetic and all other deductive sci-
ences. Myaim, inwhat follows,will be to set forthfirst, in brief
outlines, what is philosophically important in the deductions
which constitute modern Geometry, and then to proceed to
those questions, in thephilosophyof space, uponwhichmath-
ematics throws light. In the first section of this Part, though
I shall be discussing Geometries as branches of pure mathe-
matics, I shall select for discussion only those which throw
the most light either upon actual space, or upon the nature of
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mathematical reasoning. A treatise on non-Euclidean Geom-
etry is neither necessary nor desirable in a general work such
as the present, andwill thereforenot be found in the following
chapters.
354. Geometry, we said, is the study of series which have
more than one dimension. It is now time to define dimen-
sions, and to explain what is meant by a multiple series. The
relevance of our definition to Geometry will appear from the
fact that the mere definition of dimensions leads to a duality
closely analogous to that of projective Geometry.
Let us begin with two dimensions. A series of two dimen-
sions arises as follows. Let there be some asymmetrical transi-
tive relation P, which generates a series u1. Let every term of u1
be itself an asymmetrical transitive relation, which generates
a series. Let all the field of P form a simple series of asymmetri-
cal relations, and let each of these have a simple series of terms
for its field. Then the class u2 of terms forming the fields of all
the relations in the series generated by P is a two-dimensional
series. In other words, the total field of a class of asymmetrical
transitive relations forming a simple series is a double series.
But instead of starting from the asymmetrical relation P, we
may start from the terms. Let there be a class of terms u2, of
which any given one (with possibly one exception) belongs to
the field of one and only one of a certain class u1 of serial rela-
tions. That is if x be a term of u2, x is also a term of the field
of some relation of the class u1. Now further let u1 be a series.
Then u2 will be a double series. This seems to constitute the
definition of two-dimensional series.
Toobtain threedimensions,wehaveonly to suppose thatu2
itself consists of series, or of asymmetrical transitive relations.
Or, startingwith the terms of the three-dimensional series, let
any term of a certain class u2 belong to one and only one se-
ries (again with one possible exception, which may belong to
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many series) of a certain class u2. Let every termof u2 be a term 375
of some series belonging to a class u1 of series, and let u1 itself
be a simple series. Then u3 is a triple series, or a series of three
dimensions. Proceeding in this way, we obtain the definition
of n dimensions, which may be given as follows: Let there be
some series u1 whose terms are all themselves serial relations.
If x1 be any termof u1, and x2 any termof the field of x1, let x2 be
again a serial relation, and so on. Proceeding to x3; x4; etc., let
xn 1, however obtained, be always a relation generating a sim-
ple series. Then all the terms xn belonging to the field of any
serial relation xn 1, form an n-dimensional series. Or, to give
the definition which starts from the terms: Let un be a class of
terms, any one of which, xn say, belongs to the field of some
serial relation, xn 1 say, which itself belongs to a definite class
un 1 of serial relations. Let each term xn in general belong to
the field of only one serial relation xn 1 (with exceptionswhich
need not be discussed at present). Let un 1 lead to a new class
un 2 of serial relations, in exactly the way in which un led to
un 1. Let this proceed until we reach a class u1, and let u1 be a
simple series. Then un is a series of n dimensions.
355. Before proceeding further, some observations on the
above definitionsmay be useful. In the first place, we have just
seen that alternative definitions of dimensions suggest them-
selves, which have a relation analogous to what is called dual-
ity in projective Geometry. How far this analogy extends, is
a question which we cannot discuss until we have examined
projective Geometry. In the second place, every series of n di-
mensions involves series of all smaller numbers of dimensions,
but a series of (n   1) dimensions does not in general imply
one of n dimensions. In the second form of the definition of
n dimensions, the class un 1 is a series of (n   1) dimensions,
and generally, if m be less than n, the class un m is a series of
(n   m) dimensions. And in the other method, all possible
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terms xn 1 together form a series of (n   1) dimensions, and
so on. In the third place, if n be finite, a class which is an n-
dimensional series is also a one-dimensional series. This may
be established by the following rules: In the class u1, which is
a simple series, preserve the order unchanged. In u2, keep the
internal order of each series unchanged, and place that series
before which comes before in u1, and that after which comes
after in u2. Thus u2 is converted into a simple series. Apply
now the same process to u3, and so on. Then by mathemati-
cal induction, if n be finite, or be any infinite ordinal number,
un can be converted into a simple series. This remarkable fact,
which was discovered, for finite numbers and ω, by Cantor*,
has a very important bearing on the foundations of Geome- 376
try. In the fourth place, the definition of n dimensions can
be extended to the case where n is ω, the first of the transfi-
nite ordinals. For this purpose, it is only necessary to suppose
that, whatever finite number m we may take, any um will be-
long to some simple series of seriesum+1; and that the sequence
of classes of series so obtained obeys mathematical induction,
and is therefore a progression. Then the number of dimen-
sions isω. This casebringsout,whatdoesnot appear so clearly
from the case of a finite number of dimensions, that the num-
ber of dimensions is an ordinal number.
356. There are very many ways of generating multiple se-
ries, as there are of generating simple series. The discussion of
these various ways is not, however, of great importance, since
itwould follow closely the discussion of Part IV,Chapter xxiv.
Instances will meet us in the course of our examination of the
*Cantor has proved, not only that a simple series can be so formed, but
that, if n be not greater thanω, and the constituent series all have the same
cardinal number, this is also the cardinal number of the resultant series: i.e.
an n-dimensional space has the same cardinal number of points as a finite
portion of a line. SeeActa Math. ii, p. 314ff.
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various Geometries; and this examination will give opportu-
nities of testing our definition of dimensions. For the present,
it is only important to observe that dimensions, like order and
continuity, are defined in purely abstract terms, without any
reference to actual space. Thus when we say that space has
three dimensions, we are not merely attributing to it an idea
which can only be obtained from space, but we are effecting
part of the actual logical analysis of space. This will appear
more clearly from the applicability of dimensions to complex
numbers, to which we must now turn our attention.
357. The theory of imaginaries was formerly considered a
very important branch of mathematical philosophy, but it has
lost its philosophical importance by ceasing to be controver-
sial. The examination of imaginaries led, on the Continent,
to the Theory of Functions—a subject which, in spite of its
overwhelming mathematical importance, appears to have lit-
tle interest for the philosopher. But among ourselves the same
examination took a more abstract direction: it led to an exam-
ination of the principles of symbolism, the formal laws of ad-
dition and multiplication, and the general nature of a Calcu-
lus. Hence arose a freer spirit towards ordinary Algebra, and
the possibility of regarding it (like ordinary Geometry) as one
species of a genus. This was the guiding spirit of Sir William
Hamilton, De Morgan, Jevons and Peirce—to whom, as re-
gards the result, though not as regards the motive, we must
addBoole andGrassmann. Hence the philosophyof imaginar-
ies becamemerged in the far wider andmore interesting prob-
lems of Universal Algebra*. These problems cannot, in my
opinion, be dealt with by starting with the genus, and asking
ourselves: what are the essential principles of anyCalculus? It
is necessary to adopt a more inductive method, and examine 377
*SeeWhitehead,Universal Algebra, Cambridge, 1898; especially Book I.
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the various species one by one. The mathematical portion of
this taskhas been admirably performedbyMrWhitehead: the
philosophical portion is attempted in the present work. The
possibility of a deductive Universal Algebra is often based
upon a supposed principle of the Permanence of Form. Thus
it is said, for example, that complex numbers must, in virtue
of this principle, obey the same laws of addition and multipli-
cation as real numbers obey. But as a matter of fact there is
no such principle. In Universal Algebra, our symbols of op-
eration, such as + and , are variables, the hypothesis of any
one Algebra being that these symbols obey certain prescribed
rules. In order that such an Algebra should be important, it is
necessary that there should be at least one instance in which
the suggested rules of operation are verified. But even this re-
striction does not enable us to make any general formal state-
ment as to all possible rules of operation. The principle of the
Permanence of Form, therefore, must be regarded as simply
a mistake: other operations than arithmetical addition may
have some or all of its formal properties, but operations can
easily be suggested which lack some or all of these properties.
358. Complex numbers first appeared in mathematics
through the algebraical generalization of number. The princi-
ple of this generalization is the following: Given some class of
numbers, it is required that numbers should be discovered or
invented which will render soluble any equation in one vari-
able, whose coefficients are chosen from the said class of num-
bers. Startingwithpositive integers, thismethod leads at once,
by means of simple equations alone, to all rational numbers
positive and negative. Equations of finite degrees will give all
the so-called algebraic numbers, but to obtain transcendent
numbers, such as e and π, we need equations which are not
of any finite degree. In this respect the algebraical generaliza-
tion is very inferior to the arithmetical, since the latter gives all
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irrationals by a uniform method, whereas the former, strictly
speaking, will give only the algebraic numbers. But with re-
gard to complex numbers, the matter is otherwise. No arith-
metical problem leads to these, and they are wholly incapable
of arithmetical definition. But the attempt to solve such equa-
tions as of x2 + 1 = 0, or x2 + x+ 1 = 0, at once demands a new
class of numbers, since, in the whole domain of real numbers,
none can be found to satisfy these equations. To meet such
cases, the algebraical generalization defined new numbers by
means of the equationswhose roots theywere. It showed that,
assuming these new numbers to obey the usual laws of multi-
plication, each of them fell into two parts, one real, the other
the product of some real number and a fixed number of the
new kind. This fixed number could be chosen arbitrarily, and
was always taken to be one of the square roots of  1. Num-
bers thus composed of two parts were called complex num-
bers, and it was shown that no algebraic operation upon them
could lead to any new class of numbers. What is still more re- 378
markable, it was proved that any further generalization must
lead to numbers disobeying some of the formal laws of Arith-
metic*. But the algebraical generalization was wholly unable
(as it was, in truth, at every previous stage) to prove that there
are such entities as those which it postulated. If the said equa-
tions have roots, then the roots have such and suchproperties;
this is all that the algebraical method allows us to infer. There
is, however, no law of nature to the effect that every equation
musthave a root; on the contrary, it is quite essential to be able
to point out actual entities which do have the properties de-
manded by the algebraical generalization.
359. The discovery of such entities is only to be obtained by
means of the theory of dimensions. Ordinary complex num-
*See Stolz,Allgemeine Arithmetik, ii, Section 1, §10.
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bers form a series of two dimensions of a certain type, which
happen to occur as roots of equations inwhich the coefficients
are real. Complex numbers of a higher order represent a cer-
tain type of n-dimensional series, but here there is no alge-
braical problem concerning real numbers which they are re-
quired to solve. As a matter of fact, however, the algebraical
generalization, as we have seen, does not tell us what our new
entities are, nor whether they are entities at all: moreover it
encourages the erroneous view that complex numbers whose
imaginary part vanishes are real numbers. This error is analo-
gous to that of supposing that some real numbers are rational,
some rationals integral, and positive integers identical with
signless integers. All the above errors having been exposed
at length, the reader will probably be willing to admit the cor-
responding error in the present case. No complex number,
then, is a real number, but each is a term in some multiple se-
ries. It is not worth while to examine specially the usual two-
dimensional complexnumbers, whose claims, aswehave seen,
are purely technical. I shall therefore proceed at once to sys-
temswith n units. I shall give first the usual purely formal defi-
nition†, then the logical objections to this definition, and then
the definition which I propose to substitute.
Let ndifferent entities, e1; e2; : : : : : : en;whichwemay call ele-
ments or units, be given; and let each be capable of association
with any real number, or, in special cases, with any rational or
any integer. In thisway let entitiesαrer arise, whereαr is a num-
ber, and αrer differs from αses unless r = s and αr = αs. That
is, if either the numerical or the non-numerical parts of αrer
and αses be different, then the wholes are different. Further,
let there be away of combining α1e1; α2e2; : : : ; αnen, for each set
of values α1; α2; : : : ; αn to form a new entity. (The class whose
members are α1e1; α2e2; : : : ; αnen will be such an entity.) Then
†See Stolz, ibid. ii, Section 1, §9.
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the combination, which may be written as
a = α1e1 + α2e2 + α3e3 + : : :+ αnen,
is a complex number of the nth order. The arrangement of 379
the component terms α1e1; α2e2; : : : ; αnen may ormay not be es-
sential to the definition; but the only thing always essential is,
that the combination should be such that a difference in any
one or more of the numbers α1; α2; : : : ; αn insures a difference
in the resulting complex number.
360. The above definition suffers from the defect that it
does not point out any one entity which is the complex num-
ber defined by a set of real numbers. Given two real numbers,
a; b, the two complex numbers a + ib; b + ia are determinate;
and it is desirable that such determinateness should appear in
the general definition of complex numbers of any order. But
the e’s in the above definition are variables, and the suggested
complex number is only determinate when the e’s are speci-
fied as well as the α’s. Where, as in metrical Geometry or in
the Dynamics of a finite system of particles, there are impor-
tant meanings for the e’s, we may find that complex numbers
in the above sense are important. Butno special interpretation
can give us the complex number associated with a given set of
real numbers. Wemight take as the complex number the class
of all such entities as the above for all possible values of the e’s;
but such a class would be too general to serve our purposes. A
better method seems to be the following.
We wish a complex number of the nth order to be specified
by the enumeration of n real numbers in a certain order, i.e.
by the numbers α1; α2; : : : αn, where the order is indicated by
the suffix. But we cannot define a complex number as a series
of n real numbers, because the same real number may recur,
i.e. αr and αs need not be different whenever r and s are differ-
ent. Thus what defines a real number is a one-many relation
whose domain consists of real numbers and whose converse
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domain consists of the first n integers (or, in the case of a com-
plex number of infinite order, of all the integers); for the suffix
in αr, indicates correlation with the integer r. Such one-many
relations may be defined to be the complex numbers, and in
this way a purely arithmetical definition is obtained. The n-
dimensional series of complexnumbers of ordern results from
arranging all complex numbers which differ only as to (say) αr
in the order of the real numbers which are αr in the various
cases.
In order that complex numbers in the sense defined byStolz
should have any importance, there must be some motive for
considering assemblages of terms selected out of continua.
Such a motive exists in a metrical space of n dimensions, ow-
ing to a circumstance which is essential to the utility, though
not to the definition, of complex numbers. Let a collection of
entities (points) be given, each of which has to each of the en-
tities e1; e2; : : : en a numerically measurable relation (distance),
and let each be uniquely defined by the n relations which it
has to e1; e2; : : : en. Then the complex number awill represent
one of this collection of entities, and the elements e1; e2; : : : en 380
will themselves be terms of the collection*. Thus there is amo-
tive for considering thenumbersa, which in the general case is
practically absent†. But what is essential to observe, and what
applies equally to the usual complex numbers of Algebra, is
this: our numbers are not purely arithmetical, but involve es-
sential reference to a plurality of dimensions. Thus we have
definitely passed beyond the domain of Arithmetic, and this
was my reason for postponing the consideration of complex
numbers to this late stage.
*e1 is not identical with 1 e1 + 0 e2 + : : :. The former is a point, the
latter a complex number.
†In geometrical applications, it is usual to consider only the ratios α1 :
α2 : : : : : αn as relevant. In this case, our series has only (n  1) dimensions.
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chapter xlv
PROJECTIVEGEOMETRY
361. The foundations of Geometry have been subjected, in 381
recent times, to a threefold scrutiny. First came the work of
the non-Euclideans, which showed that various axioms, long
known to be sufficient for certain results, were also necessary,
i.e. that results inconsistent with the usual results but consis-
tent with each other followed from the denial of those axioms.
Next came thework ofDedekind andCantor on the nature of
continuity, which showed the necessity of investigating care-
fully the prerequisites of analytical Geometry. Lastly, a great
change has been introduced by the Italian work on closed se-
ries,mentioned inPart IV, invirtueofwhichweare able, given
a certain type of relation between four points of a line, to in-
troduce an order of all the points of a line. The work of the
non-Euclideans has, by this time, produced probably almost
all the modifications that it is likely to produce in the founda-
tions, while the work of Dedekind and Cantor only becomes
relevant at a fairly advanced stage of Geometry. The work on
closed series, on the contrary, being very recent, has not yet
been universally recognized, although, as we shall see in the
present chapter, it has enormously increased the range of pure
projective Geometry.
362. In the discussions of the present Part, I shall not divide
Geometries, as a rule, into Euclidean, hyperbolic, elliptic, and
soon, though I shall of course recognize this division andmen-
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tion it whenever it is relevant. But this is not so fundamental a
division as another, which applies, generally speaking, within
each of the above kinds of Geometry, and corresponds to a
greater logical difference. The above kinds differ, not in re-
spect of the indefinableswithwhichwe start, nor yet in respect
of the majority of the axioms, but only in respect of compar-
atively few and late axioms. The three kinds which I wish to
discuss differ both in respect of the indefinables and in respect
of the axioms, but unlike the three previous kinds, they are,
roughly speaking, mutually compatible. That is to say, given a
certain body of geometrical propositions concerning a certain
number of entities, it is more or less arbitrary which of the en- 382
tities we take as indefinable and which of the propositions as
indemonstrable. But the logical differences which result from
different selections are very great, and the systems of deduc-
tions to which different selections lead must be separately dis-
cussed.
All Geometries, as commonly developed, agree in starting
with points as indefinables. That is, there is a certain class-
concept point (which need not be the same in different Ge-
ometries), of which we assume that there are at least two, or
three, or four instances, according to circumstances. Further
instances, i.e. further points, result from special assumptions
in the various cases. Where the three great types ofGeometry
begin to diverge is as regards the straight line. ProjectiveGeom-
etry begins with the whole straight line, i.e. it asserts that any
two points determine a certain class of points which is also de-
termined by any two other members of the class. If this class
be regarded as determined in virtue of a relation between the
two points, then this relation is symmetrical. What I shall call
Descriptive Geometry, on the contrary, begins with an asym-
metrical relation, or a line with sense, which may be called a
ray; or again it may begin by regarding two points as determin-
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ing the stretch of points between them. MetricalGeometry, fi-
nally, takes the straight line in either of the above senses, and
adds either a second relation between any two points, namely
distance, which is a magnitude, or else the consideration of
stretches as magnitudes. Thus in regard to the relations of
two points, the three kinds of Geometry take different inde-
finables, and have corresponding differences of axioms. Any
one of the three, by a suitable choice of axioms, will lead to
any required Euclidean or non-Euclidean space; but the first,
as we shall see, is not capable of yielding asmany propositions
as result from the second or the third. In the present chapter, I
amgoing to assume that set of axiomswhich gives the simplest
form of projective Geometry; and I shall call any collection of
entities satisfying these axioms a projective space. We shall see
in the next chapter how to obtain a set of entities forming a
projective space from a set forming a Euclidean or hyperbolic
space; projective space itself is, so far as it goes, indistinguish-
able from the polar form of elliptic space. It is defined, like all
mathematical entities, solely by the formal nature of the rela-
tions between its constituents, not bywhat those constituents
are in themselves. Thus we shall see in the following chapter
that the “points” of a projective space may each be an infinite
class of straight lines in a non-projective space. So long as the
“points” have the requisite type of mutual relations, the defi-
nition is satisfied.
363. Projective Geometry assumes a class of entities, called
points, to which it assigns certain properties*; In the first place,
there are to be at least two different points, a and b say. These 383
two points are to determine a certain class of points, their
straight line, which we will call ab. This class is determined
*In what follows, I am mainly indebted to Pieri, I Principii della Geome-
tria di Posizione. Turin, 1898. This is, in my opinion, the best work on the
present subject.
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by b and a, as well as by a and b, i.e. there is no order of a and
b involved; moreover a (and therefore b) is itself a member of
the class. Further, the class contains at least one point other
than a and b; if c be any such point, then b belongs to the class
ac, and every point of ac belongs to ab. With these assump-
tions it follows* that, if c; d be any points of ab, then cd and ab
coincide—i.e. any two points of a line determine that line, or
two lines coincide if they have two points in common.
Before proceeding further, let us consider for a moment
what is meant by saying that two points determine a class of
points. This expression is often thought to require no expla-
nation, but as a matter of fact it is not a perfectly precise state-
ment. The precise statement of what is meant is this: There
is a certain definite relation (K say) which holds between any
couple of points and one and only one corresponding class of
points. Without some such definite relation, there could be
no question of two points determining a class. The relation
Kmay be ultimate and indefinable, in which case we need the
above properties of the class ab. We may obtain, however, a
derivative relation between two points, b and c say, namely
that of being both collinear with a given point a. This relation
will be transitive and symmetrical, but will always involve ref-
erence to a term other than those (b and c) which are its terms.
This suggests, as a simplification, that instead of a relation K
betweena couple of points anda class of points,wemighthave
a relationRbetween the twopoints a and b. IfRbe a symmetri-
cal aliorelative, transitive so far as its being an aliorelative will
permit (i.e. if aRb and bRc imply aRc, unless a and c are iden-
tical), the above properties of the straight line will belong to
the class of terms having to a the relation R together with a
itself. This view seems simpler than the former, and leads to
the same results. Since theview that the straight line is derived
*Pieri, op. cit. §1, prop. 25.
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from a relation of two points is the simpler, I shall in general
adopt it. Any two points a; b have, then, a relation Rab; a; c
have a relation Rac. If Rab and Rac are identical, while b and c
differ, Rbc is identical with both Rab and Rac; if not, not. It is to
be observed that the formal properties of any such relation R
are thosebelonging to thedisjunctionof an asymmetrical tran-
sitive relation and its converse—e.g. greater or less, before or
after, etc. These are all symmetrical aliorelatives, and are tran-
sitive so far as their being aliorelatives will permit. But not all
relationsof the type inquestion are analyzable into a transitive
asymmetrical relation or its converse; for diversity, which is of
the above type, is not so analyzable. Hence to assume that the
straight line can be generated by an asymmetrical relation and 384
its converse is a new assumption, characteristic of what I shall
call Descriptive Geometry. For the present, such an assump-
tion would be out of place. We have, then, two indefinables,
namely point, and the relation R orK*. No others are required
in projective space.
364. The next point is the definition of the plane. It is one
of the merits of projective space that, unlike other spaces, it
allows a very simple and easy definition of the plane. For this
purpose, we need a new axiom, namely: If a; b be two distinct
points, there is at least one point not belonging to ab. Let this
be c. Then the plane is the class of points lying on any line
determinedby c and anypoint xof ab. That is, if xbe any point
of ab, and y any point of cx, then y is a point of the plane cab;
and if y be a point of the plane cab, then there is some point x
in ab such that y is a point of cx. It is to be observed that this
definition will not apply to the Euclidean or hyperbolic plane,
since in these two lines may fail to intersect. The exclusion
of Euclidean and hyperbolic space results from the following
*We shall see in Chap. xlix that these notions, which are here provi-
sionally undefined, are themselves variable members of definable classes.
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axiom†: “If a; b; c be three non-collinear points, and a0 be a
point of bc other than b and c, b0 a point of ac other than a and
c, then there is a point common to aa0 and bb0.” By means of
this axiom we can prove that the plane cab is the same as the
plane abc or bac, and generally that, if d; e; f be any three non-
collinear points of abc, the plane def coincides with the plane
abc; we can also show that any two lines in a plane intersect.
365. We can now proceed to the harmonic range and von
Staudt’s quadrilateral construction. Given three collinear
points a; b; c take any two points u; v collinear with c but not
on ab. Construct the points of intersection au : bv and av : bu;
join these points, and let the line joining them meet ab in d.
This construction is called the quadrilateral construction. If
we now assume that outside the plane abu there is at least one
point, we can prove that the point d is independent of u and v,
and is uniquely determined by a; b; c. The point d is called the
harmonic of c with respect to a and b, and the four points are
said to form a harmonic range. The uniqueness‡ of the above
construction—the proof of which, it should be observed, re-
quires a point not in the plane of the constructionk—is the
fundamental proposition of projective Geometry. It gives a
relation which may hold between four points of a line, and
which, when two are given, is one-one as regards the other
two. Denoting “c and d are harmonic with respect to a and 385
b” by cHabd, the following properties of the relation are impor-
tant: (1) cHabd implies dHabc, i.e. Hab is symmetrical; (2) cHabd
†Pieri, op. cit, §3, p. 9.
‡The proof of the uniqueness of the quadrilateral construction will be
found in any text-book of Projective Geometry, e.g. in Cremona’s (Oxford
1893), Chap. viii.
kAproof that this proposition requires three dimensions is easily deriv-
able from a theorem given by Hilbert, Grundlagen der Geometrie, p. 51
(Gauss-Weber Festschrift, Leipzig, 1899).
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implies aHcdb, i.e. the relation of the pairs ab, cd is symmetrical;
(3) cHabd implies that c and d are different points, i.e. Hab is an
aliorelative. This last property is independent of the others,
and has to be introduced by an axiom*.
Having obtained the harmonic range, we may proceed in
two different directions. We may regard the harmonic rela-
tion as a relation of two pairs of points: hence, by keeping one
of the pairs fixed, we obtain what is called an involution. Or
we may regard the harmonic relation, as in the symbol cHabd,
as a relation between two points, which involves a reference
to two others. In this way, regarding a; b; c; as fixed, we obtain
three new points d; e; f on the line ab by the relations cHabd,
aHbce, bHacf. Each of thesemay be used, with two of the previ-
ous points, to determine a fourth point, and so on. This leads
to what Möbius† calls a net, and forms the method by which
Klein‡ introduces projective coordinates. This construction
gives also the method of defining an harmonic ratio. These
two directions in which projective Geometry may be devel-
oped must be separately pursued to begin with. I shall take
the former first.
366. By means of the harmonic relation, we define an invo-
lution. This consists of all pairs of points which are harmonic
conjugates with respect to two fixed pointsk. That is to say, if
*See Fano, Giornale di Matimatiche, Vol. 30; Pieri, op. cit. §4, p. 17 and
Appendix. Fano has proved the necessity of the above axiom in the only
conclusivemanner, by constructing a system satisfying all the previous ax-
ioms, but not this one. The discovery of its necessity is due to him. A
simpler but equivalent axiom is that our space contains at least one line on
which there are more than three points.
†Barycentrischer Calcul, Section ii, Chap. vi.
‡Math. Annalen, 4, 6, 7, 37; Vorlesungen über nicht-Euklidische Geometrie,
Göttingen, 1893, Vol. i, p. 308ff.
kIn what follows, only involutions with real double points are in ques-
tion.
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a; b be the two fixed points, an involution is composed of all
pairs of points x; y such that xHaby. If four points x; y; x0; y0 be
given, itmayormaynothappen that there exist twopointsa; b
such that xHaby and x0Haby0. The possibility of finding such
points a; b constitutes a certain relation of x; y to x0; y0. It is
plain that this relation sometimes holds, for it holds when x; y
are respectively identical with x0; y0. It is plain also that it some-
times does not hold; for if x and y be identical, but not x0 and
y0 then the relation is impossible. Pieri§ has shown how, by
means of certain axioms, this relation of four terms may be
used to divide the straight line into two segments with respect
to any two of its points, and to generate an order of all the
points on a line. (It must be borne in mind that, in projective 386
Geometry, the points of a line do not have an order to begin
with.) This projective order is obtained as follows.
367. Given any three different points a; b; c on a line, con-
sider the class of points x such thata and c; b and x are eachhar-
monic conjugates with respect to some pair of points y; y0—in
other words, a and c, b and x are pairs in an involution whose
double points are y; y0. Here y; y0 are supposed variable: that is,
if any such points can be found, x is to belong to the class con-
sidered. This class contains the point b, but not a or c. Let us
call it the segment (abc). Let us denote the relation of b to x (a
and c being fixed) by bQacx. ThenQac is symmetrical, and also
bQacx implies aQbxc. We have here a relation of four points,
from which, as we saw in Part IV, Chapter xxiv, an order will
result if certain further axioms are fulfilled. Three such ax-
ioms are required, and are given by Pieri as follows.
(1) If d is on the line ab, but does not belong to the segment
(abc), and does not coincide with a or with c, then dmust be-
long to the segment (bca). (If d coincides with c, we know al-
§Op. cit. §§5, 6, 7. Pieri’s method was presumably suggested by von
Staudt. Cf.Geometrie der Lage, §16: especially No. 216.
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ready that d belongs to the segment (bca). This case is there-
fore excluded from the axiom to avoid a superfluity of assump-
tions.) In virtue of this axiom, if a; b; c; d be distinct points on
a line, we must have either bQacd or cQabd. It follows that we
must have either bQacd or aQbcd. Thus at least twoQ-relations
hold between any four distinct collinear points. (2) If a; b; c be
distinct collinear points, and d be a point belonging to both
the segments (bca) and (cab), then d cannot belong to the seg-
ment (abc). That is, of the three segments to which dmay be-
long, it never belongs to more than two. From this and the
previous axiom it results that, if d be distinct from a; b and c,
then d belongs to two and only two of the three segments de-
fined by a; b and c. (3) If a; b; c be distinct collinear points, and
d a point, other than b, of the segment (abc), and e a point of
the segment (adc), then e is a point of the segment (abc). (Here
again, the condition that d is to be other than b is requiredonly
to avoid superfluity, not for the truth of the axiom.) In terms
ofQ, this axiom states that bQacd and dQace imply bQace; that
is, Qac is transitive. We saw already that Qac is symmetrical.
We can now prove that, bymeans of this relation, all points of
the line except a and c are divided into two classes, which we
may call (ac)1 and (ac)2. Any two points in the same class have
the relationQac, any two in different classes have not. The di-
vision into two classes results from the fact that, if we do not
have bQacd, nor yet dQace (b; d; e being points other than a and
c), then we do have bQace. That is to say, Qac has the formal
properties of sameness of sign, and divides the line into two
classes, just as sameness of sign divides numbers into positive
and negative.
The opposite of Qac, which I shall denote by Tac, corre-
sponds in like manner to difference of sign. Tac is not to de- 387
note the mere negation of Qac, but the fact of belonging to
different segments. That is, bTacd means that d does not co-
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incide with a or c, that d lies in the line ac, but not in the
segment (abc). Then bTacd may be taken as meaning that b
and d are separated by a and c. It is a relation which has the
formal properties of separation of couples, as enumerated in
Part IV, Chapter xxiv. If a; b; c; d; e be five distinct points in
one straight line, we have the following properties of the T-
relation. (1) bTacd is equivalent to dTacb, aTbdc, cTbda, cTdba,
etc. (2)We have one and only one of the three relations aTbcd,
aTbdC, aTcdb. (3) dTacb implies dTace or eTacb*.
By comparing the above properties of Twith those of sepa-
ration of couples, it will be seen that T leads to a closed series
(in the sense of Part IV), i.e. to a series in which there is a first
term, but this first term is arbitrary. The definition of the gen-
erating relation of the series (which involves, as in the general
case, three fixed points) is given by Pieri as follows. With re-
gard to the natural order abc; a precedes every other point of
the line; c precedes every point d not belonging to (abc) and
not coinciding with a or c, i.e. every point d such that dTacb; a
general point d precedes a general point e if dQacb and eQadc,
or if dTacb and eTadc, i.e. if d belongs to the segment (abc) and e
to the segment (acd), or if b and d are separated by a and c, and
likewise c and e by a and d. It is then shown, that of any two
points of the line, one precedes the other, and that the relation
is transitive and asymmetrical; hence all the points of the line
acquire an order.
Having nowobtained an order among our points, we can in-
troduce an axiom of continuity, to which Pieri† gives a form
*This last property affords an instance (almost the only one known to
me)wherePeirce’s relative additionoccursoutside theAlgebraofRelatives.
“dTace or eTacb” is the relative sum of Tac and Tac, if d; e; and b be variable.
This property results formally from regarding Tac as the negation of the
transitive relationQac.
†Op. cit. §9, p. 7.
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analogous to that of Dedekind’s axiom, namely: If any seg-
ment (abc) be divided into two parts h and k, such that, with
regard to the order abc, every point of h precedes every point
of k, while h and k each contain at least one point, then there
must be in (abc) at least one point x such that every point of
(abc) which precedes x belongs to h, and every point of (abc)
which follows x belongs to k. It follows from this axiom that
every infinite class contained in (abc) and having no last (or
first) term has a limit, which is either a point of (abc) or c (or
a); and it is easy to prove that, when h and k are given, there
can be only one such point as x in the axiom.
By means of the projective segment, it is easy to define tri-
angles and tetrahedra. Three points determine four triangles,
which between them contain all the points of the plane, and 388
have no commonpoints except the angles. Alsowe can define
harmonic transformations, andprove their propertieswithout
any further axiom*. Only one other axiom is required to com-
plete our Geometry, namely: A plane and a line not in the
plane always have a common point. This amounts to the ax-
iomof three dimensions. Nothing is altered, inwhat precedes,
by denying it, and proceeding to a space of n dimensions or of
an infinite number of dimensions. This last, in fact, requires
fewer axioms than a space of three dimensions†.
368. Let us now resume the other direction in which pro-
jective Geometry may be developed, in which we start from
three fixed points on a line, and examine all the points ob-
tainable from these three by successive quadrilateral construc-
tions. We do not here, as in the developmentwe have been ex-
amining, require any new axiom; but there is a corresponding
restriction in the results obtainable. In order to give projective
Geometry its fullest possible development we must combine
*These developments will be found in Pieri, loc. cit. §§8, 10.
†Pieri, §12
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the results of both directions.
Confining ourselves, to begin with, to one straight line, let
us see how to construct a net and introduce projective coordi-
nates. Denoting by aHbcd, as before, the proposition “a and
d are harmonic conjugates with respect to b and c,” we can,
by the quadrilateral construction, when a; b; c are given, de-
termine the only point d satisfying this proposition. We next
construct the point e for which bHcde, then f for which dHcef, g
for which eHcfg, and so on. In this way we obtain a progres-
sion of points on our line, such that any three consecutive
points, together with c, form a harmonic range. With our for-
mer definition of a segment, all these points will belong to the
segments (abc) and (bca). We may number these points, be-
ginning with a; 0; 1; 2; : : : ; n; : : : : Since c does not belong to
the progression, we may assign to it the number 1‡. Con-
sider next the points obtained as follows. Let d0 be such that
d0Habc, let e0Hadb, f 0Hacd0, and so on. We have thus a new pro-
gression of points, such that any three consecutive points to-
gether with a form a harmonic range, and all belonging to the
segments (abc), (cab). To these points let us assign the num-
bers 1=n in order. Similarly we can construct a progression be-
longing to the two segments (cab); (bca), and assign to them
the negative integers. By proceeding in a similar manner with
any triad of points so obtained, we can obtain more and more
points. The principle adopted in assigning numbers to points
(a principle which, from our present standpoint, has no mo-
tive save convenience) is the following: if p; q; rbe thenumbers 389
assigned to three points already constructed, and sbe thenum-
‡We must not assign to c the definite number ω, since we cannot as-
sume, without further axioms, that c is the limit of our progression. In-
deed, so long as we exclude Pieri’s three axioms above mentioned, we do
not know, to begin with, that c has any ordinal relation to the terms of our
progression.
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ber to be assigned to the harmonic conjugate (supposed not
previously constructed) of the q-point with respect to the p-
point and the r-point, thenwe are to have p  qr  q
p  s
r  s =  1.
In this manner, we can find one and only one point of our line
for each rational number, positive or negative*. Thus we ob-
tain a denumerable endless compact series of points on our
line. Whether these are all thepoints of our lineornot,we can-
notdecidewithout a further axiom. If our line is tobe a contin-
uous series, or a collection of the power of the continuum, we
must of course assume points not obtainable by quadrilateral
constructions, however often repeated, which start with three
given elements. But as the definition of our space is optional,
wemay, if we like, content ourselves with a rational space, and
introduce an axiom to the effect that all points of our line can
be obtained from three given points.
369. Before proceeding further, it may bewell to point out a
logical error, which is very apt to be committed, and has been
committed, I think, even by Klein†. So long as Pieri’s three ax-
ioms above enumerated are not assumed, our points have no
order but that which results from the net, whose construction
has just been explained. Hence only rational points (i.e. such
as, starting from three given points, have rational coordinates)
can have an order at all. If there be any other points, there can
be no sense in which these can be limits of series of rational
points, nor any reason for assigning irrational coordinates to
them. For a limit and the series which it limits must both be-
long to some one series; but in this case, the rational points
form the whole of the series. Hence other points (if there be
any) cannot be assigned as limits of series of rational points.
*On this subject, see Klein,Vorlesungen über nicht-Euklidische Geometrie,
p. 338ff., where proofs will be found.
†e.g. Op. cit. p. 344.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 567
Thenotion that this canbedone springsmerely from thehabit
of assuming that all the points of a line form a series, without
explicitly stating this or its equivalent as an axiom. Indeed,
just as we found that series of rationals properly have no limit
except when they happen to have a rational limit, so series of
points obtainable by the quadrilateral construction will not
have limits, qu terms of the series obtained from the quadri-
lateral construction, except where they happen to have a limit
within this series, i.e. when their coordinates have a rational
limit. At this point, therefore, it is highly desirable to intro-
duce Pieri’s three axioms, in virtue of which all the points of a
line have an order. We shall find that, in the natural order cab,
the order of the rational points, resulting from Pieri’s axioms,
is the same as that of their coordinates assigned on the above 390
principle*. Thus we have only to assume that all infinite series
of rational points have limits, as parts of Pieri’s series, and that
all points are either rational or limits of rational series, in order
to show that our straight line has continuity inCantor’s sense.
In this casewe shall assign tonon-rational points the irrational
numbers corresponding to the series which such points limit.
370. Returning now to the quadrilateral construction, we
define as the anharmonicratio of four points whose coordi-
nates are p; q; r; s the number p  qr  q
p  s
r  s . It can be shown
that this number is independent of the choice of our three
original points a; b; c. It expresses the series of quadrilateral
constructions required to obtain s when p; q; r are given, and
thus expresses a purely projective relation of the four points.
By the introduction of irrational points, in the manner just
explained, it follows that any four points on a line have an
*This has the one exception that c came last in the order of the quadri-
lateral constructions, and comes first in Pieri’s order. This may be reme-
died by the simple device of giving c the coordinate 1 instead of1.
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anharmonic ratio. (This cannot possibly be proved without
Pieri’s three axioms or some equivalent to them.) The anhar-
monic ratio is unaltered by any linear transformation, i.e. by
substituting for every point x the point whose coordinate is
(αx + β)=(γx + δ), where α; β; γ; δ are any fixed numbers such
that αδ  βγ is not zero. From this point we can at last advance
to what was formerly the beginning of projective Geometry,
namely the operation of projection, to which it owes its name.
It can be shown that, if p; r be harmonic conjugates with re-
spect to q; s, and p; q; r; sbe joined to somepoint o, and if op, oq,
or, osmeet any line in p0; q0; r0; s0, then p0; r0 are harmonic conju-
gates with respect to q0; s0. Hence we can show that all anhar-
monic ratios are unaltered by the above operation. Similarly if
l be any straight line not coplanar with pqrs, and the planes lp,
lq, lr, ls meet any line not coplanar with l in p0; q0; r0; s0, these
four points will have the same anharmonic ratio as p; q; r; s.
These facts are expressed by saying that anharmonic ratio is
unaltered by projection. From this point we can proceed to
the assignment of coordinates to any point in space†.
371. To begin with a plane, take three points a; b; c not in
one straight line, and assign coordinates in the above manner
to the points of ab; ac. Let p be any point of the plane abc, but
not on the line bc. Then if cpmeets ab in p1, and bpmeets ac in
p2, and x; y are the coordinates of p1; p2 respectively, let (x; y) be
the two coordinates of p. In thisway all points of the plane not
on bc acquire coordinates. To avoid this restriction, let us in-
troduce three homogeneous coordinates, as follows. Take any
four points a; b; c; e in a plane, no three of which are collinear;
let ae meet bc in e1,be meet ca in e2, ce meet ab in e3. Assign 391
coordinates to the points of bc; ca; ab as before, giving the co-
ordinate 1 to e1; e2; e3, and in ab giving 0 to a, and1 to b, and
†See Pasch,Neuere Geometrie, §22; Klein,Math. Annalen, 37.
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similarly for the other sides. In place of the single coordinate
x of any point of bc, let us introduce the homogeneous coor-
dinates x2; x3, where x = x2=x3. If now p be any point of the
plane abc, let ap meet bc in p1, bp meet ca in p2, and cp meet
ab in p3. Let x2; x3 be the homogeneous coordinates of p1; x3; x1
those of p2; then x1; x2 will be those of p3*. Hence we may as-
sign x1; x2; x3 as homogeneous coordinates of p. In likemanner
we can assign four homogeneous coordinates to any point of
space. We can also assign coordinates to the lines through a
point, or the planes through a line, or all the planes of space,
by means of the anharmonic ratios of lines and planes†. It is
easy to show that, in point-coordinates, a plane has a linear
equation, and a linear equation represents a plane; and that,
in plane-coordinates, a point has a linear equation, and a lin-
ear equation represents a point. Thus we secure all the advan-
tages of analytical Geometry. From this point onwards, the
subject is purely technical, and ceases to have philosophic in-
terest.
372. It is now time to ask ourselves what portions of the Ge-
ometry to which we are accustomed are not included in pro-
jective Geometry. In the first place, the series of points on
a line, being obtained from a four-term relation, is closed in
the sense of Part IV. That is, the order of points requires three
fixed points to be given before it can be defined. The practical
effect of this is, that givenonly three points on a line, nooneof
them is between the other two. This is a definite difference be-
tweenprojective space andEuclideanorhyperbolic space. But
it is easy to exaggerate this difference. We saw in Part IV that,
wherever a series is generated by a two-term relation, there is
also the four-term relation of separation of couples, by which
*See Pasch, loc. cit.
†The anharmonic ratio of four lines through a point or of four planes
through a line is that of the four points in which they meet any line.
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we can generate a closed series consisting of the same terms.
Hence in this respect the difference does not amount to an in-
consistency. Euclidean and hyperbolic spaces contain what
projective space contains, and something more besides. We
saw that the relation by which the projective straight line is
defined has the formal properties of “P or P,” where P is tran-
sitive and asymmetrical. If the said relation be actually of this
form, we shall have an open series with respect to P, and of
three collinear points one will be between the other two. It is
to be observed that, where the straight line is taken to be es-
sentially closed, as in elliptic space, betweenmust be excluded
where three points only are given. Hence elliptic space, in this
respect, is not only consistent with the projective axioms, but
contains nothing more than they do.
It is when we come to the plane that actual inconsisten-
cies arise between projective Geometry and Euclidean or hy- 392
perbolic Geometry. In projective space, any two lines in a
plane intersect; in the Euclidean and hyperbolic Geometries,
this does not occur. In elliptic Geometry, any two lines in a
plane intersect; but in the antipodal form they intersect twice.
Thus only the polar form wholly satisfies the projective ax-
ioms. Analogous considerations apply to the intersection of
two planes, or of a line and a plane. These differences render
the projective definition of a plane inapplicable to Euclidean
and hyperbolic spaces, and render the theory of these spaces
far more complicated than that of projective space.
Finally, in metrical Geometry it is assumed either that two
points have a quantitative relation called distance, which is de-
termined when the points are given, or that stretches satisfy
axioms in virtue of which their divisibilities become numeri-
cally measurable. In this point, even elliptic space differs from
projective space, though the difference is of the nature of an
addition, not an inconsistency. But this matter cannot be dis-
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cussed until we have examined metrical Geometry, when we
shall be in a position to examine also the projective theory of
distance to more advantage than is at present possible.
373. A few words may be added concerning the principle of
duality. This principle states, in three dimensions, that the
class of planes is also a projective space, the intersection of
two planes being, as before, the straight line, and the inter-
section of three non-collinear planes taking the place of the
point. In n dimensions, similarly, a projective space results
from all sub-classes of (n   1) dimensions. Such a duality, as
we saw inChapter xliv, belongs always ton-dimensional series
as such. It would seem (though this is only a conjecture) that
projective Geometry employs the smallest number of axioms
fromwhich it is possible to generate a series of more than two
dimensions, and that projective duality therefore flows from
that of dimensions in general. Other spaces have properties
additional to those required to make them n-dimensional se-
ries, and in other spaces, accordingly, duality is liable to vari-
ous limitations.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 572
chapter xlvi
DESCRIPTIVEGEOMETRY
374. The subject which I have called descriptive Geome- 393
try is not, as a rule, sharply distinguished from projective Ge-
ometry. These two terms, and the term “Geometry of Posi-
tion,” are commonly used as synonyms. But it seems improper
to include in projective Geometry any property which is not
unaltered by projection, and it is by the introduction of one
such property that I wish to define the subject of the present
chapter. We have seen that, in projective space, three points
on a line are not such that a definite one of them is between
the other two. The simplest possible proposition involving
between, in projective Geometry, requires four points, and is
as follows: “If a; b; c be distinct collinear points, and d is on
ac, but does not belong to the segment (abc), nor yet coin-
cide with a or c, then, with regard to the order abc, c is be-
tween b and d.” Whenwe reflect that the definition of the seg-
ment (abc) involves thequadrilateral construction—whichde-
mands, for its proof, a point outside its own plane, and four
pairs of triangles in perspective—we shall admit that the pro-
jective method of generating order is somewhat complicated.
But at any rate the ordinal propositions which result are unal-
tered by projection. The elementary sense of between, on the
contrary, which is to be introduced in the present chapter, is
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in general not unaltered by projection*.
In descriptive Geometry, we start, as before, with points,
and as before, any two points determine a class of points. But
this class nowconsists only of thepoints between the twogiven
points. What is to be understood by between is not explained 394
by any writer on this subject except Vailati, in terms of a tran-
sitive asymmetrical relation of two points; and Vailati’s expla-
nation is condemned by Peano*, on the ground that between
is a relation of three points, not of two only. This ground, as
we know from Part IV, is inadequate and even irrelevant. But
on the subject of relations, even the best mathematicians go
astray, for want, I think, of familiarity with the Logic of Rela-
tions. In the present case, as in that of projective Geometry,
we may start either with a relation of two points, or with a re-
lation between a pair and a class of points: either method is
equally legitimate, and leads to the same results, but the for-
mer is far simpler. Let us examine first the method of Pasch
and Peano, then that of Vailati.
375. We start, in the former method, with two indefinables,
point, and between. If a; b; c be three points, and c is between a
and b, we say that c is an ab, or belongs to the class of points ab.
Professor Peano has enumerated, with his usual care, the pos-
*The present subject is admirably set forth by Pasch,Neuere Geometrie,
Leipzig, 1882, with whose empirical pseudo-philosophical reasons for pre-
ferring it to projective Geometry, however, I by no means agree (see Ein-
leitung and §1). It is carried further, especially as regards the definition of
the plane, by Peano, I Principii di Geometria logicamente esposti, Turin, 1889.
For the definition of the whole line by means of its various segments, see
Peano’s note in Rivista di Matematica, ii, pp. 58–62. See also his article “Sui
fondamenti della Geometria,” ib. iv, p. 51ff., and Vailati, “Sui Principi fon-
damentali della Geometria della retta,” Riv. d. Mat. ii, pp. 71–75. What-
ever, in the following pages, is not controversial, will be found in the above
sources.
*Riv. di Mat. iv, p. 62.
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tulates required as regards the class ab†. In the first place, the
points a and b must be distinct, and when they are so, there
always is a point between them. If c is between a and b, it is
also between b and a: a itself (and therefore b) is not between
a and b. We now introduce a new definition. If a; b be any two
distinct points, then a0b is the class of all points c such that b is
between a and c. Similarly b0awill be the class of points d such
that a is between b and d. We then proceed to new postulates.
If a and bbe distinct points, a0bmust contain at least one point.
If a; b; c; d be points, and c is between a and d, b between a and
c, then b is between a and d. If b and c be between a and d, b is
between a and c, or identical with c, or between c and d. If c; d
belong to a0b, then either c and d are identical, or c is between b
and d, or d is between b and c. If b is betweena and c, and c is be-
tween b and d, then c is between a and d. Thismakes in all nine
postulates with regard to between. Peano confesses‡ that he is
unable to prove that all of them are independent: hence they
are only shown to be sufficient, not necessary. The complete
straight line (ab) is defined as b0a and a and ab and b and a0b;
that is, (1) points between which and b the point a lies; (2) the
point a; (3) points between a and b; (4) the point b; (5) points
between which and a the point b lies.
Concerning thismethod,wemayobserve to beginwith that
it is very complicated. In the second place, wemust remark, as
before, that the phrase “two points determine a class of points”
must be expanded as follows: “There is a certain specific re-
lation K, to whose domain belongs every couple of distinct
points. K is amany-one relation, and the relatum, correspond-
ing to a couple of points as referent, is a class of points.” In the
third place, we may observe that the points of the line only ac- 395
quire order by relation to the segments which they terminate,
†Ib. iv, p. 55ff.
‡Ib. p. 62.
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and that these acquire order by the relation of whole and part,
or logical inclusion. Let a; b be any two points, and consider
the class of points ab or b or a0b. Let c; d be any two distinct
points of this class. Then either ac is a proper part of ad, or ad
is a proper part of ac. Here ac and admay be called segments,
and we see that segments whose origin is a and whose limits
belong to ab or b or a0b form a series in virtue of the transi-
tive asymmetrical relation of whole and part. By correlation
with these segments, their extremities also acquire an order;
and it is easy to prove that this order is unchanged when we
substitute for a any point of ab0. But the order still results, as
it always must, from a transitive asymmetrical relation of two
terms, and nothing is gained by not admitting such a relation
immediately between points.
376. Passing now to what I have called Vailati’s theory, we
find a very great simplification. We may state the present the-
ory (which is not in every detail identical with that of Vailati)
as follows. There is a certain class,whichwewill callK, of tran-
sitive asymmetrical relations. Between any two points there is
one and only one relation of the class K. If R be a relation of
the classK, R is also a relation of this class. Every such relation
R defines a straight line; that is, if a; b be two points such that
aRb, thenabelongs to the straight lineρ. (I use the correspond-
ingGreek letter to denote the domain of a relation; thus if S be
a relation, σ is the class of terms having the relation S to some
term or other.) If aRb, then there is some point c such that aRc
and cRb; also there is a point d such that bRd. Further, if a; b
be any two distinct points belonging to ρ, then either aRb or
bRa. With this apparatus we have all that we require.
We may do well to enumerate formally the above defini-
tion of the class K, or rather the postulates concerning its
members—for K itself is not defined. I may remark to begin
with that I define the field of a class of relations as the logical
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sum of the fields of the constituent relations; and that, ifK be
the class, I denote its field by k. Then the axioms we require
are as follows.
(1) There is a class of relationsK, whose field is defined to be
the class point.
(2) There is at least one point.
If R be any term ofKwe have,
(3) R is an aliorelative.
(4) R is a term ofK.
(5) R2 = R.
(6) ρ (the domain of R) is contained in ρ.
(7) Between any two points there is one and only one rela-
tion of the classK.
(8) If a; b be points of ρ, then either aRb or bRa.
The mutual independence of these axioms is easy to see. 396
But let us first briefly sketch the proof that they give all the
required results. Since there is, by (2), at least one point, and
since by (1) this point has some relation of the class K, and
since by (3) all relations of the class K are aliorelatives, it fol-
lows that there is some term, other than the one point, to
which this one point has a relation R of the classK. But since
R, by (4), is a relation of the classK, it follows that the term to
which the one point is so related is also a point. Hence there
are at least two distinct points. Let a; b be two distinct points,
and let R be the one relation of the class K between a and b.
Thus we have aRb. But we do not have bRa, for if we did,
since R2 = R, by (5), we should have aRa, which contradicts
(3). ThusR and R are always different, i.e. each is asymmetrical.
Since R2 = R, aRbandbRc imply aRc, i.e. R is transitive. Hence
the points which have to a the relation R or R, together with
a itself, form a series. Since R = R2, aRb implies that there is
some point c such thataRc; cRb; i.e. the series generated by R
is compact. Since, by (6), ρ is contained in ρ, aRb implies that
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there is some point c such that bRc. Applying the same argu-
ment to R, there is a point d such that dRa. Thuswehaveρ = ρ,
and the field of R has no beginning or end. By (8), the field of
R is what, in Part IV, we called a connected series, that is, it
does not fall apart into two or more detached portions, but of
any two of its terms one is before and the other after. By (7), if
there bemore than one relation of the classK, the fields of two
such relations cannot, unless one is the converse of the other,
have more than one point in common. The field of one rela-
tion of the classK is called a straight line; and thus (7) assures us
that two straight lines have at most one common point, while
(8) assures us that, if ab; cd be the same line, so are ac and bd.
Thus it is proved that our axioms are sufficient for the geome-
try of a line, while (7) goes beyond a single line, but is inserted
here because it does not imply the existence of points outside
a single line, or of more than one relation of the class K. It
is most important to observe that, in the above enumeration
of fundamentals, there is only one indefinable, namelyK, not
two as in Peano’s system.
377. With regard to themutual independence of the axioms,
it is to be observed that (1) is not properly an axiom, but the as-
sumption of our indefinable K. (2) may obviously be denied
while all the others are maintained. If (3) be denied, and R be
taken to be the symmetrical relation of projective Geometry,
together with identity with some term of ρ, we obtain projec-
tiveGeometry, which is different from the present system, but
self-consistent. If (4) be denied, all the rest can bemaintained;
theonlydifficulty is as regards (7), for ifaRb, and R is not a term
ofK, bwill not have to a any relation of the classK, unless in-
deed it has one which is not R, which seems to be not contra-
dictory. As regards (5), wemay deny either that R is contained 397
in R2, or that R2 is contained in R. To deny the former makes
our series not compact, to which there is no logical objection.
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The latter, but not the former, is false as regards angles*, which
can be made to satisfy all the other axioms here laid down. (6)
will become false if our lines have last terms: thus the space
on the left of a plane, together with this plane, will satisfy all
the axioms except (6). As regards (7), it is plainly independent
of all the rest; it consists of two parts, (a) the assertion that be-
tween any two points there is at least one relation of the class
K, (b) the assertion that there is not more than one such rela-
tion between two given points. If we consider a Euclidean and
a hyperbolic space together, all the axioms will be true except
(a). If we combine two different classes K1;K2 of relations of
the above kind, such that k1 = k2, (b) alone will be false. Nev-
ertheless it seems plain that (b) cannot be deduced from the
other axioms. As regards (8), it alone is false if we take for K
the class of directions in Euclidean space, inwhich a set of par-
allel lines all have the same direction. Thus the necessity of all
except oneof our axioms is strictly proved, and that of this one
is highly probable.
378. We saw that the above method enabled us to content
ourselveswith one indefinable, namely the class of relationsK.
But we may go further, and dispense altogether with indefin-
ables. The axioms concerning the class K were all capable of
statement in terms of the logic of relations. Hence we can de-
fine a classC of classes of relations, such that everymember of
C is a class of relations satisfyingour axioms. The axioms then
become parts of a definition, andwe have neither indefinables
nor axioms. If K be any member of the class C, and k be the
field of K, then k is a descriptive space, and every term of k is
a descriptive point. Here every concept is defined in terms of
general logical concepts. The same method can be applied to
projective space, or to any other mathematical entity except
the indefinables of logic. This is, indeed, though grammat-
*See Part IV, chap. xxiv.
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ically inconvenient, the true way, philosophically speaking,
to define mathematical notions. Outside logic, indefinables
and primitive propositions are not required by pure mathe-
matics, and should therefore, strictly speaking, not be intro-
duced. This subject will be resumed in Chapter xlix.
379. The two ways of defining the straight line—that of
Pasch and Peano, and that which I have just explained—seem
equally legitimate, and lead to the same consequences. The
choice between them is therefore of no mathematical impor-
tance. The two methods agree in enabling us, in terms of two
points only, to define three parts of a straight line, namely the
part before a (b0a), the part between a and b (ab), and the part
after b (a0b). This is a point inwhich descriptiveGeometry dif-
fers from projective Geometry: there we had, with respect to 398
a and b, only two segments of the straight line ab, and these
could not be defined without reference to another point c of
the line, and to the quadrilateral construction.
The straight line may be regarded either as the class of
points forming the field of a relation R, or as this relation it-
self. For the sake of distinction, it will be well to call the re-
lation R a ray, since this word suggests a sense; R will then be
the opposite ray. In considering a number of lines all passing
through one point O, it will be well to give the name of ray
also to the class of points to which O has some relation R, i.e.
to those points of a line through O which lie on one side of
O. Those on the other side ofOwill then be the opposite ray.
The context will show in which sense the word is used.
380. I come now to the plane. Easy as it is to define the
plane in projective space, its definition when the line is not
a closed series, or rather, when we wish to call coplanar some
pairs of lines which do not intersect, is a matter of some diffi-
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culty. Pasch* takes the plane, or rather a finite portion of the
plane, as a new indefinable. It is, however, capable of defini-
tion, as, following Peano, I shall now show.
We need, to begin with, some new axioms. First, if ρ be
any straight line, there is at least one point not belonging to
ρ. Next, if a; b; c be three points not in one straight line, and d
be apoint of bcbetween b and c, e apoint ofadbetweena and d,
then bewill meet ac in a point f and ewill be between b and f, f
between a and c. Again, a; b; c; d being as before, if y be a point
between a and c, then ad and bf will intersect in a point e be-
tween a and d and between b and f†. We now define what may
be regarded as the product (in a geometrical sense) of a point
and a figure. If a be any point, and k any figure, ak is to denote
the points which lie on the various segments between a and
the points of k. That is, if pbe anypoint of k, and x anypoint of
the segment ap, then x belongs to the class ak. This definition
may be applied even when a is a point of k, and x is a straight
line or part of one. The figure akwill then be the whole line or
some continuous portion of it. Peano now proves, by purely
logical transformations, that, if a; b; cbe distinct non-collinear
points, a(bc) = b(ac). This figure is called the triangle abc,
and is thus wholly determined by its three defining points. It
is also shown that, if p; q be points of the segments ab, ac re-
spectively, the segment pq is wholly contained in the triangle
abc. After some more theorems, we come to a new definition.
If a be a point, and k any figure (i.e. class of points), a0k is to
denote all the points between which and a lies some point of
k, that is, as Peano remarks, the whole shadow of k if a be an il-
luminated point. Thus if a; b; c be non-collinear points, a0(bc)
will represent the class of points beyond bc andboundedby ab,
ac produced. This enables us to define the plane (abc) as con- 399
*Op. cit. §2.
†Riv. di Mat. iv, p. 64.
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sisting of the straight lines bc; ca; ab, the triangle abc, and the
figures a0bc; b0ca; c0ab; b0c0a; c0a0b; a0b0c*. It is then easy to show
that any other three points of the plane define the same plane,
and that the line joining two points of a plane lies wholly in
the plane. But in place of the proposition that any two lines
in a plane intersect, we have a more complicated proposition,
namely: If a; b; c; d be coplanar points, no three of which are
collinear, then either the lines ab, cd intersect, or ac; bd do so,
or ad; bc do so.
381. Having successfully defined the plane, we can now ad-
vance to solid Geometry. For this we need, to begin with, the
axiom: Given any plane, there is at least one point outside the
plane. We can then define a tetrahedron exactly as we defined
a triangle. But in order to know that two planes, which have a
point in common, have a line in common, we need a new ax-
iom, which shows that the space we are dealing with has three
dimensions. In projective space, this axiom was simply that
a line and a plane always have at least one point in common.
But here, no such simple axiom holds. The following is given
by Peano (loc. cit. p. 74): If p be a plane, and a a point not on
p, and b a point of a0p (i.e. a point such that the segment ab
contains a point of p, or, in common language, a point on the
other side of the plane from a), then if x be any point, either
x lies on the plane, or the segment ax contains a point of the
plane, or else the segment bx contains a point of the plane. By
adding to this, finally, an axiom of continuity, we have all the
*Thefigure b0(c0a), or b0c0a, represents the anglebetween ba and caboth
produced, as may be seen from the definition.
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apparatus of three-dimensional descriptive Geometry†.
382. Descriptive Geometry, as above defined, applies
equally to Euclidean and to hyperbolic space: none of the
axioms mentioned discriminate between these two. Elliptic
space, on the contrary, which was included in projective Ge-
ometry, is here excluded. It is impossible, or rather, it has hith-
erto proved so, to set up a general set of axioms which will
lead to a general Geometry applying to all three spaces, for at
some point our axiomsmust lead to either an open or a closed
series of points on a line. Such a general Geometry can be
constructed symbolically, but this results from giving differ-
ent interpretations to our symbols, the indefinables in one in-
terpretation being definable in another, and vice versâ. This
will become plain by examining the method in which projec- 400
tive Geometry is made applicable to the space above defined,
which, for want of a better name, I shall call descriptive space.
383. When we try to apply projective Geometry to descrip-
tive space, we are met by the difficulty that some of the points
required in a construction may not exist. Thus in the quadri-
lateral construction, given three points a; b; c, the fourth point
d may not exist at all. We can prove as before that, if it ex-
ists, it is unique, and so with other projective propositions:
they become hypothetical, since the construction indicated
is not always possible. This has led to the introduction of
what are called ideal elements (points, lines and planes), by
means ofwhich it becomes possible to state our projective the-
orems generally. These ideal elements have a certain analogy
†I confinemyself as a rule to threedimensions, since a further extension
has little theoretic interest. Threedimensions are farmore interesting than
two, because, as we have seen, the greater part of projectiveGeometry—i.e.
everything dependent upon the quadrilateral construction—is impossible
with less than three dimensions, unless the uniqueness of the quadrilateral
construction be taken as an axiom.
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to complex numbers in Algebra—an analogy which in analyt-
ical Geometry becomes very close. Before explaining in detail
how these elements are introduced, it may be well to state the
logical nature of the process. By means of the points, lines
and planes of descriptive Geometry, we define a new set of
entities, some of which correspond (i.e. have a one-one rela-
tion) to our points, lines and planes respectively, while oth-
ers do not. These new entities we call ideal points, lines and
planes; and we find that they have all the properties of projec-
tive points, lines and planes. Hence they constitute a projec-
tive space, andall projectivepropositions apply to them. Since
our ideal elements are defined bymeans of the elements of de-
scriptive space, projective propositions concerning these ideal
elements are theorems concerning descriptive space, though
not concerning its actual points, lines and planes. Pasch, who
has given the best account of the way in which ideal elements
are to be defined*, has not perceived (or, at any rate, does not
state) that no ideal point is an actual point, evenwhere it has a
one-one relation to an actual point, and that the same holds
of lines and planes. This is exactly the same remark as we
have had tomake concerning rationals, positive numbers, real
numbers, and complex numbers, all ofwhich are supposed, by
the mathematician, to contain the cardinals or the ordinals,
whereas no one of them can ever be one of the cardinals or
ordinals. So here, an ideal element is never identical with an
actual point, line or plane. If this be borne in mind, the air of
magic which surrounds the usual expositions disappears.
384. An ideal point is defined as follows. Consider first the
class of all the lines passing through somepoint, called the ver-
tex. This class of lines is called a sheaf of lines (Strahlenbündel).
A sheaf so defined has certain properties which can be stated
*Op. cit. §§6–8.
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without reference to the vertex†. Such are, for example, the
following: Through any point (other than the vertex) there is
one and only one line of the sheaf; and any two lines of the
sheaf are coplanar. All the properties of a sheaf, which can be 401
stated without reference to the vertex, are found to belong to
certain classes of lines having no vertex, and such that no two
of the class intersect. For these a simple construction can be
given, as follows*. Let l;m be any two lines in one plane,A any
point not in this plane. Then the planes Al, Am have a line
in common. The class of such lines, for all possible points A
outside the plane lm, has the properties above alluded to, and
the word sheaf is extended to all classes of lines so defined. It
is plain that if l;m intersect, the sheaf has a vertex; if not, it has
none. Thus, in Euclidean space, all the lines parallel to a given
line form a sheaf which has no vertex. When our sheaf has no
vertex, we define an ideal point by means of the sheaf. But this
must not be supposed to be really a point: it is merely another
name for the sheaf itself, and so, when our sheaf has a vertex,
if we are to make propositions in which ideal points occur, we
must substitute the sheaf for its vertex. That is, an ideal point
is simply a sheaf, and no sheaf is an actual point.
Concerning sheaves of lines we may observe the following
points. Any two straight lines in one plane uniquely deter-
mine a sheaf. Two sheaves both having a vertex always deter-
mine a line, namely that joining the vertices, which is common
to both sheaves. Three sheaves, of which one at least has a ver-
tex, determine a plane, unless they are collinear. A line and a
plane always have a common sheaf, and so have three planes
of which two at least have a common point.
385. Thus sheaves of lines have some projective properties,
†These are enumerated by Killing, Grundlagen der Geometrie, Vol. ii
(Paderborn, 1898), p. 82.
*Pasch, op. cit. §5
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in relation to lines and planes, which are lacking to points. In
order to obtain entities with further projective properties, we
must, to begin with, replace our lines by ideal lines. For this
purpose we must first define pencils of planes (axial pencils,
Ebenenbüschel). An axial pencil consists, in the first instance,
of all the planes through a given straight line, called the axis.
But as in the case of sheaves, it is found that such a figure has
many properties independent of the axis, and that these prop-
erties all belong to certain other classes of planes, to which
the name of pencil is therefore extended. These figures are
defined as follows†. Let A;B be two sheaves of lines. Let D
be a point not on the line (if there be one) common to the two
sheavesA;B. ThenA;B;Ddetermineuniquely a plane, which
we may callABD, or P (say). This will be the plane containing
those lines ofA andB that pass throughD. Any other pointE,
not in the plane P, will determine a different planeABE, orQ.
The class of planes so obtained, by varyingDorE, is a pencil of
planes, and has all the properties of a pencil having a real axis,
except those in which the axis is explicitly mentioned. Any
two planes P andQ belonging to the pencil completely deter-
mine it. Moreover, in place of A and B above, we may substi- 402
tute any other sheaves of linesA0;B0, belonging to both P and
Q. (A sheaf belongs to a plane when one of its lines lies in the
plane.) Any two sheaves belonging to both P andQwill serve
to define the pencil of planes, and will belong to every plane
of the pencil. Hence if, in place of actual points, we substitute
ideal points, i.e. sheaves of lines, every pencil of planes has an
axis, consisting of a certain collection of sheaves of lines, any
two of which define the pencil. This collection of sheaves is
†Pasch, op. cit. §7
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called an ideal line*.
386. Substituting ideal points and lines for actual ones, we
find that we have now made a further advance towards pro-
jective space. Two ideal points determine one and only one
ideal line; a given plane is determined by any three of its ideal
points which do not belong to one ideal line, but three ideal
points do not always determine a plane. Two ideal lines in a
plane always have a common ideal point, and so have a plane
and an ideal line. Also twoplanes always have a common ideal
line, and three planes always have either a common ideal point
or a common ideal line. The only point where our space is
not strictly projective is in regard to planes. There is a plane
through any two ideal points and one actual point, or through
an ideal point and an actual line. If there is a plane at all
through three non-collinear ideal points, or through an ideal
line and an ideal point not on the line, then there is only one
such plane; but in some cases there is no such plane. To rem-
edy this, we must introduce one more new class of entities,
namely ideal planes.
The definition of ideal planes† is comparatively simple. If
A;B;C be any three ideal points,D an ideal point on the ideal
lineAB, andEonAC, then the ideal lineDEhas an ideal point
in common with BC, whether there be an actual plane deter-
mined by A;B;C or not. Thus if B;C;D be any three ideal
points, andE any other ideal point such thatBD;CE intersect,
then BC;DE intersect, and so do BE;CD. Hence, if B;C;D be
not collinear, we define the ideal plane BCD as that class of
ideal pointsEwhich are such that the ideal linesBD,CE inter-
sect.
*For logical purposes, it is better to define the ideal line as the class of
ideal points associated with a sheaf of planes, than as the sheaf itself, for
we wish a line to be, as in projective Geometry, a class of points.
†Pasch, op. cit. §8.
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For the sake of clearness, let us repeat this definition in
terms of our original points, lines and planes, without the use
of the word ideal. Given three sheaves of lines B;C;D, which
are not all contained in a common pencil of planes, let E be
another sheaf of lines such that there is a sheaf of lines com-
mon to the two pencils of planes BD;CE. Then the class of
all sheaves E satisfying this condition is called the ideal plane
BCD.
The usual properties of planes are easily proved concerning 403
our new ideal planes, as that any three of their points deter-
mine them, that the ideal line joining two of their ideal points
is wholly contained in them, and so forth. In fact, we find now
that the new points, lines and planes constitute a projective
space, with all the properties described in the preceding chap-
ter. The elementary order of points on a line, with which we
began, has disappeared, and a new order has to be generated
by means of the separation of couples*. Thus all projective
Geometry becomes available; and wherever our ideal points,
lines and planes correspond to actual ones, we have a corre-
sponding projective proposition concerning the latter.
387. I have explained this development at length, partly be-
cause it shows the very wide applicability of projective Geom-
etry, partly because it affords a good instance of the empha-
sis whichmathematics lays upon relations. To themathemati-
cian, it is wholly irrelevant what his entities are, so long as
they have relations of a specified type. It is plain, for exam-
ple, that an instant is a very different thing from a point; but
to the mathematician as such there is no relevant distinction
between the instants of time and the points on a line. So in
our present instance, the highly complex notion of a sheaf of
lines—an infinite class of infinite classes—is philosophically
very widely dissimilar to the simple notion of a point. But
*See Pasch, op. cit. §9.
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since classes of sheaves can be formed, having the same re-
lations to their constituent sheaves that projective lines and
planes have to projective points, a sheaf of lines in descrip-
tive space is, for mathematical purposes, a projective point. It
is not, however, even for mathematical purposes, a point of
descriptive space, and the above transformation clearly shows
that descriptive space is not a species of projective space, but a
radically distinct entity. And this is, for philosophy, the prin-
cipal result of the present chapter.
It is a remarkable fact, which the above generation of a pro-
jective spacedemonstrates, that ifwe remove fromaprojective
space all the points of a plane, or all the points on one side of a
closedquadric†, the remaining points formadescriptive space,
Euclidean in the first case, hyperbolic in the second. Yet, in or-
dinary metrical language, the projective space is finite, while
the part of it which is descriptive is infinite. This illustrates
the comparatively superficial nature of metrical notions.
†For the projective definition of a surface of the second order (quadric)
in a projective space cf. Reye, Geometrie der Lage (Hanover, 1868), Part ii,
Lecture v. A quadric is closed if there are points not on it such that all
straight lines through them cut the quadric. Such points are within the
quadric.
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chapter xlvii
METRICALGEOMETRY
388. The subject of the present chapter is elementary Ge- 404
ometry, as treated by Euclid or by any other author prior to
the nineteenth century. This subject includes the usual ana-
lytical Geometry, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean; it is
distinguished from projective and descriptive Geometry, not
by any opposition corresponding to that of Euclid and non-
Euclid, but by its method and its indefinables. The question
whether its indefinables can, or cannot, be defined in terms of
those of projective and descriptive Geometry, is a very diffi-
cult one, which I postpone to the following chapter. For the
present, I shall develop the subject straightforwardly, in aman-
ner as similar to Euclid’s as is consistentwith the requisite gen-
erality and with the avoidance of fallacies. Metrical Geome-
try is logically subsequent to the two kinds which we have ex-
amined, for it necessarily assumes one or other of these two
kinds, towhich itmerely adds further specifications. I shall, as
a rule, assume descriptive Geometry, mentioning projective
Geometry only in connection with points in which it shows
important metrical differences from descriptive Geometry. In
the former case, all the first twenty-six propositions of Euclid
will hold. In the latter, the first, seventh, sixteenth, and sev-
enteenth require modification; for these propositions assume,
in one form or another, that the straight line is not a closed se-
ries. Propositions after the twenty-sixth—or, with a suitable
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definition of parallels, after the twenty-eighth—depend, with
few exceptions, upon the postulate of parallels, and are there-
fore not to be assumed generally.
389. Since Euclid still has popularly, and even with mathe-
maticians, a reputation for rigour, in virtue of which his cir-
cumlocution and long-windedness are condoned, it may be
worth while to point out, to begin with, a few of the errors
in his first twenty-six propositions*. To begin with the first
proposition. There is no evidence whatever that the circles
which we are told to construct intersect, and if they do not,
the whole proposition fails. Euclid’s problems are often re-
garded as existence-theorems, and from this point of view, it 405
is plain, the assumption that the circles in question intersect
is precisely the same as the assumption that there is an equi-
lateral triangle on a given base. And in elliptic space, where
the straight line is a closed series, the construction fails when
the length of the base exceeds half the length of the whole
straight line. As regards the second and third propositions,
there is nothing to be said, except that they are not existence-
theorems. The corresponding existence-theorem—i.e. on any
straight line, in either direction from a given point on the line,
there is a point whose distance from the given point is equal
to a given distance—is equivalent to the postulate concerning
the circle, and is thus prior to the second and third proposi-
tions. With regard to the fourth, there is a great deal to be said;
indeed Euclid’s proof is so bad that hewould have done better
to assume this proposition as an axiom*. As the issues raised
by this proof are of great importance, both tomathematics and
*Cf. Killing, op. cit.Vol. ii, Section 5.
*This course is actually adopted, as regards the equality of the remain-
ing angles, by Hilbert, Grundlagen der Geometrie (Festschrift zur Feier der
Enthüllung des Gauss-Weber Denkmals, Leipzig, 1899), p. 12.
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to philosophy, I shall set forth its fallacies at some length.
390. The fourth proposition is the first in which Euclid em-
ploys the method of superposition—a method which, since
he will make any détour to avoid it†, he evidently dislikes, and
rightly, since it has no logical validity, and strikes every intel-
ligent child as a juggle. In the first place, to speak of motion
implies that our triangles are not spatial, but material. For a
point of space is a position, and can no more change its posi-
tion than the leopard can change his spots. The motion of a
point of space is a phantom directly contradictory to the law
of identity: it is the supposition that a given point can be now
one point and now another. Hence motion, in the ordinary
sense, is only possible to matter, not to space. But in this case
superposition proves no geometrical property. Suppose that
the triangle ABC is by the window, and the side AB consists
of the column ofmercury in a thermometer; suppose also that
DEF is by the fire. Let us applyABC toDEF as Euclid directs,
and letAB just coverDE. Then we are to conclude thatABC
andDEF, before the motion, were equal in all respects. But if
we had brought DEF to ABC, no such result would have fol-
lowed. But how foolish! I shall be told; of course ABC and
DEF are to be both rigid bodies. Well and good. But two little
difficulties remain. In the first place—and for my opponent,
who is an empirical philosopher, this point is serious—it is
as certain as anything can be that there are no rigid bodies in
the universe. In the second place—and if my opponent were
not an empiricist, hewould find this objection farmore fatal—
the meaning of rigidity presupposes a purely spatial metrical
equality, logically independent of matter. For what is meant 406
by a rigid body? It is one which, throughout a continuous por-
tion of time, preserves all its metrical properties unchanged.
†Cf. Killing, loc. cit. §2.
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Hence we incur a most fatally vicious circle if we attempt to
define metrical properties by rigidity. If αβγ be a material tri-
angle, which occupies at one time the space ABC, at another
the space A0B0C0, to say that αβγ is rigid means that, however
the two times be chosen (within some assigned period), the tri-
anglesABC,A0B0C0 are equal in all respects. If we are to avoid
this conclusion, we must define rigidity in some wholly non-
geometrical manner. We may say, for example, that a rigid
bodymeans onewhich is made of steel, or of brass. But then it
becomes a logical error to regard brass eternal as slave to mor-
tal rage; and if we define equal spaces as those which can be
occupied by one and the same rigid body, the propositions of
metrical Geometry will be one and all false.
The fact is that motion, as the word is used by geometers,
has ameaning entirely different from thatwhich it has in daily
life, just as a variable, in mathematics, is not something which
changes, but is usually, on the contrary, something incapable
of change. So it is with motion. Motion is a certain class of
one-one relations, each of which has every point of space for
its extension, and each ofwhich has a converse also belonging
to the class. That is, a motion is a one-one relation, in which
the referent and the relatum are both points, and in which ev-
ery point may appear as referent and again as relatum. A mo-
tion is not this only: on the contrary, it has this further char-
acteristic, that the metrical properties of any class of referents
are identical with those of the corresponding class of relata.
This characteristic, together with the other, defines a motion
as used in Geometry, or rather, it defines a motion or a reflex-
ion; but this point need not be elucidated at present. What is
clear is, that a motion presupposes the existence, in different
parts of space, of figures having the same metrical properties,
and cannot be used to define those properties. And it is this
sense of the word motion, not the usual material sense, which
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is relevant to Euclid’s use of superposition.
391. Returning now to Euclid’s fourth proposition, we see
that the superposition ofABC onDEF involves the following
assumptions. (1) On the line DE there is a point E, on either
side ofD, such thatDE = AB. This is provided for by the pos-
tulate about the circle. (2) On either side of the ray DE, there
is a rayDF such that the angle EDF is equal to the angle BAC.
This is required for the possibility of a triangle DEF such as
the enunciation demands, but no axiom from which this fol-
lows can be found in Euclid. The problem, to construct an
angle EDF equal to BAC, does not occur till I. 23, and there I.
4 is used in the proof. Hence the present assumption must be
added to Euclid’s axioms. It now follows that on DF there is
a point F such that DF = AC. Hence the possibility of two
such triangles as the enunciation demands is established. But 407
in order to prove thatDEF is equal in all respects toABC, we
need a further axiom, namely: With one angle at D, one side
along the ray DE, and the other side to the right (or left) of
DE, there exists a triangle which is equal in all respects to the
triangleABC*. This is, in fact, the exact assumption which is
concealed in the method of superposition. With this assump-
tion, it finally becomes possible to prove thatDEF is the trian-
gle satisfying the above conditions and equal in all respects to
ABC.
The next remark concerns I. 6. Here Euclid first employs
an axiom of which he is wholly unconscious, though it is very
essential to his system, namely: If OA;OB;OC be three rays
whichmeet a straight line not passing throughO inA;B;C re-
spectively, and if B be between A and C, then the angle AOB
is less than the angleAOC. This axiom, it will be seen, is not
applicable in projective space, since it presupposes that the
*See Pasch, op. cit. §13, Grundsatz ix. The whole § is excellent.
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line is not a closed series. In I. 7, if this proposition is to ap-
ply to hyperbolic space, we require further the axiom: If three
non-intersecting lines in one plane meet two lines in A;B;C;
A0;B0;C0, respectively; and if B be betweenA andC; then B0 is
betweenA0 andC0. Also it may be observed that Euclid gives
no definition of the two sides of a line, a notion which again
presupposes that the straight line is not a closed series. And
with regard to angles, I. 7 requires sufficient axioms to show
that they are a series of the kind explained in Part IV, Chap-
ter xxiv; or else we must assume the descriptive axiom of the
last chapter, to the effect that, ifA;B;C;D be coplanar points,
no three of which are collinear, there is a point common to
the stretches AB;CD, or to AC;BD, or to AD;BC. All these
assumptions will be found implicit in I. 7, as may be seen by
attempting a symbolic proof in which no figure is used.
Similar remarks apply to I. 16. In I. 12 it is assumed that a
circle must meet a line in two points, if at all. But enough has
been said to show that Euclid is not faultless, and that his ex-
plicit axioms are very insufficient. Let us, then, make an inde-
pendent examination of metrical Geometry.
392. Metrical Geometry is usually said to be distinguished
by the introduction of quantity. It is sufficient for the charac-
terization of metrical Geometry to observe that it introduces,
between every pair of points, a relation having certain proper-
ties in virtue of which it is numerically measurable—i.e. such
that numbers can be given a one-one correspondencewith the
various relations of the class in question. The class of rela-
tions is called distance, andwill be regarded, though this is not
strictly necessary, as a class of magnitudes. Some of the prop-
erties of distance are as follows.
(1) Every pair of points has one and only one distance. 408
(2) Distances are symmetrical relations.
(3) On a given straight line through a given point, there are
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two and only two points at a given distance from the given
point.
(4) There is no maximum distance.
(5) The distance of a point from itself is zero*.
(6) There is no minimum to the distance between distinct
points.
(7) If d; δ be two given distances, and A0;A1;A2; : : :An; : : :
be distinct points on a straight line, whose distances one from
thenext are all δ, then for somevalue ofn,A0An is greater than
d.
(8) If A0;An be any two points, there exist n   1 distinct
points (whatever integer n may be) on the straight line A0An,
such that the distances of each from the next, of A0 from the
first, and ofAn from the last, are all equal†.
393. It may be observed that, if we admit the axiom that the
whole is greater than the part, the properties (1), (4), (5) and (6)
belong to stretches, while (2) becomes admissible by abstract-
ing from the sense of a stretch. With regard to the remain-
ing properties, (3), (7) and (8), there is nothing in descriptive
Geometry to show whether or not they belong to stretches.
Hence we may, if we choose, regard these three properties
as axioms regarding stretches, and drop the word distance al-
together. I believe that this represents the simplest course,
and, as regards actual space, the most correct. At the same
time, there is no contradiction in regarding distances as new
relations distinct from stretches‡. If we identify distance and
stretch, what distinguishes metrical from descriptive Geome-
try is primarily the three additional axioms (3), (7) and (8), ap-
plied to a new indefinable, namely, the magnitude of divisibil-
*See Part III, Chap. xxii.
†Further properties of distance will be added later on.
‡Stretches are, of course, not properly relations; but this point is irrele-
vant in the present discussion.
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ity of a stretch. This is not properly a notion of pure mathe-
matics, since it cannot be derived from our original apparatus
of logical notions. On the other hand, distance is not indefin-
able, being a class of one-one relations with certain assignable
properties. On this point either course is logically permissible,
but only distance can be introduced into puremathematics in
the strict sense in which the word is used in this work.
The above axioms are required for showing that all dis-
tances are numerically measurable in terms of any standard
distance§. It is not necessary that distances should be magni-
tudes, or even relations; all that is essential is that distances
should form a series with certain properties. If the points of
a line form a continuous series, then distances do so also, in 409
virtue of (3); thus all signless real numbers will be required for
their measurement.
394. Assuming that distance and stretch are distinct, it may
be asked whether distances do not suffice for generating or-
der on the straight line, without the need of any asymmetri-
cal transitive relation of points. This represents, I think, the
usual view of philosophers; but it is by no means easy to de-
cide whether it represents a tenable view. It might perhaps
be thought that (2) might be dropped, and distance regarded
as an asymmetrical relation. So long as we confine our atten-
tion to one line, this view seems unobjectionable. But as soon
as we consider the fact that distances on different lines may
be equal, we see that the difference of sense between AB and
BA is not relevant to distance, since there is no such differ-
ence between distances on different lines. Thus if CD be a
distance on another line, CD may be equal both to AB and
BA, and hence AB and BA must be equal, not opposite, dis-
tances. And the same thingmay bemade evident by consider-
§See Part IV, Chap. xxxi.
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ing a sphere. For this certainly consists of points at a given dis-
tance from the centre; and thus points at opposite ends of a di-
ametermust have the samedistance from the centre. Distance,
then, is symmetrical; but it does not follow that the order on a
line cannot be generated by distance. LetA;B be given points
on a line, and let C;C0 be two points on AB whose distances
from A are equal, and less than AB. If we now set up the ax-
iom that either BC or BC0 is less thanAB, while the other, BC0
or BC, is greater thanAB, we shall, I think, after some further
axioms, be able to generate order without any other relation
than distance. If A;B;C be three collinear points such that
the distancesAC;CB are both less thanAB, then we shall say
thatC is betweenA and B. IfA;B;C0 be points such thatAC0,
AB are both less than BC0, then we shall say thatA is between
B and C0. If, finally, A;B;C00 be points such that AB;BC00
are both less than AC00, we shall say that B is between A and
C00. It remains to see whether, as the generation of a series re-
quires, one of these always happens. LetA;B;C be any three
collinear points. First suppose, if possible, that the distances
AB;BC;CA are all equal. This case is not excluded by any-
thing hitherto assumed; we require, therefore, the further ax-
iom that, ifAB;BC be equal,AC is not equal to either of them;
and I think itwill be prudent to assume thatAC is greater than
either. Thus the case of two equal distances and one less than
either is excluded. Of the three distances AB;BC;AC, there-
fore, one must be the greatest: let this be AC. Then in virtue
of the definition, B will be betweenA andC. But our difficul-
ties are not at an end. For we require further that any point
between A and B shall be between A and C; and that, if A be
between D and C, B shall be between D and C. With regard
to the first point, if E be betweenA and B,AE and EB are less
than AB, and therefore less than AC. But nothing assures us
that EC is less than AC. For this purpose we need a new ax- 410
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iom, which will be just what we set out to prove, namely: If
AE;EB be both less than AB, and AB, BC be both less than
AC, then EC is less than AC. Finally, to prove that, if A be
betweenD andC, and B betweenA andC, then B is between
D andC. HereDA;AC are less thanDC, andAB;BC are less
than AC. Hence BC is less than DC; but nothing proves BD
less thanDC. For this we shall need a new axiom, and then at
last our order will be definite. But the process, as is evident, is
extremely complicated.
395. Moreoverwe still need amethodofdefining the straight
line. Pieri has shown, in an admirable memoir*, how to de-
duce metrical geometry by taking point andmotion as the only
indefinables. In §390, we objected to the introduction of mo-
tion, as usually effected, on the ground that its definition pre-
supposes metrical properties; but Pieri escapes this objection
by not defining motion at all, except through the postulates
assumed concerning it. The straight line joining two points
is the class of points that are unchanged by a motion which
leaves the two points fixed. The sphere, the plane, perpen-
dicularity, the order of points on a line, etc. are easily defined.
This procedure is logically unimpeachable, and is probably the
simplest possible for elementary geometry. But we must now
return to the consideration of other suggested systems.
There is a method, invented by Leibniz† and revived by
Frischauf‡ and Peano§, in which distance alone is fundamen-
tal, and the straight line is defined by its means. In this
method distances are given to beginwith as a class of relations
which are the field of a certain transitive asymmetrical relation
*Della geometria elementare como sistema ipotetico deduttivo, Turin, 1899.
†Cf. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, Paris, 1901, Chap. ix, esp. p. 420.
‡Absolute Geometrie nach Johann Bolyai, Anhang.
§Accademia Reale delle Scienze di Torino, 1902–3, “La Geometria basata
sulle idee di punto e distanza.”
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(greater and smaller); if we assume this relation to be continu-
ous, distances will be measurable; all distances have the same
domain and the same converse domain, namely all the points
of the space in question; the locus of points equidistant from
two fixed points is called a plane, and the intersection of two
non-coincident planes, when it is not null, is called a straight
line. (The definition of the straight line given by Peanok is
as follows: The straight line ab is the class of points x such
that any point y, whose distances from a and b are respectively
equal to the distances of x from a and b, must be coincident
with x.) Leibniz, who invented this method, failed, according
to Couturat, to prove that there are straight lines, or that a
straight line is determined by any two of its points. Peano has
not, so far as I am aware, succeeded in proving either of these
propositions, but it is of course possible to introduce them by
means of axioms. Frischauf professes to demonstrate them,
but his proofs are very informal, and it is difficult to know 411
what axioms he is assuming. In any case, however, the defi-
nitions prove that, by a sufficient use of axioms, it is possible
to construct a geometry inwhichdistance is fundamental, and
the straight line derivative. The method is so complicated as
to be not practically desirable; but its logical possibility is nev-
ertheless important.
396. It is thus plain that the straight line must be indepen-
dent of distance, while distance may be independent of the
straight line. Taking both as symmetrical relations, we can,
by a very complicated series of axioms, succeed in generat-
ing order on the straight line and in explaining the addition
andmeasurement of distances. But this complication, inmost
spaces*, is logically unnecessary, and is wholly avoided by de-
kloc. cit.
*The only exceptions known tome are finite spaces of two dimensions.
See Chap. xlix.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 600
rivingdistances fromstretches. Wenowstart, as indescriptive
Geometry, with an asymmetrical transitive relation by which
the straight line is both defined and shown to be a series. We
define as the distance of two points A and B the magnitude of
divisibility of the stretch fromA to B or B toA—for divisibil-
ity is a signless magnitude. Divisibility being a kind of magni-
tude, any two distances will be equal or unequal. As with all
divisibilities, the sum of the divisibilities of AB and EF is the
divisibility of the logical sum of the classes AB and EF, pro-
vided these classes have no common part. If they have a com-
mon part, we substitute for EF a stretch E0F0 equal to it and
having no part in commonwithAB. The difference of the dis-
tancesAB;EF (supposingAB the greater) is the divisibility of
a stretchCDwhich, added logically to EF, and having no part
in common with EF, produces a stretch equal to AB. It fol-
lows at once that, if A;B;C be collinear, and B be between A
andC,AB+BC = AC andAC AB = BC. No further axiom
is required for these propositions. For the proposition that, if
AB = A0B0 , andCD = C0D0, thenAB+CD = A0B0+C0D0, we
require only the general axiom, applicable to all divisibilities,
that the sums of equals are equal. Thus by the help of the ax-
ioms (3), (7), (8) above, we have everything that is required for
the numerical measurement (theoretically speaking) of all dis-
tances in terms of any given distance, and for the proof that
change of unit involves multiplication throughout by a com-
mon factor.
397. With regard to magnitude of divisibility, in the sense
in which this is relevant to metrical Geometry, it is important
to realize that it is an ordinal notion, expressing a property of
relations, not of their fields. We wish to say that a stretch of
two inches has twice as much divisibility as a stretch of one
inch, and that an area is infinitelymore divisible than a stretch.
Now, if we are dealing (as will be assumed in this discussion)
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with a continuous space, every stretch, area or volume is a
class of 2α0 terms; and considered as a class, it is the field of an
infinite number of relations beside that (or those) belonging
to it in respect of the space we are considering. The habit of 412
allowing the imagination to dwell upon actual space hasmade
the order of points appear in some way intrinsic or essential,
and not merely relative to one of many possible ordering re-
lations. But this point of view is not logical: it arises, in re-
gard to actual space, only from the fact that the generating re-
lations of actual space have a quite peculiar connection with
our perceptions, and, through the continuity of motion, with
time. From the standpoint of logic, no one of the relations
having a given field has any preeminence, and the points of ac-
tual space, like any other class of 2α0 terms, form, with regard
to other sets of generating relations, other sorts of continuous
spaces—indeed any other continuous space, having any finite
number of dimensions, or even ω dimensions, can be formed
of the points of a Euclidean space by attending to other gener-
ating relations.
From this it follows that magnitude of divisibility, if it is to
distinguish a long stretch from a short one, or an area from
a stretch, must be a property of the relations involved, not
of the class of points composing the area or the stretch. It is
not quite easy to define the exact property which is required;
for any two stretches are ordinally similar. We require some
sense for the equality or inequality of the relations whose
fields are the given stretches. Where coordinates (i.e. a cor-
relation of the points of a line with the real numbers) have
been already introduced, we may define the magnitude of a
stretch as the difference of the coordinates of its end-points
or its limits (according as the stretch has ends or not); but if
this is done, themagnitudes of stretcheswill depend upon the
necessarily more or less arbitrary plan uponwhich we have in-
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troduced our coordinates. This is the course adopted in the
projective theory of distance—a course which has the merit
of makingmetrical Geometry a logical development from pro-
jective axioms alone (see next chapter). The other course that
may be adopted is, to assume that the generating relations of
any two stretches have either a symmetrical transitive relation
(equality), or an asymmetrical transitive relation or its con-
verse (greater or less). Certain axioms will be required, as, for
example, that if the points A;B;C;D are collinear, and AC is
greater thanAD, thenBC is greater thanBD*. The relations of
equal, greater and less may be regarded as defined by these ax-
ioms, and the common property of the generating relations of
those stretches that are equal to a given stretchmay be defined
as themagnitudeof divisibility of the said generating relations.
The sense inwhich an areahas infinitelymoredivisibility than
a stretch is that, if n be any finite integer, and n stretches equal
to a given stretch be removed from an area, there always re-
mains an area, however great nmay be. What is important to
observe, in the above discussion, is that the logical parity of 413
all the orders of which a class of terms is capable makes it nec-
essary to regard the magnitudes with which metrical Geome-
try deals as belonging to relations or classes of relations, not,
as is commonly supposed, to the class of points forming their
fields.
398. In elliptic space, where the straight line is a closed se-
ries, the attempt tomakedistance independentof stretch leads
to still further complications. We now no longer have the ax-
iom that, if A;B;C be collinear, we cannot have AB = BC =
CA; and we have to recognize two distances between every
pair of points, which, when distance is taken as fundamental,
becomes extremely awkward. We may however avoid admit-
*Stretches arehere regardedashaving sign, so that, ifAC is greater than
AD,CA is less thanDA.
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ting two distances by refusing to regard the greater of the two
as properly a distance. This will then be only a stretch. If two
distances are admitted, one is always greater than the other,
except in a limiting case, when both are the lower limit of the
greater distances and the upper limit of the lesser distances.
Further if a; b; c; d be any four distinct points, the greater of
the twodistances ab is always greater than the lesser of the two
distances cd. Thus the whole class of greater distances may be
banished, and only greater stretches be admitted.
We must now proceed as follows. Distances are a class of
symmetrical relations, which aremagnitudes of one kind, hav-
ing a maximum, which is a one-one relation whose field is all
points, and a minimum, which is the distance of any point
from itself. Every point on a given line has a given distance
other than themaximum orminimum from two and only two
other points on the line. If a; b; c; d be four distinct points on
one line, we shall say that a and c are separated by b and d in
the following four cases, of which (1) and (2) and also (3) and (4)
are not mutually exclusive:
(1) If ab < ac : bc < ac : ad > ac.
(2) If ab < ac : bc < ac : dc > ac.
(3) If ab > ac : ad < ac : dc < ac.
(4) If bc > ac : ad < ac : dc < ac.
We then need Vailati’s five axioms enumerated in Part IV,
Chap. xxiv, in order to generate a closed series from the sep-
aration of couples so defined. Thus it is possible, though by a
somewhat complicated process, to generate a closed series of
points on a line by means of the symmetrical relation of dis-
tance.
I shall not work out in further detail the consequences of
this hypothesis in elliptic space, but proceed at once to the hy-
pothesis that distances are themagnitudes of stretches. When
thenumber of dimensions exceeds two, the polar formof ellip-
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tic space ismerely projective space togetherwith thenecessary
metrical axioms; the antipodal form is a space in which two
antipodal points together have the properties of a single pro-
jective point. Neglecting the latter, to which similar remarks 414
will apply, I shall confine myself to the polar form. Since this
is a projective space, every pair of points determines two seg-
ments on the line joining the points. The sum of these two
segments, together with the two points, is the whole line, and
therefore constant. It is an axiom that all complete straight
lines have the same divisibility. The divisibility of either seg-
ment is a distance between the two points: when the two dis-
tances are equal, either may be called the distance; when they
are unequal, it will be convenient to call the smaller the dis-
tance, except in special problems. The whole theory then pro-
ceeds as in the case of descriptive space. But it is important to
observe that, in elliptic space, the quadrilateral construction
and the generation of order, being prior to stretches, are prior
to distances, and are presupposed in metrical Geometry.
399. So far, therefore, metrical Geometry introduces three
new axioms, and one new indefinable. The stretch in every se-
ries is a quantity, and metrical Geometry merely introduces
such axioms asmake all stretches of points measurable. A few
words may be useful as to the sense in which, in a theoretical
discussion, the wordmeasurement is to be understood. The ac-
tual application of the foot-rule is here not in question, but
only those properties of pure space which are presupposed in
the use of the foot-rule. A set of magnitudes is theoretically
measurable when there is a one-one relation between them
and some or all numbers; it is practically measurable when,
given any magnitude, we can discover, with a certain margin
of error, what the number is to which our magnitude has the
relation in, question. But how we are to discover this is a sub-
sequent question, presupposing that there is such a proposi-
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tion to be discovered, and soluble, if at all, by empirical means
to be invented in the laboratory. With practical measurement,
then, we are not at all concerned in the present discussion.
400. I come now to a more difficult question than distance,
namely the question as to the definition of angle. Here, to
begin with, we must deal with rays, not with whole straight
lines. The ray may be taken either as an asymmetrical rela-
tion, or as the half-line on one side of a given point on a line.
The latter usage is very convenient, and I shall frequently em-
ploy it. Elementary Geometry assumes that two rays starting
from the same point determine a certain magnitude, called
the angle between them. This magnitude may, however, be
defined in various ways. In the first place, we must observe
that, since the rays in a plane through a point form a closed se-
ries, every pair of rays through a point defines two stretches
of rays. Of these, however, one stretch contains the oppo-
sites of both rays, while the other stretch contains the oppo-
sites of neither—except, indeed, in the one casewhere the two
rays are each other’s opposites. This case is met by Euclid’s
postulate that all right angles are equal—a postulate, however, 415
which is now known to be demonstrable*. Omitting this case,
the angle between two rays may be defined as that stretch of
rays through their intersection which is bounded by the two
rays and does not contain the opposite of either, i.e. ifA;B be
the rays, and A, B their opposites, the angle is the class of rays
Cwhich are separated from A or B byA and B. Wemight also,
but for an objection to be mentioned shortly, define the angle
as all the points on such rays. A definition equivalent to this
last, but simpler in form, and avoiding the mention of the op-
posite rays, is the following†. Let a; b be any two points of the
*See e.g. Killing, op. cit. Vol. ii, p. 171. A strict proof will be found in
Hilbert, op. cit. p. 16.
†Killing, op. cit. ii, p. 169.
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rays A;B, and let c be any point of the stretch ab. Then the
class of points c, for all possible positions of a and b on their
respective rays, is the angle between A and B. That is, every
pair of intersecting rays divides the plane of the rays into two
parts: the part defined as above is the angle. Or rather, the part
so defined is the angle as a quantity: the angle as a magnitude
is the divisibility of this part. But to these latter definitions
we shall find fatal objections, and we shall find it necessary to
adhere to the definition as a stretch of rays.
401. Thus angle, like distance, is not a new indefinable, but
like distance, it requires somenewaxioms. The angle between
a ray A and its opposite A0 cannot be defined as above, but
may be defined as the logical sum of the angles between A
and B, B and A0 respectively. This limiting angle is greater
than any other at the point, being in fact the whole half of
the plane on one side of the straight line AA0. If the angles
between A and B, B and A0 are equal, each is called a right
angle. (That there are such angles, can be proved if we as-
sume continuity.) Two intersecting straight lines make four
angles, which are equal in pairs. The order of a collection of
rays through a point in a planemay be obtained by correlation
with the points where these rays intersect a given straight line,
provided there is any straight line which all of them intersect.
But since rays through a point in a plane form a closed series,
while the points on a line do not, we require a four-term re-
lation for the former order. The following definition seems
adequate. Given four rays OA;OB;OC;OD through a point
O and in one plane, if these all meet a certain straight line in
A;B;C;D respectively, andA andC are separated by B andD,
then OA and OC are said to be separated by OB and OD. In
projective space this suffices. But in descriptive spacewemust
provide for other cases. Thus if OA;OB;OC meet the given
line, and B is between OA and OC, while OD does not meet
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the given line, thenOA andOC are again said to be separated
by OB and OD. If, finally, OA0 and OB0 be the opposites of 416
OA andOB, thenOA andOA0 are separated byOB andOB0.
In virtue of the descriptive axioms of the preceding chapter,
the order among the rays so obtainedwill be unambiguous, i.e.
independent of our choice of the lineABC, and will cover all
cases.
But now we need axioms analogous to those which, in the
case of distance, were numbered (3), (7) and (8). At any given
point in a given ray, there must be, in a given plane, two and
only two rays, on opposite sides of the given ray (i.e. separated
fromeach other by the given ray and its opposite), whichmake
a given angle with the given ray; and angles must obey the ax-
ioms of Archimedes and of linearity. But in addition to these
axioms, which insure that angles shall be numerically measur-
able, we must have some method of connecting the measure
of angles with that of distances, such as is required for the so-
lution of triangles. Does this require a new axiom? Euclid ap-
pears to obtain this, by means of I. 47, II. 12, and II. 13, without
any fresh axiom. For this result we depend upon the proposi-
tionson the congruenceof triangles (I. 4, 8, 26),whichdemand
only, aswe saw, the axiom that, with one angle at a givenpoint,
and one side along a given ray through that point, there exist
two and only two triangles in a given plane through the ray
(one on each side of the given ray), which are equal in all re-
spects to a given triangle. Thus it would seem that no fresh
axioms are required for angles in a plane.
402. With regard to the definition of an angle as a portion
of a plane, it is necessary (as in many other cases), if we retain
this definition, somewhat to restrict the axiom that the whole
is greater than the part. If a wholeA has two parts B;C, which
together constitute A, and if C be infinitesimal with respect
toA, then Bwill be equal toA. This case occurs in a plane un-
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der the following circumstances. LetO;O0 be any two points,
OP;O0P0 lines in one plane and making equal angles with the
ray OO0*. Then in Euclidean or hyperbolic space these lines
OP;O0P0 will not intersect; thus the angle between OO0 and
O0P0 will be part of the angle O0OP. Hence the above restric-
tion is necessary as regards the axiom that the whole is greater
than the part.
In Euclidean space this answer is sufficient, since, if OP
makes withOO0 a less angle thanO0P0 does,OP andO0P0 will
intersect. But in hyperbolic space,OP andO0P0 may not inter-
sect even then. Hence if we adhere to the above definition of
angle, we shall have to hold that the whole may be less than
the part. This, however, is intolerable, and shows that the def-
inition in question must be rejected. We may, however, still
regard angle as the stretch of rays; for the rays in the angle at
O0 are not part of the rays in the angle atO. Hence it is only as
a stretch of rays, or as the magnitude of such a stretch, that an
angle can be properly defined.
As showing, in a curiousmanner, the increased power of de- 417
duction which results from the above axioms concerning dis-
tances and angles, we may remark that the uniqueness of the
quadrilateral construction, which before could not be proved
without three dimensions, can now be proved, as regards all
constructions in one plane, without any assumption of points
outside that plane. Nothing is easier than to prove this propo-
sition by the methods of elementary coordinate Geometry.
Thus although projective Geometry, as an independent sci-
ence, requires three dimensions, any projective proposition
concerning plane figures canbemetrically proved, if the above
axioms hold, for a two-dimensional space.
403. As regards figures of three dimensions, angles between
*The angle between the rays OO0;O0P0 is what Euclid would call the
angle betweenOO0 produced andO0P0.
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planes and solid angles can be defined exactly as rectilinear an-
gleswere defined. Moreover fresh axiomswill not be required,
for the measurement of such angles can be deduced from the
data we already possess.
With regard to areas and volumes some remarks seem nec-
essary. Areas and volumes, like angles, are classes of points
when taken as quantities, anddivisibilitieswhen taken asmag-
nitudes. For areas and volumes we do not require afresh the
axioms of Archimedes and of linearity, but we require one
axiom apiece to give a criterion of equal areas and volumes,
i.e. to connect their equality with that of distances and angles.
Such an axiom is supplied, as regards areas, by the axiom that
two congruent triangles have the same area, and as regards
volumes, by the corresponding axiom concerning tetrahedra.
But the existence of congruent tetrahedra, like that of con-
gruent triangles, demands an axiom. For this purpose, Pasch*
gives the following general axiom: If two figures are congru-
ent, and a new point be added to one of them, a new point can
be added to the other so that the two new figures are congru-
ent. This axiom allows us to infer congruent tetrahedra from
congruent triangles; and hence the measurement of volumes
proceeds smoothly.
404. In three dimensions, a curious fact has to be
taken account of, namely, the disjunction of right and left-
handedness, or of clockwise and counter-clockwise. This fact
is itself of a descriptive nature, and may be defined as fol-
lows. Between two non-coplanar rays, or between four non-
coplanar points taken in an assigned order, there is always one
of two opposite relations, which may be called right and left.
The formal properties of these relations have been explained
in Part IV (§222); for the present I am concernedwith their ge-
ometrical consequences. In the first place, they cause volumes
*Op. cit. p. 109.
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to become magnitudes with sign, in exactly the way in which
distances on a straight line have sign when compounded with
their sense. But in the case of distances, since not all are on
one straight line, we could not thus compound distance and
sense generally: we should require, for a compound, some
more general notion than sense, such as vectors supply. Here, 418
on the contrary, since, in a three-dimensional space, all vol-
umes have one or other of two senses, the compound can be
made for all volumes. Thus if the volume of the tetrahedron
abcd has one sign, that of bacd will have the opposite sign.
This is the familiar geometrical fact that the determinant giv-
ing the volume of a tetrahedron abcd has one or other sign ac-
cording as the sense of abcd is the same as or different from
that of OXYZ, where O is the origin and X;Y;Z any positive
points on the axes. It is this fact, also, which gives signs to
angular momentum in Dynamics. The importance of the fact
(which itself seems to be an independent axiom) is this, that it
makes a distinction between two figures whose metrical prop-
erties are all identical. It is this distinctionwhichpuzzledKant,
who, like most of his contemporaries, supposed all geometri-
cal facts to be metrical. In itself, the fact would be no more
puzzling than, the distinction between the stretches AB and
BA, which are metrically indistinguishable. But it becomes
puzzlingwhenmetrical equality is supposed to result frommo-
tion and superposition. In our former definition of motion
(§390) we omitted (as was then observed) a condition essential
to its definition. Not only must two congruent figures be met-
rically equal, but there must be a continuous series of equal
figures leading from the one to the other. Or, what amounts to
the same thing, if a; b; c; d and a0; b0; c0; d0 be homologous non-
coplanar points in the two figures, the tetrahedra abcd, a0b0c0d0
must have the same sense. In the case of equal and opposite
tetrahedra, these conditions fail. For there is no gradual transi-
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tion from clockwise to counter-clockwise; thus at some point
in the series a sudden jump would be necessary. No motion
will transform abcd into a tetrahedron metrically equal in all
respects, but with the opposite sense. In this fact, however,
there seems, tomymind, to benothingmysterious, butmerely
a result of confining ourselves to three dimensions. In one
dimension, the same would hold of distances with opposite
senses; in two dimensions, of areas. It is only to those who re-
gardmotion as essential to the notion ofmetrical equality that
right and left-handedness form a difficulty; in our theory, they
are rather a confirmation than a stumbling-block.
With this we may end our brief review of metrical Geome-
try, leaving it to the next chapter to discuss its relation to pro-
jectiveGeometry and the projective theory of distance and an-
gle.
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chapter xlviii
RELATIONOFMETRICAL TO
PROJECTIVEAND
DESCRIPTIVEGEOMETRY
405. In the present chapter I wish to discuss two questions. 419
First, can projective and descriptive Geometry be established
without any metrical presuppositions, or even without imply-
ing metrical properties? Secondly, can metrical Geometry be
deduced from either of the others, or, if not, what unavoid-
able novelties does it introduce? The previous exposition has
already dogmatically assumed certain answers to these ques-
tions, butwe arenow to examine critically the various possible
answers.
The distinction between projective and descriptiveGeome-
try is very recent, and is of an essentially ordinal nature. If we
adopt the view—which, as we saw, is the simpler of two legiti-
mate views—that the straight line is defined by a certain rela-
tion between any two of its points, then in projective Geome-
try this relation is symmetrical, while in descriptiveGeometry
it is asymmetrical. Beyond this we have the difference that, in
projective Geometry, a line and a plane, two planes, or two
lines in a plane, always intersect, while in descriptive Geom-
etry the question whether this is the case or not is left open.
But these differences are not very important for our present
purpose, and it will therefore be convenient to speak of pro-
jective anddescriptiveGeometry together asnon-quantitative
Geometry.
The logical independence of non-quantitative Geometry is
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now scarcely open to question. Wehave seen, inChapters xlv
and xlvi, how it may be built up without any reference what-
ever to quantitative considerations. Quantity, in fact, though
philosophers appear still to regard it as very essential to math-
ematics, does not occur in pure mathematics, and does oc-
cur in many cases not at present amenable to mathematical
treatment. The notion which does occupy the place tradition-
ally assigned to quantity is order; and this notion, we saw, is
present in both kinds of non-quantitative Geometry. But the
purity of the notion of order has been much obscured by the
belief that all order depends upon distance—a belief which,
though it is entertained by so excellent a writer as Meinong,
we have seen to be false. Distance being essentially quanti- 420
tative, to admit that series depend upon distance is to admit
that order depends upon quantity. But this view leads at once
to an endless regress, since distances have an order of magni-
tude, which would have to be derived from new distances of
distances, and so on. And positively, an asymmetrical transi-
tive relation suffices to generate a series, but does not imply
distance. Hence the fact that the points of a line form a series
does not show that Geometry must have metrical presuppo-
sitions, and no such presuppositions appear in the detail of
projective or descriptive Geometry.
406. But although non-quantitativeGeometry, as it now ex-
ists, is plainly independent of everything metrical, the histor-
ical development of the subject has tended greatly to obscure
this independence. A brief historical review of the subject
may be useful in showing the relation of the more modern to
the more traditional methods.
In Euclid, and in Greek geometers generally, hardly any
descriptive theorems are to be found. One of the earliest
discoveries of an important descriptive theorem was the one
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named after Pascal*. Gradually it was found that proposi-
tions which assert points to be collinear or lines to be con-
current, or propositions concerning tangents, poles and po-
lars, and similar matters, were unaltered by projection; that
is, any such property belonging to a plane figure would be-
long also to the projection or shadow of this figure from
any point on to any plane. All such properties (as, for in-
stance, those common to all conics) were called projective
or descriptive. Among these properties was anharmonic ra-
tio, which was defined as follows. If A;B;C;D be four points
on one straight line, their anharmonic ratio is ABCB
AD
CD ; if
OA;OB;OC;OD be four lines through a point, their anhar-
monic ratio is sinAOBsinCOB
sinAOD
sinCOD . In Chasles’s great work
ondescriptiveGeometry, and even inmost recentworks (such
as Cremona’s projective Geometry), this definition will be
found at a very early stage in the development of the sub-
ject, together with a proof that anharmonic ratio is unaltered
by projection. But such a definition is itself metrical, and
cannot therefore be used to found a subject independent of
metrical Geometry. With other portions of what used to be
called descriptive or projective Geometry, the same lack of in-
dependence will be found. Consider, for example, the defi-
nition of a conic. To define it as a curve of the second de-
greewould require projective coordinates, which therewasno
known method of introducing. To define it as a curve meet-
ing any straight line in not more than two points would re-
quire the distinction of real and imaginary points, for if we
confine ourselves to real points there are innumerable curves 421
other than conics which satisfy the definition. But imaginary
*If a hexagon be inscribed in a conic, the three pairs of opposite sides
intersect in collinear points.
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points are, in ordinary metrical Geometry, imaginary coordi-
nates, for which there is no purely geometrical interpretation;
thus without projective coordinates, our definition again fails.
To define a conic as the locus of points P for which the an-
harmonic ratio of PA;PB;PC;PD (where A;B;C;D are fixed
points) is constant, again involves metrical considerations, so
long as we have no projective definition of anharmonic ratio.
And the same dependence upon metrical Geometry appears
as regards any other projective or descriptive theorem, so long
as the traditional order of ideas is adhered to.
The true founder of non-quantitative Geometry is von
Staudt*. It was he who introduced the definition of a har-
monic range by means of the quadrilateral construction, and
who rendered it possible, by repetitions of this construction,
to give projective definitions of all rational anharmonic ra-
tios†. These definitions indicate the succession of quadrilat-
eral constructions required in order to obtain a fourth point
from three given points; thus, though they are essentially nu-
merical, they have no reference whatever to quantity. But
there remained one further step, before projective Geometry
could be considered complete, and this stepwas taken by Pieri.
InKlein’s account, it remains doubtful whether all sets of four
collinear points have an anharmonic ratio, and whether any
meaning can be assigned to irrational anharmonic ratios. For
this purpose, we require a method of generating order among
all the points of a line. For, if there be no order but that ob-
tained fromKlein’s method, there is no sense in whichwe can
regard a point not obtained by that method as the limit of a se-
ries of points which are so obtained, since the limit and the se-
*Geometrie der Lage, Nürnberg, 1847; Beiträge zur Geometrie der Lage, ib.
1856, 1857, 1860.
†This step, I believe, is due to Klein. See Math. Annalen, Vols. iv, vi,
xxxvii.
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rieswhich it limitsmust always bothbelong to someone series.
Hence therewill benowayof assigning irrational, coordinates
to the points which do not have rational coordinates. There
is, of course, no projective reason for supposing that there are
such points; but there are metrical reasons, and in any case it
is well, if possible, to be able to deal projectively with a contin-
uous space. This is effected by Pieri, with the help of certain
new axioms, but without any new indefinables. Thus at last
the long process by which projective Geometry has purified
itself from every metrical taint is completed.
407. Projective Geometry, having achieved its own inde-
pendence, has, however, embarked upon a career of foreign
aggrandisement; and in this we shall, I think, though on the
whole favourable, be obliged tomake some slight reservations.
The so-called projective theory of distance aims at proving
that metrical is merely a branch of projective Geometry, and 422
that distances aremerely logarithms of certain anharmonic ra-
tios. If this theory be correct, there is not a special subject of
metricalGeometry, and the axiomsbywhich, in the preceding
chapter, we distinguished this subject, must be consequences
of projective axioms. Let us examine themanner inwhich this
result is obtained*.
We have already seen how to assign coordinates to every
point of a line in projective space, and how to define the an-
harmonic ratio of any four points. We have seen also how to
obtain a projective from a descriptive space. In a descriptive
space, when an ideal point has a real correlative (i.e. when it
is a sheaf of lines which has a vertex), we assign to the real
point the coordinate which belongs to the ideal point consid-
*The projective theory of distance and angle is due to Cayley (Sixth
Memoir upon Quantics, 1859) and to Klein (Math. Annalen, Vols, iv, vi, vii,
xxxvii). A fuller discussion than the following will be found in my Foun-
dations of Geometry, Cambridge, 1897, §§30–38.
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ered as belonging to a projective space. In this way, the co-
ordinate Geometry of the two spaces becomes very similar,
the difference being that, in projective space, every real set of
coordinates gives a real point, whereas, in descriptive space,
this holds of each coordinate only within certain limits (both
of which limits are excluded). In what follows, therefore, re-
marks concerning projective space will apply also to descrip-
tive space except when the contrary is expressly stated.
Let us consider the anharmonic ratios of all ranges axby,
where a; b are fixed points and x; y variable points on our
line. Let α; ξ; β; η be the coordinates of these points. Then
ξ  α
ξ  β
η  α
η  β will be the anharmonic ratio of the four points,
which, since a; β are constants, may be conveniently denoted
by (ξη). If now ζ be the coordinate of any other point z, we
have
Hence
(ξη)(ηζ) = (ξζ):
log(ξη) + log(ηζ) = log(ξζ):
Thus the logarithm of the anharmonic ratio in question has
one of the essential properties of distance, namely additive-
ness. If xy; yz; xz be the distances of x; y; z taken as having sign,
we must have
xy+ yz = xz:
We have also log(ξξ) = 0 and log(ξη) =   log(ηξ), which are
two further properties of distance. From these properties (of
which the third follows from the other two) it is easy to show
that all properties of distances which have no reference to the
fixed points a; b belong to the logarithm in question. Hence,
if the distances of points from a and b can also be made, by
a suitable choice of a and b, to agree with those derived from
the logarithm, we shall be able to identify distance with this
logarithm. In this way—so it is contended—metrical Geom-
etry may be wholly brought under the projective sway; for a 423
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similar theory applies to angles between lines or planes.
408. Let us consider first the case where our projective
points are the ideal points of a descriptive space. Let x be con-
sidered fixed, and distinct from a and b. Let y be moved so
that η becomes more and more nearly equal to β. Then as η
approaches β, log(ξη)will be always finite, but will assume val-
ues exceeding any that may be assigned. This is mathemati-
cally expressed by saying that, if ξ be any number other than
α and β, then log(ξβ) is infinite. (If ξ be equal to α or β, log(ξα)
and log(ξβ) are indeterminate; this case will therefore be sup-
posed excluded in what follows.) Hence a and bmust be at an
infinite distance from every point except each other; and their
distance from each other is indeterminate. Again x and ymust
not be separated by a and b, i.e. ymust belong to the segment
axb, if wewish the distance to be real; for if ξ α and ξ βhave
the same sign, η   α and η   β must also have the same sign,
but if ξ α and ξ  β have different signs, η α and η  βmust
also have different signs; and these conditions amount to the
same as the condition that y must belong to the segment axb.
Hence ifwe insist that any two real points (i.e.pointswhich are
notmerely ideal) are to have a real distance (i.e. a distancemea-
sured by a number which is not complex or purely imaginary),
we shall require a and b to fulfil the following conditions: (1)
theymust be ideal points towhichno real ones correspond; (2)
they must be the two limits of the series of those ideal points
to which real points do correspond. These two conditions in-
clude all that has been said. For, in the first place, there is no
real distance of any point from α or β; hence α and βmust not
be coordinates of real points. In the second place, on one of
the two segments defined by a and b, there is a real distance
xy however near ξ or η may approach to α or β; hence a and
b are the limits of the ideal points to which real ones corre-
spond. In the third place, it follows from the last proposition
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that all ideal points to which real ones correspond belong to
one of the two segments ab, and all ideal points to which no
real ones correspond (except a and b themselves) belong to the
other of the two segments ab. When these conditions are sat-
isfied, the function log(ξη) will have all the properties which
are required for a measure of distance.
The above theory is only applicable to descriptive space, for
it is only there that we have a distinction between ideal and ac-
tual points. And in descriptive space we begin with an asym-
metrical transitive relation bywhich order is generated on the
straight line. Before developing a theorywhich is applicable to
pure projective space, let us examine a little further the above
theory, which may be called the descriptive theory of distance.
In the first place, the ideal points to which real ones corre-
spond,which for shortness I shall call proper points, formpart
of thewhole series of ideal points, which is closed. The proper 424
points are a semi-continuous portion of this closed series, i.e.
they have all the properties of a continuum except that of hav-
ing two ends. It may happen that there is only one ideal point
which is not proper, or it may happen that there are many. In
the former case, the one purely ideal point will be the limit of
the proper points in both directions. This is the case of Eu-
clidean space, for in Euclidean space there is only one sheaf of
lines to which a given line belongs and which has no vertex,
namely the sheaf of lines parallel to the given line. Hence in
this case the points a and bmust be taken to be identical. The
function log(ξη) is then zero for all values of ξ and η, and is
therefore useless as a measure of distance. But by a familiar
process of proceeding to the limit, we can, in this case, obtain
the value ξ   η for the distance*. This is the usual measure
of elementary Geometry; and for the distance of two points
*See e.g. Klein, Vorlesungen über nicht Euklidische Geometrie, Göttingen,
1893, Vol. i, pp. 151ff.
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in a plane or in space we should similarly obtain the usual for-
mula in this case. We see here the exact meaning of the com-
mon phrase that, in Euclidean space, +1 is the same as  1,
or that the two ends of a line coincide. The fact is, of course,
that the line has no ends, but that it determines only one ideal
point which is not proper, and that this is the limit of proper
ideal points in both directions: when it is added to the proper
ideal points, we obtain a closed continuous series of sheaves
towhich the line in question belongs. In this way, a somewhat
cryptic expression is found to have a very simple interpreta-
tion.
But it may happen also—and this is the case of hyperbolic
space—that there aremany improper ideal points on a line. In
this case, the proper ideal points will have two different lim-
its; thesewill be the sheaves of Lobatchewsky’s parallels in the
two directions. In this case, our function log(ξη) requires no
modification, but expresses distance as it stands. The ideal
points a and b are distinct, which is commonly expressed by
saying that our line has two real and distinct points at infinity.
Thus in descriptive space, in which our coordinates are
obtained by correlation with those of the derived projective
space, it is always possible to define a certain function of
our projective coordinates which will fulfil the conditions re-
quired for a measure of distance. These conditions may be
enumerated as follows†. (1) Every pair of real points is to have
a distance whose measure is real and finite, and vanishes only
when the two points coincide. (2) If x; y; z are collinear, and y
lies between x and z, the sum of the measures of xy and yz is to
be the measure of xz. (3) As the ideal point corresponding to
y approaches the ideal point which is the limit of proper ideal 425
points, while x remains fixed, the absolute value of the mea-
†Cf. Whitehead, Universal Algebra, Bk. vi, Chap. i. I confine myself in
the text to distances on one straight line.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 621
sure of xy is to grow without limit.
It may well be asked, however, why we should desire to de-
fine a function of two variable points possessing these proper-
ties. If themathematician replies that his only object is amuse-
ment, his procedure will be logically irreproachable, but ex-
tremely frivolous. He will, however, scarcely make this reply.
We have, as a matter of fact, the notion of a stretch, and, in
virtue of the general axiom that every class has some magni-
tude of divisibility, we know that the stretch has magnitude.
But we do not know, without a special assumption to that ef-
fect, that the stretch fulfils the axioms of Archimedes and of
linearity. When once these are assumed, the above properties
of the measure of distance become properties which must be-
long to the measure of stretch. But if these two axioms are
not assumed, there is no reason why there should be anymag-
nitude having a measure possessing the above four character-
istics. Thus the descriptive theory of distance, unless we re-
gard it as purely frivolous, does not dispense with the need
of the above axioms. What it does show—and this fact is ex-
tremely remarkable—is that, if stretches are numerically mea-
surable, then they are measured by a constant multiple of the
logarithmof the anharmonic ratio of the two ideal points asso-
ciated with the ends of the stretch together with the two ideal
points which limit the series of proper ideal points; or, in case
the latter pair are identical, the stretch is measured by a func-
tion obtained as the limit of the above when the said pair ap-
proach to identity and the constant factor increases without
limit. This is a most curious result, but it does not obviate
the need for the axiomswhich distinguishmetrical Geometry.
The same conclusion follows as regards metrical Geometry in
a plane or in three dimensions; but here new complications
are introduced, which are irrelevant to the present issue, and
will therefore not be discussed.
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It is important to realize that the reference to two fixed ideal
points, introduced by the descriptive theory of distance, has
no analogue in the nature of distance or stretch itself. This ref-
erence is, in fact, a convenient device, but nothing more. The
stretch, in descriptive space, is completely defined by its end-
points, and in noway requires a reference to two further ideal
points. And as descriptiveGeometry starts with the stretch, it
would be a needless complication to endeavour subsequently
to obtain a definition of stretch in terms of four points. In
short, even if we had a projective theory of distance in descrip-
tive space, this would still be not purely projective, since the
whole projective space composed of ideal elements is derived
from axioms which do not hold in projective space.
409. It remains to examine the projective theory of distance
in projective space. The theory we have hitherto examined,
since it used the distinction of real and ideal elements, was 426
descriptive, not projective; we have now to examine the cor-
responding theory for pure projective Geometry. Here there
areno ideal elements of the above sort associatedwithour line;
if, therefore, α and β be real and distinct numbers, they will be
the coordinates of real and distinct points. Hence there will
he real points x; ywhich will be separated by a and b, and will
have an imaginarymeasure of distance. To this there could be
no objection, but for the fact that we wish our measure to be
the measure of a stretch. This is the reason why it is desired
that any two real points shouldhave a realmeasure of distance.
In order to insure this result in a pure projective space, it is nec-
essary that α and β should not be the coordinates of points at
all, but should be conjugate complex numbers. It is further
necessary that the constant multiple of the logarithm should
be a pure imaginary. We then find that the distance of two real
points always has a real measure, which is an inverse cosine*.
*This is the form originally given by Cayley in the Sixth Memoir upon
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In a projective space, the condition (2) of p. 424 introduces
complications, since between has not, as in descriptive space, a
simple meaning. The definition of between in this case is dealt
with fully by MrWhitehead in hisUniversal Algebra (§206).
410. But if such a function is to be properly geometrical, and
to give a truly projective theory of distance, it will be neces-
sary to find some geometrical entity to which our conjugate
complex numbers α and β correspond. This can be done by
means of involutions. Although, in a projective space, there
areno ideal points, yet there arewhatmaybe called ideal point-
pairs. InChapter xlvwe considered involutionswith real dou-
ble points: if a; b be two points on a line, all point-pairs x; x0
such that x; x0 are harmonic conjugates with respect to a; b
form an involution. In this case, x and x0 are said to be con-
jugate; a and b are each self-conjugate, and are called the dou-
ble points of the involution. But there are also involutions
without real double points. The general definition of an in-
volution may be given as follows (substituting the relation of
x to x0 for the pair x; x0): An involution of points is a symmet-
rical one-one relation, other than identity, whose domain and
converse domain are the same straight line, and which is such
that any class of referents is projectively similar to the corre-
sponding class of relata. Such a relation is either strictly an
aliorelative, or is a self-relative as regards two and only two
points, namely the double points of the involution. For every
pair of distinct points on the line as double points there will
be one and only one involution: all point-pairs (using this ex-
pression so as to exclude the identity of the two points of the
pair) have a one-one correlation with some involutions. Thus
involutions may be called ideal point-pairs: those that corre-
spond to an actual point-pair are called hyperbolic, the others 427
Quantics. The simpler logarithmic form is due to Klein.
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elliptic. Thus an ideal point-pair is one and indivisible, being
in fact a one-one relation. Two proper ideal point-pairs have
an anharmonic ratio defined by their respective double points:
two improper ideal point-pairs, or a proper and an improper
ideal point-pair, have an analogous projective relation, which
is measured by the function obtained as above from the sup-
position that α and β are conjugate complex numbers. This
function may be called the anharmonic ratio of the two ideal
point-pairs. If one be fixed and improper, the other variable
and proper, an imaginary multiple of the logarithm of the re-
sulting anharmonic ratiohas theproperties required for amea-
sure of the distance of the actual point-pair corresponding to
the proper ideal point-pair. This gives the pure projective the-
ory of distance. But to this theory, as anything more than a
technical development, there are the same objections as in the
case of descriptive space; i.e. unless there be some magnitude
determined by every actual point-pair, there is no reason for
the process bywhichwe obtain the abovemeasure of distance;
and if there is such a magnitude, then the above process gives
merely the measure, not the definition, of the magnitude in
question. Thus stretch or distance remains a fundamental en-
tity, of which the properties are such that the above method
gives a measure of it, but not a definition*.
411. There is however another and a simpler way of intro-
ducing metrical notions into a projective space, and in this
way distance becomes a natural accompaniment of the intro-
duction of coordinates. Let p; q; r be three fixed points, abc a
line not passing through p or q or r but in the plane pqr. Let
qr pass through a, rp through b, pq through c. Let R1 be the re-
lation which holds between x and y when these are points on
abc, and xr, yq meet on ap; and let R2;R3 be similarly defined.
*On the above method of introducing imaginaries in projective Geom-
etry, see von Staudt, Beiträge zur Geometrie der Lage, i, §7.
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Then a Möbius net may be regarded as constructed by repe-
titions of the relations R1;R2;R3. We shall have, if xR1y; yR1z,
then xHayx. We can define the square root of R1, or any power
ofR1 whose index is a positive or negative power of 2. Further,
if s is any point of qr, and xR10y means that x and y are on abc
and xr, ysmeet on ap, then R1R10 = R10R1. From these proposi-
tions, which are proved by pure projectivemethods, it follows
that ifα and βbenumbers, wemaydefineR1α+β tomeanR1αR1β,
providedR1α andR1β have been already defined; whence, since
R12n can be defined if n is a positive or negative integer, all ra-
tional powers of R1 can be defined, and irrational powers can
be defined as limits. Hence, if x be any real number, positive or
negative, we can define R1x, for we may identify R1 x with R1x.
We may now take this relation R1x as the distance of any two
points between which it holds, and regard x as the measure 428
of the distance. We shall find that distances so defined have
the usual properties of Euclidean distances, except that the
distance of a fromanyother point is infinite. Thus on a projec-
tive line any two points do actually have a relation which may
be called distance, and in this sense a projective theory ofmet-
rical properties can be justified. But I do not know whether
this method can be extended to a plane or to space.
To sum up: Although the usual so-called projective the-
ory of distance, both in descriptive and in projective space, is
purely technical, yet such spaces do necessarily possess met-
rical properties, which can be defined and deduced without
new indefinables or indemonstrables. But metrical Geometry,
as an independent subject, requires the new idea of themagni-
tude of divisibility of a series, which is indefinable, and does
not belong, properly speaking, to puremathematics. This idea
is applied to stretches, angles, areas, etc., and it is assumed that
all the magnitudes dealt with obey the axioms of Archimedes
and linearity. Without these axioms, many of the usual metri-
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cal propositions cannot be proved in the usual metrical man-
ner; with these axioms, the usual kind of elementary Geom-
etry becomes possible, and such results as the uniqueness of
the quadrilateral construction can be provedwithout three di-
mensions. Thus there is a genuinely distinct science of met-
rical Geometry, but, since it introduces a new indefinable, it
does not belong to puremathematics in the sense in whichwe
have used the word in this work. It does not, as is often sup-
posed, require distances and angles as new relations between
points or lines or planes, but stretches and magnitudes of di-
visibility suffice throughout. On the other hand, projective
and descriptive Geometry are both independent of all metri-
cal assumptions, and allow the development of metrical prop-
erties out of themselves; hence, since these subjects belong to
puremathematics, the puremathematician should adopt their
theory of metrical matters. There is, it is true, another met-
rical Geometry, which does work with distances, defined as
one-one relations having certain properties, and this subject
is part of pure mathematics; but it is terribly complicated, and
requires a bewildering number of axioms. Hence the deduc-
tion of metrical properties from the definition of a projective
or descriptive space has real importance, and, in spite of ap-
pearances to the contrary, it affords, from the point of view of
pure mathematics, a genuine simplification and unification of
method.
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chapter xlix
DEFINITIONSOFVARIOUS
SPACES
412. In the preceding discussions of different Geometries, 429
I have usually, for the sake of convenience, adhered to the
distinction between definitions and indefinables on the one
hand, and axioms or postulates on the other. But this distinc-
tion, in pure mathematics, has no validity except as regards
the ideas and propositions of Logic. In pure mathematics, all
the propositions state logical implications containing a vari-
able. This is, in fact, the definition, or part of the definition, of
pure mathematics. The implications stated must flow wholly
from the propositions of Logic, which are prior to those of
other branches of mathematics. Logic and the rest of pure
mathematics are distinguished from applied mathematics by
the fact that, in it, all the constants are definable in terms of
some eight fundamental notions, which we agreed to call log-
ical constants. What distinguishes other branches of mathe-
matics fromLogic ismerely complication, which usually takes
the form of a hypothesis that the variable belongs to some
rather complicated class. Such a class will usually be denoted
by a single symbol; and the statement that the class in question
is to be represented by such and such a symbol is what math-
ematicians call a definition. That is to say, a definition is no
part of mathematics at all, and does not make any statement
concerning the entities dealt with by mathematics, but is sim-
ply and solely a statement of a symbolic abbreviation: it is a
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proposition concerning symbols, not concerning what is sym-
bolized. I do notmean, of course, to affirm that theword defini-
tion has no other meaning, but only that this is its true mathe-
maticalmeaning. Allmathematics is built up by combinations
of a certain number of primitive ideas, and all its propositions
can, but for the length of the resulting formulae, be explicitly
stated in terms of these primitive ideas; hence all definitions
are theoretically superfluous. But further, when Logic is ex-
tended, as it should be, so as to include the general theory of
relations, there are, I believe, no primitive ideas in mathemat-
ics except such as belong to the domain of Logic. In the pre-
vious chapters of this Part, I have spoken, as most authors do,
of certain indefinables in Geometry. But this was a conces- 430
sion, andmustnowbe rectified. Inmathematics, twoclassesof
entities which have internal relations of the same logical type
are equivalent. Hence we are never dealing with one particu-
lar class of entities, but with a whole class of classes, namely,
with all classes having internal relations of some specified type.
And by the type of a relation I mean its purely logical proper-
ties, such as are denoted by thewords one-one, transitive, sym-
metrical, and so on. Thus for example we defined the class of
classes called progressionby certain logical characteristics of the
internal relations of terms of any class which is a progression,
and we found that finite Arithmetic, in so far as it deals with
numbers, and not with the terms or classes of which numbers
can be asserted, applies equally to all progressions. Andwhen
it is realized that all mathematical ideas, except those of Logic,
can be defined, it is seen also that there are no primitive propo-
sitions in mathematics except those of Logic. The so-called
axioms of Geometry, for example, when Geometry is consid-
ered as a branch of pure mathematics, are merely the protasis
in thehypotheticalswhich constitute the science. Theywould
be primitive propositions if, as in applied mathematics, they
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were themselves asserted; but so long as we only assert hypo-
theticals (i.e. propositions of the form “A implies B”) in which
the supposed axioms appear as protasis, there is no reason to
assert the protasis, nor, consequently, to admit genuine ax-
ioms. My object in the present chapter is to execute the purely
formal task imposed by these considerations, and to set forth
the strict definitions of various spaces, from which, without
indefinables and without primitive propositions, the various
Geometries will follow. I shall content myself with the defini-
tion of some of the more important spaces, since my object is
chiefly to show that such definitions are possible.
413. (1) Projective Space of three dimensions. A projective space
of three dimensions is any class of entities such that there
are at least two members of the class; between any two dis-
tinct members there is one and only one symmetrical aliorela-
tive, which is connected, and is transitive so far as its being
an aliorelative will permit, and has further properties to be
enumerated shortly; whatever such aliorelative may be taken,
there is a termof theprojective spacenot belonging to the field
of the said aliorelative, which field is wholly contained in the
projective space, and is called, for shortness, a straight line, and
is denoted by ab, if a; b be any two of its terms; every straight
linewhich contains two terms contains at least oneother term;
if a; b; c be any three terms of the projective space, such that c
does not belong to the class ab, then there is at least one term
of the projective space not belonging to any class cx, where x
is any term of ab; under the same circumstances, if a0 be a term
of bc, b0 a term of ac, the classes aa0, bb0 have a common part;
if d be any term, other than a and b, of the class ab, and u; v
any two terms such that d belongs to the class uv, but neither 431
u nor v belongs to the class ab, and if y be the only term of
the common part of au and bv, z the only term of the common
part of av and bu, x the only termof the commonpart of yz and
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 630
ab, then x is not identical with d (under these circumstances it
may be proved that the term x is independent of u and v, and
is uniquely determined by a; b; d; hence x and d have a sym-
metrical one-one relation which may be denoted, for brevity,
by xHabd; if y; e be two further terms of the projective space,
belonging to the class xd, and such that there are two terms
g; h of the class xd for which we have gHxdh and gHyeh, then we
write for shortness yQxde to express this relation of the four
terms x; d; y; e); a projective space is such that the relationQxd,
whatever terms of the space x and dmay be, is transitive; also
that, if a; b; c; d be any four distinct terms of one straight line,
two and only two of the propositions aQbcd, aQbdc, aQcdbwill
hold; from these properties of projective space it results that
the terms of a line form a series; this series is continuous in the
sense defined in §277; finally, if a; b; c; d; e be any five terms of
a projective space, there will be in the class ae at least one term
x, and in the class cd at least one term y, such that x belongs to
the class by.
This is a formal definition of a projective space of three di-
mensions. Whatever class of entities fulfils this definition is
a projective space. I have enclosed in brackets a passage in
which no new properties of projective space are introduced,
which serves only the purpose of convenience of language.
There is awhole class of projective spaces, and this class has an
infinite number of members. The existence-theorem may be
proved to begin with, by constructing a projective space out
of complex numbers in the purely arithmetical sense defined
in §360. We then know that the class of projective spaces has
at least four members, since we know of four sub-classes con-
tained under it, each of which has at least one member. In
the first place, we have the above arithmetical space. In the
second place, we have the projective space of descriptive Ge-
ometry, in which the terms of the projective space are sheaves
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of lines in the descriptive space. In the third place, we have
the polar form of elliptic space, which is distinguished by the
addition of certainmetrical properties of stretches, consistent
with, but not implied by, the definition of projective space; in
the fourth place, we have the antipodal form of elliptic Geom-
etry, in which the terms of the projective space are pairs of
terms of the said elliptic space. And anynumber of varieties of
projective space may be obtained by adding properties not in-
consistent with the definition—for example, by insisting that
all planes are to be red or blue. In fact, every class of 2α0 terms
(i.e. of the number of terms in a continuous series) is a projec-
tive space; forwhen two classes are similar, if one is the field of
a certain relation, the other will be the field of a like relation.
Hence by correlation with a projective space, any class of 2α0
terms becomes itself a projective space. The fact is, that the 432
standpoint of line-Geometry is more fundamental where def-
inition is concerned: a projective space would be best defined
as a class K of relations whose fields are straight lines satisfy-
ing the above conditions. This point is strictly analogous to
the substitution of serial relations for series which we found
desirable in Part IV. When a set of terms are to be regarded
as the field of a class of relations, it is convenient to drop the
terms and mention only the class of relations, since the latter
involve the former, but not the former the latter.
It is important to observe that the definition of a space, as of
most other entities of a certain complexity, is arbitrary within
certain limits. For if therebe anypropertywhich implies and is
impliedbyoneormore of the properties used in thedefinition,
wemaymake a substitution of thenewproperty in place of the
one or more in question. For example, in place of defining the
line by a relation between points, it is possible to define the
line as a class having a certain relation to a couple of points.
In such cases, we can only be guided by motives of simplicity.
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It seems scarcely necessary to give a formal definition of de-
scriptive or metrical space, since the above model serves to
show how such a definition might be constructed. I shall in-
stead give a definition of Euclidean space. This I shall give in
a form which is inappropriate when Euclidean space is con-
sidered as the limit of certain non-Euclidean spaces, but is
very appropriate to quaternions and the vectorCalculus. This
form has been adopted by Peano*, and leads to a very simple
account of the Euclidean axioms. I shall not strictly follow
Peano, but my account will be very similar to his.
414. (2)Euclidean space of three dimensions. AEuclidean space
of three dimensions is a class of terms containing at least two
members, and such that any two of them have one and only
one asymmetrical one-one relation of a class, which will be
called the class of vectors, defined by the following character-
istics†: the converse of a vector, or the relative product of two
vectors, is a vector; if a given vector holds between a and b, c
and d, then the vectorwhich holds between a and c is the same
as that which holds between b and d; any term of the space has
any assigned relation of the class to at least one term of the
space; if the nth power (where n is any integer) of any vector
of the class is identity, then the vector itself is identity; there
is a vector whose nth power is a given vector; any two vectors
have one and only one symmetrical relation of a certain class
having the following properties: the relation of any two vec-
tors is measured by a real number, positive or negative, and is
such that the relation of a vector to itself is always measured 433
*“Analisi della Teoria dei vettori,” Turin, 1898 (Accademia Reale delle
Scienze di Torino).
†For the convenience of the reader, itmaybewell to observe that this re-
lation corresponds to that of having a given distance in a given direction—
direction being taken in the sense in which all parallel lines have the same
direction.
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by a positive number, and that the measure of the relation of
the relative product of two vectors to a third vector is the sum
of the measures of their several relations to the third vector;
there is a vector satisfying the definition of an irrational power
of a vector given below; there are vectors which are not rela-
tive products of powers of two given vectors; if i; j; k be three
vectors, no one of which is a relative product of powers of one
or both of the others, then all vectors are relative products of
powers of i; j; k.
The only points calling for explanation here are the notion
of an irrational power of a vector and the measurable relation
of two vectors. All rational powers are definite; for every vec-
tor has an nth root, and the nth root has anmth power, which
is the m=nth power of the original vector. But it does not fol-
low that real powers which are not rational can be defined.
The definition of limits of classes of vectors given by Peano* is,
when translated into relational language, the following. Let u
be a class of real numbers, x0 a number belonging to the deriva-
tive of u. Let some one-one relation subsist between all u’s
and some or all vectors; and let v be the class of vectors cor-
relative to u. Then the vector a is said to be the limit of the
class v as x approaches x0 in the class u, when the limit of the
measure of the relation to itself of the vector which, multi-
plied relatively into a, will give the correlate to x in the class
v, is zero. The point of this definition is the use of the order
obtained among vectors by means of the measurable relation
which each has to itself. Thus suppose we have a progression
x1; x2; : : : xn; : : : of rational numbers, and suppose these to be
respectively themeasures of the relations to themselves of the
vectors a1; a2; : : : an; : : :Then if xbe the limit of x1; x2; : : : xn; : : :,
there is to be a vector whose relation to itself is measured by
x, and this is to be the limit of the vectors a1; a2; : : : an; : : :; and
*Op. cit. p. 22.
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thus irrational powers of a vector becomedefinable. The other
point to be examined is the measurable relation between two
vectors. This relation measures, in terms of elementary Ge-
ometry, the product of the two stretches represented by the
vectors into the cosine of the angle between them; it is, in the
language of the calculus of extension, the internal product of
the twovectors. To say that the relation ismeasurable in terms
of real numbers means, in the sense in which this statement is
employed, that all such relations have a one-one relation to
some or all of the real numbers; hence, from the existence of
irrational powers, it follows that all such relations form a con-
tinuous series; to say that the relation of a vector to itself is
always measured by a positive number means that there ex-
ists a section (in Dedekind’s sense) of the continuous series
of relations, such that all those relations that vectors can have
to themselves appear on one side of the section; while it can 434
be proved that the relation which defines the section is that
which the vector identity has to itself.
This definition is, of course, by no means the only one
which can be given of Euclidean space, but it is, I think, the
simplest. For this reason, and also because it belongs to an
order of ideas which, being essentially Euclidean, is foreign
to the methods of previous chapters, I have thought it worth
while to insert it here.
415. As another example which may serve to enlarge our
ideas, I shall take the space invented by Clifford, or rather the
space which is formally analogous to his surface of zero curva-
ture and finite extent*. I shall first briefly explain the nature
of this space, and then proceed to a formal definition. Spaces
of the type in question may have any number of dimensions,
*On the general subject of the spaces ofwhich this is the simplest exam-
ple, see Klein, Math. Annalen xxxvii, pp. 554–565, and Killing, Grundlagen
der Geometrie, Vol. i, Chap. iv.
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but for the sake of simplicity I shall confine myself to two di-
mensions. In this space, most of the usual Euclidean proper-
ties hold as regards figures not exceeding a certain size; that
is to say, the sum of the angles of a triangle is two right an-
gles, and there are motions, which may be called translations,
in which all points travel along straight lines. But in other re-
spects, the space is very different from Euclidean space. To
begin with, the straight line is a closed series, and the whole
space has a finite area. In the second place, every motion is a
translation; a circular transformation (i.e. onewhich preserves
distances from a certain fixed point unaltered) is never a mo-
tion, i.e. never leaves every distance unaltered; but all transla-
tions can, as in Euclidean space, be compounded out of trans-
lations in two fixed directions. In this space, as in Euclid, we
have parallels, i.e. straight lines which remain at a constant
distance apart, and can be simultaneously described in a mo-
tion; also straight lines can be represented by linear equations.
But the formula for distance is quite unlike the Euclidean for-
mula. Thus if πk be the length of the whole straight line, and
(x; y); (x0; y0) be the coordinates of any two points (choosing a
system in which the straight line has a linear equation), then
if ω be the angle between the lines x = 0; y = 0, the distance
of the two points in question is d, where
cos dk= cos(x  x0)  cos(y  y0)  cosω sin(x  x0) sin(y  y0),
and the formula for the angle between two lines is similarly
complicated. We may, in order to lead to these results, set up
the following definition.
(3)Clifford’s space of two dimensions. AClifford’s space of two
dimensions is a class of at least two terms, between any two
of which there are two relations of different classes, called re-
spectively distance and direction, and possessing the follow- 435
ing properties: a direction is a symmetrical aliorelative, transi-
tive so far as its being an aliorelative will permit, but not con-
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nected; a termof the space togetherwith all the terms towhich
the said term has a given relation of direction form what is
called a straight line; no straight line contains all the terms of
the space; every term of the space has any assigned relation of
direction to some but not all other terms of the space; no pair
of terms has more than one relation of direction; distances are
a class of symmetrical relations forming a continuous series,
having two ends, one of which is identity; all distances except
identity are intransitive aliorelatives; every term of the space
has any assigned relation of distance to some but not all of the
terms of the space; any given term of the space has any given
distance and direction from two and only two other terms of
the space, unless the given distance be either end of the se-
ries of distances; in this case, if the given distance be iden-
tity, there is no term having this distance and also the given
direction from the given term, but if the distance be the other
end of the series, there is one and only one term having the
given distance and the given direction from the given term;
distances in one straight line have the properties, mentioned
in Chapter xlvii, required for generating an order among the
terms of one straight line; the only motions, i.e. one-one rela-
tions whose domain and converse domain are each the space
in question andwhich leave all distances among the relata the
same as those among the corresponding referents, are such as
consist in combining a given distance, a given direction, and
one of the two senses of the series constituting a straight line;
and every such combination is equivalent to the relative prod-
uct of somedistance in one fixed directionwith somedistance
in another fixed direction, both taken with a suitable sense; fi-
nally all possible directions form a single closed continuous
series in virtue of mutual relations.
This completes, I think, the definition of a Clifford’s space
of two dimensions. It is to be observed that, in this space, dis-
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tance cannot be identified with stretch, because (1) we have
only two dimensions, so that we cannot generate a closed se-
ries of terms on a line bymeans of projectivemethods*, (2) the
line is to be closed, so that we cannot generate order on the
straight line by the descriptivemethod. It is for similar reasons
that both directions and distances have to be taken as symmet-
rical relations; thus it is only after an order has been generated
on a line that we can distinguish two senses, which may be
associated with direction to render it asymmetrical, and with
distances in a given direction to give them signs. It is impor-
tant to observe that, when distance is taken as independent 436
of the straight line, it becomes necessary, in order to distin-
guish different spaces, to assign some property or properties
of the one-one relations or transformations which leave dis-
tances unchanged. This method has been adopted by Lie in
applying to Geometry the theory of continuous groups*, and
has produced, in his hands and those of Klein, results of the
greatest interest to non-Euclidean Geometry. But since, in
most spaces, it is unnecessary to take distance as indefinable, I
have been able, except in this instance of Clifford’s space†, to
adopt a simpler method of specifying spaces. For this reason,
it was important to consider briefly some such space as Clif-
ford’s, in order to give an instance of the use of distance, and
of what geometers call motion, in the definition of a space.
Enough has now been said, I hope, to show that the defi-
nition of a kind of space is always possible in purely logical
*MrW.E. Johnson has pointed out to me that this difficulty might be
overcome by introducing the uniqueness of the quadrilateral construction
by a special axiom—a method which would perhaps be simpler than the
above.
*Leipziger Berichte, 1890.
†If I had defined an elliptic space of two dimensions, I should have had
to take distance as distinct from stretch, because the projective generation
of order fails in two dimensions.
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terms, and that new indefinables are not required. Not only
are the actual terms composing a space irrelevant, and only
their relations important, but even the relationsdonot require
individual determination, but only specification as members
of certain logical classes of relations. These logical classes are
the elements used in geometrical definitions, and these are de-
finable in terms of the small collection of indefinables out of
which the logical calculus (including that of relations) is built
up. This result, which holds throughout pure mathematics,
was the principal object of the present chapter.
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chapter l
THECONTINUITYOF SPACE
416. It has been commonly supposed by philosophers that 437
the continuity of space was something incapable of further
analysis, to be regarded as a mystery, not critically inspected
by the profane intellect. In Part V, I asserted that Cantor’s
continuity is all that we require in dealing with space. In the
present chapter, I wish to make good this assertion, in so far
as is possible without raising the question of absolute and rel-
ative position, which I reserve for the next chapter.
Let us begin with the continuity of projective space. We
have seen that thepoints of descriptive space are ordinally sim-
ilar to thoseof a semi-continuousportionof a projective space,
namely to the ideal pointswhich have real correlatives. Hence
the continuity of descriptive space is of the same kind as that
of projective space, and need not, therefore, be separately con-
sidered. But metrical space will require a new discussion.
It is to be observed thatGeometries, as they are treated now-
a-days, do not begin by assuming spaces with an infinite num-
ber of points; in fact, space is, as Peano remarks*, a word with
which Geometry can very easily dispense. Geometries begin
by assuming a class-concept point, together with certain ax-
ioms from which conclusions can be drawn as to the number
of points. So, in projective Geometry, we begin with the as-
*Riv. di Mat.Vol. iv, p. 52.
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sumption that there are at least two points, and that any two
points determine a class of points, the straight line, to which
they and at least one other point belong. Hence we have three
points. We now introduce the new assumption that there is at
least one point not on any given straight line. This gives us a
fourth point, and since there must be points on the lines join-
ing it to our previous points, we obtain three more points—
seven in all. Hence we can obtain an infinite denumerable
series of points and lines, but we cannot, without a further
assumption, prove that there are more than three points on
any one line. Four points on a line result from the assump-
tion that, if b and d be harmonic with respect to a and c, then 438
b and d are distinct. But in order to obtain an infinite num-
ber of points on a line, we need the further assumptions from
which the projective order results*. These assumptions neces-
sitate a denumerable series of points on our line. With these,
if we chose, we might be content. Such a series of points is
obtained by successive quadrilateral constructions; and if we
chose todefine a space inwhich all points ona line couldbeob-
tained by successive quadrilateral constructions starting with
any three points of the line, no contradiction would emerge.
Such a space would have the ordinal type of the positive ra-
tionals and zero: the points on a line would form a compact
denumerable series with one end. The extension, introduced
by assuming that the series of points is continuous, is only
necessary if our projective space is to possess the usual met-
rical properties—if, that is to say, there is to be a stretch, with
one end and its straight line given, which is to be equal to any
given stretch. With only rational points, this property (which
is Euclid’s postulate of the existence of the circle) cannot hold
universally. But for pure projective purposes, it is irrelevant
*Cf. Pieri, op. cit. §6, Prop. 1.
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whether our space possesses or does not possess this property.
The axiom of continuity itself may be stated in either of the
two following forms. (1) All points on a line are limits of series
of rational points, and all infinite series of rational points have
limits; (2) if all points of a line be divided into two classes, of
which onewholly precedes the other, then either the first class
has a last term, or the last has a first term, but both do not hap-
pen. In the first of these ways, the continuity which results
is exactly Cantor’s, but the second, which is Dedekind’s defi-
nition, is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for Cantor’s
continuity. Adopting this first definition, the rational points,
omitting their first term, form an endless compact denumer-
able series; all points form a perfect series; and between any
two points there is a rational point, which is precisely the or-
dinal definition of continuity†. Thus if a projective space is
to have continuity at all, it must have the kind of continuity
which belongs to the real numbers.
417. Let us consider next the continuity of a metrical space;
and, for the sake of definiteness, let us take Euclidean space.
The question is here more difficult, for continuity is not usu-
ally introduced by an axiom ad hoc, but appears to result, in
some sense, from the axiomsofdistance. Itwas alreadyknown
to Plato that not all lengths are commensurable, and a strict
proof of this fact is contained in the tenth book of Euclid. But
this does not take us very far in the direction of Cantor’s con-
tinuity. The gist of the assertion that not all lengths are com-
mensurable, together with the postulate of the circle, may be
expressed as follows. IfAB;AChe two lengths along the same
straight line, it may happen that, ifAB be divided intom equal 439
parts, and AC into n equal parts, then, however m and nmay
be chosen, one of the parts of AB will not be equal to one of
†See Part V, Chap. xxxvi.
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the parts ofAC, but will be greater for some values ofm and n,
and less for others; also lengths equal to either may be taken
along any given line and with any given end-points*. But this
fact by nomeans proves that the points on a line are not denu-
merable, since all algebraic numbers are denumerable. Let us
see, then, what our axioms allow us to infer.
In Greek Geometry there were two great sources of irra-
tionals, namely, the diagonal of a square and the circumfer-
ence of a circle. But there could be no knowledge that these
are irrationals of different kinds, the one being measured by
an algebraic number, the other by a transcendent number. No
generalmethodwas known for constructing any assigned alge-
braic number†, still less for constructing an assigned transcen-
dent number. And so far as I know, such methods, except by
means of limits, are still wanting. Some algebraic and some
transcendent numbers can be constructed geometrically with-
out the use of limits, but the constructions are isolated, and
do not follow any general plan. Hence, for the present, it can-
not be inferred from Euclid’s axioms that space has continu-
ity in Cantor’s sense, or that the points of space are not denu-
merable. Since the introduction of analytic Geometry, some
equivalent assumption has been always tacitly made. For ex-
ample, it has been assumed that any equationwhich is satisfied
by real values of the variables will represent a figure in space;
and it seems even to be universally supposed that to every set
of real Cartesian coordinates a point must correspond. These
assumptions were made, until quite recent times, without any
discussion at all, and apparently without any consciousness
*A length is not synonymouswith a segment, since a length is regarded
as essentially terminated. But a length is, for present purposes, synony-
mous with a stretch or a distance.
†For shortness, I shall identify numbers with the lengths which they
measure.
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that they were assumptions.
When once these assumptions are recognized as such, it
becomes apparent that, here as in projective space, continu-
ity must be introduced by an axiom ad hoc. But as against
the philosophers, we may make the following remark. Can-
tor’s continuity is indubitably sufficient to satisfy all metrical
axioms, and the only question is, whether existent space need
have continuity of so high an order. In any case, if measure-
ment is to be theoretically possible, space must not have a
greater continuity than that of the real numbers.
The axiom that the points on a line form a continuous se-
ries may be put in the form which results from amending
Dedekind, or in the form that a line is a perfect series. In
the first form, every section of the line is definable by a single
point, which is at one end of one of the parts produced by the
section, while the other part has no end. In the second form, 440
which is preferable because, unlike the first, it completely de-
fines the ordinal type, every infinite series of points has a limit,
and every point is a limiting point. It is not necessary to add
that the line has cohesion*, for this results from the axioms of
Archimedes and of linearity, which are in any case essential
to measurement. Whether the axiom of continuity be true as
regards our actual space, is a question which I see no means
of deciding. For any such question must be empirical, and it
wouldbequite impossible todistinguish empiricallywhatmay
be called a rational space from a continuous space. But in any
case there is no reason to think that space has a higher power
than that of the continuum.
418. The axiom of continuity enables us to dispense with
the postulate of the circle, and to substitute for it the follow-
ing pair. (1) On any straight line there is a point whose dis-
*See Part V, Chap. xxxv.
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tance from a given point on the line is less than a given dis-
tance. (2) On any straight line there is a point whose distance
from a given point on or off the line is greater than a given dis-
tance. From these two assumptions, together with continuity,
the existence of the circle can be proved. Since it is not possi-
ble, conversely, to deduce continuity from the circle, and since
much of analytic Geometry might be false in a discontinuous
space, it seems a distinct advance to banish the circle from our
initial assumptions, and substitute continuity with the above
pair of axioms.
419. There is thus nomystery in the continuity of space, and
no need of any notions not definable in Arithmetic. There is,
however, among most philosophers, a notion that, in space,
the whole is prior to the parts†; that although every length,
area, or volume can be divided into lengths, areas, or volumes,
yet there are no indivisibles of which such entities are com-
posed. According to this view, points are mere fictions, and
only volumes are genuine entities. Volumes are not to be re-
garded as classes of points, but as wholes containing parts
which are never simple. Some such view as this is, indeed, of-
ten put forward as giving the very essence of what should be
called continuity. This question is distinct from the question
of absolute and relative position, which I shall discuss in the
following chapter; For, if we regard position as relative, our
present question will arise again concerning continuous por-
tions of matter. This present question is, in fact, essentially
concerned with continuity, and may therefore be appropri-
ately discussed here.
The series which arise in Arithmetic, whether continuous
or not, are essentially composed of terms—integers, rationals,
real numbers, etc. And where we come near to the continuity
†Cf. Leibniz, Phil. Werke (Gerhardt), ii, p. 379; iv, p. 491; also my Philoso-
phy of Leibniz, Chap. ix.
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of space, as in the case of the real numbers, each real number
is a segment or infinite class of rationals, and no denial that a 441
segment is composed of elements is possible. In this case, we
start from the elements and gradually construct various infi-
nite wholes. But in the case of space, we are told, it is infinite
wholes that are given to begin with; the elements are only in-
ferred, and the inference, we are assured, is very rash. This
question is in themain one of Logic. Let us see how the above
view is supported.
Those who deny indivisible points as constituents of space
have had, in the past, two lines of argument by which tomain-
tain their denial. They had the difficulties of continuity and
infinity, and they had the way in which space is presented in
what, according to their school, they called intuition or sensa-
tion or perception. The difficulties of continuity and infinity,
as we saw in Part V, are a thing of the past; hence this line of
argument is no longer open to those who deny points. As re-
gards the other argument, it is extremely difficult to give it a
precise form—indeed I suspect that it is impossible. We may
take it as agreed that everything spatial, of whose existencewe
become immediately aware in sensation or intuition, is com-
plex and divisible. Thus the empirical premiss, in the investi-
gation of space, is the existence of divisible entities with cer-
tain properties. But here it may be well to make a little digres-
sion into the meaning of an empirical premiss.
420. An empirical premiss is a proposition which, for some
reason or for no reason, I believe, and which, we may add, is
existential. Having agreed to accept this proposition, we shall
usually find, on examination, that it is complex, and that there
are one ormore sets of simpler propositions fromwhich itmay
be deduced. If P be the empirical premiss, letA be the class of
sets of propositions (in their simplest form) fromwhich Pmay
be deduced; and let twomembers of the classA be considered
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equivalent when they imply one another. From the truth of
P we infer the truth of one set of the class A. If A has only
onemember, that member must be true. But if there are many
members of the class A, not all equivalent, we endeavour to
find some other empirical premiss P0, implied by all sets of sim-
ple propositions of the class A0. If now it should happen that
the classesA andA0 have only one commonmember, and the
other members ofA are inconsistent with the other members
of A0, the common member must be true. If not, we seek a
new empirical premiss P00, and so on. This is the essence of in-
duction*. The empirical premiss is not in any essential sense a
premiss, but is a proposition which we wish our deduction to
arrive at. In choosing the premisses of our deduction, we are
only guided by logical simplicity and the deducibility of our
empirical premiss.
421. Applying these remarks to Geometry, we see that the
common desire for self-evident axioms is entirely mistaken.
This desire is due to the belief that theGeometry of our actual 442
space is an à priori science, based on intuition. If this were the
case, it would be properly deducible from self-evident axioms,
as Kant believed. But if we place it along with other sciences
concerning what exists, as an empirical study based upon ob-
servation, we see that all that can be legitimately demanded
is that observed facts should follow from our premisses, and,
if possible, from no set of premisses not equivalent to those
which we assume. No one objects to the law of gravitation
as being not self-evident, and similarly, when Geometry is
taken as empirical, no one can legitimately object to the ax-
iom of parallels—except, of course, on the ground that, like
the law of gravitation, it need only be approximately true in
order to yield observed facts. It cannot be maintained that no
premisses except those of Euclidean Geometry will yield ob-
*Cf. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, Paris, 1901, p. 270.
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served results; but others which are permissible must closely
approximate to theEuclideanpremisses. And so it iswith con-
tinuity: we cannot prove that our actual spacemust be contin-
uous, but we cannot prove that it is not so, and we can prove
that a continuous space would not differ in any discoverable
manner from that in which we live.
422. To return from this digression: we agreed that the
empirical premisses, as regards the continuity of space, are
concerned always with divisible entities which have divisible
parts. The question before us is whether we are to infer from
this that the logical premisses for the science of existing space
(i.e. the definition of existing space)may ormust be concerned
with divisible entities. The question whether our premisses
must be concerned with divisible entities is fully answered, in
the negative, by actual Geometry, where, by means of indivis-
ible points, a space empirically indistinguishable from that in
which we live is constructed. The only reasons hitherto al-
leged by philosophers against regarding this answer as satis-
factory, are either such as were derived from the difficulties of
infinity and continuity, or such as were based upon a certain
logical theory of relations. The former have been already dis-
proved; the latter will be discussed in the next chapter. The
questionwhether our premisses may be concernedwith divis-
ible entities is far more difficult, and can be answered only by
means of the logical discussions of Part II. Whatever is com-
plex, we then decided (§143), must be composed of simple ele-
ments; and this conclusion carries us a long way towards the
decision of our present question. But it does not quite end
our doubts. We distinguished, in Part II, two kinds of wholes,
namely aggregates and unities. The former may be identified,
at any rate for present purposes, with classes, while the lat-
ter seem to be indistinguishable from propositions. Aggre-
gates consist of units from whose addition (in the sense pre-
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supposed in Arithmetic) they result; unities, on the contrary,
are not reconstituted by the addition of their constituents. In
all unities, one term at least is either a predicated predicate or
a relating relation; in aggregates, there is no such term. Now 443
what is reallymaintained by thosewho deny that space is com-
posed of points is, I imagine, the view that space is a unity,
whose constituents do not reconstitute it. I do not mean to
say that this view is consciously held by all who make the de-
nial in question, but that it seems the only viewwhich renders
the said denial reasonable.
Before discussing this opinion, it is necessary to make a dis-
tinction. An aggregate may be an aggregate of unities, and
need by no means be an aggregate of simple terms. The ques-
tion whether a space is an aggregate of unities or of simple
terms is mathematically, though not philosophically, irrele-
vant; the difference of the two cases is illustrated by the dif-
ference between an independent projective space and the pro-
jective space defined in terms of the elements of a descriptive
space. For the present, I do notwish to discusswhether points
are unities or simple terms, but whether space is or is not an
aggregate of points.
This question is one in which confusions are very liable to
occur, and have, I think, actually occurred among those who
have denied that a space is an aggregate. Relations are, of
course, quite essential to a space, and this has led to the belief
that a space is, not only its terms, but also the relations relat-
ing them. Here, however, it is easy to see that, if a space be
the field of a certain class of relations, then a space is an aggre-
gate; and if relations are essential to the definition of a space,
there must be some class of relations having a field which is
the space. The relations essential to Geometry will not hold
between two spatially divisible terms: there is no straight line
joining two volumes, and no distance between two surfaces.
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Thus, if a space is to be defined by means of a class of rela-
tions, it does not follow, as is suggested, that a space is a unity,
but rather, on the contrary, that it is an aggregate, namely the
field of the said class of relations. And against any viewwhich
starts from volumes or surfaces, or indeed anything except
points and straight lines, we may urge, with Peano*, that the
distinction between curves, surfaces, and volumes, is only to
be effected by means of the straight line, and requires, even
then, the most elaborate developments†. There is, therefore,
nopossibility of anydefiniteGeometrywithout points, no log-
ical reason against points, and strong logical reasons in their
favour. We may therefore take it as proved that, if we are to
construct any self-consistent theory of space, we must hold
space to be an aggregate of points, and not a unity which is
indefinable as a class. Space is, in fact, essentially a class, since
it cannot be defined by enumeration of its terms, but only by
means of its relation to the class-concept point. Space is noth-
ing but the extension of the concept point, as the British army 444
is the extension of the concept British soldier; only, since the
number of points is infinite, Geometry is unable to imitate the
Army-List by the issue of a Space-List.
Space, then, is composedof points; and if analyticalGeome-
try is to be possible, the number of pointsmust be either equal
to, or less than, the number of the continuum. If the number
be less, some propositions of the accepted Geometry will be
false; but a space in which the number of points is equal to
thenumber of finite numbers, and inwhich thepoints of a line
form a series ordinally similar to the rationals, will, with suit-
*Riv. di Mat. iv, p. 53.
†Cf. Peano, “Sur une courbe qui remplit toute une aire plane,” Math.
Annalen, xxxvi, where it is shown that a continuous curve can be made to
pass through all the points of the area of a square, or, for thatmatter, of the
volume of a cube.
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able axioms, be empirically indistinguishable from a continu-
ous space, andmay be actual. ThusArithmetic, as enlarged by
Cantor, is undoubtedly adequate to deal with Geometry; the
only question is, whether the more elaborate parts of its ma-
chinery are required. It is in number that we become certain
of the continuum; among actual existents, so far as present ev-
idence shows, continuity is possible, but cannot be rendered
certain and indubitable.
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chapter li
LOGICALARGUMENTS
AGAINST POINTS
423. It has been an almost universal opinion amongphiloso- 445
phers, ever since the time of Leibniz, that a space composed
of points is logically impossible. It is maintained that the spa-
tial relations with which we have been concerned do not hold
between spatial points, which essentially and timelessly have
the relationswhich they do have, but betweenmaterial points,
which are capable of motion, i.e. of a change in their spatial re-
lations. This is called the theory of relative position, whereas
the theory of spatial points is called the theory of absolute
position. Those who advocate relative position usually also
maintain that matter and spatial relations, on account of cer-
tain contradictions supposed to be found in them, are not real,
but belong only to the world of appearance. This is, however,
a further point, whichneednot be explicitly discussed inwhat
follows. Apart from this point, the issue between the absolute
and relative theories may be stated as follows: The absolute
theory holds that there are true propositions in which spatial
relations are asserted to hold timelessly between certain terms,
whichmay be called spatial points; the relational theory holds
that every true proposition asserting a spatial relation involves
a time at which this relation holds between its terms, so that
the simplest spatial propositions assert triangular relations of
a time and two terms, which may be called material points.
The question as to which of these two theories applies to
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the actual world is, like all questions concerning the actual
world, in itself irrelevant to pure mathematics*. But the ar-
gument against absolute position usually takes the form of
maintaining that a space composed of points is logically inad-
missible, and hence issues are raised which a philosophy of
mathematics must discuss. In what follows, I am concerned
only with the question: Is a space composed of points self-
contradictory? It is true that, if this question be answered in
the negative, the sole ground for denying that such a space ex- 446
ists in the actual world is removed; but this is a further point,
which, being irrelevant to our subject, will be left entirely to
the sagacity of the reader.
424. The arguments against the absolute theory are, in
my opinion, one and all fallacious. They are best collected
in Lotze’s Metaphysic (§108ff.). They are there confused with
arguments for the subjectivity of space—an entirely distinct
question, as should have been evident from the fact that Kant,
in the Critique, appears to have advocated the theory of abso-
lute position*. Omitting arguments only bearing on this latter
point, we have the following summary of Lotze’s arguments
against absolute space.
(1) Relations only are either (α) as presentations in a relat-
ing consciousness, or (β) as internal states in the real elements
which are said to stand in these relations (§109).
(2) The being of empty space is neither the being which
works effects (which belongs to a thing), nor the mere validity
of a truth, nor the fact of being presented by us. What kind of
being is it then? (§109).
(3) All points are exactly alike, yet every pair have a relation
*Some arguments on this point will be found in the earlier part of my
paper, “Is position inTime andSpace absolute or relative?” Mind, N.S., No.
39; the later portions of this paper are here reprinted.
*Cf. Vaihinger,Commentar, pp. 189–190.
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peculiar to themselves; but being exactly like every other pair,
the relation should be the same for all pairs (§111).
(4) The being of every point must consist in the fact that it
distinguishes itself from every other, and takes up an invari-
able position relatively to every other. Hence the being of
space consists in an active mutual conditioning of its various
points, which is really an interaction (§110).
(5) If the relations of points were a mere fact, they could be
altered, at least in thought; but this is impossible: we cannot
move points or imagine holes in space. This impossibility is
easily explained by a subjective theory (§110).
(6) If there are real points, either (α) one point creates others
in appropriate relations to itself, or (β) it brings already exist-
ing points into appropriate relations, which are indifferent to
their natures (§111).
425. (1) All these arguments depend, at bottom, upon the
first, the dogma concerning relations. As it is of the essence
of the absolute theory to deny this dogma, I shall begin by
examining it at some length†. “All relations,” Lotze tells us,
“only are as presentations in a relating consciousness, or as in-
ternal states in the real elements which, as we are wont to say,
stand in these relations.” This dogma Lotze regards as self-
evident, as indeed he well may; for I doubt if there is one ante-
rior philosopher, unless it be Plato, who does not, consciously
or unconsciously, employ the dogma as an essential part of his 447
system. To deny it, therefore, is a somewhat hardy undertak-
ing. Let us, nevertheless, examine the consequences to which
the dogma leads us.
It would seem that, if we accept the dogma, we must dis-
tinguish two kind of relations, (α) those which are presenta-
†The logical opinions which follow are in the main due to Mr G. E.
Moore, to whom I owe also my first perception of the difficulties in the
relational theory of space and time.
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tions in a relating consciousness, and (β) thosewhich are inter-
nal states of the elements supposed to be related. These may
be ultimately identical, but it will be safer in the mean time
to treat them as different. Let us begin with those which are
only presentations in a relating consciousness. These presen-
tations, wemust suppose, are beliefs in propositions asserting
relations between the terms which appear related. For it must
be allowed that there are beliefs in suchpropositions, andonly
such beliefs seem capable of being regarded as presentations
in which relations have their being. But these beliefs, if the
relations believed to hold have no being except in the beliefs
themselves, are necessarily false. If I believeA to be B’s father,
when this is not the case,mybelief is erroneous; and if I believe
A to be west of B, when westerliness in fact exists only in my
mind, I am again mistaken. Thus this first class of relations
has no validity whatever, and consists merely in a collection
of mistaken beliefs. The objects concerning which the beliefs
are entertained are as amatter of factwholly unrelated; indeed
there cannot even be objects, for the plural implies diversity,
and all beliefs in the relation of diversity must be erroneous.
There cannot even be one object distinct from myself, since
this would have to have the relation of diversity to me, which
is impossible. Thus we are committed, so far as this class of
relations goes, to a rigid monism.
But now, what shall we say of the second class of relations,
those namely which are reducible to internal states of the ap-
parently related objects? It must be observed that this class of
relations presupposes a plurality of objects (two at least), and
hence involves the relation of diversity. Now we have seen
that, if there be diversity, it cannot be a relation of the first
class; hence it must itself be of the second class. That is, the
mere fact thatA is different from Bmust be reducible to inter-
nal states ofA and B. But is it not evident that, before we can
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distinguish the internal states of A from those of B, we must
first distinguish A from B? i.e. A and B must be different, be-
fore they can have different states. If it be said that A and B
are precisely similar, and are yet two, it follows even more ev-
idently that their diversity is not due to difference of internal
states, but is prior to it. Thus the mere admission that there
are internal states of different things destroys the theory that
the essence of relations is to be found in these states. We are
thus brought back to the notion that the apparent relations of
two things consist in the internal states of one thing, which
leads us again to the rigid monism implied in the first type of
relation.
Thus the theory of relations propounded by Lotze is, in
fact, a theory that there are no relations. This has been recog- 448
nisedby themost logical adherents of thedogma—e.g.Spinoza
and Mr Bradley—who have asserted that there is only one
thing, God or the Absolute, and only one type of proposition,
namely that ascribing predicates to the Absolute. In order to
meet this development of the above theory of relations, it will
be necessary to examine the doctrine of subject and predicate.
426. Every proposition, true or false—so the present theory
contends—ascribes a predicate to a subject, and—what is a
corollary from the above—there is only one subject. The con-
sequences of this doctrine are so strange, that I cannot believe
they have been realised by those who maintain it. The the-
ory is in fact self-contradictory. For if the Absolute has pred-
icates, then there are predicates; but the proposition “there
are predicates” is not one which the present theory can admit.
We cannot escape by saying that the predicates merely qualify
theAbsolute; for theAbsolute cannot be qualified bynothing,
so that the proposition “there are predicates” is logically prior
to the proposition “the Absolute has predicates.” Thus the
theory itself demands, as its logical prius, a proposition with-
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out a subject and a predicate; moreover this proposition in-
volves diversity, for even if there be only one predicate, this
must be different from the one subject. Again, since there is a
predicate, the predicate is an entity, and its predicability of the
Absolute is a relation between it and the Absolute. Thus the
very proposition which was to be non-relational turns out to
be, after all, relational, and to express a relationwhich current
philosophical languagewould describe as purely external. For
both subject and predicate are simply what they are—neither
is modified by its relation to the other. To be modified by the
relation couldonlybe tohave someother predicate, andhence
we should be led into an endless regress. In short, no relation
ever modifies either of its terms. For if it holds betweenA and
B, then it is between A and B that it holds, and to say that it
modifiesA andB is to say that it really holds between different
termsC andD. To say that two termswhich are relatedwould
be different if they were not related, is to say something per-
fectly barren; for if they were different, they would be other,
and it would not be the terms in question, but a different pair,
that would be unrelated. The notion that a term can be mod-
ified arises from neglect to observe the eternal self-identity of
all terms and all logical concepts, which alone form the con-
stituents of propositions*. What is called modification con-
sistsmerely inhaving at one time, butnot at another, some spe-
cific relation to some other specific term; but the term which
sometimes has and sometimes has not the relation in question
must beunchanged, otherwise itwouldnot be that termwhich 449
had ceased to have the relation.
The general objection to Lotze’s theory of relations may be
thus summedup. The theory implies that all propositions con-
*SeeMrG. E.Moore’s paper on “TheNature of Judgment,”Mind, N.S.,
Vol. viii. Also supra, §§47, 48, where the view adopted differs somewhat
fromMrMoore’s.
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sist in the ascription of a predicate to a subject, and that this
ascription is not a relation. The objection is, that the predi-
cate is either something or nothing. If nothing, it cannot be
predicated, and the pretended proposition collapses. If some-
thing, predication expresses a relation, and a relation of the
very kind which the theory was designed to avoid. Thus in ei-
ther case the theory stands condemned, and there is no reason
for regarding relations as all reducible to the subject-predicate
form.
427. (2) I come now to the second of Lotze’s objections to
empty space. This is again of a somewhat abstract logical char-
acter, but it is far easier to dispose of, since it depends upon a
view more or less peculiar to Lotze. There are, it says, three
and only three kinds of being, no one of which belongs to
space. These are (α) the being of things, which consists in
activity or the power to produce effects; (β) the validity of a
truth; (γ) the being which belongs to the contents of our pre-
sentations.
The answer to this is, that there is only one kind of be-
ing, namely, being simpliciter, and only one kind of existence,
namely, existence simpliciter. Both being and existence, I be-
lieve, belong to empty space; but being alone is relevant to the
refutation of the relational theory—existence belongs to the
question which Lotze confounds with the above, namely, as
to the reality or subjectivity of space. It may be well first to
explain the distinction of being and existence, and then to re-
turn to Lotze’s three kinds of being.
Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to ev-
ery possible object of thought—in short to everything that can
possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such
propositions themselves. Being belongs to whatever can be
counted. IfAbe any term that canbe counted as one, it is plain
that A is something, and therefore that A is. “A is not” must
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always be either false or meaningless. For if A were nothing,
it could not be said not to be; “A is not” implies that there is a
term A whose being is denied, and hence that A is. Thus un-
less “A is not” be an empty sound, it must be false—whatever
A may be, it certainly is. Numbers, the Homeric gods, rela-
tions, chimeras and four-dimensional spaces all have being,
for if theywere not entities of a kind, we couldmake no propo-
sitions about them. Thus being is a general attribute of every-
thing, and to mention anything is to show that it is.
Existence, on the contrary, is the prerogative of some only
amongst beings. To exist is to have a specific relation to
existence—a relation, by the way, which existence itself does
not have. This shows, incidentally, the weakness of the ex-
istential theory of judgment—the theory, that is, that every 450
proposition is concerned with something that exists. For if
this theorywere true, it would still be true that existence itself
is an entity, and it must be admitted that existence does not
exist. Thus the consideration of existence itself leads to non-
existential propositions, and so contradicts the theory. The
theory seems, in fact, to have arisen from neglect of the dis-
tinction between existence and being. Yet this distinction is
essential, if we are ever to deny the existence of anything. For
what does not exist must be something, or it would be mean-
ingless to deny its existence; and hence we need the concept
of being, as that which belongs even to the non-existent.
Returning now to Lotze’s three kinds of being, it is suffi-
ciently evident that his views involve hopeless confusions.
(α) The being of things, Lotze thinks—following Leibniz
here as elsewhere—consists in activity. Now activity is a
highly complex notion, which Lotze falsely supposed unana-
lyzable. But at any rate it is plain that, if there be activity, what
is activemust both be and exist, in the senses explained above.
It will also be conceded, I imagine, that existence is conceptu-
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ally distinguishable from activity. Activity may be a universal
mark of what exists, but can hardly be synonymous with ex-
istence. Hence Lotze requires the highly disputable proposi-
tion that whatever exists must be active. The true answer to
this proposition lies (1) in disproving the grounds alleged in
its favour, (2) in proving that activity implies the existence of
time, which cannot be itself active. For the moment, however,
it may suffice to point out that, since existence and activity
are logically separable, the supposition that something which
is not active exists cannot be logically absurd.
(β) The validity of a truth—which is Lotze’s second kind
of being—is in reality no kind of being at all. The phrase, in
the first place, is ill-chosen—what is meant is the truth of a
truth, or rather the truth of a proposition. Now the truth of a
proposition consists in a certain relation to truth, and presup-
poses the being of the proposition. And as regards being, false
propositions are on exactly the same level, since to be false a
proposition must already be. Thus validity is not a kind of be-
ing, but being belongs to valid and invalid propositions alike.
(γ) The being which belongs to the contents of our presen-
tations is a subject upon which there exists everywhere the
greatest confusion. This kind is described by Lotze as “ein
Vorgestelltwerden durch uns.” Lotze presumably holds that the
mind is in some sense creative—that what it intuits acquires,
in some sense, an existence which it would not have if it were
not intuited. Some such theory is essential to every form of
Kantianism—to the belief, that is, that propositionswhich are
believed solely because themind is somade thatwe cannot but
believe them may yet be true in virtue of our belief. But the
whole theory rests, if I am not mistaken, upon neglect of the
fundamental distinction between an idea and its object. Mis-
led by neglect of being, people have supposed that what does 451
not exist is nothing. Seeing that numbers, relations, andmany
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other objects of thought, do not exist outside the mind, they
have supposed that the thoughts in which we think of these
entities actually create their own objects. Every one except a
philosopher can see the difference between a post andmy idea
of a post, but few see the difference between the number 2 and
my idea of the number 2. Yet the distinction is as necessary
in one case as in the other. The argument that 2 is mental re-
quires that 2 should be essentially an existent. But in that case
it would be particular, and it would be impossible for 2 to be in
twominds, or in onemind at two times. Thus 2must be in any
case an entity, which will have being even if it is in no mind*.
But further, there are reasons for denying that 2 is created by
the thought which thinks it. For, in this case, there could
never be two thoughts until some one thought so; hence what
the person so thinking supposed to be two thoughts would
not have been two, and the opinion, when it did arise, would
be erroneous. And applying the same doctrine to 1; there can-
not be one thought until some one thinks so. Hence Adam’s
first thoughtmust have been concernedwith thenumber 1; for
not a single thought could precede this thought. In short, all
knowledge must be recognition, on pain of being mere delu-
sion; Arithmetic must be discovered in just the same sense in
whichColumbus discovered theWest Indies, andwe nomore
create numbers than he created the Indians. The number 2 is
not purely mental, but is an entity which may be thought of.
Whatever can be thought of has being, and its being is a pre-
condition, not a result, of its being thought of. As regards the
existence of an object of thought, however, nothing can be in-
ferred from the fact of its being thought of, since it certainly
does not exist in the thoughtwhich thinks of it. Hence, finally,
no special kind of being belongs to the objects of our presenta-
tions as such. With this conclusion, Lotze’s second argument
*Cf. Frege,Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, p. xviii.
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is disposed of.
428. (3) Lotze’s third argument has been a great favourite,
ever since Leibniz introduced it. All points, we are told, are
exactly alike, and therefore any two must have the same mu-
tual relation as any other two; yet their mutual distances must
differ, and even, according to Lotze (though in this, in the
sense in which he seems to mean it, he is mistaken), the rela-
tion of every pair must be peculiar to that pair. This argument
will be found todepend againupon the subject-predicate logic
which we have already examined. To be exactly alike can
only mean—as in Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles—not to
have different predicates. But when once it is recognised
that there is no essential distinction between subjects and
predicates, it is seen that any two simple terms simply differ
immediately—they are two, and this is the sum-total of their
differences. Complex terms, it is true, have differences which
can be revealed by analysis. The constituents of the one may 452
be A;B;C;D, while those of the other are A;E;F;G. But the
differences of B;C;D from E;F;G are still immediate differ-
ences, and immediate differences must be the source of all
mediate differences. Indeed it is a sheer logical error to sup-
pose that, if there were an ultimate distinction between sub-
jects and predicates, subjects could be distinguished by differ-
ences of predicates. For before two subjects can differ as to
predicates, they must already be two; and thus the immediate
diversity is prior to that obtained from diversity of predicates.
Again, two terms cannot be distinguished in the first instance
by difference of relation to other terms; for difference of rela-
tion presupposes two distinct terms, and cannot therefore be
the ground of their distinctness. Thus if there is to be any di-
versity at all, there must be immediate diversity, and this kind
belongs to points.
Again, points have also the subsequent kind of diversity
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consisting in difference of relation. They differ not only, as
Lotze urges, in their relations to each other, but also in their
relations to the objects in them. Thus they seem to be in the
same position as colours, sounds, or smells. Two colours, or
two simple smells, have no intrinsic difference save immedi-
ate diversity, but have, like points, different relations to other
terms.
Wherein, then, lies the plausibility of the notion that all
points are exactly alike? This notion is, I believe, a psycholog-
ical illusion, due to the fact that we cannot remember a point,
so as to know it when we meet it again. Among simultane-
ously presented points it is easy to distinguish; but thoughwe
are perpetually moving, and thus being brought among new
points, we are quite unable to detect this fact by our senses,
and we recognise places only by the objects they contain. But
this seems to be a mere blindness on our part—there is no
difficulty, so far as I can see, in supposing an immediate dif-
ference between points, as between colours, but a difference
which our senses are not constructed to be aware of. Let us
take an analogy: Suppose a man with a very bad memory for
faces: he would be able to know, at any moment, whether he
saw one face or many, but he would not be aware whether he
had ever seen any of the faces before. Thus he might be led
to define people by the rooms in which he saw them, and to
suppose it self-contradictory that new people should come to
his lectures, or old people cease to do so. In the latter point,
at least, it will be admitted by lecturers that he would be mis-
taken. And as with faces, so with points—inability to recog-
nise them must be attributed, not to the absence of individu-
ality, but merely to our incapacity.
429. (4) Lotze’s fourth argument is an endeavour to effect
a reductio ad absurdum, by proving that, on the absolute the-
ory, points must interact. The being of every point, Lotze con-
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tends, must consist in the fact that it distinguishes itself from
every other, and takes up an invariable position relatively to
every other. Many fallacies are contained in this argument. In
the first place, there is what may be called the ratiocinator’s 453
fallacy, which consists in supposing that everything has to be
explained by showing that it is something else. Thus the be-
ing of a point, for Lotze, must be found in its difference from
other points, while, as amatter of fact, its being is simply its be-
ing. So far from being explained by something else, the being
of a point is presupposed in all other propositions about it, as
e.g. in the proposition that the point differs from other points.
Again, the phrase that the point distinguishes itself from all
other points seems to be designed to imply some kind of self-
assertion, as though the point would not be different unless
it chose to differ. This suggestion helps out the conclusion,
that the relations between points are in reality a form of in-
teraction. Lotze, believing as he does that activity is essential
to existence, is unable to imagine any other relation between
existents than that of interaction. How hopelessly inapplica-
ble such a view is, will appear from an analysis of interaction.
Interaction is an enormously complex notion, presupposing
a host of other relations, and involving, in its usual form, the
distinction of a thing from its qualities—a distinction depen-
dent on the subject-predicate logic already criticized. Interac-
tion, to begin with, is either the simultaneous action of A on
B and B on A, or the action of the present states of A and B
conjointly on their states at the next instant. In either case it
implies action. Action generally may be defined as a causal re-
lation between one ormore states of one ormore things at the
present instant and one ormore states of the same or different
things at a subsequent instant. When there is only one thing
in both cases, the action is immanent if the thing be the same
in cause and effect, transient if the cause be in one thing and
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the effect in another. In order to speak of action, rather than
causality simply, it is necessary to suppose things enduring for
a certain time, and having changing states. Thus the notion
of interaction presupposes the following relations: (1) diver-
sity between things; (2) diversity between the states of things;
(3) simultaneity; (4) succession; (5) causality; (6) the relation
of a thing to its states. This notion, involving, as a moment’s
inspection shows, six simpler relations in its analysis, is sup-
posed to be the fundamental relation! No wonder absurdities
are produced by such a supposition. But the absurdities be-
long to Lotze, not to space. To reduce the relations of points
to interactions, on the ground that interaction is the type of
all relations, is to display a complete incapacity in the simplest
problems of analysis. The relations of points are not interac-
tions, any more than before and after, or diversity, or greater
and less, are interactions. They are eternal relations of entities,
like the relation of 1 to 2 or of interaction itself to causality.
Points do not assign positions to each other, as though they
were each other’s pew-openers: they eternally have the rela-
tions which they have, just like all other entities. The whole
argument, indeed, rests upon an absurd dogma, supported by
a false and scholastic logic.
430. (5) The fifth argument seems to be designed to prove 454
the Kantian apriority of space. There are, it says, necessary
propositions concerning space, which show that the nature of
space is not a “mere fact.” We are intended to infer that space
is an à priori intuition, and a psychological reason is givenwhy
we cannot imagine holes in space. The impossibility of holes
is apparently what is called a necessity of thought. This argu-
ment again involvesmuch purely logical discussion. Concern-
ing necessities of thought, the Kantian theory seems to lead
to the curious result that whatever we cannot help believing
must be false. What we cannot help believing, in this case, is
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something as to the nature of space, not as to the nature of our
minds. The explanation offered is, that there is no space out-
side our minds; whence it is to be inferred that our unavoid-
able beliefs about space are all mistaken. Moreover we only
push one stage farther back the region of “mere fact,” for the
constitution of our minds remains still a mere fact.
The theory of necessity urged by Kant, and adopted here
by Lotze, appears radically vicious. Everything is in a sense
a mere fact. A proposition is said to be proved when it is de-
duced from premisses; but the premisses, ultimately, and the
rule of inference, have to be simply assumed. Thus any ulti-
mate premiss is, in a certain sense, a mere fact. On the other
hand, there seems to be no true proposition of which there is
any sense in saying that itmight have been false. Onemight as
well say that redness might have been a taste and not a colour.
What is true, is true; what is false, is false; and concerning fun-
damentals, there is nothing more to be said. The only logical
meaning of necessity seems to be derived from implication. A
proposition is more or less necessary according as the class of
propositions for which it is a premiss is greater or smaller*. In
this sense the propositions of logic have the greatest necessity,
and thoseof geometryhave ahighdegreeofnecessity. But this
sense of necessity yields no valid argument from our inability
to imagine holes in space to the conclusion that there cannot
really be any space at all except in our imaginations.
431. (6) The last argument may be shortly disposed of. If
points be independent entities, Lotze argues—so I interpret
him—that we can imagine a new point coming into existence.
This point, then, must have the appropriate relations to other
points. Either it creates the other points with the relations,
or it merely creates the relations to already existing points.
Now it must be allowed that, if there be real points, it is
*Cf. G. E. Moore, “Necessity,”Mind, N.S., No. 35.
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not self-contradictory to suppose some of them non-existent.
But strictly speaking, no single proposition whatever is self-
contradictory. The nearest approach would be “No proposi-
tion is true,” since this implies its own truth. But even here, it
is not strictly self-contradictory to deny the implication. Ev- 455
erywhere we come upon propositions accepted because they
are self-evident, and for no other reason: the law of contradic-
tion itself is such a proposition. Themutual implication of all
the points of space seems to be another; the denial of some
only among points is rejected for the same reason as the asser-
tion that such and such a proposition is both true and false,
namely, because both are obviously untrue. But if, per impossi-
bile, a point previously missing were to come into existence, it
would not create new points, but would have the appropriate
relations to already existing points. The point, in fact, would
have already had being, and as an entity would have eternally
had to other points the same relations as it has when it comes
into existence. Thus Lotze’s argument on this, as on other
points, depends upon a faulty logic, and is easily met by more
correct views as to the nature of judgment.
I conclude, from the above discussion, that absolute posi-
tion is not logically inadmissible, and that a space composedof
points is not self-contradictory. The difficulties which used to
be found in the nature of infinity depended upon adherence
to one definite axiom, namely, that a whole must have more
terms than a part; those in the nature of space, on the other
hand, seem to have been derived almost exclusively from gen-
eral logic. With a subject-predicate theory of judgment, space
necessarily appears to involve contradictions; but when once
the irreducible nature of relational propositions is admitted,
all the supposed difficulties vanish like smoke*. There is no
*Cf. my Philosophy of Leibniz, Cambridge, 1900, Chap. x.
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reason, therefore, so far as I am able to perceive, to deny the
ultimate and absolute philosophical validity of a theory of ge-
ometrywhich regards space as composed of points, and not as
a mere assemblage of relations between non-spatial terms.
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chapter lii
KANT’S THEORYOF SPACE
432. In the present chapter I do not propose to undertake 456
a minute or textual examination of Kant’s opinions; this has
been done elsewhere, andnotably inVaihinger’smonumental
commentary, so well that it need not be done over again here.
It is only the broadoutlines of theKantiandoctrine that Iwish
to discuss. This doctrine, more or less modified, has held the
field for over a century, and has won a nearly universal accep-
tance. As my views are, on almost every point of mathemati-
cal theory, diametrically opposed to those of Kant, it becomes
necessary explicitly to defend the opinions in which I differ
from him*. In this I shall pay special attention to what Kant
calls the transcendental arguments, i.e. those derived from the
nature of mathematics.
433. Broadly speaking, the way in which Kant seeks to
deduce his theory of space from mathematics (especially in
the Prolegomena) is as follows. Starting from the question:
“How is puremathematics possible?” Kant first points out that
all the propositions of mathematics are synthetic. He infers
hence that these propositions cannot, as Leibniz had hoped,
be proved bymeans of a logical calculus; on the contrary, they
*The theory of space which I shall discuss will be that of the Critique
and the Prolegomena. Pre-critical works, and the Metaphysische Anfangs-
gründe derNaturwissenschaft (which differs from theCritique on this point),
will not be considered.
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require, he says, certain synthetic à priori propositions, which
may be called axioms, and even then (it would seem) the rea-
soning employed in deductions from the axioms is different
from that of pure logic. Now Kant was not willing to ad-
mit that knowledge of the external world could be obtained
otherwise than by experience; hence he concluded that the
propositions of mathematics all deal with something subjec-
tive, which he calls a form of intuition. Of these forms there
are two, space and time; time is the source ofArithmetic, space
of Geometry. It is only in the forms of time and space that
objects can be experienced by a subject; and thus pure mathe-
matics must be applicable to all experience. What is essential,
from the logical point of view, is, that the à priori intuitions 457
supplymethodsof reasoning and inferencewhich formal logic
does not admit; and these methods, we are told, make the fig-
ure (which may of course be merely imagined) essential to all
geometrical proofs. The opinion that time and space are sub-
jective is reinforced by the antinomies, where Kant endeav-
ours to prove that, if they be anything more than forms of ex-
perience, they must be definitely self-contradictory.
In the above outline I have omitted everything not relevant
to the philosophy of mathematics. The questions of chief im-
portance to us, as regards the Kantian theory, are two, namely,
(1) are the reasonings inmathematics in anyway different from
those of Formal Logic? (2) are there any contradictions in the
notions of time and space? If these two pillars of the Kantian
edifice can be pulled down, we shall have successfully played
the part of Samson towards his disciples.
434. The question of the nature of mathematical reason-
ing was obscured in Kant’s day by several causes. In the first
place, Kant never doubted for amoment that the propositions
of logic are analytic, whereas he rightly perceived that those of
mathematics are synthetic. It has since appeared that logic is
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just as synthetic as all other kinds of truth; but this is a purely
philosophical question, which I shall here pass by*. In the sec-
ondplace, formal logicwas, inKant’s day, in a verymuchmore
backward state than at present. It was still possible to hold, as
Kant did, that no great advance hadbeenmade sinceAristotle,
and that none, therefore, was likely to occur in the future. The
syllogism still remained the one type of formally correct rea-
soning; and the syllogism was certainly inadequate for mathe-
matics. But now, thanksmainly to themathematical logicians,
formal logic is enriched by several forms of reasoning not re-
ducible to the syllogism†, and bymeans of these all mathemat-
ics can be, and large parts of mathematics actually have been,
developed strictly according to the rules. In the third place,
in Kant’s day, mathematics itself was, logically, very inferior
to what it is now. It is perfectly true, for example, that any one
who attempts, without theuse of the figure, to deduceEuclid’s
seventh proposition from Euclid’s axioms, will find the task
impossible; and there probably did not exist, in the eighteenth
century, any single logically correct piece of mathematical rea-
soning, that is to say, any reasoning which correctly deduced
its result from the explicit premisses laid down by the author.
Since the correctness of the result seemed indubitable, it was
natural to suppose that mathematical proof was something
different from logical proof. But the fact is, that the whole
difference lay in the fact that mathematical proofs were sim-
ply unsound. On closer examination, it has been found that
many of the propositions which, to Kant, were undoubted 458
truths, are as amatter of fact demonstrably false*. A still larger
class of propositions—for instance, Euclid’s seventh proposi-
*See my Philosophy of Leibniz, §11.
†See Chap. ii supra, esp. §18.
*For example, the proposition that every continuous function can be
differentiated.
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tion mentioned above—can be rigidly deduced from certain
premisses, but it is quitedoubtfulwhether thepremisses them-
selves are true or false. Thus the supposed peculiarity ofmath-
ematical reasoning has disappeared.
The belief that the reasonings of Geometry are in any way
peculiar has been, I hope, sufficiently refuted already by the
detailed accounts which have been given of these reasonings,
and especially by Chapter xlix. We have seen that all geomet-
rical results follow, by the mere rules of logic, from the defini-
tions of the various spaces. And as regards the opinion that
Arithmetic depends upon time, this too, I hope, has been an-
swered by our accounts of the relation of Arithmetic to Logic.
Indeed, apart from any detail, it seems to be refuted by the
simple observation that time must have parts, and therefore
plurality, whole and part, are prior to any theory of time. All
mathematics, we may say—and in proof of our assertion we
have the actual developmentof the subject—isdeducible from
the primitive propositions of formal logic: these being admit-
ted, no further assumptions are required.
But admitting the reasonings of Geometry to be purely for-
mal, a Kantian may still maintain that an à priori intuition as-
sures him that the definition of three-dimensional Euclidean
space, alone among the definitions of possible spaces, is the
definition of an existent, or at any rate of an entity having
some relation to existents which other spaces do not have.
This opinion is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the philosophy
of mathematics, since mathematics is throughout indifferent
to the question whether its entities exist. Kant thought that
the actual reasoning of mathematics was different from that of
logic; the suggested emendation drops this opinion, andmain-
tainsmerely a new primitive proposition, to the effect that Eu-
clidean space is that of the actual world. Thus, although I do
not believe in any immediate intuition guaranteeing any such
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primitive proposition, I shall not undertake the refutation of
this opinion. It is enough, for my purpose, to have shown
that no such intuition is relevant in any strictly mathematical
proposition.
435. It remains to discuss the mathematical antinomies.
These are concernedwith infinity and continuity, whichKant
supposed to be specially spatio-temporal. We have already
seen that this view ismistaken, since both occur in pureArith-
metic. We have seen also in Part V (especially in Chapter
xlii) that the supposed antinomies of infinity and continuity,
in their arithmetical form, are soluble; it remains to prove
the same conclusion concerning Kant’s spatio-temporal form. 459
The third and fourth antinomies are not relevant here, since
they involve causality; only the first two, therefore, will be ex-
amined.
First Antinomy. Thesis: “The world has a beginning in time,
and as regards space also is enclosedwithin limits.” This state-
ment is not concernedwithpure time andpure space, butwith
the things in them. The proof, such as it is, applies in the
first instance to time only, and is effected by reductio ad absur-
dum. “For assume,” it says, “that theworldhasnobeginning in
time, then an eternity has passed away (abgelaufen) before ev-
ery given point of time, and consequently an infinite series of
conditions of the things in the world has happened. But the
infinity of a series consists in this, that it can never be com-
pleted by successive synthesis. Consequently an infinite past
series of things in the world (Weltreihe) is impossible, and a be-
ginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence,
which was first to be proved.”
This argument is difficult to follow, and suggests a covert
appeal to causality and the supposed necessity for a first cause.
Neglecting this aspect of the argument, it would seem that,
like most of the arguments against infinity, it fails to under-
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stand the use of the class-concept and the word any. It is
supposed—so it would seem—that the events preceding a
given event ought to be definable by extension, which, if their
number is infinite, is obviously not the case. “Completion
by successive synthesis” seems roughly equivalent to enumer-
ation, and it is true that enumeration of an infinite series is
practically impossible. But the series may be none the less per-
fectly definable, as the class of terms having a specified rela-
tion to a specified term. It then remains a question, as with
all classes, whether the class is finite or infinite; and in the
latter alternative, as we saw in Part V, that there is nothing
self-contradictory. In fact, to elicit a contradiction, it would
be necessary to state as an axiom that every class must have a
finite number of terms—an axiom which can be refuted, and
for which there are no grounds. It seems, however, that previ-
ous events are regardedbyKant as causesof later ones, and that
the cause is supposed to be logically prior to the effect. This,
no doubt, is the reason for speaking of conditions, and for con-
fining the antinomy to events instead ofmoments. If the cause
were logically prior to the effect, this argument would, I think,
be valid; but we shall find, in PartVII, that cause and effect are
on the same logical level. Thus the thesis of the first antinomy,
in so far as it concerns time, must be rejected as false, and the
argument concerning space, since it dependsupon that regard-
ing time, falls also.
Antithesis. “The world has no beginning, and no limits in
space, but is infinite both in respect of time and space.” The
proof of this proposition assumes the infinity of pure time
and space, and argues that these imply events and things to
fill them. This view was rejected, as regards space, in the pre-
ceding chapter, and can be disproved, as regards time, by pre- 460
cisely similar arguments; it is in any case irrelevant to our con-
tention, since no proof is offered that time and space are them-
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selves infinite. This, in fact, seems incapable of proof, since it
dependsupon themerely self-evident axiom that there is amo-
ment before any givenmoment, and a point beyond any given
point. But as no converse proof is valid, we may, in this in-
stance, regard the self-evident as true. Whether events had
a beginning, and whether matter is bounded by empty space,
are questions which, if our philosophy of space and time be
sound, no argument independent of causality can decide.
Second Antinomy. Thesis: “Every complex substance in the
world consists of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere
except the simple, or what is composed of simple parts.” Here,
again, the argument applies to things in space and time, not
to space and time themselves. We may extend it to space
and time, and to all collections, whether existent or not. It
is indeed obvious that the proposition, true or false, is con-
cerned purely with whole and part, and has no special rela-
tion to space and time. Instead of a complex substance, we
might consider the numbers between 1 and 2, or any other de-
finable collection. And with this extension, the proof of the
proposition must, I think, be admitted; only that terms or con-
cepts should be substituted for substances, and that, instead of
the argument that relations between substances are acciden-
tal (zufällig), we should content ourselves with saying that re-
lations imply terms, and complexity implies relations.
Antithesis. “No complex thing in the world consists of sim-
ple parts, andnothing simple exists in it anywhere.” Theproof
of this proposition, as of the first antithesis, assumes, what is
alone really interesting, to us, the corresponding property of
space. “Space,” Kant says, “does not consist of simple parts,
but of spaces.” This dogma is regarded as self-evident, though
all employment of points shows that it is not universally ac-
cepted. It appears to me that the argument of the thesis, ex-
tended as I have just suggested, applies to pure space as to
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any other collection, and demonstrates the existence of sim-
ple points which compose space. As the dogma is not ar-
gued, we can only conjecture the grounds upon which it is
held. The usual argument from infinite division is probably
what influenced Kant. However many parts we divide a space
into, these parts are still spaces, not points. But howevermany
parts we divide the stretch of ratios between 1 and 2 into, the
parts are still stretches, not single numbers. Thus the argu-
ment against points proves that there are nonumbers, andwill
equally prove that there are no colours or tones. All these ab-
surdities involve a covert use of the axiom of finitude, i.e. the
axiom that, if a space does consist of points, it must consist of
some finite number of points. When once this is denied, we
may admit that no finite number of divisions of a space will
lead to points, while yet holding every space to be composed
of points. A finite space is a whole consisting of simple parts,
but not of any finite number of simple parts. Exactly the same 461
thing is true of the stretchbetween 1 and 2. Thus the antinomy
is not specially spatial, and any answer which is applicable in
Arithmetic is applicable here also. The thesis, which is an es-
sential postulate of Logic, should be accepted, while the an-
tithesis should be rejected.
Thus Kant’s antinomies do not specially involve space and
time: any other continuous series, including that of real num-
bers, raises the same problems. And what is more, the prop-
erties of space and time, to which Kant appeals, are general
properties of such series. Other antinomies than Kant’s—e.g.
that concerning absolute and relative position, or concerning
the straight line as both a relation and a collection of points—
have been solved in the preceding chapters of this Part. Kant’s
antinomies, which involve the difficulties of infinity, are by
far the most serious, and these being essentially arithmetical,
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have been already solved in Part V.
436. Before proceeding to matter and motion, let us briefly
recapitulate the results of this Part. Geometry, we said, is the
study of series having more than one dimension; and such
series arise wherever we have a series whose terms are series.
This subject is important inpuremathematics, because it gives
us new kinds of order and new methods of generating order.
It is important in applied mathematics, because at least one
series of several dimensions exists, namely, space. We found
that the abstract logical method, based upon the logic of re-
lations, which had served hitherto, was still adequate, and
enabled us to define all the classes of entities which mathe-
maticians call spaces, and to deduce from the definitions all
the propositions of the correspondingGeometries. We found
that the continuity and infinity of a space can always be arith-
metically defined, and that no new indefinables occur in Ge-
ometry. We saw that the philosophical objections to points
raised by most philosophers are all capable of being answered
by an amended logic, and that Kant’s belief in the peculiar-
ity of geometrical reasoning, and in the existence of certain
antinomies peculiar to space and time, has been disproved
by the modern realization of Leibniz’s universal characteris-
tic. Thus, although we discussed no problems specially con-
cerned with what actually exists, we incidentally answered all
the arguments usually alleged against the existence of an abso-
lute space. Since common sense affirms this existence, there
seems therefore no longer any reason for denying it; and this
conclusion, we shall find, will give us the greatest assistance in
the philosophy of Dynamics.
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PARTVII
MATTERANDMOTION
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chapter liii
MATTER
437. The nature of matter, even more than that of space, 465
has always been regarded as a cardinal problem of philosophy.
In the present work, however, we are not concerned with the
question: What is the nature of the matter that actually ex-
ists? We are concerned merely with the analysis of rational
Dynamics considered as a branch of puremathematics, which
introduces its subject-matter by definition, not by observation
of the actual world. Thus we are not confined to laws of mo-
tion which are empirically verified: non-Newtonian Dynam-
ics, like non-Euclidean Geometry, must be as interesting to
us as the orthodox system. It is true that philosophical ar-
guments against the reality of matter usually endeavour to
raise logical objections to the notion of matter, and these ob-
jections, like the objections to absolute space, are relevant to
a discussion of mathematical principles. But they need not
greatly concern us at this stage, as they havemostly been dealt
with incidentally in the vindication of space. Those who have
agreed that a space composed of points is possible, will proba-
bly agree also that matter is possible. But the question of pos-
sibility is in any case subsequent to our immediate question,
which is: What is matter? And here matter is to mean, matter
as it occurs in rational Dynamics, quite independently of all
questions as to its actual existence.
438. There is—so we decided in Part VI—no logical impli-
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cation of other entities in space. It does not follow, merely be-
cause there is space, that therefore there are things in it. If we
are tobelieve this, wemust believe it onnewgrounds, or rather
on what is called the evidence of the senses. Thus we are here
taking an entirely new step. Among terms which appear to
exist, there are, we may say, four great classes: (1) instants,
(2) points, (3) terms which occupy instants but not points, (4)
terms which occupy both points and instants. It seems to be
the fact that there areno termswhichoccupypoints butnot in-
stants. What ismeant by occupying a point or an instant, analy-
sis cannot explain; this is a fundamental relation, expressedby
in or at, asymmetrical and intransitive, indefinable and simple.
It is evident that bits ofmatter are among the terms of (4). Mat-
ter or materiality itself, the class-concept, is among the terms
which do not exist, but bits of matter exist both in time and in 466
space. They donot, however, form thewhole of class (4): there
are, besides, the so-called secondary qualities, at least colours,
which exist in time and space, but are not matter. We are not
called upon to decide as to the subjectivity of secondary qual-
ities, but at least we must agree that they differ from matter.
How, then, is matter to be defined?
439. There is a well-worn traditional answer to this ques-
tion. Matter, we are told, is a substance, a thing, a subject, of
which secondary qualities are the predicates. But this tradi-
tional answer cannot content us. The whole doctrine of sub-
ject and predicate, as we have already had occasion to argue, is
radically false, and must be abandoned. It may be questioned
whether, without it, any sense other than that of Chapter iv
can bemade of the notion of thing. We are sometimes told that
things are organic unities, composed ofmany parts expressing
the whole and expressed in the whole. This notion is apt to
replace the older notion of substance, not, I think, to the ad-
vantage of precise thinking. The only kind of unity to which
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I can attach any precise sense—apart from the unity of the ab-
solutely simple—is that of a whole composed of parts. But
this form of unity cannot be what is called organic; for if the
parts express the whole or the other parts, they must be com-
plex, and therefore themselves contain parts: if the parts have
been analyzed as far as possible, theymust be simple terms, in-
capable of expressing anything except themselves. A distinc-
tion is made, in support of organic unities, between concep-
tual analysis and real division into parts. What is really indi-
visible, we are told, may be conceptually analyzable. This dis-
tinction, if the conceptual analysis be regarded as subjective,
seems to me wholly inadmissible. All complexity is concep-
tual in the sense that it is due to awhole capable of logical anal-
ysis, but is real in the sense that it has nodependenceupon the
mind, but onlyupon thenature of theobject. Where themind
can distinguish elements, there must be different elements to
distinguish; though, alas! there are often different elements
which the mind does not distinguish. The analysis of a finite
space into points is no more objective than the analysis (say)
of causality into time-sequence + ground and consequent, or
of equality into sameness of relation to a given magnitude. In
every case of analysis, there is a whole consisting of parts with
relations; it is only the nature of the parts and the relations
which distinguishes different cases. Thus the notion of an or-
ganic whole in the above sensemust be attributed to defective
analysis, and cannot be used to explain things.
It is also said that analysis is falsification, that the complex
is not equivalent to the sum of its constituents and is changed
when analyzed into these. In this doctrine, as we saw in Parts I
and II, there is ameasure of truth, whenwhat is to be analyzed
is a unity. A proposition has a certain indefinable unity, in
virtue of which it is an assertion; and this is so completely lost
by analysis that no enumeration of constituents will restore
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it, even though itself be mentioned as a constituent. There is, 467
it must be confessed, a grave logical difficulty in this fact, for
it is difficult not to believe that a whole must be constituted
by its constituents. For us, however, it is sufficient to observe
that all unities are propositions or propositional concepts, and
that consequently nothing that exists is a unity. If, therefore,
it is maintained that things are unities, we must reply that no
things exist.
440. Thus no form of the notion of substance seems appli-
cable to the definition of matter. The question remains: How
and why is matter distinguished from the so-called secondary
qualities? It cannot, I think, be distinguished as belonging to
a different logical class of concepts; the only classes appear to
be things, predicates, and relations, and both matter and the
secondary qualities belong to the first class. Nevertheless the
world of dynamics is sharply distinguished from that of the
secondary qualities, and the elementary properties of matter
are quite different from those of colours. Let us examine these
properties with a view to definition.
The most fundamental characteristic of matter lies in the
nature of its connection with space and time. Two pieces of
matter cannot occupy the sameplace at the samemoment, and
the same piece cannot occupy two places at the samemoment,
though it may occupy two moments at the same place. That
is, whatever, at a given moment, has extension, is not an indi-
visible piece of matter: division of space always implies divi-
sion of any matter occupying the space, but division of time
has no corresponding implication. (These properties are com-
monly attributed to matter: I do not wish to assert that they
do actually belong to it.) By these properties, matter is distin-
guished from whatever else is in space. Consider colours for
example: these possess impenetrability, so that no two colours
can be in the same place at the same time, but they do not
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possess the other property of matter, since the same colour
may be in many places at once. Other pairs of qualities, as
colour and hardness, may also coexist in one place. On the
view which regarded matter as the subject of which qualities
were attributes, one piece of colour was distinguished from
another by the matter whose attribute it was, even when the
two colourswere exactly similar. I shouldprefer to say that the
colour is the same, and has no direct relation to the matter in
the place. The relation is indirect, and consists in occupation
of the same place. (I do not wish to decide anymoot questions
as to the secondary qualities, but merely to show the differ-
ence between the common-sense notions of these and of mat-
ter respectively.) Thus impenetrability and its converse seem
to characterize matter sufficiently to distinguish it from what-
ever else exists in space. Two pieces of matter cannot occupy
the same place and the same time, and one piece ofmatter can-
not occupy twoplaces at the same time. But the latter property
must be understood of a simple piece of matter, one which is
incapable of analysis or division.
Other properties of matter flow from the nature of motion.
Every piece ofmatter persists through time: if it exists once, it 468
would seemthat itmust always exist. It either retains its spatial
position, or changes it continuously, so that its positions at
various times form a continuous series in space. Both these
properties require considerable discussion, which will follow
at a later stage. They are purely kinematical, i.e. they involve
none of the so-called laws of motion, but only the nature of
motion itself.
A controversy has always existed, since early Greek times,
as to the possibility of a vacuum. The question whether there
is a vacuum cannot, I think, be decided on philosophical
grounds, i.e. no decision is possible from the nature of matter
or of motion. The answer belongs properly to Science, and
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therefore none will be suggested here.
We may sum up the nature of matter as follows. Material
unit is a class-concept, applicable to whatever has the follow-
ing characteristics: (1)A simplematerial unit occupies a spatial
point at anymoment; two units cannot occupy the same point
at the samemoment, and one cannot occupy two points at the
same moment. (2) Every material unit persists through time;
its positions in space at any two moments may be the same
or different; but if different, the positions at times interme-
diate between the two chosen must form a continuous series.
(3) Twomaterial units differ in the same immediate manner as
two points or two colours; they agree in having the relation of
inclusion in a class to the general concept matter, or rather to
the general concept material unit. Matter itself seems to be a
collective name for all pieces of matter, as space for all points
and time for all instants. It is thus thepeculiar relation to space
and timewhich distinguishesmatter fromother qualities, and
not any logical difference such as that of subject and predicate,
or substance and attribute.
441. We can now attempt an abstract logical statement of
what rational Dynamics requires its matter to be. In the first
place, time and space may be replaced by a one-dimensional
and n-dimensional series respectively. Next, it is plain that
the only relevant function of a material point is to establish
a correlation between all moments of time and some points
of space, and that this correlation is many-one. So soon
as the correlation is given, the actual material point ceases
to have any importance. Thus we may replace a material
point by a many-one relation whose domain is a certain one-
dimensional series, and whose converse domain is contained
in a certain three-dimensional series. To obtain amaterial uni-
verse, so far as kinematical considerations go, we have only to
consider a class of such relations subject to the condition that
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the logical product of any two relations of the class is to be
null. This condition insures impenetrability. If we add that
the one-dimensional and the three-dimensional series are to
be both continuous, and that each many-one relation is to de-
fine a continuous function, we have all the kinematical con-
ditions for a system of material particles, generalized and ex-
pressed in terms of logical constants.
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chapter liv
MOTION
442. Much has been written concerning the laws of mo- 469
tion, the possibility of dispensing with Causality in Dynam-
ics, the relativity of motion, and other kindred questions. But
there are several preliminary questions, of great difficulty and
importance, concerning which little has been said. Yet these
questions, speaking logically, must be settled before the more
complex problems usually discussed can be attacked with any
hope of success. Most of the relevant modern philosophical
literature will illustrate the truth of these remarks: the the-
ories suggested usually repose on a common dogmatic basis,
and can be easily seen to be unsatisfactory. So long as an au-
thor confines himself to demolishing his opponents, he is ir-
refutable; whenhe constructs his own theory, he exposes him-
self, as a rule, to a similar demolition by the next author. Un-
der these circumstances, we must seek some different path,
whose by-ways remain unexplained. “Back to Newton” is the
watchword of reform in this matter. Newton’s scholium to
the definitions contains arguments which are unrefuted, and
so far as I know, irrefutable: they have been before the world
twohundredyears, and it is time theywere refutedor accepted.
Being unequal to the former, I have adopted the latter alterna-
tive.
The concept of motion is logically subsequent to that of oc-
cupying a place at a time, and also to that of change. Motion is
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the occupation, by one entity, of a continuous series of places
at a continuous series of times. Change is the difference, in
respect of truth or falsehood, between a proposition concern-
ing an entity and a time T and a proposition concerning the
same entity and another timeT0, provided that the two propo-
sitions differ only by the fact that T occurs in the one where
T0 occurs in the other. Change is continuous when the propo-
sitions of the above kind form a continuous series correlated
with a continuous series of moments. Change thus always in-
volves (1) a fixed entity, (2) a three-cornered relation between
this entity, another entity, and some but not all, of the mo-
ments of time. This is its bare minimum. Mere existence at
some but not all moments constitutes change on this defini-
tion. Consider pleasure, for example. This, we know, exists at 470
some moments, and we may suppose that there are moments
when it does not exist. Thus there is a relation between plea-
sure, existence, and somemoments, whichdoesnot subsist be-
tween pleasure, existence, and other moments. According to
the definition, therefore, pleasure changes in passing from ex-
istence to non-existence or vice versâ. This shows that the def-
inition requires emendation, if it is to accord with usage. Us-
age does not permit us to speak of change except where what
changes is an existent throughout, or is at least a class-concept
one of whose particulars always exists. Thus we should say,
in the case of pleasure, that my mind is what changes when
the pleasure ceases to exist. On the other hand, if my plea-
sure is of different magnitudes at different times, we should
say the pleasure changes its amount, thoughwe agreed in Part
III that not pleasure, but only particular amounts of pleasure,
are capable of existence. Similarly we should say that colour
changes, meaning that there are different colours at different
times in some connection; though not colour, but only partic-
ular shades of colour, can exist. And generally, where both
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the class-concept and the particulars are simple, usage would
allow us to say, if a series of particulars exists at a continuous
series of times, that the class-concept changes. Indeed it seems
better to regard this as the only kind of change, and to regard
as unchanging a term which itself exists throughout a given
periodof time. But ifwe are todo this, wemust say thatwholes
consisting of existent parts do not exist, or else that a whole
cannot preserve its identity if any of its parts be changed. The
latter is the correct alternative, but some subtlety is required
to maintain it. Thus people say they change their minds: they
say that the mind changes when pleasure ceases to exist in it.
If this expression is to be correct, the mind must not be the
sum of its constituents. For if it were the sum of all its con-
stituents throughout time, it would be evidently unchanging;
if it were the sum of its constituents at one time, it would lose
its identity as soon as a former constituent ceased to exist or
a new one began to exist. Thus if the mind is anything, and
if it can change, it must be something persistent and constant,
to which all constituents of a psychical state have one and the
same relation. Personal identity could be constituted by the
persistence of this term, to which all a person’s states (and
nothing else) would have a fixed relation. The change ofmind
would then consist merely in the fact that these states are not
the same at all times.
Thus we may say that a term changes, when it has a fixed
relation to a collection of other terms, each of which exists at
some part of time, while all do not exist at exactly the same se-
ries ofmoments. Canwe say, with this definition, that the uni-
verse changes? The universe is a somewhat ambiguous term:
it may mean all the things that exist at a single moment, or all
the things that ever have existed or will exist, or the common 471
quality of whatever exists. In the two former senses it cannot
change; in the last, if it be other than existence, it can change.
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Existence itself would not be held to change, though differ-
ent terms exist at different times; for existence is involved in
the notion of change as commonly employed, which applies
only in virtue of the difference between the things that exist
at different times. On thewhole, then,we shall keepnearest to
usage if we say that the fixed relation, mentioned at the begin-
ning of this paragraph, must be that of a simple class-concept
to simple particulars contained under it.
443. The notion of change has been much obscured by the
doctrine of substance, by the distinction between a thing’s na-
ture and its external relations, and by the pre-eminence of
subject-predicate propositions. It has been supposed that a
thing could, in some way, be different and yet the same: that
though predicates define a thing, yet it may have different
predicates at different times. Hence the distinction of the es-
sential and the accidental, and a number of other useless dis-
tinctions, which were (I hope) employed precisely and con-
sciously by the scholastics, but are used vaguely and uncon-
sciously by the moderns. Change, in this metaphysical sense,
I do not at all admit. The so-called predicates of a term are
mostly derived from relations to other terms; change is due,
ultimately, to the fact that many terms have relations to some
parts of timewhich they do not have to others. But every term
is eternal, timeless, and immutable; the relations it may have
to parts of time are equally immutable. It is merely the fact
that different terms are related to different times that makes
the difference betweenwhat exists at one time andwhat exists
at another. And though a term may cease to exist, it cannot
cease to be; it is still an entity, which can be counted as one,
and concerning which some propositions are true and others
false.
444. Thus the important point is the relation of terms to
the times they occupy, and to existence. Can a term occupy a
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timewithout existing? At first sight, one is tempted to say that
it can. It is hard to deny thatWaverley’s adventures occupied
the time of the ’45, or that the stories in the 1,001 Nights oc-
cupy the period ofHarun alRaschid. I should not say, withMr
Bradley, that these times are not parts of real time; on the con-
trary, I should give them a definite position in the Christian
Era. But I should say that the events are not real, in the sense
that they never existed. Nevertheless, when a term exists at a
time, there is an ultimate triangular relation, not reducible to
a combination of separate relations to existence and the time
respectively. This may be shown as follows. If “A exists now”
can be analyzed into “A is now” and “A exists,” where exists is
used without any tense, we shall have to hold that “A is then”
is logically possible even if A did not exist then; for if occu-
pation of a time be separable from existence, a term may oc-
cupy a time at which it does not exist, even if there are other
times when it does exist. But, on the theory in question, “A 472
is then” and “A exists” constitute the very meaning of “A ex-
isted then,” and therefore, when these two propositions are
true, A must have existed then. This can only be avoided by
denying the possibility of analyzing “A exists now” into a com-
bination of two-term relations; and hence non-existential oc-
cupation of a time, if possible at all, is radically different from
the existential kind of occupation.
It should be observed, however, that the above discussion
has a merely philosophical interest, and is strictly irrelevant
to our theme. For existence, being a constant term, need not
be mentioned, from a mathematical point of view, in defin-
ing the moments occupied by a term. From the mathematical
point of view, change arises from the fact that there are propo-
sitional functions which are true of some but not all moments
of time, and if these involve existence, that is a further point
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 690
with which mathematics as such need not concern itself.
445. Before applying these remarks to motion, we must ex-
amine the difficult idea of occupying a place at a time. Here
again we seem to have an irreducible triangular relation. If
there is to be motion, we must not analyze the relation into
occupation of a place and occupation of a time. For a moving
particle occupies many places, and the essence of motion lies
in the fact that they are occupied at different times. If “A is
here now” were analyzable into “A is here” and “A is now,”
it would follow that “A is there then” is analyzable into “A
is there” and “A is then.” If all these propositions were inde-
pendent, we could combine them differently: we could, from
“A is now” and “A is there,” infer “A is there now,” which we
know to be false, if A is a material point. The suggested anal-
ysis is therefore inadmissible. If we are determined to avoid
a relation of three terms, we may reduce “A is here now” to
“A’s occupation of this place is now.” Thus we have a relation
between this time and a complex concept, A’s occupation of
this place. But this seemsmerely to substitute another equiva-
lent proposition for the one which it professes to explain. But
mathematically, the whole requisite conclusion is that, in re-
lation to a given term which occupies a place, there is a corre-
lation between a place and a time.
446. We can now consider the nature of motion, which
need not, I think, cause any great difficulty. A simple unit
of matter, we agreed, can only occupy one place at one time.
Thus if A be a material point, “A is here now” excludes “A is
there now,” but not “A is here then.” Thus any givenmoment
has a unique relation, not direct, but viâ A, to a single place,
whose occupation byA is at the givenmoment; but there need
not be a unique relation of a given place to a given time, since
the occupation of the place may fill several times. A moment
such that an interval containing the given moment otherwise
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than as an end-point can be assigned, at any moment within
which intervalA is in the same place, is amomentwhenA is at
rest. A moment when this cannot be done is a moment when 473
A is in motion, provided A occupies some place at neighbour-
ing moments on either side. A moment when there are such
intervals, but all have the said moment as an end-term, is one
of transition from rest tomotion or vice versâ. Motion consists
in the fact that, by the occupation of a place at a time, a corre-
lation is established between places and times; when different
times, throughout any period however short, are correlated
with different places, there is motion; when different times,
throughout someperiodhowever short, are all correlatedwith
the same place, there is rest.
Wemay now proceed to state our doctrine of motion in ab-
stract logical terms, remembering thatmaterial particles are re-
placed by many-one relations of all times to some places, or
of all terms of a continuous one-dimensional series t to some
terms of a continuous three-dimensional series s. Motion con-
sists broadly in the correlation of different terms of twith dif-
ferent terms of s. A relation Rwhich has a single term of s for
its converse domain corresponds to a material particle which
is at rest throughout all time. A relation R which correlates
all the terms of t in a certain interval with a single term of s
corresponds to a material particle which is at rest throughout
the interval, with the possible exclusion of its end-terms (if
any), which may be terms of transition between rest and mo-
tion. A time ofmomentary rest is given by any term for which
the differential coefficient of themotion is zero. Themotion is
continuous if the correlating relation R defines a continuous
function. It is to be taken as part of the definition of motion
that it is continuous, and that further it has first and second
differential coefficients. This is an entirely new assumption,
having no kind of necessity, but serving merely the purpose
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of giving a subject akin to rational Dynamics.
447. It is to be observed that, in consequence of the denial
of the infinitesimal, and in consequence of the allied purely
technical viewof the derivative of a function, wemust entirely
reject the notion of a state of motion. Motion consists merely
in the occupation of different places at different times, sub-
ject to continuity as explained in Part V. There is no transi-
tion from place to place, no consecutive moment or consecu-
tive position, no such thing as velocity except in the sense of
a real number which is the limit of a certain set of quotients.
The rejection of velocity and acceleration as physical facts (i.e.
as properties belonging at each instant to a moving point, and
notmerely real numbers expressing limits of certain ratios) in-
volves, as we shall see, some difficulties in the statement of the
laws of motion; but the reform introduced by Weierstrass in
the infinitesimal calculus has rendered this rejection impera-
tive.
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chapter lv
CAUSALITY
448. Agreat controversyhas existed in recent times, among 474
thosewho are interested in the principles ofDynamics, on the
question whether the notion of causality occurs in the sub-
ject or not. Kirchoff* and Mach, and, in our own country,
Karl Pearson, have upheld the view that Dynamics is purely
descriptive, while those who adhere to the more traditional
opinion maintain that it not merely registers sequences, but
discovers causal connections. This controversy is discussed
in a very interesting manner in Professor James Ward’s Natu-
ralism and Agnosticism, in which the descriptive theory is used
toprove thatDynamics cannot givemetaphysical truths about
the real world. But I do not find, either in Professor Ward’s
book or elsewhere, a very clear statement of the issue between
the two schools. The practical mathematical form of the ques-
tion arises as regards force, and in this form, there can be no
doubt that the descriptive school are in the right: the notion
of force is onewhich ought not to be introduced into the prin-
ciples of Dynamics. The reasons for this assertion are quite
conclusive. Force is the supposed cause of acceleration: many
forces are supposed to concur in producing a resultant accel-
eration. Now an acceleration, as was pointed out at the end of
the preceding chapter, is a mere mathematical fiction, a num-
*Vorlesungen über mathematische Physik, Leipzig, 1883, Vorrede.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 694
ber, not a physical fact; and a component acceleration is dou-
bly a fiction, for, like the component of any other vector sum,
it is not part of the resultant, which alone could be supposed
to exist. Hence a force, if it be a cause, is the cause of an ef-
fect which never takes place. But this conclusion does not suf-
fice to show that causality never occurs in Dynamics. If the
descriptive theory were strictly correct, inferences from what
occurs at some times to what occurs at others would be impos-
sible. Such inferences must involve a relation of implication
between events at different times, and any such relation is in a
general sense causal. What does appear to be the case is, that
the only causality occurring in Dynamics requires the whole
configuration of the material world as a datum, and does not
yield relations of particulars to particulars, such as are usually 475
called causal. In this respect, there is a difficulty in interpret-
ing such seeming causation of particulars by particulars as ap-
pears, for example, in the law of gravitation. On account of
this difficulty, it will be necessary to treat causation at some
length, examining first the meaning to be assigned to the cau-
sation of particulars by particulars as commonly understood,
then themeaning of causalitywhich is essential to rationalDy-
namics, and finally the difficulty as regards component accel-
eration.
449. The first subject of the present chapter is the logical na-
ture of causal propositions. In this subject there is a consider-
able difficulty, due to the fact that temporal succession is not a
relation between events directly, but only between moments*.
If two events could be successive, we could regard causation
as a relation of succession holding between two events with-
out regard to the time at which they occur. If “A precedes B”
(where A and B are actual or possible temporal existents) be
*See my article inMind, N.S., No. 39, “Is position in time and space ab-
solute or relative?”
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a true proposition, involving no reference to any actual part
of time, but only to temporal succession, then we sayA causes
B. The law of causality would then consist in asserting that,
among the thingswhich actually precede a given particular ex-
istent B now, there is always one series of events at successive
moments which would necessarily have preceded B then, just
aswell asBnow; the temporal relations ofB to the terms of this
series may then be abstracted from all particular times, and as-
serted per se.
Such would have been the account of causality, if we had
admitted that events can be successive. But as we have denied
this, we require a different andmore complicated theory. As a
preliminary, let us examine some characteristics of the causal
relation.
A causal relation between two events, whatever its nature
may be, certainly involves no reference to constant particu-
lar parts of time. It is impossible that we should have such a
proposition as “A causes B now, but not then.” Such a propo-
sition would merely mean thatA exists now but not then, and
thereforeBwill exist at a slightly subsequentmoment, though
it did not exist at a time slightly subsequent to the former time.
But the causal relation itself is eternal: if A had existed at
any other time, B would have existed at the subsequent mo-
ment. Thus “A causes B” has no reference to constant partic-
ular parts of time.
Again, neitherA nor B need ever exist, though ifA should
exist at any moment, B must exist at a subsequent moment,
and vice versâ. In all Dynamics (as I shall prove later) we work
with causal connections; yet, except when applied to concrete
cases, our terms are not existents. Their non-existence is, in
fact, the mark of what is called rational Dynamics. To take an-
other example: All deliberation and choice, all decisions as to
policies, demand the validity of causal series whose terms do 476
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not and will not exist. For the rational choice depends upon
the constructionof two causal series, only oneofwhich canbe
made to exist. Unless both were valid, the choice could have
no foundation. The rejected series consists of equally valid
causal connections, but the events connected are not to be
found among existents. Thus all statesmanship, and all ratio-
nal conduct of life, is based upon the method of the frivolous
historical game, in which we discuss what the world would be
if Cleopatra’s nose had been half an inch longer.
A causal relation, we have seen, has no essential reference
to existence, as to particular parts of time. But it has, none
the less, some kind of connection with both. If one of its
terms is among existents, so is the other; if one is non-existent,
the other is also non-existent. If one of the terms is at one
moment, the other is at a later or earlier moment. Thus if A
causes B, we have also “A’s existence implies B’s” and “A’s be-
ing at thismoment impliesB’s being at a subsequentmoment.”
These two propositions are implied by “A causes B”; the sec-
ond, at least, also implies “A causes B,” so that we have here a
mutual implication. Whether the first also implies “A causes
B,” is a difficult question. Some people would hold that two
moments of time, or two points of space, imply each other’s
existence; yet the relation between these cannot be said to be
causal.
It would seem that whatever exists at any part of time has
causal relations. This is not a distinguishing characteristic of
what exists, since we have seen that two non-existent terms
may be cause and effect. But the absence of this characteris-
tic distinguishes terms which cannot exist from terms which
might exist. Excluding space and time,wemaydefine as a possi-
ble existent any termwhich has a causal relation to some other
term. This definition excludes numbers, and all so-called ab-
stract ideas. But it admits the entities of rational Dynamics,
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which might exist, though we have no reason to suppose that
they do.
If we admit (what seems undeniable) that whatever occu-
pies any given time is both a cause and an effect, we obtain
a reason for either the infinity or the circularity of time, and
a proof that, if there are events at any part of time, there al-
ways have been and always will be events. If, moreover, we
admit that a single existent A can be isolated as the cause of
another single existent B, which in turn causes C, then the
world consists of as many independent causal series as there
are existents at any one time. This leads to an absolute Leib-
nizian monadism—a view which has always been held to be
paradoxical, and to indicate an error in the theory fromwhich
it springs. Let us, then, return to themeaning of causality, and
endeavour to avoid the paradox of independent causal series.
450. The proposition “A causes B” is, as it stands, incom-
plete. The only meaning of which it seems capable is “A’s ex-
istence at any time implies B’s existence at some future time.”
It has always been customary to suppose that cause and effect 477
must occupy consecutive moments; but as time is assumed to
be a compact series, there cannotbe anyconsecutivemoments,
and the interval between any two moments will always be fi-
nite. Thus in order to obtain a more complete causal proposi-
tion, we must specify the interval betweenA and B. A causal
connection then asserts that the existenceofA at anyone time
implies the existence of B after an interval which is indepen-
dent of the particular time at whichA existed. In other words,
we assert: “There is an interval t such thatA’s existence at any
time t1 implies B’s existence at a time t1 + t.” This requires
the measurement of time, and consequently involves either
temporal distance, or magnitude of divisibility, which last we
agreed to regard as not amotion of puremathematics. Thus if
our measure is effected by means of distance, our proposition
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is capable of the generalization which is required for a purely
logical statement.
451. A very difficult question remains—the question which,
when the problem is precisely stated, discriminates most
clearly between monism and monadism. Can the causal rela-
tion hold between particular events, or does it hold only be-
tween the whole present state of the universe and the whole
subsequent state? Or can we take a middle position, and re-
gard one group of events now as causally connected with one
group at another time, but not with any other events at that
other time?
I will illustrate this difficulty by the case of gravitating par-
ticles. Let there be three particles A;B;C. We say that B and
C both cause accelerations inA, and we compound these two
accelerations by the parallelogram law. But this composition
is not truly addition, for the components are not parts of the
resultant. The resultant is a new term, as simple as its com-
ponents, and not by any means their sum. Thus the effects
attributed to B andC are never produced, but a third term dif-
ferent from either is produced. This, we may say, is produced
by B andC together, taken as one whole. But the effect which
they produce as a whole can only be discovered by supposing
each to produce a separate effect: if this were not supposed,
it would be impossible to obtain the two accelerations whose
resultant is the actual acceleration. Thus we seem to reach an
antinomy: the whole has no effect except what results from
the effects of the parts, but the effects of the parts are non-
existent.
The examination of this difficulty will rudely shake our
cherished prejudices concerning causation. The laws of mo-
tion, we shall find, actually contradict the received view, and
demand a quite different and far more complicated view. In
Dynamics, we shall find (1) that the causal relation holds be-
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tween events at three times, not at two; (2) that thewhole state
of the material universe at two of the three times is necessary
to the statement of a causal relation. In order to provide for
this conclusion, let us re-examine causality in a less conven-
tional spirit.
452. Causality, generally, is the principle in virtue of which, 478
from a sufficient number of events at a sufficient number of
moments, one or more events at one or more new moments
can be inferred. Let us suppose, for example, that, by means
of the principle, if we are given e1 events at a time t1, e2 at a time
t2; : : : en at a time tn, then we can infer en+1 events at a time tn+1.
If, then, er+1 5er, and if the times tr are arbitrary, except that
tr+1 is after tr, it follows that, from the original data, we can
infer certain events at all future times. For we may choose e1
of the events e2; : : : en of the events en+1, and infer en+1 events
at a new time tn+2. Hence by means of our supposed law, in-
ference to future times is assured. And if, for any value of r,
er+1 > er, thenmore than en+1 events canbe inferred at the time
tn+2, since there are several ways of choosing er events out of
er+1 events. But if for any value of r, er+1 > er, then inference
to the past becomes in general impossible. In order that an un-
ambiguous inference to the pastmay be possible, it is necessary
that the implication should be reciprocal, i.e. that e1 events at
time t1 should be implied by e2 at t2 : : : en+1 at tn+1. But some in-
ference to the past is possible without this condition, namely,
that at time t1 there were e1 events implying, with the others
up to tn, the en+1 events at time tn+1. But even this inference
soon fails if, for any value of r, er+1 > er, since, after inferring
e1 events at time t1, er for the next inference takes the place of
er+1, but is too small to allow the inference. Thus if unambigu-
ous inference to any part of time is to be possible, it is neces-
sary and sufficient (1) that any one of the n+ 1 groups of events
should be implied by the other n groups; (2) that er = er+1 for
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all values of r. Since causality demands the possibility of such
inference, we may take these two conditions as satisfied.
Another somewhat complicated point is the following. If
e1e2 : : : en cause en+1, and e2 : : : en+1, cause en+2 and so on, we
have an independent causal series, and a return to monadism,
though the monad is now complex, being at each moment a
group of events. But this result is not necessary. It may hap-
pen that only certain groups e1e2 : : : en allow inference to en+1,
and that e2e3 : : : en; en+1 is not such a group. Thus suppose
e01e02 : : : e0n simultaneouswith e1 : : : en, and causing e0n+1. Itmay
be that e2e3 : : : ene0n+1 and e02e03 : : : e0nen+1 form the next causal
groups, causing en+2 and e0n+2 respectively. In this way no in-
dependent causal series will arise, in spite of particular causal
sequences. This however remains amere possibility, of which,
so far as I know, no instance occurs.
Do the general remarks on the logical nature of causal
propositions still hold good? Must we suppose the causal rela-
tion to hold directly between the events e1e2 : : : en+1, andmerely
to imply their temporal succession? There are difficulties in
this view. For, having recognized that consecutive times are
impossible, it has become necessary to assume finite intervals
of time between e1 and e2, e2 and e3 etc. Hence the length of 479
these intervals must be specified, and thus a mere reference
to events, without regard to temporal position, becomes im-
possible. All we can say is, that only relative position is rel-
evant. Given a causal relation in which the times are tr, this
relation will still be valid for times T + tr. Thus the ultimate
statement seems to be: givenm events at anymoment,m other
events at a moment whose distance from the first is specified,
and so on till we have n groups of events, then m new events
can be inferred at any new moment whose distance from the
first is specified, provided m and n have suitable values, and
the groups of events be suitably chosen—where, however, the
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values to be assigned tom and nmay depend upon the nature
of the events in question. For example, in a material system
consisting ofN particles, we shall havem = N; n = 2. Herem
depends upon the nature of the material system in question.
What circumstances obtain in Psychology, it is as yet impossi-
ble to say, since psychologists have failed to establish any strict
causal laws.
Thus rational Dynamics assume that, in an independent
material system, the configurations at any two moments im-
ply the configuration at any other moment. This statement is
capable of translation into the language of pure mathematics,
as we shall see in the next chapter. But it remains a question
what we are to say concerning such causation of particulars by
particulars as appears to be involved in such principles as the
law of gravitation. But this discussion must be postponed un-
til we have examined the so-called laws of motion.
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chapter lvi
DEFINITIONOFA
DYNAMICALWORLD
453. Before proceeding to the laws of motion, which intro- 480
duce new complications of which some are difficult to express
in terms of pure mathematics, I wish briefly to define in logi-
cal language the dynamical world as it results from previous
chapters.
Let t be a one-dimensional continuous series, s a three-
dimensional continuous series, which we will not assume to
be Euclidean as yet. If R be a many-one relation whose do-
main is t and whose converse domain is contained in s, then
R defines a motion of a material particle. The indestructibil-
ity and ingenerability of matter are expressed in the fact that
R has the whole of t for its field. Let us assume further that R
defines a continuous function in s.
In order to define themotions of amaterial system, it is only
necessary to consider a class of relations having the properties
assigned above to R, and such that the logical product of any
two of them is null. This last condition expresses impenetra-
bility. For it asserts that no twoof our relations relate the same
moment to the same point, i.e. no two particles can be at the
same place at the same time. A set of relations fulfilling these
conditions will be called a class of kinematical motions.
With these conditions, we have all that kinematics requires
for the definition of matter; and if the descriptive school were
wholly in the right, our definition would not add the new con-
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dition which takes us from kinematics to kinetics. Neverthe-
less this condition is essential to inference from events at one
time to events at another, without which Dynamics would
lose its distinctive feature.
454. A generalized form of the statement of causality which
we require is the following: Aclass of kineticmotions is a class of
kinematical motions such that, given the relata of the various
component relations at n given times, the relata at all times are
determinate. In ordinary Dynamics we have n = 2, and this
assumption may be made without the loss of any interesting
generality. Our assertion then amounts to saying that there
is a certain specific many-one relation which holds between 481
any two configurations and their times and any third time, as
referent, and the configuration at the third time as relatum;
in ordinary language, given two configurations at two given
times, the configuration at any other time is determinate. For-
mally, the principle of causality in this form may be stated as
follows. If R be a relation which is any one of our motions,
and t any time, let Rt be the relation holding only between t
and the term to which t has the relation R. If K be the whole
class of motions, let Kt be the whole class of such terms as Rt.
ThenKt expresses the configuration of the system at the time
t. Now let t0; t00 be any other two times. Then K is a class of
kinetic motions if there is a many-one relation S, the same for
any three times, which holds between the class whose terms
are t; t0; t00;Kt;Kt0 , as referent and the configurationKt00 as rela-
tum.
The particular causal laws of the particular universe consid-
ered are givenwhen S is given, and vice versâ*. Wemay treat of
a whole set of universes agreeing in having the same S, i.e. the
same causal laws, and differing only in respect of the distribu-
*In the Dynamics applicable to the actual world, the specification of S
requires the notion of mass.
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tion of matter, i.e. the classK. This is the ordinary procedure
of rationalDynamics,which commonlydefines its S in theway
believed to apply to the actual world, and uses its liberty only
to imagine different material systems.
It will be observed that, owing to the rejection of the in-
finitesimal, it is necessary to give an integrated formtoour gen-
eral law of causality. We cannot introduce velocities and ac-
celerations into statements of general principles, though they
becomenecessary as soon aswe descend to the laws ofmotion.
A large part of Newton’s laws, as we shall see in the next chap-
ter, is contained in the above definition, but the third law in-
troduces a radical novelty, and gives rise to the difficulty as
to the causation of particulars by particulars, which we have
mentioned but not yet examined.
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chapter lvii
NEWTON’S LAWSOF
MOTION
455. Thepresent chapterwill adopt, for themoment, a naïve 482
attitude towards Newton’s Laws. It will not examine whether
they really hold, or whether there are other really ultimate
laws applying to the ether; its problem is merely to give those
laws a meaning.
The first thing to be remembered is—what physicists now-
a-days will scarcely deny—that force is a mathematical fiction,
not a physical entity. The second point is that, in virtue of
the philosophy of the calculus, acceleration is a mere math-
ematical limit, and does not itself express a definite state of
an accelerated particle. It may be remembered that, in dis-
cussing derivatives, we inquired whether it was possible to
regard them otherwise than as limits—whether, in fact, they
could be treated as themselves fractions. This we found im-
possible. In this conclusion there was nothing new, but its ap-
plication in Dynamics will yield much that is distinctly new.
It has been customary to regard velocity and acceleration as
physical facts, and thus to regard the laws of motion as con-
necting configuration and acceleration. This, however, as an
ultimate account, is forbidden to us. It becomes necessary to
seek a more integrated form for the laws of motion, and this
form, as is evident, must be one connecting three configura-
tions.
456. The first law of motion is regarded sometimes as a defi-
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nition of equal times. This view is radically absurd. In the first
place, equal times have no definition except as times whose
magnitude is the same. In the second place, unless the first law
told us when there is no acceleration (which it does not do), it
would not enable us to discover whatmotions are uniform. In
the third place, if it is always significant to say that a givenmo-
tion is uniform, there canbenomotionbywhichuniformity is
defined. In the fourth place, science holds that no motion oc-
curring innature is uniform; hence theremust be ameaningof
uniformity independent of all actual motions—and this defi-
nition is, the description of equal absolute distances in equal
absolute times.
The first law, in Newton’s form, asserts that velocity is un-
changed in the absence of causal action from some other piece
of matter. As it stands, this law is wholly confused. It tells us 483
nothing as to how we are to discover causal action, or as to
the circumstances under which causal action occurs. But an
important meaning may be found for it, by remembering that
velocity is a fiction, and that the only events that occur in any
material system are the various positions of its various parti-
cles. If we then assume (as all the laws of motion tacitly do)
that there is to be some relation between different configura-
tions, the law tells us that such a relation can only hold be-
tween three configurations, not between two. For two config-
urations are required for velocity, and another for change of
velocity, which is what the law asserts to be relevant. Thus in
any dynamical system, when the special laws (other than the
laws of motion) which regulate that system are specified, the
configuration at any given time can be inferred when two con-
figurations at two given times are known.
457. The second and third laws introduce the new idea of
mass; the third also gives one respect in which acceleration de-
pends upon configuration.
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The second law as it stands is worthless. For we know noth-
ing about the impressed force except that it produces change
ofmotion, and thus the lawmight seem to be amere tautology.
But by relating the impressed force to the configuration, an
important law may be discovered, which is as follows. In any
material system consisting of n particles, there are certain con-
stant coefficients (masses) m1;m2; : : :mn to be associated with
these particles respectively; and when these coefficients are
considered as forming part of the configuration, thenm1 mul-
tiplied by the corresponding acceleration is a certain function
of the momentary configuration; this is the same function for
all times and all configurations. It is also a function dependent
only upon the relative positions: the same configuration in an-
other part of space will lead to the same accelerations. That is,
if xr, yr, zr, be the coordinates ofmr at time t, we have xr = fr(t)
etc., and
m1x1 = F(m1;m2;m3; : : :mn; x2 x1; x3 x1 : : : xn x1; y2 y1; : : :).
This involves the assumption that x1 = f1(r) is a function hav-
ing a second differential coefficient x1; the use of the equation
involves the further assumption that x1 has a first and second
integral. The above, however, is a very specialized form of the
second law; in its general form, the function F may involve
other coefficients than themasses, and velocities as well as po-
sitions.
458. The third law is very interesting, and allows the analy-
sis of F into a vector sumof functions each depending only on
m1, and one other particlemr and their relative position. It as-
serts that the accelerationofm1 ismadeupof component accel-
erations having special reference respectively tom2;m3 : : :mn;;
and if these components be f12; f13; : : : f1n, it asserts that the ac- 484
celeration of any other particlemr has a corresponding compo-
nent fr1 such that
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mrfr1 =  m1f1r.
This law leads to the usual properties of the centre of mass.
For if x12 be the x-component of f12, we havem1x12 +m2x21 = 0,
and thus X
r
X
s
mrxrs = 0.
Again, the special reference of f12 tom2 can only be a reference
to themassm2, the distance r12, and the direction of the line 12;
for these are the only intrinsic relations of the two particles. It
is often specified as part of the third law that the acceleration
is in the direction 12, and this seems worthy to be included, as
specifying the dependence of f12 upon the line 12. Thus f12, is
along 12, and
f12 = φ(m1;m2; r12);
f21 = φ(m2;m1; r12)
and m1φ(m1;m2; r12) =  m2φ(m2;m1; r12);
or, measuring f12 from 1 towards 2, and f21 from 2 towards 1,
both will have the same sign, and
m1φ(m1;m2; r12) = m2φ(m2;m1; r12).
Hencem1φ(m1;m2; r12) is a symmetrical function ofm1 andm2,
say
ψ(m1;m2; r12).
Thus f12 =
1
m1
ψ(m1;m2; r12);
f21 =
1
m2
ψ(m1;m2; r12):
Thus the resultant acceleration of each particle is analyz-
able into components depending only upon itself and one
other particle; but this analysis applies only to the statement
in terms of acceleration. No such analysis is possible whenwe
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compare, not configuration and acceleration, but three config-
urations. At any moment, though the change of distance and
straight line 12 is not due to m1 and m2, alone, yet the acceler-
ation of m1 consists of components each of which is the same
as it would be if there were only one other particle in the field.
But where a finite time is in question this is no longer the case.
The total change in the position of m1 during a time t is not
what it would have been if m2 had first operated alone for a
time t, thenm3 alone and so on. Thus we cannot speak of any
total effect ofm2 or ofm3; and since momentary effects are fic-
tions, there are really no independent effects of separate par-
ticles onm1. The statement by means of accelerations is to be
regarded as a mathematical device, not as though there really
were an actual acceleration which is caused in one particle by
one other. And thus we escape the very grave difficulty which
we should otherwise have to meet, namely, that the compo- 485
nent accelerations, not being (in general) parts of the resultant
acceleration, would not be actual even if we allowed that accel-
eration is an actual fact.
459. The first two laws are completely contained in the fol-
lowing statement: In any independent system; the configura-
tion at any time is a function of that time and of the config-
urations at two given times, provided we include in configu-
ration the masses of the various particles composing the sys-
tem. The third law adds the further fact that the configuration
can be analyzed into distances and straight lines; the function
of the configuration which represents the acceleration of any
particle is a vector-sum of functions containing only one dis-
tance, one straight line, and twomasses each—moreover, if we
accept the addition to the third law spoken of above, each of
these functions is a vector along the join of the two particles
which enter into it. But for this law, it might happen that the
acceleration of m1 would involve the area of the triangle 1 2 3,
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or the volume of the tetrahedron 1 2 3 4; and but for this law,
we should not have the usual properties of the centre of mass.
The three laws together, as nowexpounded, give the greater
part of the law of gravitation; this law merely tells us that, so
far as gravitation is concerned, the above function
ψ(m1;m2; r12) = m1m2=r122.
It shouldbe remembered that nothing is known, from the laws
ofmotion, as to the formofψ, and thatwemighthave e.g.ψ = 0
if r12 > R. If ψ had this form, provided Rwere small compared
to sensible distances, the world would seem as though there
were no action at a distance.
It is to be observed that the first two laws, according to the
above analysis, merely state the general form of the law of
causality explained in Chapter lv. From this it results that we
shall be able, with the assumptions commonlymade as to con-
tinuity and the existence of first and second derivatives, to
determine a motion completely when the configuration and
velocities at a given instant are given; and in particular, these
data will enable us to determine the acceleration at the given
instant. The third law and the law of gravitation together add
the further properties that the momentary accelerations de-
pend only upon the momentary configuration, not upon the
momentary velocities, and that the resultant acceleration of
any particle is the vector-sum of components each dependent
only on themasses and distances of the given particle and one
other.
The question whether Newtonian Dynamics applies in
such problems as those of the motion of the ether is an inter-
esting and important one; but in so far as it dealswith the truth
or falsehood of the laws of motion in relation to the actual
world, it is for us irrelevant. For us, as pure mathematicians,
the laws of motion and the law of gravitation are not properly
laws at all, but parts of the definition of a certain kind of mat-
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ter.
460. By the above account the view of causality which has 486
usually satisfied philosophers is contravened in two respects,
(1) in that the relation embodied in a causal law holds between
three events, not between two; (2) in that the causal lawhas the
unity of a formula or function, i.e. of a constant relation, not
merely that derived from repetition of the same cause. The
first of these is necessitatedbymodern theories of the infinites-
imal calculus; the second was always necessary, at least since
Newton’s time. Both demand some elucidation.
(1) The whole essence of dynamical causation is contained
in the following equation: if t1; t2 be specified times, C1;C2
the corresponding configurations of any self-contained sys-
tem, andC the configuration at any time t, then
C = F(C1; t1;C2; t2; t)
(a compressed form for as many equations as C has coordi-
nates). The form of F depends only upon the number of parti-
cles and thedynamical laws of the system, not upon the choice
ofC1 orC2. The cause must be taken to be the two configura-
tions C1 and C2, and the interval t2   t1 may be any we please.
Further t may fall between t1 and t2, or before both. The ef-
fect is any single one of the coordinates of the system at time
t, or any collection of these coordinates; but it seems better
to regard each coordinate as one effect, since each is given in
one equation. Thus the language of cause and effect has to be
greatly strained tomeet the case, and seems scarcelyworthpre-
serving. The cause is two states of the whole system, at times
as far apart as we please; the effect is one coordinate of the
system at any time before, after, or between the times in the
cause. Nothing could well be more unlike the views which it
has pleased philosophers to advocate. Thus on the whole it is
not worthwhile preserving the word cause: it is enough to say,
what is far less misleading, that any two configurations allow
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us to infer any other.
(2) The causal law regulating any system is contained in the
formofF. The lawdoes not assert that one eventAwill always
be followed by another B; ifA be the configuration of the sys-
tem at one time, nothing can be inferred as to that at another;
the configurationmight recurwithout a recurrenceof any con-
figuration that formerly followed it. IfAbe two configurations
whose distance in time is given, then indeed our causal law
does tell us what configurations will follow them, and if A re-
curred, sowould its consequences. But if this were all that our
causal law told us, it would afford cold comfort, since no con-
figuration ever does actually recur. Moreover, we should need
an infinite number of causal laws to meet the requirements of
a system which has successively an infinite number of config-
urations. What our law does is to assert that an infinite class
of effects have each the same functional relation to one of an
infinite class of causes; and this is done bymeans of a formula.
One formula connects any three configurations, and but for 487
this fact continuousmotionswould not be amenable to causal
laws, which consist in specifications of the formula.
461. I have spoken hitherto of independent systems of n par-
ticles. It remains to examine whether any difficulties are intro-
duced by the fact that, in the dynamical world, there are no
independent systems short of the material universe. We have
seen that no effect can be ascribed, within a material system,
to anyonepart of the system; thewhole system isnecessary for
any inference as to what will happen to one particle. The only
effect traditionally attributed to the action of a single particle
on another is a component acceleration; but (α) this is not part
of the resultant acceleration, (β) the resultant acceleration it-
self is not an event, or a physical fact, but ameremathematical
limit. Hence nothing can be attributed to particular particles.
But it may be objected that we cannot know the whole mate-
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rial universe, and that, since no effect is attributable to any
part as such, we cannot consequently know anything about
the effect of the whole. For example, in calculating the mo-
tions of planets, we neglect the fixed stars; we pretend that the
solar system is the whole universe. By what right, then, do we
assume that the effects of this feigned universe in any way re-
semble those of the actual universe?
The answer to this question is found in the law of gravita-
tion. We can show that, if we compare the motions of a parti-
cle in a number of universes differing only as regards the mat-
ter at a greater distance than R, while much within this dis-
tance all of them containmuchmatter, then themotion of the
particle in question relatively to thematter well within the dis-
tance R will be approximately the same in all the universes*.
This is possible because, by the third law, a kind of fictitious
analysis into partial effects is possible. Thus we can approxi-
mately calculate the effect of a universe of which part only is
known. Wemust not say that the effect of the fixed stars is in-
sensible, for we assume that they have no effect per se; wemust
say that the effect of a universe in which they exist differs lit-
tle from that of one in which they do not exist; and this we
are able to prove in the case of gravitation. Speaking broadly,
we require (recurring to our previous function φ) that, if ε be
any number, however small, there should be some distance R
such that, recurring to our previous function φ, if dds denote
differentiation in any direction, then
d
ds
Z 1
r
φ(r)dr < ε if r > R.
When this condition is satisfied, the difference between the
relative accelerations of two particles within a certain region,
which results from assuming different distributions of matter
at a distance greater than R from a certain point within the
*This is true only of relative, not of absolute motions.
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region, will have an assignable upper limit; and hence there is
an upper limit to the error incurred by pretending that there is 488
nomatter outside the space of radiusR. Hence approximation
becomes possible in spite of the fact that thewhole universe is
involved in the exact determination of any motion.
The above leads to two observations of some interest. First,
no law which does not satisfy the above inequality is capable
of being practically applied or tested. The assumption that
gravity varies as the direct distance, for example, could only
be tested in a finite universe. And in all phenomena, such as
those of electricity, we must assume, where the total effect is
a sum or integral, or is calculated by means of a sum or inte-
gral, that the portion contributed to relative motions by large
values of r is small. Secondly, the denial of any partial effect
of a part is quite necessary if we are to apply our formulae to
an infinite universe in the form of integrals. For an integral is
not really an infinite sum, but the limit of a finite sum. Thus
if each particle had a partial effect, the total effect of an infi-
nite number of particles would not be an integral. But though
an integral cannot represent an infinite sum, there seems no
reason whatever why it should not represent the effect of a
universe which has an infinite number of parts. If there are
finite volumes containing an infinite number of particles, the
notion of mass must be modified so as to apply no longer to
single particles, but to infinite classes of particles. The density
at a point will then be not the mass of that point, but the dif-
ferential coefficient, at the point, of the mass with respect to
the volume.
It should be observed that the impossibility of an indepen-
dent system short of the whole universe does not result from
the laws of motion, but from the special laws, such as that of
gravitation, which the laws of motion lead us to seek.
462. The lawsofmotion, to conclude, havenovestigeof self-
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evidence; on the contrary, they contradict the form of causal-
ity which has usually been considered evident. Whether
they are ultimately valid, or are merely approximate general-
izations, must remain doubtful; the more so as, in all their
usual forms, they assume the truth of the axiomof parallels, of
whichwehave so far no evidence. The laws ofmotion, like the
axiom of parallels in regard to space, may be viewed either as
parts of a definition of a class of possiblematerial universes, or
as empirically verified assertions concerning the actual mate-
rial universe. But in noway can they be taken as à priori truths
necessarily applicable to any possible material world. The à
priori truths involved in Dynamics are only those of logic: as
a system of deductive reasoning, Dynamics requires nothing
further, while as a science of what exists, it requires exper-
iment and observation. Those who have admitted a similar
conclusion in Geometry are not likely to question it here; but
it is important to establish separately every instance of the
principle that knowledge as to what exists is never derivable
from general philosophical considerations, but is always and
wholly empirical.
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chapter lviii
ABSOLUTEANDRELATIVE
MOTION
463. In the justly famous scholium to the definitions, New- 489
ton has stated, with admirable precision, the doctrine of abso-
lute space, time, and motion. Not being a skilled philosopher,
he was unable to give grounds for his views, except an empiri-
cal argument derived from actual Dynamics. Leibniz, with an
unrivalled philosophical equipment, controverted Newton’s
position in his letters against Clarke*; and the victory, in the
opinion of subsequent philosophers, rested wholly with Leib-
niz. Although it would seem that Kant, in the Transcenden-
tal Aesthetic, inclines to absolute position in space, yet in the
MetaphysischeAnfangsgründe derNaturwissenschafthequite def-
initely adopts the relational view. Not only other philoso-
phers, but also men of science, have been nearly unanimous
in rejecting absolute motion, the latter on the ground that it
is not capable of being observed, and cannot therefore be a da-
tum in an empirical study.
But a great difficulty has always remained as regards the ar-
gument from absolute rotation, adduced by Newton himself.
This argument, in spite of a definite assertion that all motion
is relative, is accepted and endorsed by Clerk Maxwell†. It
*Phil. Werke, ed. Gerhardt, Vol. vii.
†Matter and Motion, Art. cv. Contrast Art. xxx.
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has been revived and emphasized by Heymans‡, combated by
Mach§, Karl Pearsonk, and many others, and made part of the
basis of a general attack onDynamics in ProfessorWard’sNat-
uralism and Agnosticism. Let us first state the argument in vari-
ous forms, and then examine some of the attempts to reply to
it. For us, since absolute time and space have been admitted,
there is no need to avoid absolute motion, and indeed no pos-
sibility of doing so. But if absolute motion is in any case un-
avoidable, this affords a new argument in favour of the justice
of our logic, which, unlike the logic current among philoso-
phers, admits and even urges its possibility.
464. If a bucket containing water is rotated, Newton ob- 490
serves, the water will become concave andmount up the sides
of the bucket. But if the bucket be left at rest in a rotating
vessel, the water will remain level in spite of the relative rota-
tion. Thus absolute rotation is involved in the phenomenon
in question. Similarly, from Foucault’s pendulum and other
similar experiments, the rotation of the earth can be demon-
strated, and could be demonstrated if there were no heav-
enly bodies in relation to which the rotation becomes sensi-
ble. But this requires us to admit that the earth’s rotation is
absolute. Simpler instances may be given, such as the case of
two gravitating particles. If the motion dealt with in Dynam-
ics werewholly relative, these particles, if they constituted the
whole universe, could onlymove in the line joining them, and
would therefore ultimately fall into one another. But Dynam-
ics teaches that, if they have initially a relative velocity not in
the line joining them, they will describe conics about their
common centre of gravity as focus. And generally, if accel-
‡Die Gesetze and Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens, Leyden, 1890.
§Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung, Leipzig, 1883. (Translated, London,
1902.)
kGrammar of Science, London, 1892. (2nd edition, 1900.)
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eration be expressed in polars, there are terms in the acceler-
ation which, instead of containing several differentials, con-
tain squares of angular velocities: these terms require abso-
lute angular velocity, and are inexplicable so long as relative
motion is adhered to.
If the law of gravitation be regarded as universal, the point
may be stated as follows. The laws of motion require to be
stated by reference towhat have been called kinetic axes: these
are in reality axes havingno absolute acceleration andno abso-
lute rotation. It is asserted, for example, when the third law is
combinedwith the notion ofmass, that, ifm;m0 be themasses
of twoparticles betweenwhich there is a force, the component
accelerations of the two particles due to this force are in the
ratio m2 : m1. But this will only be true if the accelerations
are measured relatively to axes which themselves have no ac-
celeration. We cannot here introduce the centre of mass, for,
according to the principle that dynamical facts must be, or be
derived from, observable data, the masses, and therefore the
centre of mass, must be obtained from the acceleration, and
not vice versâ. Hence any dynamical motion, if it is to obey the
laws ofmotion, must be referred to axes which are not subject
to any forces. But, if the law of gravitation be accepted, noma-
terial axes will satisfy this condition. Hence we shall have to
take spatial axes, and motions relative to these are of course
absolute motions.
465. In order to avoid this conclusion, C. Neumann* as-
sumes as an essential part of the laws of motion the existence,
somewhere, of an absolutely rigid “BodyAlpha,” by reference
to which all motions are to be estimated. This suggestion
misses the essence of the discussion, which is (or should be)
as to the logical meaning of dynamical propositions, not as to 491
*Die Galilei-Newtonsche Theorie, Leipzig, 1870, p. 15.
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the way in which they are discovered. It seems sufficiently evi-
dent that, if it is necessary to invent a fixed body, purely hypo-
thetical and serving no purpose except to be fixed, the reason
is that what is really relevant is a fixed place, and that the body
occupying it is irrelevant. It is true that Neumann does not in-
cur the vicious circle which would be involved in saying that
the BodyAlpha is fixed, while all motions are relative to it; he
asserts that it is rigid, but rightly avoids any statement as to its
rest ormotion, which, in his theory, would bewholly unmean-
ing. Nevertheless, it seems evident that the question whether
onebody is at rest or inmotionmusthave as goodameaning as
the same question concerning any other body; and this seems
sufficient to condemn Neumann’s suggested escape from ab-
solute motion.
466. A development of Neumann’s views is undertaken by
Streintz*, who refers motions to what he calls “fundamental
bodies” and “fundamental axes.” These are defined as bodies
or axes which do not rotate and are independent of all out-
side influences. Streintz follows Kant’s Anfangsgründe in re-
garding it as possible to admit absolute rotation while deny-
ing absolute translation. This is a view which I shall discuss
shortly, and which, as we shall see, though fatal to what is de-
sired of the relational theory, is yet logically tenable, though
Streintz does not show that it is so. But apart from this ques-
tion, two objections may be made to his theory. (1) If motion
meansmotion relative to fundamental bodies (and if not, their
introduction is no gain from a logical point of view), then the
law of gravitation becomes strictly meaningless if taken to be
universal—aviewwhich seems impossible to defend. The the-
ory requires that there should be matter not subject to any
forces, and this is denied by the law of gravitation. The point
*Die physikalischen Grundlagen der Mechanik, Leipzig, 1883; see esp. pp.
24, 25.
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is not so much that universal gravitation must be true, as that
it must be significant—whether true or false is an irrelevant
question. (2) We have already seen that absolute accelerations
are required even as regards translations, and that the failure
to perceive this is due to overlooking the fact that the centre of
mass is not a piece of matter, but a spatial point which is only
determined by means of accelerations.
467. Somewhat similar remarks apply to Mr W.H.
Macaulay’s article on “Newton’s Theory of Kinetics†.” Mr
Macaulay asserts that the true way to state Newton’s theory
(omitting points irrelevant to the present issue) is as follows:
“Axes of reference can be so chosen, and the assignment of
masses so arranged, that a certain decomposition of the rates
of change of momenta, relative to the axes, of all the parti-
cles of the universe is possible, namely one in which the com-
ponents occur in pairs; the members of each pair belonging 492
to two different particles, and being opposite in direction, in
the line joining the particles, and equal in magnitude” (p. 368).
Here again, a purely logical point remains. The above state-
ment appears unobjectionable, but it does not show that ab-
solute motion is unnecessary. The axes cannot be material,
for all matter is or may be subject to forces, and therefore un-
suitable for our purpose; they cannot even be defined by any
fixed geometrical relation to matter. Thus our axes will really
be spatial; and if there were no absolute space, the suggested
axes could not exist. For apart from absolute space, any axes
would have to bematerial or nothing. The axes can, in a sense,
be defined by relation tomatter, but not by a constant geomet-
rical relation; and when we ask what property is changed by
motion relative to such axes, the only possible answer is that
†Bulletin of theAmericanMath. Soc., Vol. iii. (1896–7). For a later state-
ment ofMrMacaulay’s views, see Art.Motion, Laws of, in the new volumes
of the Encycl. Brit. (Vol. xxxi).
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the absolute position has changed. Thus absolute space and
absolute motion are not avoided by Mr Macaulay’s statement
of Newton’s laws.
468. If absolute rotation alone were in question, it would
be possible, by abandoning all that recommends the relational
theory to philosophers and men of science, to keep its logi-
cal essence intact. What is aimed at is, to state the principles
of Dynamics in terms of sensible entities. Among these we
find themetrical properties of space, but not straight lines and
planes. Collinearity and coplanarity may be included, but if a
set of collinearmaterial points change their straight line, there
is no sensible intrinsic change. Hence all advocates of the rela-
tional theory, when they are thorough, endeavour, like Leib-
niz*, to deduce the straight line from distance. For this there
is also the reason that the field of a given distance is all space,
whereas the field of the generating relation of a straight line
is only that straight line, whence the latter, but not the for-
mer, makes an intrinsic distinction among the points of space,
which the relational theory seeks to avoid. Still, we might re-
gard straight lines as relations between material points, and
absolute rotation would then appear as change in a relation
between material points, which is logically compatible with a
relational theory of space. We should have to admit, however,
that the straight linewasnot a sensibleproperty of twoparticles
between which it was a relation; and in any case, the necessity
for absolute translational accelerations remains fatal to any re-
lational theory of motion.
469. Mach† has a very curious argument by which he at-
tempts to refute the grounds in favour of absolute rotation.
He remarks that, in the actual world, the earth rotates relating
to the fixed stars, and that the universe is not given twice over
*See my article “RecentWork on Leibniz,” inMind, 1903.
†Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung, 1st edition, p. 216.
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in different shapes, but only once, and as we find it. Hence
any argument that the rotation of the earth could be inferred
if there were no heavenly bodies is futile. This argument
contains the very essence of empiricism, in a sense in which
empiricism is radically opposed to the philosophy advocated 493
in the present work*. The logical basis of the argument is
that all propositions are essentially concerned with actual ex-
istents, not with entities whichmay ormay not exist. For if, as
has beenheld throughout our previous discussions, thewhole
dynamical world with its laws can be considered without re-
gard to existence, then it can be no part of the meaning of
these laws to assert that the matter to which they apply ex-
ists, and therefore they can be applied to universes which do
not exist. Apart from general arguments, it is evident that the
laws are so applied throughout rational Dynamics, and that,
in all exact calculations, the distribution ofmatter which is as-
sumed is not that of the actual world. It seems impossible to
deny significance to such calculations; and yet, if they have
significance, if they contain propositions at all, whether true
or false, then it can be no necessary part of theirmeaning to as-
sert the existence of thematter towhich they are applied. This
being so, the universe is given, as an entity, not only twice,
but as many times as there are possible distributions of mat-
ter, andMach’s argument falls to the ground. The point is im-
portant, as illustrating a respect in which the philosophy here
advocated is to be reckoned with idealism and not with em-
piricism, in spite of the contention that what exists can only
be known empirically.
Thus, to conclude: Absolute motion is essential to Dynam-
ics, and involves absolute space. This fact, which is a difficulty
in current philosophies, is for us a powerful confirmation of
*Cf.Art. “Nativism” in theDictionary of Philosophy andPsychology, edited
by Baldwin, Vol. ii, 1902.
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the logic upon which our discussions have been based.
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chapter lix
HERTZ’S DYNAMICS
470. We have seen that Newton’s Laws are wholly lacking 494
in self-evidence—somuch so, indeed, that they contradict the
lawof causation in a formwhichhas usually beenheld to be in-
dubitable. We have seen also that these laws are specially sug-
gestive of the law of gravitation. In order to eliminatewhat, in
elementaryDynamics, is speciallyNewtonian, fromwhat is re-
ally essential to the subject, we shall do well to examine some
attempts to re-state the fundamental principles in a formmore
applicable to such sciences as Electricity. For this purpose the
most suitable work seems to be that of Hertz*.
The fundamental principles of Hertz’s theory are so simple
and so admirable that it seems worth while to expound them
briefly. His object, like that of most recent writers, is to con-
struct a system inwhich there are only three fundamental con-
cepts, space, time, and mass. The elimination of a fourth con-
cept, such as force or energy, though evidently demanded by
theory, is difficult to carry out mathematically. Hertz seems,
however, to have overcome the difficulty in a satisfactoryman-
ner. There are, in his system, three stages in the specification
of a motion. In the first stage, only the relations of space and
time are considered: this stage is purely kinematical. Matter
appears here merely as a means of establishing, through the
*Principien der Mechanik, Leipzig, 1894.
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motion of a particle, a one-one correlation between a series
of points and a series of instants. At this stage a collection
of n particles has 3n coordinates, all so far independent: the
motions which result when all are regarded as independent
are all the thinkablemotions of the system. But before coming
to kinetics, Hertz introduces an intermediate stage. Without
introducing time, there are in any free material system direct
relations between space and mass, which form the geometri-
cal connections of the system. (These may introduce time in
the sense of involving velocities, but they are independent of
time in the sense that they are expressed at all times by the
same equations, and that these do not contain the time explic-
itly.) Those among thinkable motions which satisfy the equa-
tions of connection are called possible motions. The connec- 495
tions among the parts of a system are assumed further to be
continuous in a certain well-defined sense (p. 89). It then fol-
lows that they can be expressed by homogeneous linear differ-
ential equations of the first order among the coordinates. But
now a further principle is needed to discriminate among possi-
blemotions, andhereHertz introduces his only lawofmotion,
which is as follows:
“Every free system persists in its state of rest or of uniform
motion in a straightest path.”
This law requires some explanation. In the first place, when
there are in a systemunequal particles, each is split into a num-
ber of particles proportional to its mass. By this means all par-
ticles become equal. If now there are n particles, their 3n coor-
dinates are regarded as the coordinates of a point in space of
3n dimensions. The above law then asserts that, in a free sys-
tem, the velocity of this representative point is constant, and
its path from a given point to another neighbouring point in a
given direction is that one, among the possible paths through
these two points, which has the smallest curvature. Such a
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path is called a natural path, andmotion in it is called a natural
motion.
471. It will be seen that this system, though far simpler and
more philosophical in form than Newton’s, does not differ
very greatly in regard to the problems discussed in the preced-
ing chapter. We still have, what we found to be the essence of
the law of inertia, the necessity for three configurations in or-
der to obtain a causal relation. This broad fact must reappear
in every system at all resembling ordinary Dynamics, and is
exhibited in the necessity for differential equations of the sec-
ond order, which pervades all Physics. But there is one very
material difference between Hertz’s system and Newton’s—
a difference which, as Hertz points out, renders an experi-
mental decision between the two at least theoretically possi-
ble. The special laws, other than the laws of motion, which
regulate any particular system, are for Newton laws concern-
ing mutual accelerations, such as gravitation itself. For Hertz,
these special laws are all contained in the geometrical connec-
tions of the system, and are expressed in equations involving
only velocities (v. p. 48). This is a considerable simplification,
and is shown byHertz to be more conformable to phenomena
in all departments except where gravitation is concerned. It
is also a great simplification to have only one law of motion,
instead of Newton’s three. But for the philosopher, so long as
this law involves second differentials (which are introduced
through the curvature), it is a comparativelyminormatter that
the special laws of special systems should be of the first order.
The definition of mass as number of particles, it should be
observed, is ameremathematical device, and is not, I think, re-
garded by Hertz as anything more (v. p. 54). Not only must we
allow the possibility of incommensurable masses, but even if
this difficulty were overcome, it would still remain significant 496
to assert that all our ultimate particleswere equal. Masswould
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therefore still be a variety of magnitude, only that all particles
would happen to be of the same magnitude as regards their
mass. Thiswouldnot effect any theoretical simplification, and
we shall dowell, therefore, to retainmass as an intensive quan-
tity of which a certain magnitude belongs to a certain particle,
without any implication that the particle is divisible. There
is, in fact, no valid ground for denying ultimately different
masses to different particles. The whole question is, indeed,
purely empirical, and the philosopher should, in this matter,
accept passively what the physicist finds requisite.
With regard to ether and its relations to matter, a similar
remark seems to be applicable. Ether is, of course, matter in
the philosophical sense; but beyond this the present state of
Science will scarcely permit us to go. It should be observed,
however, that in Electricity, as elsewhere, our equations are
of the second order, thus indicating that the law of inertia, as
interpreted in the preceding chapter, still holds good. This
broad fact seems, indeed, to be the chief result, for philosophy,
of our discussion of dynamical principles.
472. Thus to sum up, we have two principal results:
(1) In any independent system, there is a relation between
the configurations at three given times, which is such that,
given the configurations at two of the times, the configuration
at the third time is determinate.
(2) There is no independent system in the actual world ex-
cept the whole material universe; but if two universes which
have the same causal laws as the actual universe differ only in
regard to thematter at a great distance froma given region, the
relative motions within this region will be approximately the
same in the twouniverses—i.e. an upper limit can be found for
the difference between the two sets of motions.
These twoprinciples apply equally to theDynamics ofNew-
ton and to that of Hertz. When these are abandoned, other
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principles will give a science having but little resemblance to
received Dynamics.
473. One general principle, which is commonly stated as
vital to Dynamics, deserves at least a passing mention. This
is the principle that the cause and effect are equal. Owing to
pre-occupationwith quantity and ignorance of symbolic logic,
it appears to have not been perceived that this statement is
equivalent to the assertion that the implication between cause
and effect ismutual. All equations, at bottom, are logical equa-
tions, i.e. mutual implications; quantitative equality between
variables, such as cause and effect, involves a mutual formal
implication. Thus the principle in question can only be main-
tained if cause and effect be placed on the same logical level,
which, with the interpretation we were compelled to give to
causality, it is no longer possible to do. Nevertheless, when
one state of the universe is given, any two others have a mu-
tual implication; and this is the source of the various laws of 497
conservationwhich pervadeDynamics, and give the truth un-
derlying the supposed equality of cause and effect.
474. Wemaynow review thewhole course of the arguments
contained in the present work. In Part I, an attempt is made
to analyze the nature of deduction, and of the logical con-
cepts involved in it. Of these, the most puzzling is the notion
of class, and from the contradiction discussed in Chapter x
(though this is perhaps soluble by the doctrine of types*), it
appeared that a tenable theory as to the nature of classes is
very hard to obtain. In subsequent Parts, it was shown that
existing pure mathematics (including Geometry and Rational
Dynamics) can be derived wholly from the indefinables and
indemonstrables of Part I. In this process, two points are spe-
cially important: the definitions and the existence-theorems.
*See Appendix B.
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A definition is always either the definition of a class, or the
definition of the single member of a unit class: this is a nec-
essary result of the plain fact that a definition can only be ef-
fected by assigning a property of the object or objects to be
defined, i.e. by stating a propositional function which they are
to satisfy. A kind of grammar controls definitions, making it
impossible e.g. to define Euclidean Space, but possible to de-
fine the class of Euclidean spaces. And wherever the principle
of abstraction is employed, i.e. where the object to be defined
is obtained from a transitive symmetrical relation, some class
of classes will always be the object required. When symbolic
expressions are used, the requirements of what may be called
grammar become evident, and it is seen that the logical type of
the entity defined is in no way optional.
The existence-theorems of mathematics—i.e. the proofs
that the various classes defined are not null—are almost all ob-
tained fromArithmetic. Itmaybewell here to collect themore
important of them. The existence of zero is derived from the
fact that thenull-class is amember of it; the existence of 1 from
the fact that zero is a unit-class (for the null-class is its only
member). Hence, from the fact that, if n be a finite number,
n+1 is the number of numbers from0 to n (both inclusive), the
existence-theorem follows for all finite numbers. Hence, from
the class of the finite cardinal numbers themselves, follows the
existence of α0, the smallest of the infinite cardinal numbers;
and from the series of finite cardinals in order of magnitude
follows the existence of ω, the smallest of infinite ordinals.
From the definition of the rational numbers and of their or-
der of magnitude follows the existence of η, the type of end-
less compact denumerable series; thence, from the segments
of the series of rationals, the existence of the real numbers,
and of θ, the type of continuous series. The terms of the series
of well-ordered types are proved to exist from the two facts: (1)
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that the number of well-ordered types from 0 to α is α + 1, (2)
that if u be a class of well-ordered types having no maximum, 498
the series of all types not greater than every u is itself of a type
greater than every u. From the existence of θ, by the definition
of complex numbers (Chapter xliv), we prove the existence
of the class of Euclidean spaces of any number of dimensions;
thence, by the process of Chapter xlvi, we prove the existence
of the class of projective spaces, and thence, by removing the
points outside a closed quadric, we prove the existence of the
class of non-Euclidean descriptive (hyperbolic) spaces. By the
methods of Chapter xlviii, we prove the existence of spaces
with various metrical properties. Lastly, by correlating some
of thepoints of a spacewith all the termsof a continuous series
in the ways explained in Chapter lvi, we prove the existence
of the class of dynamical worlds. Throughout this process, no
entities are employed but such as are definable in terms of the
fundamental logical constants. Thus the chain of definitions
and existence-theorems is complete, and the purely logical na-
ture of mathematics is established throughout.
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appendix a
THE LOGICALAND
ARITHMETICALDOCTRINES
OF FREGE
475. The work of Frege, which appears to be far less known 501
than it deserves, contains many of the doctrines set forth in
Parts I and II of the presentwork, andwhere it differs from the
views which I have advocated, the differences demand discus-
sion. Frege’s work abounds in subtle distinctions, and avoids
all the usual fallacies which beset writers on Logic. His sym-
bolism, though unfortunately so cumbrous as to be very dif-
ficult to employ in practice, is based upon an analysis of log-
ical notions much more profound than Peano’s, and is philo-
sophically very superior to its more convenient rival. In what
follows, I shall try briefly to expound Frege’s theories on the
most important points, and to explain my grounds for differ-
ing where I do differ. But the points of disagreement are very
few and slight compared to those of agreement. They all result
from difference on three points: (1) Frege does not think that
there is a contradiction in the notion of concepts which can-
not be made logical subjects (see §49 supra); (2) he thinks that,
if a term a occurs in a proposition, the proposition can always
be analysed into a and an assertion about a (see Chapter vii);
(3) he is not aware of the contradiction discussed inChapter x.
These are very fundamentalmatters, and it will bewell here to
discuss themafresh, since the previous discussionwaswritten
in almost complete ignorance of Frege’s work.
Frege is compelled, as I have been, to employ common
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words in technical senses which depart more or less from us-
age. As his departures are frequently different from mine, a
difficulty arises as regards the translation of his terms. Some
of these, to avoid confusion, I shall leave untranslated, since
every English equivalent that I can think of has been already
employed by me in a slightly different sense.
The principal heads under which Frege’s doctrines may be
discussed are the following: (1) meaning and indication; (2)
truth-values and judgment; (3) Begriff and Gegenstand; (4)
classes; (5) implication and symbolic logic; (6) the definition
of integers and the principle of abstraction; (7) mathematical
induction and the theory of progressions. I shall deal succes-
sively with these topics.
476. Meaning and indication. The distinction betweenmean- 502
ing (Sinn) and indication (Bedeutung)* is roughly, though not
exactly, equivalent to my distinction between a concept as
such and what the concept denotes (§96). Frege did not pos-
sess this distinction in the first two of the works under consid-
eration (the Begriffsschrift and the Grundlagen der Arithmetik);
it appears first in BuG. (cf. p. 198), and is specially dealt with in
SuB. Before making the distinction, he thought that identity
has to do with the names of objects (Bs. p. 13): “A is identical
withB”means, he says, that the signA and the signB have the
same signification (Bs. p. 15)—a definition which, verbally at
least, suffers from circulariiy. But later he explains identity in
much the same way as it was explained in §64. “Identity,” he
says, “calls for reflection owing to questions which attach to
it and are not quite easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation
between Gegenstände? or between names or signs of Gegen-
stande?” (SuB. p. 25). We must distinguish, he says, the mean-
*I donot translateBedeutungby denotation, because thiswordhas a tech-
nical meaning different from Frege’s, and also because bedeuten, for him, is
not quite the same as denoting for me.
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ing, inwhich is contained theway of being given, fromwhat is
indicated (from the Bedeutung). Thus “the evening star” and
“themorning star” have the same indication, but not the same
meaning. A word ordinarily stands for its indication; if we
wish to speak of its meaning, we must use inverted commas
or some such device (pp. 27–8). The indication of a proper
name is the object which it indicates; the presentation which
goes with it is quite subjective; between the two lies themean-
ing, which is not subjective and yet is not the object (p. 30). A
proper name expresses its meaning, and indicates its indication
(p. 31).
This theoryof indication ismore sweeping andgeneral than
mine, as appears from the fact that every proper name is sup-
posed to have the two sides. It seems to me that only such
proper names as are derived fromconcepts bymeans of the can
be said to have meaning, and that such words as John merely
indicate withoutmeaning. If one allows, as I do, that concepts
can be objects and have proper names, it seems fairly evident
that their proper names, as a rule, will indicate them without
having any distinct meaning; but the opposite view, though
it leads to an endless regress, does not appear to be logically
impossible. The further discussion of this point must be post-
poned until we come to Frege’s theory of Begriffe.
477. Truth-values and Judgment. The problem to be dis-
cussed under this head is the same as the one raised in §52†,
concerning the difference between asserted and unasserted
propositions. But Frege’s position on this question is more
subtle thanmine, and involves a more radical analysis of judg-
ment. His Begriffsschrift, owing to the absence of the distinc-
†This is the logical side of the problemofAnnahmen, raised byMeinong
in his able work on the subject, Leipzig, 1902. The logical, though not the
psychological, part ofMeinong’swork appears to have been completely an-
ticipated by Frege.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 736
tion between meaning and indication, has a simpler theory
than his later works. I shall therefore omit it from the discus-
sions.
There are, we are told (Gg. p. x), three elements in judg-
ment: (1) the recognition of truth, (2) the Gedanke, (3) the
truth-value (Wahrheitswerth). Here theGedanke is what I have 503
called an unasserted proposition—or rather, what I called by
this name covers both the Gedanke alone and the Gedanke
together with its truth-value. It will be well to have names
for these two distinct notions; I shall call the Gedanke alone a
propositional concept; the truth-value of a Gedanke I shall call
an assumption*. Formally at least, an assumption does not re-
quire that its content should be a propositional concept: what-
ever xmay be, “the truth of x” is a definite notion. This means
the true if x is true, and if x is false or not a proposition itmeans
the false (FuB. p. 21). In like manner, according to Frege, there
is “the falsehood of x”; these are not assertions and negations
of propositions, but only assertions of truth or of falsity, i.e.
negationbelongs towhat is asserted, and is not the opposite of
assertion†. Thuswehave first a propositional concept, next its
truth or falsity as the case may be, and finally the assertion of
its truth or falsity. Thus in a hypothetical judgment, we have a
relation, not of two judgments, but of two propositional con-
cepts (SuB. p. 43).
This theory is connected in a very curious waywith the the-
ory of meaning and indication. It is held that every assump-
tion indicates the true or the false (which are called truth-
values), while it means the corresponding propositional con-
cept. The assumption “22 = 4” indicates the true, we are told,
just as “22” indicates 4‡ (FuB. p. 13; SuB. p. 32). In a dependent
*Frege, like Meinong, calls this anAnnahme: FuB. p. 21.
†Gg. p. 10. Cf. also Bs. p. 4.
‡When a term which indicates is itself to be spoken of, as opposed to
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clause, or where a name occurs (such asOdysseus) which indi-
cates nothing, a sentence may have no indication. But when
a sentence has a truth-value, this is its indication. Thus every
assertive sentence (Behauptungssatz) is a proper name, which
indicates the true or the false (SuB. pp. 32–4; Gg. p. 7). The
sign of judgment (Urtheilstrich) does not combine with other
signs to denote an object; a judgment indicates nothing, but
asserts something. Frege has a special symbol for judgment,
which is something distinct from and additional to the truth-
value of a propositional concept (Gg. pp. 9–10).
478. There are some difficulties in the above theory which
it will be well to discuss. In the first place, it seems doubtful
whether the introduction of truth-values marks any real anal-
ysis. If we consider, say, “Caesar died,” it would seem that
what is asserted is thepropositional concept “thedeathofCae-
sar,” not “the truth of the death of Caesar.” This latter seems
to be merely another propositional concept, asserted in “the
death of Caesar is true,” which is not, I think, the same propo-
sition as “Caesar died.” There is great difficulty in avoiding
psychological elements here, and it would seem that Frege has
allowed them to intrude in describing judgment as the recog-
nition of truth (Gg. p. x). The difficulty is due to the fact that
there is a psychological sense of assertion, which is what is
lacking to Meinong’s Annahmen, and that this does not run
parallel with the logical sense. Psychologically, any propo-
sition, whether true or false, may be merely thought of, or
may be actually asserted: but for this possibility, error would
be impossible. But logically, true propositions only are as-
serted, though they may occur in an unasserted form as parts 504
of other propositions. In “p implies q,” either or both of the
propositions p; q may be true, yet each, in this proposition,
what it indicates, Frege uses inverted commas. Cf. §56.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 738
is unasserted in a logical, and not merely in a psychological,
sense. Thus assertion has a definite place among logical no-
tions, though there is a psychological notion of assertion to
which nothing logical corresponds. But assertion does not
seem to be a constituent of an asserted proposition, although
it is, in some sense, contained in an assertedproposition. If p is
a proposition, “p’s truth” is a conceptwhichhas being even if p
is false, and thus “p’s truth” is not the same as p asserted. Thus
no concept canbe foundwhich is equivalent to p asserted, and
therefore assertion is not a constituent in p asserted. Yet asser-
tion is not a term to which p, when asserted, has an external
relation; for any such relation would need to be itself asserted
in order to yield what we want. Also a difficulty arises owing
to the apparent fact, which may however be doubted, that an
asserted proposition can never be part of another proposition:
thus, if this be a fact, where any statement is made about p
asserted, it is not really about p asserted, but only about the
assertion of p. This difficulty becomes serious in the case of
Frege’s one and only principle of inference (Bs. p. 9): “p is
true and p implies q; therefore q is true*.” Here it is quite es-
sential that there should be three actual assertions, otherwise
the assertionofpropositionsdeduced fromassertedpremisses
would be impossible; yet the three assertions together form
one proposition, whose unity is shown by the word therefore,
without which q would not have been deduced, but would
have been asserted as a fresh premiss.
It is also almost impossible, at least to me, to divorce asser-
tion from truth, as Frege does. An asserted proposition, it
would seem, must be the same as a true proposition. We may
allow thatnegationbelongs to the content of a proposition (Bs.
p. 4), and regard every assertion as asserting something to be
true. We shall then correlate p and not-p as unasserted propo-
*Cf. supra, §18, (4) and §38.
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sitions, and regard “p is false” as meaning “not-p is true.” But
to divorce assertion from truth seems only possible by taking
assertion in a psychological sense.
479. Frege’s theory that assumptions are proper names for
the true or the false, as the case may be, appears to me also un-
tenable. Direct inspection seems to show that the relation of
a proposition to the true or the false is quite different from
that of (say), “the present King of England” to Edward VII.
Moreover, if Frege’s viewwere correct on this point,we should
have to hold that in an asserted proposition it is the meaning,
not the indication, that is asserted, for otherwise, all asserted
propositions would assert the very same thing, namely the
true, (for false propositions are not asserted). Thus asserted
propositions would not differ from one another in any way,
but would be all strictly and simply identical. Asserted propo-
sitions have no indication (FuB. p. 21), and can only differ, if
at all, in some way analogous to meaning. Thus the mean-
ing of theunassertedproposition togetherwith its truth-value
must bewhat is asserted, if themeaning simply is rejected. But 505
there seems no purpose in introducing the truth-value here: it
seemsquite sufficient to say that an assertedproposition is one
whose meaning is true, and that to say the meaning is true is
the same as to say themeaning is asserted. Wemight then con-
clude that true propositions, even when they occur as parts of
others, are always and essentially asserted, while false proposi-
tions are always unasserted, thus escaping the difficulty about
therefore discussed above. It may also be objected to Frege that
“the true” and “the false,” as opposed to truth and falsehood,
do not denote single definite things, but rather the classes of
true and false propositions respectively. This objection, how-
ever, would be met by his theory of ranges, which correspond
approximately tomy classes; these, he says, are things, and the
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true and the false are ranges (v. inf.).
480. Begriff andGegenstand. Functions. I comenow to a point
in which Frege’s work is very important, and requires care-
ful examination. His use of the word Begriff does not corre-
spondexactly to anynotion inmyvocabulary, though it comes
very near to the notion of an assertion as defined in §43, and
discussed in Chapter vii. On the other hand, his Gegenstand
seems to correspond exactly to what I have called a thing (§48).
I shall therefore translateGegenstand by thing. Themeaning of
proper name seems to be the same for him as for me, but he re-
gards the range of proper names as confined to things, because
they alone, in his opinion, can be logical subjects.
Frege’s theory of functions and Begriffe is set forth simply
in FuB. and defended against the criticisms of Kerry* in BuG.
He regards functions—and in this I agree with him—as more
fundamental than predicates and relations; but he adopts con-
cerning functions the theory of subject and assertion which
we discussed and rejected in Chapter vii. The acceptance of
this view gives a simplicity to his expositionwhich I have been
unable to attain; but I do not find anything in his work to per-
suade me of the legitimacy of his analysis.
An arithmetical function, e.g. 2x3+x, does not denote, Frege
says, the result of an arithmetical operation, for that ismerely a
number, whichwould be nothing new (FuB. p. 5). The essence
of a function is what is left when the x is taken away, i.e., in
the above instance, 2( )3 + ( ). The argument x does not be-
long to the function, but the two together make a whole (ib.
p. 6). A function may be a proposition for every value of the
variable; its value is then always a truth-value (p. 13). A propo-
sition may be divided into two parts, as “Caesar” and “con-
quered Gaul.” The former Frege calls the argument, the latter
the function. Any thing whatever is a possible argument for a
*Vierteljahrschrift für wiss. Phil., vol. xi, pp. 249–307.
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function (p. 17). (This divisionof propositions corresponds ex-
actly to my subject and assertion as explained in §43, but Frege
does not restrict thismethod of analysis as I do inChapter vii.)
A thing is anything which is not a function, i.e.whose expres-
sion leaves no empty place. The two following accounts of the
nature of a function are quoted from the earliest and one of
the latest of Frege’s works respectively.
(1) “If in an expression, whose content need not be proposi-
tional (beurtheilbar), a simple or composite sign occurs in one 506
or more places, and we regard it as replaceable, in one or more
of these places, by something else, but by the same everywhere,
then we call the part of the expression which remains invari-
able in this process a function, and the replaceable part we call
its argument” (Bs. p. 16).
(2) “If from a proper namewe exclude a proper name, which
is part or the whole of the first, in some or all of the places
where it occurs, but in such away that these places remain rec-
ognizable as to be filled by one and the same arbitrary proper
name (as argument positions of the first kind), I call what we
thereby obtain the name of a function of the first order with
one argument. Such a name, together with a proper name
which fills the argument-places, forms a proper name” (Gg. p.
44).
The latter definition may become plainer by the help of
some examples. “The present king of England” is, accord-
ing to Frege, a proper name, and “England” is a proper name
which is part of it. Thus here we may regard England as the
argument, and “the present king of” as function. Thus we are
led to “thepresent kingof x.” This expressionwill alwayshave
a meaning, but it will not have an indication except for those
values of x which at present are monarchies. The above func-
tion is not propositional. But “Caesar conquered Gaul” leads
to “x conqueredGaul”; here we have a propositional function.
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There is here aminor point to be noticed: the asserted proposi-
tion is not a proper name, but only the assumption is a proper
name for the true or the false (v. supra); thus it is not “Caesar
conquered Gaul” as asserted, but only the corresponding as-
sumption, that is involved in the genesis of a propositional
function. This is indeed sufficiently obvious, since we wish
x to be able to be any thing in “x conquered Gaul,” whereas
there is no such asserted proposition except when x did ac-
tually perform this feat. Again consider “Socrates is a man
implies Socrates is a mortal.” This (unasserted) is, according
to Frege, a proper name for the true. By varying the proper
name “Socrates,” we can obtain three propositional functions,
namely “x is a man implies Socrates is a mortal,” “Socrates is a
man implies x is amortal,” “x is aman implies x is amortal.” Of
these the first and third are true for all values of x, the second
is true when and only when x is a mortal.
By suppressing in like manner a proper name in the name
of a function of the first order with one argument, we obtain
the name of a function of the first order with two arguments
(Gg. p. 44). Thus e.g. starting from “1 < 2,” we get first “x < 2,”
which is thenameof a functionof thefirst orderwithone argu-
ment, and thence “x < y,” which is the name of a function of
the first order with two arguments. By suppressing a function
in like manner, Frege says, we obtain the name of a function
of the second order (Gg. p. 44). Thus e.g. the assertion of ex-
istence in the mathematical sense is a function of the second
order: “There is at least one value of x satisfying φx” is not a
function of x, but may be regarded as a function of φ. Here φ
must onno account be a thing, butmay be any function. Thus
this proposition, considered as a function of φ, is quite differ-
ent from functions of the first order, by the fact that the possi-
ble arguments are different. Thus given any proposition, say
f(a), wemay consider either f(x), the function of the first order 507
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 743
resulting from varying a and keeping f constant, or φ(a), the
function of the second order got by varying f and keeping a
fixed; or, finally, we may consider φ(x), in which both f and a
are separately varied. (It is to be observed that such notions
as φ(a), in which we consider any proposition concerning a,
are involved in the identity of indiscernibles as stated in §43.)
Functions of the first order with two variables, Frege points
out, express relations (Bs. p. 17); the referent and the relatum
are both subjects in a relational proposition (Gl. p. 82). Rela-
tions, just as much as predicates, belong, Frege rightly says, to
pure logic (ib. p. 83).
481. The word Begriff is used by Frege to mean nearly the
same thing as propositional function (e.g.FuB. p. 28)*; when there
are two variables, the Begriff is a relation. A thing is anything
not a function, i.e. anythingwhose expression leaves no empty
place (ib. p. 18). To Frege’s theory of the essential cleavage be-
tween things and Begriffe, Kerry objects (loc. cit. p. 272ff.) that
Begriffe also can occur as subjects. To this Frege makes two
replies. In the first place, it is, he says, an important distinc-
tion that some terms can only occur as subjects, while others
can occur also as concepts, even if Begriffe can also occur as
subjects (BuG. p. 195). In this I agree with him entirely; the
distinction is the one employed in §§48, 49. But he goes on
to a second point which appears to me mistaken. We can, he
says, have a concept falling under a higher one (as Socrates
falls under man, he means, not as Greek falls under man); but
in such cases, it is not the concept itself, but its name, that is in
question (BuG. p. 195). “The concept horse,” he says, is not a
concept, but a thing; the peculiar use is indicated by inverted
commas (ib. p. 196). But a few pages later he makes statements
*“We have here a function whose value is always a truth-value. Such
functions with one argument we have called Begriffe; with two, we call
them relations.” Cf. Gl. pp. 82–3.
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which seem to involve a different view. A concept, he says,
is essentially predicative even when something is asserted of
it: an assertion which can be made of a concept does not fit
an object. When a thing is said to fall under a concept, and
when a concept is said to fall under a higher concept, the two
relations involved, though similar, are not the same (ib. p. 201).
It is difficult to me to reconcile these remarks with those of p.
195; but I shall return to this point shortly.
Frege recognizes the unity of a proposition: of the parts
of a propositional concept, he says, not all can be complete,
but one at least must be incomplete (ungesättigt) or predica-
tive, otherwise the parts would not cohere (ib. p. 205). He rec-
ognizes also, though he does not discuss, the oddities result-
ing from any and every and such words: thus he remarks that
every positive integer is the sum of four squares, but “every
positive integer” is not a possible value of x in “x is the sum
of four squares.” The meaning of “every positive integer,” he
says, depends upon the context (Bs. p. 17)—a remark which
is doubtless correct, but does not exhaust the subject. Self-
contradictory notions are admitted as concepts: F is a concept
if “a falls under the conceptF” is a propositionwhatever thing
amay be (Gl. p. 87). A concept is the indication of a predicate;
a thing is what can never be the whole indication of a predi- 508
cate, though it may be that of a subject (BuG. p. 198).
482. The above theory, in spite of close resemblance, dif-
fers in some important points from the theory set forth in Part
I above. Before examining the differences, I shall briefly reca-
pitulate my own theory.
Given any propositional concept, or any unity (see §136),
which may in the limit be simple, its constituents are in gen-
eral of two sorts: (1) those which may be replaced by anything
else whatever without destroying the unity of the whole; (2)
thosewhichhavenot this property. Thus in “thedeathofCae-
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sar,” anything elsemay be substituted forCaesar, but a proper
name must not be substituted for death, and hardly anything
can be substituted for of. Of the unity in question, the former
class of constituentswill be called terms, the latter concepts. We
have then, in regard to any unity, to consider the following ob-
jects:
(1) What remains of the said unity when one of its terms is
simply removed, or, if the term occurs several times, when it is
removed from one ormore of the places in which it occurs, or,
if the unity has more than one term, when two or more of its
terms are removed from some or all of the places where they
occur. This is what Frege calls a function.
(2) The class of unities differing from the said unity, if at
all, only by the fact that one of its terms has been replaced, in
one ormore of the placeswhere it occurs, by someother terms,
or by the fact that two or more of its terms have been thus re-
placed by other terms.
(3) Any member of the class (2).
(4) The assertion that every member of the class (2) is true.
(5) The assertion that some member of the class (2) is true.
(6) The relation of a member of the class (2) to the value
which the variable has in that member.
The fundamental case is that where our unity is a propo-
sitional concept. From this is derived the usual mathemati-
cal notion of function, which might at first sight seem sim-
pler. If f(x) is not a propositional function, its value for a given
value of x (f(x) being assumed to be one-valued) is the term y
satisfying the propositional function y = f(x), i.e. satisfying,
for the given value of x, some relational proposition; this re-
lational proposition is involved in the definition of f(x), and
some such propositional function is required in the definition
of any function which is not propositional.
As regards (1), confining ourselves to one variable, it was
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maintained in Chapter vii that, except where the proposition
from which we start is predicative or else asserts a fixed rela-
tion to a fixed term, there is no such entity: the analysis into
argument and assertion cannot be performed in the manner
required. Thus what Frege calls a, function, if our conclusion
was sound, is in general a non-entity. Another point of differ-
ence from Frege, in which, however, he appears to be in the
right, lies in the fact that I place no restriction upon the vari-
ation of the variable, whereas Frege, according to the nature
of the function, confines the variable to things, functions of
the first order with one variable, functions of the first order
with two variables, functions of the second order with one
variable, and so on. There are thus for him an infinite num-
ber of different kinds of variability. This arises from the fact 509
that he regards as distinct the concept occurring as such and
the concept occurring as term, which I (§49) have identified.
For me, the functions, which cannot be values of variables in
functions of the first order, are non-entities and false abstrac-
tions. Instead of the rump of a proposition considered in (1),
I substitute (2) or (3) or (4) according to circumstances. The
ground for regarding the analysis into argument and function
as not always possible is that, when one term is removed from
a propositional concept, the remainder is apt to have no sort
of unity, but to fall apart into a set of disjointed terms. Thus
what is fundamental in such a case is (2). Frege’s general defi-
nition of a function, which is intended to cover also functions
which are not propositional, may be shown to be inadequate
by considering whatmay be called the identical function, i.e. x
as a function of x. If we follow Frege’s advice, and remove x in
hopes of having the function left, we find that nothing is left
at all; yet nothing is not the meaning of the identical function.
Frege wishes to have the empty places where the argument is
tobe inserted indicated in someway; thushe says that in 2x3+x
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the function is 2( )3 + ( ). But here his requirement that the
twoemptyplaces are tobefilledby the same letter cannotbe in-
dicated: there is no way of distinguishing what wemean from
the function involved in 2x3 + y. The fact seems to be that we
want the notion of any term of a certain class, and that this is
what our empty places really stand for. The function, as a sin-
gle entity, is the relation (6) above; we can then consider any
relatum of this relation, or the assertion of all or some of the
relata, and any relation can be expressed in terms of the corre-
sponding referent, as “Socrates is aman” is expressed in terms
of Socrates. But the usual formal apparatus of the calculus of
relations cannot be employed, because it presupposes proposi-
tional functions. We may say that a propositional function is
a many-one relation which has all terms for the class of its ref-
erents, and has its relata contained among propositions*: or,
if we prefer, we may call the class of relata of such a relation a
propositional function. But the air of formal definition about
these statements is fallacious, since propositional functions
are presupposed in defining the class of referents and relata
of a relation.
Thus bymeans of propositional functions, propositions are
collected into classes. (These classes are not mutually exclu-
sive.) But we may also collect them into classes by the terms
which occur in them: all propositions containing a given term
awill forma class. In thiswayweobtain propositions concern-
ing variable propositional functions. In the notation φ(x), the
φ is essentially variable; if wewish it not to be so, wemust take
some particular proposition about x, such as “x is a class” or “x
implies x.” Thus φ(x) essentially contains two variables. But,
ifwehavedecided thatφ is not a separable entity,we cannot re-
gard φ itself as the second variable. It will be necessary to take
*Not all relations having this property are propositional functions; v.
inf.
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as our variable either the relation of x to φ(x), or else the class
of propositions φ(y) for different values of y but for constant
φ. This does not matter formally, but it is important for logic
to be clear as to the meaning of what appears as the variation 510
of φ. We obtain in this way another division of propositions
into classes, but again these classes are notmutually exclusive.
In the above manner, it would seem, we can make use of
propositional functions without having to introduce the ob-
jectswhichFrege calls functions. It is to be observed, however,
that the kind of relation by which propositional functions are
defined is less general than the class ofmany-one relationshav-
ing their domain coextensive with terms and their converse
domain contained in propositions. For in this way any propo-
sition would, for a suitable relation, be relatum to any term,
whereas the term which is referent must, for a propositional
function, be a constituent of the proposition which is its re-
latum*. This point illustrates again that the class of relations
involved is fundamental and incapable of definition. But it
would seem also to show that Frege’s different kinds of vari-
ability are unavoidable, for in considering (say) φ(2), where
φ is variable, the variable would have to have as its range the
above class of relations, which we may call propositional rela-
tions. Otherwise,φ(2) is not a proposition, and is indeedmean-
ingless, forwe are dealingwith an indefinable, whichdemands
thatφ(2) shouldbe the relatumof 2with regard to somepropo-
sitional relation. The contradiction discussed in Chapter x
seems to show that some mystery lurks in the variation of
propositional functions; but for the present, Frege’s theory of
different kinds of variables must, I think, be accepted.
483. It remains to discuss afresh the question whether con-
cepts can be made into logical subjects without change of
*The notion of a constituent of a proposition appears to be a logical
indefinable.
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meaning. Frege’s theory, that when this appears to be done
it is really the name of the concept that is involved, will not,
I think, bear investigation. In the first place, the mere asser-
tion “not the concept, but its name, is involved,” has already
made the concept a subject. In the second place, it seems al-
ways legitimate to ask: “what is it that is named by this name?”
If there were no answer, the name could not be a name; but if
there is an answer, the concept, as opposed to its name, can be
made a subject. (Frege, it may be observed, does not seem to
have clearly disentangled the logical and linguistic elements of
naming: the former depend upon denoting, and have, I think,
a much more restricted range than Frege allows them.) It is
true that we found difficulties in the doctrine that everything
can be a logical subject: as regards “any a,” for example, and
also as regards plurals. But in the case of “any a,” there is am-
biguity, which introduces a new class of problems; and as re-
gardsplurals, there arepropositions inwhich themanybehave
like a logical subject in every respect except that they aremany
subjects and not one only (see §§127, 128). In the case of con-
cepts, however, no such escapes are possible. The case of as-
serted propositions is difficult, but is met, I think, by holding
that an asserted proposition is merely a true proposition, and
is therefore asserted wherever it occurs, even when grammar
would lead to the opposite conclusion. Thus, on the whole,
thedoctrineof conceptswhich cannot bemade subjects seems
untenable.
484. Classes. Frege’s theory of classes is very difficult, and I
amnot sure that I have thoroughly understood it. He gives the 511
nameWerthverlauf* to an entitywhich appears to be nearly the
same as what I call the class as one. The concept of the class,
and the class as many, do not appear in his exposition. He dif-
*I shall translate this as range.
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fers from the theory set forth in Chapter vi chiefly by the fact
that he adopts a more intensional view of classes than I have
done, being led theretomainly by the desirability of admitting
the null-class and of distinguishing a term from a class whose
only member it is. I agree entirely that these two objects can-
not be attained by an extensional theory, though I have tried
to show how to satisfy the requirements of formalism (§§69,
73).
The extension of a Begriff, Frege says, is the range of a func-
tion whose value for every argument is a truth-value (FuB. p.
16). Ranges are things, whereas functions are not (ib. p. 19).
There would be no null-class, if classes were taken in exten-
sion; for the null-class is only possible if a class is not a collec-
tion of terms (KB. pp. 436–7). If x be a term, we cannot iden-
tify x, as the extensional view requires, with the class whose
onlymember is x; for suppose x to be a class havingmore than
one member, and let y; z be two different members of x; then
if x is identical with the class whose only member is x, y and z
will both be members of this class, and will therefore be iden-
tical with x and with each other, contrary to the hypothesis†.
The extension of a Begriff has its being in the Begriff itself, not
in the individuals falling under the Begriff (ib. p. 451). When I
say something about all men, I say nothing about somewretch
in the centre of Africa, who is in no way indicated, and does
not belong to the indication of man (p. 454). Begriffe are prior
to their extension, and it is a mistake to attempt, as Schröder
does, to base extension on individuals; this leads to the calcu-
lus of regions (Gebiete), not to Logic (p. 455).
What Frege understands by a range, and in what way it is
to be conceived without reference to objects, he endeavours
to explain in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. He begins by de-
ciding that two propositional functions are to have the same
†Ib. p. 444. Cf. supra, §74.
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range when they have the same value for every value of x, i.e.
for every value of x both are true or both false (pp. 7, 14) This
is laid down as a primitive proposition. But this only deter-
mines the equality of ranges, not what they are in themselves.
If X(ξ) be a function which never has the same value for dif-
ferent values of ξ and if we denote by φ0 the range of φx, we
shall have X(φ0) = X(ψ0) when and only when φ0 and ψ0 are
equal, i.e.whenandonlywhenφx andψx alwayshave the same
value. Thus the conditions for the equality of ranges do not of
themselves decide what ranges are to be (p. 16). Let us decide
arbitrarily—since the notion of a range is not yet fixed—that
the true is to be the range of the function “x is true” (as an as-
sumption, not an asserted proposition), and the false is to be
the range of the function “x = not every term is identical with
itself.” It follows that the range ofφx is the truewhen and only
when the true and nothing else falls under the Begriff φx; the
range ofφx is the falsewhen andonlywhen the false andnoth-
ing else falls under the Begriff φx; in other cases, the range is
neither the true nor the false (pp. 17–18). If only one thing falls 512
under a concept, this one thing is distinct from the range of
the concept in question (p. 18, note)—the reason is the same
as that mentioned above.
There is an argument (p. 49) to prove that the name of the
range of a function always has an indication, i.e. that the sym-
bol employed for it is never meaningless. In view of the con-
tradictiondiscussed inChapter x, I should be inclined to deny
a meaning to a range when we have a proposition of the form
φ[f(φ)], where f is constant and φ variable, or of the form fx(x),
where x is variable and fx is a propositional function which is
determinate when x is given, but varies from one value of x to
another—provided, when fx is analyzed into things and con-
cepts, the part dependent on x does not consist only of things,
but contains also at least one concept. This is a very compli-
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cated case, in which, I should say, there is no class as one, my
only reason for saying so being that we can thus escape the
contradiction.
485. Bymeans of variable propositional functions, Frege ob-
tains a definition of the relation which Peano calls ϵ, namely
the relation of a term to a class of which it is a member*. The
definition is as follows: “a ϵ u” is to mean the term (or the
range of terms if there be none or many) x such that there is a
propositional function φwhich is such that u is the range of φ
andφa is identical with x (p. 53). It is observed that this defines
a ϵ uwhatever things a andumaybe. In the first place, suppose
u to be a range. Then there is at least one φ whose range is u,
and any two whose range is u are regarded by Frege as identi-
cal. Thus we may speak of the function φwhose range is u. In
this case, a ϵ u is the proposition φa, which is true when a is a
member of u, and is false otherwise. If, in the second place, u
is not a range, then there, is no such propositional function as
φ, and therefore a ϵ u is the range of a propositional function
which is always false, i.e. the null-range. Thus a ϵ u indicates
the true when u is a range and a is a member of u; a ϵ u indi-
cates the false when u is a range and a is not a member of u; in
other cases, a ϵ u indicates the null-range.
It is to be observed that from the equivalence of x ϵ u, and
x ϵ v for all values of x we can only infer the identity of u and
v when u and v are ranges. When they are not ranges, the
equivalence will always hold, since x ϵ u and x ϵ v are the null-
range for all values of x; thus ifwe allowed the inference in this
case, any two objects which are not ranges would be identical,
which is absurd. One might be tempted to doubt whether u
and v must be identical even when they are ranges: with an
intensional view of classes, this becomes open to question.
Frege proceeds (p. 55) to an analogous definition of the
*Cf. §§21, 76, supra.
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propositional function of three variableswhich I have symbol-
ised as, xRy, and here again he gives a definition which does
not place any restrictions on the variability of R. This is done
by introducing a double range, defined by a propositional func-
tion of two variables; we may regard this as a class of couples
with sense†. If then R is such a class of couples, and if (x; y) is
a member of this class, xRy is to hold; in other cases it is to be 513
false or null as before. On this basis, Frege successfully erects
as much of the logic of relations as is required for his Arith-
metic; and he is free from the restrictions on the variability of
R which arise from the intensional view of relations adopted
in the present work (cf. §83).
486. The chief difficulty which arises in the above theory of
classes is as to the kind of entity that a range is to be. The rea-
son which led me, against my inclination, to adopt an exten-
sional view of classes, was the necessity of discovering some
entity determinate for a given propositional function, and the
same for any equivalent propositional function. Thus “x is
a man” is equivalent (we will suppose) to “x is a featherless
biped,” and we wish to discover some one entity which is de-
termined in the same way by both these propositional func-
tions. The only single entity I have been able to discover is the
class as one—except the derivative class (also as one) of propo-
sitional functions equivalent to either of the given proposi-
tional functions. This latter class is plainly a more complex
notion, which will not enable us to dispense with the general
notion of class; but this more complex notion (so we agreed
in §73) must be substituted for the class of terms in the sym-
bolic treatment, if there is to be any null-class and if the class
whose onlymember is a given term is to be distinguished from
that term. It would certainly be a very great simplification to
†Neglecting, for the present, our doubts as to there being any such en-
tity as a couple with sense, cf. §98.
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admit, as Frege does, a range which is something other than
the whole composed of the terms satisfying the propositional
function in question; but formy part, inspection reveals tome
no such entity. On this ground, and also on account of the
contradiction, I feel compelled to adhere to the extensional
theory of classes, though not quite as set forth in Chapter vi.
487. That somemodification in that doctrine is necessary, is
proved by the argument of KB. p. 444. This argument appears
capable of proving that a class, even as one, cannot be identi-
fiedwith the class ofwhich it is the onlymember. In §74, I con-
tended that the argument was met by the distinction between
the class as one and the class asmany, but this contention now
appears to me mistaken. For this reason, it is necessary to re-
examine the whole doctrine of classes.
Frege’s argument is as follows. If a is a class of more than
one term, and if a is identical with the class whose only term
is a, then to be a term of a is the same thing as to be a term of
the class whose only term is a, whence a is the only term of
a. This argument appears to prove not merely that the exten-
sional view of classes is inadequate, but rather that it is wholly
inadmissible. For suppose a to be a collection, and suppose
that a collection of one term is identical with that one term.
Then, if a can be regarded as one collection, the above argu-
ment proves that a is the only term of a. We cannot escape
by saying that ϵ is to be a relation to the class-concept or the
concept of the class or the class asmany, for if there is any such
entity as the class as one, therewill be a relation,whichwemay
call ϵ, between terms and their classes as one. Thus the above
argument leads to the conclusion that either (α) a collection of
more than one term is not identical with the collection whose
only term it is, or (β) there is no collection as one term at all
in the case of a collection of many terms, but the collection is
strictly and only many. One or other of these must be admit- 514
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ted in virtue of the above argument.
488. (α) To either of these views there are grave objections.
The former is the view of Frege and Peano. To realize the para-
doxical nature of this view, it must be clearly grasped that it is
not only the collection asmany, but the collection as one, that
is distinct from the collectionwhose only term it is. (I speak of
collections, because it is important to examine the bearing of
Frege’s argument upon the possibility of an extensional stand-
point.) This view, in spite of its paradox, is certainly the one
which seems to be required by the symbolism. It is quite essen-
tial that we should be able to regard a class as a single object,
that there should be a null-class, and that a term should not
(in general, at any rate) be identical with the class of which it
is the only member. It is subject to these conditions that the
symbolicmeaning of class has to be interpreted. Frege’s notion
of a range may be identified with the collection as one, and all
will then go well. But it is very hard to see any entity such as
Frege’s range, and the argument that there must be such an
entity gives us little help. Moreover, in virtue of the contra-
diction, there certainly are cases where we have a collection as
many, but no collection as one (§104). Let us then examine (β),
and see whether this offers a better solution.
(β) Let us suppose that a collection of one term is that one
term, and that a collection of many terms is (or rather are)
thosemany terms, so that there is not a single term at all which
is the collection of the many terms in question. In this view
there is, at first sight at any rate, nothing paradoxical, and it
has themerit of admitting universally what theContradiction
shows to be sometimes the case. In this case, unless we aban-
don one of our fundamental dogmas, ϵ will have to be a re-
lation of a term to its class-concept, not to its class; if a is a
class-concept, what appears symbolically as the class whose
only term is a will (one might suppose) be the class-concept
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under which falls only the concept a, which is of course (in
general, if not always) different from a. We shall maintain, on
account of the contradiction, that there is not always a class-
concept for a given propositional function φx, i.e. that there is
not always, for every φ, some class-concept a such that x ϵ a is
equivalent to φx for all values of x; and the cases where there
is no such class-concept will be cases in which φ is a quadratic
form.
So far, all goeswell. But nowweno longer have one definite
entitywhich is determined equally by any one of a set of equiv-
alent propositional functions, i.e. there is, it might be urged,
no meaning of class left which is determined by the extension
alone. Thus, to take a case where this leads to confusion, if
a and b be different class-concepts such that x ϵ a and x ϵ b are
equivalent for all values of x, the class-concept under which
a falls and nothing else will not be identical with that under
which falls b and nothing else. Thus we cannot get any way of
denoting what should symbolically correspond to the class as
one. Or again, if u and v be similar but different classes, “simi-
lar to u” is a different concept from “similar to v”; thus, unless
we canfind someextensionalmeaning for class, we shall not be
able to say that the number of u is the same as that of v. And
all the usual elementary problems as to combinations (i.e. as to
the number of classes of specified kinds contained in a given 515
class) will have become impossible and evenmeaningless. For
these various reasons, an objector might contend, something
like the class as onemust bemaintained; and Frege’s range ful-
fils the conditions required. It would seem necessary there-
fore to accept ranges by an act of faith, without waiting to see
whether there are such things.
Nevertheless, the non-identification of the class with the
class as one, whether in my form or in the form of Frege’s
range, appears unavoidable, and by a process of exclusion the
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class as many is left as the only object which can play the part
of a class. By a modification of the logic hitherto advocated
in the present work, we shall, I think, be able at once to sat-
isfy the requirements of the Contradiction and to keep in har-
mony with common sense*.
489. Let us begin by recapitulating the possible theories of
classeswhich have presented themselves. A classmay be iden-
tified with (α) the predicate, (β) the class concept, (γ) the con-
cept of the class, (δ) Frege’s range, (ε) the numerical conjunc-
tion of the terms of the class, (ζ) the whole composed of the
terms of the class.
Of these theories, the first three, which are intensional,
have the defect that they do not render a class determinate
when its terms are given. The other three do not have this de-
fect, but they have others. (δ) suffers from a doubt as to there
being such an entity, and also from the fact that, if ranges are
terms, the contradiction is inevitable, (ε) is logically unobjec-
tionable, but is not a single entity, except when the class has
only one member. (ζ) cannot always exist as a term, for the
same reason as applies against (δ); also it cannot be identified
with the class on account of Frege’s argument†.
Nevertheless, without a single object‡ to represent an ex-
tension, Mathematics crumbles. Two propositional functions
which are equivalent for all values of the variable may not be
identical, but it is necessary that there should be some object
determined by both. Any object that may be proposed, how-
ever, presupposes thenotionof class. Wemaydefine classopta-
tively as follows: A class is an object uniquely determined by a
propositional function, and determined equally by any equiv-
*Thedoctrine to be advocated inwhat follows is the direct denial of the
dogma stated in §70, note.
†Archiv i. p. 444.
‡For the use of theword object in the followingdiscussion, see §58, note.
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alent propositional function. Now we cannot take as this ob-
ject (as in other cases of symmetrical transitive relations) the
class of propositional functions equivalent to a given propo-
sitional function, unless we already have the notion of class.
Again, equivalent relations, considered intensionally, may be
distinct: we want therefore to find some one object deter-
mined equally by any one of a set of equivalent relations. But
the only objects that suggest themselves are the class of re-
lations or the class of couples forming their common range;
and these both presuppose class. And without the notion of
class, elementary problems, such as “howmany combinations
can be formed of m objects n at a time?” become meaning-
less. Moreover, it appears immediately evident that there is
some sense in saying that two class-concepts have the same
extension, and this requires that there should be some object 516
which can be called the extension of a class-concept. But it is
exceedingly difficult to discover any such object, and the con-
tradiction proves conclusively that, even if there be such an
object sometimes, there are propositional functions for which
the extension is not one term.
The class asmany, whichwe numbered (ε) in the above enu-
meration, is unobjectionable, but is many and not one. We
may, if we choose, represent this by a single symbol: thus x ϵ u
will mean “x is one of the u’s.” This must not be taken as a
relation of two terms, x and u, because u as the numerical con-
junction is not a single term, and we wish to have a meaning
for x ϵ u which would be the same if for u we substituted an
equal class v, which prevents us from interpreting u intension-
ally. Thus we may regard “x is one of the u’s” as expressing a
relation of x to many terms, among which x is included. The
main objection to this view, if only single terms can be sub-
jects, is that, if u is a symbol standing essentially for many
terms, we cannot make u a logical subject without risk of er-
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ror. We can no longer speak, one might suppose, of a class of
classes; for what should be the terms of such a class are not
single terms, but are each many terms*. We cannot assert a
predicate of many, one would suppose, except in the sense of
asserting it of eachof themany; butwhat is requiredhere is the
assertionof a predicate concerning themany asmany, not con-
cerning each nor yet concerning the whole (if any) which all
compose. Thus a class of classes will be many many’s; its con-
stituents will each be only many, and cannot therefore in any
sense, one might suppose, be single constituents. Now I find
myself forced to maintain, in spite of the apparent logical dif-
ficulty, that this is precisely what is required for the assertion
of number. If we have a class of classes, each of whose mem-
bers has two terms, it is necessary that the members should
each be genuinely two-fold, and should not be each one. Or
again, “Brown and Jones are two” requires that we should not
combine Brown and Jones into a single whole, and yet it has
the form of a subject-predicate proposition. But now a diffi-
culty arises as to the number of members of a class of classes.
In what sense can we speak of two couples? This seems to re-
quire that each couple should be a single entity; yet if it were,
we shouldhave twounits, not two couples. We require a sense
for diversity of collections, meaning thereby, apparently, if u
and v are the collections in question, that x ϵ u and x ϵ v are not
equivalent for all values of x.
490. The logical doctrine which is thus forced upon us is
this: The subject of a proposition may be not a single term,
but essentially many terms; this is the case with all proposi-
tions asserting numbers other than 0 and 1. But the predi-
cates or class-concepts or relations which can occur in propo-
*Wherever the context requires it, the reader is to add “provided the
class in question (or all the classes in question) do not consist of a single
term.”
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sitions having plural subjects are different (with some excep-
tions) from those that can occur in propositions having single
terms as subjects. Although a class is many and not one, yet
there is identity and diversity among classes, and thus classes
can be counted as though each were a genuine unity; and in
this sense we can speak of one class and of the classes which
are members of a class of classes. Onemust be held, however, 517
to be somewhat different when asserted of a class from what
it is when asserted of a term; that is, there is a meaning of one
which is applicable in speaking of one term, and anotherwhich
is applicable in speaking of one class, but there is also a general
meaning applicable to both cases. The fundamental doctrine
uponwhich all rests is the doctrine that the subject of a propo-
sition may be plural, and that such plural subjects are what is
meant by classes which have more than one term*.
It will now be necessary to distinguish (1) terms, (2) classes,
(3) classes of classes, and so on ad infinitum; we shall have to
hold that no member of one set is a member of any other set,
and that x ϵ u requires that x shouldbeof a set of a degree lower
by one than the set to which u belongs. Thus x ϵ xwill become
a meaningless proposition; and in this way the contradiction
is avoided.
491. Butwemustnowconsider theproblemof classeswhich
have one member or none. The case of the null-class might
be met by a bare denial—this is only inconvenient, not self-
contradictory. But in the case of classes having only one term,
it is still necessary to distinguish them from their sole mem-
bers. This results from Frege’s argument, which we may re-
peat as follows. Let u be a class having more than one term;
let ιu be the class of classes whose only member is u. Then ιu
has one member, u has many; hence u and ιu are not identi-
*Cf. §§128, 132 supra.
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cal. It may be doubted, at first sight, whether this argument is
valid. The relation of x to u expressed by x ϵ u is a relation of a
single term to many terms; the relation of u to ιu expressed by
u ϵ ιu is a relation of many terms (as subject) to many terms (as
predicate)†. This is, so an objector might contend, a different
relation from the previous one; and thus the argument breaks
down. It is in different senses that x is a member of u and that
u is a member of ιu; thus u and ιumay be identical in spite of
the argument.
This attempt, however, to escape from Frege’s argument, is
capable of refutation. For all the purposes of Arithmetic, to
begin with, and for many of the purposes of logic, it is neces-
sary to have a meaning for ϵwhich is equally applicable to the
relationof a term to a class, of a class to a class of classes, and so
on. But the chief point is that, if every single term is a class, the
proposition x ϵ x, which gives rise to the Contradiction, must
be admissible. It is only by distinguishing x and ιx, and insist-
ing that in x ϵ u the u must always be of a type higher by one
than x, that the contradiction can be avoided. Thus, although
we may identify the class with the numerical conjunction of
its terms, wherever there are many terms, yet where there is
only one term we shall have to accept Frege’s range as an ob-
ject distinct from its only term. Andhaving done this, wemay
of course also admit a range in the case of a null propositional
function. We shall differ from Frege only in regarding a range
as in no case a term, but an object of a different logical type, in
the sense that a propositional function φ(x), in which x may
be any term, is in general meaningless if for x we substitute a
range; and if xmay be any range of terms, φ(x)will in general 518
be meaningless if for x we substitute either a term or a range
of ranges of terms. Ranges, finally, are what are properly to
†Theword predicate is hereused loosely, not in theprecise sensedefined
in §48.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 762
be called classes, and it is of them that cardinal numbers are
asserted.
492. According to the view here advocated, it will be nec-
essary, with every variable, to indicate whether its field of sig-
nificance is terms, classes, classes of classes, or so on*. A vari-
able will not be able, except in special cases, to extend from
one of these sets into another; and in x ϵ u, the x and the u
must always belong to different types; ϵ will not be a relation
between objects of the same type, but ϵϵ or ϵRϵ† will be, pro-
vided R is so. We shall have to distinguish also among rela-
tions according to the types to which their domains and con-
verse domains belong; also variables whose fields include rela-
tions, these being understood as classes of couples, will not as
a rule include anything else, and relations between relations
will be different in type from relations between terms. This
seems to give the truth—though in a thoroughly extensional
form—underlying Frege’s distinction between terms and the
various kinds of functions. Moreover the opinion here advo-
cated seems to adhere very closely indeed to common sense.
Thus the final conclusion is, that the correct theory of
classes is even more extensional than that of Chapter vi; that
the class asmany is the only object always definedby aproposi-
tional function, and that this is adequate for formal purposes;
that the class as one, or the whole composed of the terms of
the class, is probably a genuine entity except where the class
is defined by a quadratic function (see §103), but that in these
cases, and in other cases possibly, the class as many is the only
object uniquely defined.
The theory that there are different kinds of variables de-
mands a reform in the doctrine of formal implication. In a
formal implication, the variable does not, in general, take all
*See Appendix B.
†On this notation, see §§28, 97.
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the values ofwhich variables are susceptible, but only all those
that make the propositional function in question a proposi-
tion. For other values of the variable, it must be held that any
given propositional function becomes meaningless. Thus in
x ϵ u, umust be a class, or a class of classes, or etc., and xmust
be a term if u is a class, a class if u is a class of classes, and so
on; in every propositional function there will be some range
permissible to the variable, but in general there will be possi-
ble values for other variables which are not admissible in the
given case. This fact will require a certain modification of the
principles of Symbolic Logic; but it remains true that, in a for-
mal implication, all propositions belonging to a given propo-
sitional function are asserted.
With this we come to the end of the more philosophical
part of Frege’s work. It remains to deal briefly with his Sym-
bolic Logic andArithmetic; but here I findmyself in such com-
plete agreementwithhim that it is hardlynecessary todomore
than acknowledge his discovery of propositions which, when
I wrote, I believed to have been new.
493. Implication and Symbolic Logic. The relation which
Frege employs as fundamental in the logic of propositions is
not exactly the same as what I have called implication: it is a
relation which holds between p and q whenever q is true or p 519
is not true, whereas the relation which I employ holds when-
ever p and q are propositions, and q is true or p is false. That
is to say, Frege’s relation holds when p is not a proposition at
all, whatever qmay be; mine does not hold unless p and q are
propositions. His definition has the formal advantage that it
avoids the necessity for hypotheses of the form “p and q are
propositions”; but it has the disadvantage that it does not lead
to a definition of proposition and of negation. In fact, negation
is taken by Frege as indefinable; proposition is introduced by
means of the indefinable notion of a truth-value. Whatever x
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may be, “the truth-value of x” is to indicate the true if x is true,
and the false in all other cases. Frege’s notation has certain ad-
vantages over Peano’s, in spite of the fact that it is exceedingly
cumbrous and difficult to use. He invariably defines expres-
sions for all values of the variable, whereas Peano’s definitions
areoftenprecededbyahypothesis. Hehas a special symbol for
assertion, and he is able to assert for all values of x a proposi-
tional function not stating an implication, which Peano’s sym-
bolism will not do. He also distinguishes, by the use of Latin
and German letters respectively, between any proposition of
a certain propositional function and all such propositions. By
always using implications, Frege avoids the logical product of
two propositions, and therefore has no axioms corresponding
to Importation and Exportation*. Thus the joint assertion of
p and q is the denial of “p implies not-q.”
494. Arithmetic. Frege gives exactly the same definition of
cardinal numbers as I have given, at least if we identify his
range with my class†. But following his intensional theory
of classes, he regards the number as a property of the class-
concept, not of the class in extension. If u be a range, the num-
ber of u is the range of the concept “range similar to u.” In
theGrundlagen der Arithmetik, other possible theories of num-
ber are discussed and dismissed. Numbers cannot be asserted
of objects, because the same set of objects may have different
numbers assigned to them (Gl. p. 29); for example, one army is
somany regiments and such another number of soldiers. This
view seems to me to involve too physical a view of objects: I
do not consider the army to be the same object as the regi-
ments. A stronger argument for the same view is that 0 will
not apply to objects, but only to concepts (p. 59). This argu-
ment is, I think, conclusive up to a certain point; but it is sat-
*See §18, (7), (8).
†See Gl. pp. 79, 85; Gg. p. 57, Df. Z.
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isfied by the view of the symbolic meaning of classes set forth
in §73. Numbers themselves, like other ranges, are things (p.
67). For defining numbers as ranges, Frege gives the same gen-
eral ground as I have given, namely what I call the principle
of abstraction‡. In theGrundgesetze der Arithmetik, various the-
orems in the foundations of cardinal Arithmetic are proved
with great elaboration, so great that it is often very difficult to
discover the difference between successive steps in a demon-
stration. In view of the contradiction of Chapter x, it is plain
that some emendation is required in Frege’s principles; but it
is hard to believe that it can domore than introduce some gen-
eral limitation which leaves the details unaffected.
495. In addition to his work on cardinal numbers, Frege has, 520
already in theBegriffsschrift, a very admirable theory of progres-
sions, or rather of all series that can be generated bymany-one
relations. Frege does not confine himself to one-one relations:
as long as we move in only one direction, a many-one relation
also will generate a series. In some parts of his theory, he even
deals with general relations. He begins by considering, for any
relation f(x, y), functions Fwhich are such that, if f(x; y) holds,
then F(x) implies F(y). If this condition holds, Frege says that
the property F is inherited in the f-series (Bs. pp. 55–58). From
this he goes on to define, without the use of numbers, a rela-
tion which is equivalent to “some positive power of the given
relation.” This is defined as follows. The relation in question
holds between x and y if every property F, which is inherited
in the f-series and is such that f(x; z) implies F(z) for all values
of z, belongs to y (Bs. p. 60). On this basis, a non-numerical the-
ory of series is very successfully erected, and is applied in Gg.
to the proof of propositions concerning the number of finite
numbers and kindred topics. This is, so far as I know, the best
method of treating such questions, and Frege’s definition just
‡Gl. p. 79; cf. §111 supra.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 766
quoted gives, apparently, the best formofmathematical induc-
tion. But as no controversy is involved, I shall not pursue this
subject any further.
Frege’s works contain much admirable criticism of the psy-
chological standpoint in logic, and also of the formalist theory
ofmathematics, which believes that the actual symbols are the
subject-matter dealt with, and that their properties can be ar-
bitrarily assigned by definition. In both these points, I find
myself in complete agreement with him.
496. Kerry (loc. cit.) has criticized Frege very severely, and
professes to have proved that a purely logical theory of Arith-
metic is impossible (p. 304). On the question whether con-
cepts can be made logical subjects, I find myself in agreement
with his criticisms; on other points, they seem to rest onmere
misunderstandings. As these are such as would naturally oc-
cur to any one unfamiliar with symbolic logic, I shall briefly
discuss them.
The definition of numbers as classes is, Kerry asserts, a
ὕστϵρον πρότϵρον. We must know that every concept has only
one extension, and we must know what one object is; Frege’s
numbers, in fact, are merely convenient symbols for what are
commonly called numbers (p. 277). It must be admitted, I
think, that the notion of a term is indefinable (cf. §132 supra),
and is presupposed in the definition of the number 1. But
Frege argues—andhis argument at least deserves discussion—
that one is not a predicate, attaching to every imaginable term,
but has a less general meaning, and attaches to concepts (Gl.
p. 40). Thus a term is not to be analyzed into one and term,
and does not presuppose the notion of one (cf. §72 supra). As
to the assumption that every concept has only one extension,
it is not necessary to be able to state this in language which
employs the number 1: all we need is, that if φx and ψx are
equivalent propositions for all values of x, then they have the
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same extension—a primitive proposition whose symbolic ex-
pression in no way presupposes the number 1. From this it
follows that if a and b are both extensions of φx, a and b are
identical, which again does not formally involve the number
1. In like manner, other objections to Frege’s definition can be
met.
Kerry is misled by a certain passage (Gl. p. 80, note) into 521
the belief that Frege identifies a concept with its extension.
The passage in question appears to assert that the number of
umight be defined as the concept “similar to u” and not as the
range of this concept; but it does not say that the two defini-
tions are equivalent.
There is a long criticism of Frege’s proof that 0 is a number,
which reveals fundamental errors as to the existential import
of universal propositions. The point is to prove that, if u and
v are null-classes, they are similar. Frege defines similarity to
mean that there is a one-one relation R such that “x is a u” im-
plies “there is a v to which x stands in the relation R,” and vice
versa. (I have altered the expressions into conformity withmy
usual language.) This, he says, is equivalent to “there is a one-
one relation R such that ‘x is a u’ and ‘there is no term of v to
which x stands in the relationR’ cannot bothbe true,whatever
value xmay have, and vice versa”; and this proposition is true
if “x is a u” and “y is a v” are always false. This strikes Kerry
as absurd (pp. 287–9). Similarity of classes, he thinks, implies
that they have terms. He affirms that Frege’s assertion above is
contradicted by a later one (Gl. p. 89): “If a is a u, and nothing
is a v, then ‘a is a u’ and ‘no term is a v which has the relation
R to a’ are both true for all values of R.” I do not quite know
whereKerry finds the contradiction; but he evidently does not
realize that false propositions imply all propositions and that
universal propositions have no existential import, so that “all
a is b” and “no a is b” will both be true if a is the null-class.
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Kerry objects (p. 290, note) to the generality of Frege’s no-
tion of relation. Frege asserts that any proposition containing
a and b affirms a relation between a and b (Gl. p. 83); hence
Kerry (rightly) concludes that it is self-contradictory to deny
that a and b are related. So general a notion, he says, can
have neither sense nor purpose. As for sense, that a and b
should both be constituents of one proposition seems a per-
fectly intelligible sense; as for purpose, the whole logic of re-
lations, indeed the whole of mathematics, may be adduced in
answer. There is, however, what seems at first sight to be a
formal disproof of Frege’s view. Consider the propositional
function “R and S are relations which are identical, and the re-
lation R does not hold between R and S.” This contains two
variables, R and S; let us suppose that it is equivalent to “R
has the relationT to S.” Then substitutingT for both R and S,
we find, since T is identical with T, that “T does not have the
relation T to T” is equivalent to “T has the relation T to T.”
This is a contradiction, showing that there is no such relation
as T. Frege might object to this instance, on the ground that
it treats relations as terms; but his double ranges, which, like
single ranges, he holds to be things, will bring out the same re-
sult. The point involved is closely analogous to that involved
in the Contradiction: it was there shown that some proposi-
tional functions with one variable are not equivalent to any
propositional function asserting membership of a fixed class,
while here it is shown that some containing two variables are
not equivalent to the assertion of any fixed relation. But the
refutation is the same in the case of relations as it was in the
previous case. There is a hierarchy of relations according to
the type of objects constituting their fields. Thus relations, be-
tween terms are distinct from those between classes, and these 522
again are distinct from relations between relations. Thus no
relation can have itself both as referent and as relatum, for if
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it be of the same order as the one, it must be of a higher order
than the other; the proposed propositional function is there-
fore meaningless for all values of the variables R and S.
It is affirmed (p. 291) that only the concepts of 0 and 1, not the
objects themselves, are defined by Frege. But if we allow that
the range of a Begriff is an object, this cannot be maintained;
for the assigning of a concept will carry with it the assigning
of its range. Kerry does not perceive that the uniqueness of 1
has been proved (ib.): he thinks that, with Frege’s definition,
theremight be several 1’s. I do not understand how this can be
supposed: the proof of uniqueness is precise and formal.
The definition of immediate sequence in the series of natu-
ral numbers is also severely criticized (p. 292ff.). This depends
upon the general theory of series set forth in Bs. Kerry objects
that Frege has defined “F is inherited in the f-series,” but has
not defined “the f-series” nor “F is inherited.” The latter es-
sentially ought not to be defined, having no precise sense; the
former is easily defined, if necessary, as the field of the relation
f. This objection is therefore trivial. Again, there is an attack
on the definition: “y follows x in the f-series if y has all the
properties inherited in the f-series and belonging to all terms
to which x has the relation f*.” This criterion, we are told, is
of doubtful value, because no catalogue of such properties ex-
ists, and further because, as Frege himself proves, following x
is itself one of these properties, whence a vicious circle. This
argument, to my mind, radically misconceives the nature of
deduction. In deduction, a proposition is proved to hold con-
cerning everymember of a class, andmay then be asserted of a
particular member: but the proposition concerning every does
not necessarily result from enumeration of the entries in a cat-
*Kerry omits the last clause, wrongly; for not all properties inherited
in the f-series belong to all its terms; for example, the property of being
greater than 100 is inherited in the number-series.
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alogue. Kerry’s position involves acceptance of Mill’s objec-
tion to Barbara, that the mortality of Socrates is a necessary
premiss for themortality of allmen. The fact is, of course, that
general propositions can often be establishedwhere nomeans
exist of cataloguing the terms of the class for which they hold;
and even, as we have abundantly seen, general propositions
fully stated hold of all terms, or, as in the above case, of all
functions, of which no catalogue can be conceived. Kerry’s
argument, therefore, is answered by a correct theory of deduc-
tion; and the logical theory ofArithmetic is vindicated against
its critics.
Note. The second volume of Gg., which appeared too late
to be noticed in the Appendix, contains an interesting discus-
sion of the contradiction (pp. 253–265), suggesting that the so-
lution is to be found by denying that two propositional func-
tions which determine equal classes must be equivalent. As
it seems very likely that this is the true solution, the reader is
strongly recommended to examine Frege’s argument on the
point.
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appendix b
THEDOCTRINEOF TYPES
497. The doctrine of types is here put forward tentatively, 523
as affording a possible solution of the contradiction; but it re-
quires, in all probability, to be transformed into some subtler
shape before it can answer all difficulties. In case, however, it
should be found to be a first step towards the truth, I shall en-
deavour in thisAppendix to set forth itsmain outlines, aswell
as some problems which it fails to solve.
Every propositional function φ(x)—so it is contended—
has, in addition to its range of truth, a range of significance, i.e.
a range within which xmust lie if φ(x) is to be a proposition at
all, whether true or false. This is the first point in the theory
of types; the second point is that ranges of significance form
types, i.e. if x belongs to the range of significance of φ(x), then
there is a class of objects, the type of x, all of which must also
belong to the range of significance of φ(x), however φmay be
varied; and the range of significance is always either a single
type or a sum of several whole types. The second point is less
precise than the first, and the case of numbers introduces dif-
ficulties; but in what follows its importance and meaning will,
I hope, become plainer.
A term or individual is any object which is not a range. This
is the lowest type of object. If such an object—say a certain
point in space—occurs in a proposition, any other individual
may always be substituted without loss of significance. What
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we called, in Chapter vi, the class as one, is an individual, pro-
vided itsmembers are individuals; the objects of daily life, per-
sons, tables, chairs, apples, etc., are classes as one. (A person
is a class of psychical existents, the others are classes of ma-
terial points, with perhaps some reference to secondary qual-
ities.) These objects, therefore, are of the same type as simple
individuals. It would seem that all objects designated by sin-
gle words, whether things or concepts, are of this type. Thus
e.g. the relations that occur in actual relational propositions
are of the same type as things, though relations in extension,
which are what Symbolic Logic employs, are of a different
type. (The intensional relations which occur in ordinary rela-
tional propositions arenot determinatewhen their extensions
are given, but the extensional relations of Symbolic Logic are
classes of couples.) Individuals are the only objects of which
numbers cannot be significantly asserted.
The next type consists of ranges or classes of individuals. 524
(No ordinal ideas are to be associated with the word range.)
Thus “Brown and Jones” is an object of this type, and will in
general not yield a significant proposition if substituted for
“Brown” in any true or false proposition of which Brown is a
constituent. (This constitutes, in a kind of way, a justification
for the grammatical distinction of singular and plural; but the
analogy is not close, since a range may have one term or more,
and where it has many, it may yet appear as singular in certain
propositions.) If u be a range determined by a propositional
function φ(x), not-u will consist of all objects for which φ(x)
is false, so that not-u is contained in the range of significance
ofφ(x), and contains only objects of the same type as themem-
bers of u. There is a difficulty in this connection, arising from
the fact that two propositional functions φ(x);ψ(x) may have
the same range of truth u, while their ranges of significance
may be different; thus not-u becomes ambiguous. There will
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always be a minimum type within which u is contained, and
not-umay be defined as the rest of this type. (The sum of two
or more types is a type; a minimum type is one which is not
such a sum.) In view of the Contradiction, this view seems
the best; for not-umust be the range of falsehood of “x is a u”
and “x is an x” must be in general meaningless; consequently
“x is a u”must require that x and u should be of different types.
It is doubtful whether this result can be insured except by con-
fining ourselves, in this connection, to minimum types.
There is an unavoidable conflict with common sense in the
necessity for denying that a mixed class (i.e. one whose mem-
bers are not all of the same minimum type) can ever be of
the same type as one of its members. Consider, for example,
such phrases as “Heine and the French.” If this is to be a class
consisting of two individuals, “the French” must be under-
stood as “the French nation,” i.e., as the class as one. If we are
speaking of the French as many, we get a class consisting not
of two members, but of one more than there are Frenchmen.
Whether it is possible to form a class of which one member
is Heine, while the other is the French as many, is a point to
which I shall return later; for thepresent it is enough to remark
that, if there be such a class, it must, if the Contradiction is to
be avoided, be of a different type both from classes of individ-
uals and from classes of classes of individuals.
The next type after classes of individuals consists of classes
of classes of individuals. Such are, for example, associations
of clubs; the members of such associations, the clubs, are
themselves classes of individuals. It will be convenient to
speak of classes only where we have classes of individuals, of
classes of classes only where we have classes of classes of indi-
viduals, and so on. For the general notion, I shall use theword
range. There is a progression of such types, since a range may
be formedof objects of any given type, and the result is a range
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of higher type than its members.
A new series of types begins with the couple with sense. A
range of such types is what Symbolic Logic treats as a relation:
this is the extensional view of relations. We may then form
ranges of relations, or relations of relations, or relations of
couples (such as separation in Projective Geometry*), or 525
relations of individuals to couples, and so on; and in this
way we get, not merely a single progression, but a whole
infinite series of progressions. We have also the types formed
of trios, which are the members of triple relations taken
in extension as ranges; but of trios there are several kinds
that are reducible to previous types. Thus if φ(x; y; z) be a
propositional function, it may be a product of propositions
φ1(x) : φ2(y) : φ3(z) or a product φ1(x) : φ2(y; z), or a propo-
sition about x and the couple (y; z), or it may be analyzable
in other analogous ways. In such cases, a new type does not
arise. But if our proposition is not so analyzable—and there
seems no à priori reason why it should always be so—then
we obtain a new type, namely the trio. We can form ranges
of trios, couples of trios, trios of trios, couples of a trio
and an individual, and so on. All these yield new types.
Thus we obtain an immense hierarchy of types, and it is
difficult to be sure how many there may be; but the method
of obtaining new types suggests that the total number is only
α0 (the number of finite integers), since the series obtained
more or less resembles the series of rationals in the order
1; 2; : : : ; n; : : : ; 1=2; 1=3; : : : ; 1=n; : : : ; 2=3; : : : ; 2=5; : : : 2=(2n +
1); : : : This, however, is only a conjecture.
Each of the types above enumerated is a minimum type; i.e.,
if φ(x) be a propositional function which is significant for one
value of x belonging to one of the above types, thenφ(x) is sig-
*Cf. §203.
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nificant for every value of x belonging to the said type. But it
would seem—though of this I am doubtful—that the sum of
any number of minimum types is a type, i.e. is a range of sig-
nificance for certain propositional functions. Whether or not
this is universally true, all ranges certainly form a type, since
every range has a number; and so do all objects, since every
object is identical with itself.
Outside the above series of types lies the type proposition;
and from this as starting-point anewhierarchy, onemight sup-
pose, could be started; but there are certain difficulties in the
way of such a view, which render it doubtful whether propo-
sitions can be treated like other objects.
498. Numbers, also, are a type lying outside the above se-
ries, and presenting certain difficulties, owing to the fact that
every number selects certain objects out of every other type of
ranges, namely those ranges which have the given number of
members. This renders the obvious definition of 0 erroneous;
for every type of rangewill have its ownnull-range, whichwill
be a member of 0 considered as a range of ranges, so that we
cannot say that 0 is the range whose only member is the null-
range. Also numbers require a consideration of the totality of
types and ranges; and in this consideration there may be diffi-
culties.
Since all ranges have numbers, ranges are a range; conse-
quently x ϵ x is sometimes significant, and in these cases its
denial is also significant. Consequently there is a range w of
ranges for which x ϵ x is false: thus the Contradiction proves
that this range w does not belong to the range of significance
of x ϵ x. Wemayobserve that x ϵ x can only be significantwhen
x is of a type of infinite order, since, in x ϵ u, umust always be
of a type higher by one than x; but the range of all ranges is of
course of a type of infinite order.
Since numbers are a type, the propositional function “x is
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not a u,” where u is a range of numbers, mustmean “x is a num- 526
ber which is not a u”; unless, indeed, to escape this somewhat
paradoxical result, we say that, although numbers are a type
in regard to certain propositions, they are not a type in regard
to such propositions as “u is contained in v” or “x is a u.” Such
a view is perfectly tenable, though it leads to complications of
which it is hard to see the end.
That propositions are a type results from the fact—if it be
a fact—that only propositions can significantly be said to be
trueor false. Certainly truepropositions appear to forma type,
since they alone are asserted (cf. Appendix A. §479). But if
so, the number of propositions is as great as that of all objects
absolutely, since every object is identical with itself, and “x
is identical with x” has a one-one relation to x. In this there
are, however, two difficulties. First, what we called the propo-
sitional concept appears to be always an individual; conse-
quently there should be no more propositions than individu-
als. Secondly, if it is possible, as it seems to be, to form ranges
of propositions, there must be more such ranges than there
are propositions, although such ranges are only some among
objects (cf. §343). These two difficulties are very serious, and
demand a full discussion.
499. The first point may be illustrated by somewhat sim-
pler ones. There are, we know, more classes than individuals;
but predicates are individuals. Consequently not all classes
have defining predicates. This result, which is also deducible
from the Contradiction, shows how necessary it is to distin-
guish classes frompredicates, and to adhere to the extensional
view of classes. Similarly there are more ranges of couples
than there are couples, and thereforemore than there are indi-
viduals; but verbs, which express relations intensionally, are
individuals. Consequently not every range of couples forms
the extension of some verb, although every such range forms
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the extension of some propositional function containing two
variables. Although, therefore, verbs are essential in the log-
ical genesis of such propositional functions, the intensional
standpoint is inadequate to give all the objects which Sym-
bolic Logic regards as relations.
In the case of propositions, it seems as though there were
always an associated verbal noun which is an individual. We
have “x is identical with x” and “the self-identity of x,” “x dif-
fers from y” and “the difference of x and y”; and so on. The
verbal noun, which is what we called the propositional con-
cept, appears on inspection to be an individual; but this is im-
possible, for “the self-identity of x” has asmany values as there
are objects, and thereforemore values than there are individu-
als. This results from the fact that there are propositions con-
cerning every conceivable object, and the definition of iden-
tity shows (§26) that every object concerning which there are
propositions, is identicalwith itself. The onlymethodof evad-
ing this difficulty is to deny that propositional concepts are
individuals; and this seems to be the course to which we are
driven. It is undeniable, however, that a propositional con-
cept and a colour are two objects; hence we shall have to ad-
mit that it is possible to form mixed ranges, whose members
are not all of the same type; but such ranges will be always of
a different type from what we may call pure ranges, i.e. such
as have only members of one type. The propositional concept
seems, in fact, to be nothing other than the proposition itself, 527
the difference being merely the psychological one that we do
not assert the proposition in the one case, and do assert it in
the other.
500. The second point presents greater difficulties. We can-
not deny that there are ranges of propositions, for we often
wish to assert the logical product of such ranges; yet we can-
not admit that there are more ranges than propositions. At
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first sight, the difficulty might be thought to be solved by the
fact that there is a proposition associated with every range of
propositions which is not null, namely the logical product of
the propositions of the range*; but this does not destroy Can-
tor’s proof that a range has more sub-ranges than members.
Let us apply the proof by assuming a particular one-one rela-
tion, which associates every proposition p which is not a log-
ical product with the range whose only member is p, while it
associates the product of all propositions with the null-range
of propositions, and associates every other logical product of
propositionswith the range of its own factors. Then the range
w which, by the general principle of Cantor’s proof, is not
correlated with any proposition, is the range of propositions
which are logical products, but are not themselves factors of
themselves. But, by the definition of the correlating relation,
w ought to be correlated with the logical product of w. It will
be found that the old contradiction breaks out afresh; for we
can prove that the logical product of w both is and is not a
member of w. This seems to show that there is no such range
as w; but the doctrine of types does not show why there is no
such range. It seems to follow that theContradiction requires
further subtleties for its solution; but what these are, I am at a
loss to imagine.
Let us state this new contradictionmore fully. Ifm be a class
of propositions, the proposition “everym is true” may or may
not be itself anm. But there is a one-one relation of this propo-
*It might be doubted whether the relation of ranges of propositions to
their logical products is one-one or many-one. For example, does the log-
ical product of p and q and r differ from that of pq and r? A reference to
the definition of the logical product (p. 21) will set this doubt at rest; for
the two logical products in question, though equivalent, are by no means
identical. Consequently there is a one-one relation of all ranges of propo-
sitions to some propositions, which is directly contradictory to Cantor’s
theorem.
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sition to m: if n be different from m, “every n is true” is not
the same proposition as “every m is true.” Consider now the
whole class of propositions of the form “every m is true,” and
having the property of not being members of their respective
m’s. Let this class bew, and let p be the proposition “everyw is
true.” If p is aw, it must possess the defining property ofw; but
this property demands that p should not be a w. On the other
hand, if p be not a w, then p does possess the defining prop-
erty ofw, and therefore is aw. Thus the contradiction appears
unavoidable.
In order to deal with this contradiction, it is desirable to re-
open the question of the identity of equivalent propositional
functions and of the nature of the logical product of two
propositions. These questions arise as follows. Ifm be a class
of propositions, their logical product is the proposition “ev-
erym is true,” which I shall denote by^`m. If we now consider
the logical product of the class of propositions composed ofm
together with ^`m, this is equivalent to “Every m is true and 528
every m is true,” i.e. to “every m is true” i.e. to ^`m. Thus the
logical product of the new class of propositions is equivalent
to a member of the new class, which is the same as the logi-
cal product ofm. Thus if we identify equivalent propositional
functions (^`m being a propositional function ofm), the proof
of the above contradiction fails, since every proposition of the
form ^`m is the logical product both of a class of which it is a
member and of a class of which it is not a member.
But such an escape is, in reality, impracticable, for it is quite
self-evident that equivalent propositional functions are often
not identical. Who will maintain, for example, that “x is an
even prime other than 2” is identical with “x is one of Charles
II.’s wise deeds or foolish sayings”? Yet these are equivalent,
if a well-known epitaph is to be credited. The logical product
of all the propositions of the class composed of m and ^`m is
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“Every propositionwhich either is anm or asserts that everym
is true, is true”; and this is not identical with “everym is true,”
although the two are equivalent. Thus there seems no simple
method of avoiding the contradiction in question.
The close analogy of this contradiction with the one dis-
cussed in Chapter x strongly suggests that the two must have
the same solution, or at least very similar solutions. It is possi-
ble, of course, to hold that propositions themselves are of vari-
ous types, and that logical productsmust have propositions of
only one type as factors. But this suggestion seems harsh and
highly artificial.
To sum up: it appears that the special contradiction of
Chapter x is solved by the doctrine of types, but that there is
at least one closely analogous contradictionwhich is probably
not soluble by this doctrine. The totality of all logical objects,
or of all propositions, involves, it would seem, a fundamental
logical difficulty. What the complete solution of the difficulty
may be, I have not succeeded in discovering; but as it affects
the very foundations of reasoning, I earnestly commend the
study of it to the attention of all students of logic.
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 781
INDEX
The references are to pages. References in black type are to passages 529
where a technical term is defined or explained.
Absolute, 226, 448
Abstraction, principle of, ix, 166, 219, 242, 285, 305, 314, 497, 519
Acceleration, 474, 483; absolute, 490, 491
Achilles and the tortoise, 350, 358
Action and Reaction, 483
Activity, 450
Addition, arithmetical, 118, 307; of individuals, 71, 133–135; log-
ical, 17, 21, 116; ordinal, 318; of quantities, 179, 180; relational,
182, 254; of relations, 321; relative, 26, 387n.; of vectors, 477
Adjectives, 20n., 42
Aggregates, 67, 139, 442; and classes as one, 141; infinite, 143
Algebra, universal, 376
Aliorelative, 203n., 320n.
All, 72, 105, 113, 305
Analysis, how far falsification, 141, 466; conceptual and real,
466
And, 67, 69, 71, 130
Angles, 205, 414; axioms of, 415, 416
Anharmonic ratio, 390, 391, 420
Antinomies, of infinity, 188, 190–193; Kant’s, 259, 458–461
Any, 45, 46, 57, 105, 263, 305, 351; and kindred words, 55, 56, 59,
Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics 782
89, 91
Archimedes, axiom of, 181, 252, 254, 288, 332, 333, 337, 408
Area, 333, 417
Arithmetic, has no indemonstrables, 127; and progressions,
240; relation-, 321
Arrow, Zeno’s argument of, 350
Assertion, 34–35, 48, 100, 502ff.
Assertions, 39, 44, 82, 83, 98, 106, 505
Associative law, 307
Assumptions, 503
Axioms, in Geometry, 373, 441
Being, 43, 49, 71, 446, 449
Bernoulli, 329n.
Bernstein, 306n, 367n.
Bettazzi, 181n., 185
Between, 200, 201, 205, 207, 214; three theories of, 208; is a re-
lation between its terms? 210; and difference of sense, 211;
indefinable? 213; in projective Geometry, 391, 393, 426; in de-
scriptive Geometry, 393
Bolyai, 373
Bolzano, 70, 201n., 307, 357n.
Boole, 10, 24, 376
Borel, 306n., 367n.
Bradley, 41, 43n., 47, 90, 99, 161n, 221, 224, 448, 471
Burali-Forti, 112n., 323, 364n.
Calculus, propositional, 13–18; of classes, 18–23; of relations,
23–26; logical, 142; infinitesimal, 259, 276, 304, 325–330, 338ff.;
principles of a, 376
Cantor, Georg, viii, 101, 111, 112, 119, 120, 121n., 144, 157, 161, 177,
199, 239n., 245, 259ff., 267, 270ff., 282, 331, 334, 347, 350, 353,
371, 375, 381, 390, 437ff., 444, 527; on irrationals, 283; on conti-
nuity, 287ff.; on transfinite cardinals, 304–311; on transfinite
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ordinals, 312–324; on infinitesimal segments, 335; on orders
of infinity, 336; against greatest number, 363ff.
Carroll, Lewis, 18n., 35
Cassirer, 287n.
Cauchy, 329n.
Causal laws, 481, 486
Causality, 474–479, 481; in rational dynamics, 479
Causation, of particulars by particulars, vii, 475, 477, 481, 487
Cause, equal to effect? 496
Cayley, 422n.
Chain, 245, 246; of an element, 245, 246
Change, 347, 469ff.
Chasles, 420
Circle, postulate of, 438, 440
Class, v, ix, 18ff., 40, 66–81, 349, 356, 497, 510ff.; extensional
view of, 20, 67, 69, 131ff., 513, 526; intensional genesis of, 67,
515; concept of, 67; as many, 68, 76, 104, 106, 132; as one, 76,
103, 104, 106, 132, 513, 523; always definable by a predicate? 98, 530
526; when a member of itself, 102; defined by relation, 97,
98; of terms not haying a given relation to themselves, 102;
multiplicative, 308; infinite, 72, 106, 260, 306, 356, 357; denu-
merable, 309; and well-ordered series, 322; of one term, see
Individual
Class-concept, 19, 20, 54, 56, 58, 67, 101, 113; distinct from class,
68, 116, 131, 514
Clifford, 434
Cohen, 276n., 326, 338–345
Collections, 69, 133, 140, 513, 514
Colours, 466, 467
Commutative law, 118, 240, 307, 312
Composition, 17, 31
Concepts, 44, 211, 508; as such and as terms, 45; variation of, 86;
propositional, 503, 526; can they be subjects? 46, 507, 510
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Congruent figures, 417
Conjunction, numerical, 57, 67, 72, 113, 131ff.; propositional, 57;
variable, 57
Connection, 202, 239
Consecutive, 201
Constants, logical, 3, 7, 8, 11, 106, 429; and parameters, 6
Constituent, of a proposition, 356, 510; of a whole, 143, 144
Continuity, 188, 193, 259, 286ff., 368; Dedekind’s axiom of, 279,
294; ordinal, 296–303; philosophy of, 346–354; antinomies of,
347ff.; in projective Geometry, 387, 390, 437; of Euclidean
space, 438ff.
Continuum, in philosophical sense, 146, 440; in mathematical
sense, 297, 299n., 310; composed of elements, 344, 347, 353,
440ff.; primarily arithmetical, 444
Contradiction, the, vi, ix, 20, 66, 79, 97, 101–107, 305, 362, 513,
515, 517, 523, 524, 525; Frege’s solution of, 522; law of, 455
Coordinates, 439; projective, 385, 388, 390, 422, 427
Correlation, 260; of classes, 261; of series, 261, 321
Counting, 114, 133, 309
Couples, are relations classes of? 24, 99, 524; with sense, 99,
512, 524
Couples, separation of, 200, 205, 214, 237; and transitive asym-
metrical relations, 215, 238; in projective geometry, 386, 387
Couturat, 66, 194n., 267n., 291n., 296n., 310n., 326n., 410n.,
441n.
Cremona, 384n., 420
Dedekind, 90, 111, 157, 199, 239n., 245–251, 294, 307, 315, 357n.,
381, 387, 438; on irrationals, 278ff.
Deduction, 522; principles of, 4, 15, 16
Definition, 15, 27, 111, 429, 497; and the, 62; always nominal, 112;
by abstraction, 114, 219, 249
DeMorgan, 23, 64n., 218n., 219n., 326, 376
Denoting, 45, 47, 53, 106, 131; and predicates, 54; and any, etc., 55,
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62; are there different kinds of? 56, 61; and identity, 63; and
infinite classes, 72, 73, 145, 350
Derivatives, of a series, 290ff., 323; of functions, 328
Descartes, 157
Dichotomy, Zeno’s argument of, 348
Differential coefficients, 173, 328
Dimensions, 372, 374; definable logically, 376; axiom of three,
388, 399
Dini, 324n., 327, 328n., 329n.
Direction, 435
Disjunction, 15n., 17, 31; variable and constant, 22, 58
Distance, 171, 179, 182n., 195, 252–256, 288, 353; measurement
of, 180, 181, 254, 408; and order, 204, 409, 419; and relative
position, 252; not implied by order, 252, 254; definition of,
253; and limits, 254; and stretch, 254, 342, 352, 408ff., 435; in
Arithmetic, 254; axioms of, 407ff., 413, 424; and straight line,
410; projective theory of, 422, 425, 427; descriptive theory of,
423–425
Distributive law, 240, 307
Diversity, 23; conceptual, 46
Divisibility, infinite, 460
Divisibility, magnitude of, 149, 151, 153, 173, 230, 333, 345, 411,
425, 428; and measurement, 178; not a property of wholes
as such, 179, 412
Domain, see Relation
Duality, logical, 26; geometrical, 375, 392
Du Bois Reymond, 181n., 254, 336
Dynamics, vi; as pure mathematics, 465; two principles of, 496
Economics, mathematical, 233n.
Electricity, 494, 496
Empiricism, 373, 492
Epistemology, 339
Equality, 219, 339; of classes, 21; of relations, 24; of quantities,
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159
Equivalence, of propositions, 15, 527
Ether, 485, 496
Euclid, 157, 287, 373, 404, 420, 438; his errors, 405–407
Euler, 329n.
Evellin, 352
Existence, vii, 449, 458, 472; of a class, 21, 32
Existence-theorems, ix, 322, 431, 497; and Euclid’s problems,
404
Exponentiation, 120, 308
Exportation, 16
Extension and Intension, 66
Fano, 385n.
Field, see Relation
Finite, 121, 192, 371
Finitude, axiom of, 188, 191, 460; absolute and relative, 332
Force, 474, 482 531
Formal truth, 40, 105
Formalism, limits of, 16, 41
Formula, 267
Fractions, 149, 150, 151
Frege, vi, viii, 19, 68n., 76n., 111, 124n., 132, 142, 451n., 501ff.; three
points of disagreement with, 501; his three elements in judg-
ment, 502; his signof judgment, 503, 519; his theory of ranges,
505, 510ff.; his Begriff, 505, 507; his Symbolic Logic, 518; his
Arithmetic, 519; his theory of progressions, 520; Kerry’s crit-
icism of, 520
Frischauf, 410
Functions, 32, 262, 263; non-serial, 263; numerical, 265; com-
plex, 266, 376; real, 324; continuous, 326; Frege’s theory of,
505ff.
Functions, propositional, 13, 19, 82–88, 92, 263, 356, 508ff.; de-
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finable? 83; indefinable, 88, 106;more numerous than terms?
103; and the contradiction, 103; with two variables, 94, 506;
and classes, 19, 88, 93, 98; variable, 103, 104; cardinal number
of, 367; range of significance of, 523
Fundamental bodies, 491
Generalization, 7; algebraical, 267, 377
Geometry, 199, 372; distance and stretch theories of, 181; and
actual space, 372, 374; three kinds of, 381; based on distance,
410, 492; and order, 419; has no indemonstrables, 429
Geometry, descriptive, 199, 382, 393–403; indefinables of, 394,
395, 397; axioms of, 394ff.; their mutual independence, 396;
relation to projective Geometry, 400ff.; and distance, 423–
425
Geometry, elliptic, 206, 382, 391, 399, 413; Euclidean, 391, 399,
442; hyperbolic, 255, 382, 391, 399; non-Euclidean, 158, 179,
255, 373, 381, 436; of position, 393
Geometry, metrical, 382, 392, 403, 404–418; and quantity, 407;
and distance, 407; and stretch, 414; relation to projective
and descriptive Geometry, 419–428
Geometry, projective, 199, 206, 381–392; and order, 385ff., 389,
421; requires three dimensions, 394, 399n.; differences from
descriptive Geometry, 419; independent of metrical Geom-
etry, 419–421; history of, 420; and distance, 421, 425, 427
Gilman, 203n.
Grammar, 42, 497
Grassmann, 376
Gravitation, 485, 487, 490, 491
Greater, 122, 159, 222, 306, 323, 364
Groups, continuous, 436
Hamilton, 376
Harmonic relation, 384
Hegel, 105, 137, 287, 346, 355
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Helmholtz, 241
Hertz, 494–496
Heymans, 489
Hilbert, 384n., 405n., 415n.
Idea and object, 450
Identity, 20, 96, 219, 502; distinguished from equality, 21; and
denoting, 63; of indiscernibles, 451
Imaginaries, 376
Impenetrability, 467, 480
Implication, formal, 5, 11, 14, 36–41, 89, 106, 518; asserts a class
of material implications, 38; and any, etc., 91
Implication, material, 14, 26, 33–36, 106, 203n.; Frege’s theory
of, 518
Importation, 16
Inclusion, of classes, 19, 36, 40, 78
Incommensurables, 287, 438, 439
Incompatibility, synthetic, 233
Indefinables, v, 112
Indication, 502
Individual, relation to class, 18, 19, 26, 77, 103, 512, 522; distinct
from class whose only member it is? vi, 23, 68, 106, 130, 513,
514, 517
Induction, 11n., 441; mathematical, 123, 192, 240, 245, 246, 248,
260, 307, 314, 315, 357, 371, 520
Inertia, law of, 482
Inextensive, 342
Inference, asyllogistic, 10; and deduction, 11n.; logical and psy-
chological, 33; two premisses unnecessary, 35
Infinite, 121, 259, 260, 315, 368; antinomies of, 188, 190, 355; not
specially quantitative, 194; as limit of segments, 273; mathe-
matical theory of, 304, 355; philosophy of, 355–368; improper,
331–337; orders of, 335
Infinitesimal, 188, 260, 276, 325, 330, 331–337; defined, 331; in-
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stances of, 332; philosophy of, 338–345; and continuity, 344;
and change, 347
Integers, infinite classes of, 299, 310n.
Integral, definite, 329
Intensity, 164
Interaction, 446, 453
Intuition, 260, 339, 456
Involution, 385, 426
Is, 49, 64n., 100, 106
Isolated points, 290
Jevons, 376
Johnson, viii, 435n.
Jordan, 329n.
Kant, 4, 143, 158, 168, 177, 184, 223n., 227, 259, 326, 339, 342, 355,
373, 442, 446, 450, 454, 456–461, 489
Kerry, 505, 520–522
Killing, 400n., 404n., 405n., 415n., 434n.
Kinetic axes, 490
Kirchoff, 474
Klein, 385, 389, 390n., 421, 422n., 424n., 426n., 434n., 436
Kronecker, 241 532
Law, 268
Leibniz, 5, 10, 132, 143, 144, 145n., 221, 222, 227, 228, 252, 287, 306,
325, 329n., 338, 342, 347, 355, 410, 440n., 445, 450, 451, 456, 461,
489, 492
Lie, 436
Likeness, 242, 261, 262, 317, 321
Limitation, principle of, 314
Limiting-point, 290, 323
Limits, 276ff., 320, 361; and infinity, 188, 189, 260; and conti-
nuity, 353; conditions for existence of, 291ff., 389; and the
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infinitesimal calculus, 325, 339; of functions, 327, 328; and
magnitude, 341
Line, see Straight
Line-Geometry, 432
Linearity, axiom of, 181, 252, 254, 408
Lobatchewsky, 373
Logic, symbolic, 10–32; three parts of, 11; andmathematics, v, 5,
8, 106, 397, 429, 457
Lotze, 221, 446ff.
Macaulay, 491
Mach, 474, 489, 492
Magnitude, 159, 164ff., 194; relative theory of, 162; absolute the-
ory of, 164; axioms of, 163, 165, 168; kinds of, 164, 334; and di-
visibility, 173; and existence, 174, 177, 342; extensive, 182; in-
tensive, 182, 326, 342; discrete and continuous, 193, 346; pos-
itive and negative, 229–231; infinitesimal, 332; limiting, 341
Manifold, 67
Mass, 481n., 483, 488, 495; centre of, 490
Mathematics, pure, vii, 3, 106, 112, 397, 429, 456, 497; applied, 5,
8, 112, 429; arithmetization of, 259
Matter, 465–468; as substance, 466; relation to space and time,
467; logical definition of, 468
Maxwell, 489
McColl, 12, 13, 22
Meaning, 47, 502
Measure, Zeno’s argument of, 352
Measurement, 157, 176–183, 195;
Meinong, 55n., 162n., 168, 171n., 173n., 181n., 184, 187, 252, 253,
289, 419, 502n., 503
Mill, 373, 522
Möbius net, 385, 388
Monadism, 476
Monism, 44, 447
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Moore, viii, 24, 44n., 51n., 446n., 448n., 454n.
Motion, 265, 344, 405, 469–473; state of, 351, 473; in geometry,
406, 418; logical definitionof, 473; lawsof, 482–488; absolute
and relative, 489–493; Hertz’s law of, 495
Motions, kinematical, 480; kinetic, 480; thinkable, 494; possi-
ble, 495; natural, 495
Multiplication, arithmetical, 119, 307, 308; ordinal, 318
nth, 243, 250, 312
Necessity, 454
Negation, of propositions, 18, 31; of classes, 23, 31, 524; of rela-
tions, 25
Neumann, 490
Newton, 325, 338, 469, 481, 482–492
Noël, 348, 352
Null-class, vi, 22, 23, 32, 38, 68, 73, 106, 517, 525
Number, algebraical generalization of, 267
Number, cardinal, logical theory of. 111ff., 241, 519, 520–522; de-
finable? 111, 112, 130; defined, 115, 305; and classes, 112, 305, 306,
519; defined by abstraction, 114; transfinite, 112, 260, 304–311;
finite, 124, 260, 357; Dedekind’s definition of, 247, 249; Can-
tor’s definition of, 304; addition of, 118, 307; multiplication
of, 119, 307, 308; of finite integers, 122, 309, 364; well-ordered,
323, 364; of the continuum, 310, 364; is there a greatest? 101,
362ff.; of cardinal numbers, 362; of classes, 362; of proposi-
tions, 362, 526, 527; as a logical type, 525
Number, ordinal, 240, 319; defined, 242, 317; Dedekind’s defi-
nition of, 248; not prior to cardinal, 241, 249–251; transfinite,
240n., 260, 312–324; finite, 243, 260; of finite ordinals, 243,
313; second class of, 312, 315, 322; two principles of formation
of, 313; addition of, 317; subtraction of, 317; multiplication
of, 318; division of, 318; no greatest, 323, 364; positive and
negative, 244
Number, relation-, 262, 321
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Numbers, complex, 372, 376ff., 379; ordinal, series of, 323; pos-
itive and negative, 229; real, 270
Numbers, irrational, 157, 270ff., 320; arithmetical theories of,
277ff.
Numbers, rational, 149ff., 259, 335; cardinal number of, 310; or-
dinal type of, 296, 316, 320
Object, 55n.
Occupation (of space or time), 465, 469, 471, 472
One, 241, 356, 520; definable? 112, 130, 135; applicable to individ-
uals or to classes? 130, 132, 517
Oppositeness, 96, 205
Order, 199ff., 207–217, 255; not psychological, 242; cyclic, 199;
and infinity, 188, 189, 191, 195; in projective space, 385ff., 389;
in descriptive space, 394, 395
Ordinal element, 200, 353
Padoa, 111n., 114n., 125, 205
Parallelism, psychophysical, 177
Parallelogram law, 477
Parallels, axiom of, 404
Part, 360; proper, 121, 246n.; ordinal, 361; three kinds of, 138, 533
143; similarity to whole, 121, 143, 306, 316, 350, 355, 358, 371
Pascal, 420
Pasch, 390n., 391n., 393ff., 407n., 417
Peano, vi, vii, 4, 10ff., 23, 26–32, 36, 62, 68, 78ff., 111, 114, 115, 131,
139, 142, 152, 159n., 163n., 199, 205n., 219, 241n., 248, 270, 290,
300n., 328n., 334n., 335, 341, 360, 410, 437, 443, 501, 514, 519;
his indefinables, 27, 112; his indemonstrables, 29; his Arith-
metic, 124–128, 239n.; on real numbers, 274; on descriptive
geometry, 393ff.; on theory of vectors, 432
Pearson, 474, 489
Peirce, 23, 26, 203n., 232n., 320n., 376, 387n.
Pencils of planes, 400
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Perception, its function in philosophy, v, 129
Permutations, 316
Philosophy, of Mathematics, 4, 226; distinguished fromMath-
ematics, 128; andMathematics, 338
Pieri, 199, 216n., 382ff., 410, 421
Planes, projective, 384; kinds of, 391; descriptive, 398; ideal,
400, 402; metrical 410
Plato, 73, 355, 357, 438, 446
Pleasure, quantity of, 162, 174; magnitude of, 164; and pain,
233n.
Pluralism, viii
Poincaré, 347
Point-pairs, 426
Points, 382, 394, 437, 443; rational and irrational, 389; ideal,
400; proper and improper ideal, 423; imaginary, 420; logical
objections to, 445–455; material, 445; indiscernible? 446, 451
Position, absolute and relative, 220, 221, 444ff.
Power, 364n. SeeNumber, cardinal
Predicates, 45, 56; predicable of themselves, 96, 97, 102
Premiss, empirical, 441
Presentations, 446, 450
Primes, ordinal, 319
Process, endless. See Regress
Product, logical, of propositions, 16, 519, 527; of classes, 21
Product, relative, 25, 98
Progressions, 199, 239ff., 247, 283, 313, 314, 520; existence of, 322,
497
Projection, 390, 393
Proper names, 42, 44, 502
Propositions, ix, 13, 15, 211, 502, 525; unity of, 50, 51, 107, 139, 466,
507; when analyzable into subject and assertion, 83ff., 106,
505–510; can they be infinitely complex? 145; cardinal num-
ber of, 367; contradiction as to number of, 527; existential
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theory of, viii, 449, 493
Quadratic forms, 104, 512, 514
Quadrics, 403
Quadrilateral construction, 333, 384; in metrical geometry, 417
Quantity, 159; relation to number, 157, 158, 160; not always di-
visible, 160, 170; sometimes a relation, 161, 172; range of, 170–
175; and infinity, 188; does not occur in pure mathematics,
158, 419
Quaternions, 432
Ranges, 511ff., 524; extensional or intensional? 511; double, 512
Ratio, 149, 336
Rays, 231, 398, 414; order of, 415
Reality, Kant’s category of, 342, 344
Reduction, 17
Referent, 24, 96, 99, 263
Regress, endless. 50, 99, 223, 348
Regression, 291, 300, 320
Relation, 95, 107; peculiar to two terms, 25, 99, 268; domain of,
26, 97, 98; converse domainof, 97, 98; field of, 97, 98; in itself
and as relating, 49, 100; of a term to itself, 86, 96, 97, 105; de-
finable as a class of couples? 99, 512; of a relation to its terms,
99; fundamental, 112; when analyzable, 163; particularized by
its terms, 51n., 52, 211; finite, 262
Relations, intensional view of, 24, 523, 526; extensional view
of, 99, 523, 526; monistic and monadistic theories of, 221ff.;
as functions of two variables, 507, 521; converse of, 25, 95, 97,
201n., 228; reality of? viii, 99, 221, 224, 446ff.; sense of, 86, 95,
99, 107, 225, 227; difference from numbers, 95; with assigned
domains, 26, 268; types of, 8, 23, 403, 436; symmetrical, 25,
96, 114, 203n., 218; asymmetrical, 25, 200, 203n., 218–226; not-
symmetrical, 25, 96, 218; transitive, 114, 203, 218; intransitive,
218; not-transitive, 218; reflexive, 114, 159n., 219, 220; many-
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one, 114, 246n; one-one, 113, 130, 305; non-repeating, 232n.;
serial, 242; propositional, 510; triangular, 204, 211, 471, 472.
SeeVerbs
Relation-number. SeeNumber, relation-
Relatum, 24, 96, 99, 263
Representation, of a system, 245
Resemblance, immediate, 171
Rest, 265
Reye, 403n.
Riemann, 266
Right and left, 223n., 231, 417
Rigidity, 405
Rotation, absolute, 489ff.
Schröder, 10n., 12n., 13, 22, 24, 26, 142, 201n., 221n., 232, 306n.,
320n., 367n.
Segments, 271, 359; and limits, 292; completed, 289, 303; of com-
pact series, 299–302; of well-ordered series, 314n.; infinitesi-
mal, 334, 353, 368; in projective geometry, 385ff.; in descrip-
tive geometry, 394, 397
Semi-continuum, 320
Separation. SeeCouples
Series, 199; compact, 193n., 203, 259, 271, 277, 287, 289, 299– 534
303; closed, 202, 204, 205, 234–238, 297, 381, 387; infinite,
204, 239; denumerable, 296, 298; continuous, 205, 271, 287ff.;
well-ordered, 310, 319, 322, 363; independent, 262; by corre-
lation, 262, 363; complete, 269, 303; perfect, 273, 288, 290,
292, 297; coherent, 274, 283, 297; cohesive, 288; fundamen-
tal, 283, 297; simple andmultiple, 372; anddistance, 204; and
triangular relations, 204
Sheaves, 400
Sign, difference of, 227–233
Similarity, of classes, 113, 249, 261, 305, 356; of null-classes, 521;
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of whole and part, see Part
Simplification, 16
Some, distinguished from a, 56n., 59
Space, 372, 436, 442; an infinite aggregate, 143, 443, 455; abso-
lute, 227, 445ff.; finite and infinite, 403; continuity of, 437–
444; subjective? 446; empty, 446, 449, 465; à priori? 454; and
existence, vii, 458, 461
Spaces, projective, defined, 430; Euclidean, defined, 432; Clif-
ford’s, defined, 434
Spinoza, 221, 448
Staudt, von, 199, 216, 333, 384, 385n., 421, 427n.
Stolz, 90, 282n., 283n., 334, 336, 378n., 379
Straight lines, elliptic, 205; projective, 382ff., 387, 391; segments
of projective, 385; descriptive, 394–398; segments of descrip-
tive, 394, 397; ideal, 400, 402; metrical, 410; kinds of, 382, 391;
and distance, 410, 492
Streintz, 491
Stretch, 181, 182n., 230, 254, 288, 342, 353, 408ff., 425
Sub-classes, number contained in a given class, 366, 527
Subject, and predicate, 47, 54, 77, 95, 211, 221, 448, 451, 471; log-
ical, can it be plural? 69, 76, 132, 136, 516
Substance, 43, 471
Substantives, 42
Such that, 3, 11, 19, 20, 28, 79, 82
Sum, logical, 21; relative, 26
Superposition, 161, 405
Syllogism, 10, 16, 21, 30, 457
System, singly infinite, 245, 247
Tautology, law of, 23
Terms, 43, 55n., 152, 211, 448, 471, 522; of a proposition, 45, 95, 211;
combinations of, 55, 56; simple and complex, 137; of a whole,
143; principal, in a series, 297; four classes of, 465; cardinal
number of, 362, 366
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Tetrahedra, 387, 399
Than, 100
The, 62
Therefore, 35, 504
Things, 44, 106, 466, 505; and change, 471
Time, an infinite aggregate, 144; relational theory of, 265;
Kant’s theory of, 456, 458
Totality, 362, 368, 528
Transcendental Aesthetic, 259; Dialectic, 259
Triangles, 387, 398
Trios, 525
Tristram Shandy, paradox of, 358
Truth, 3, 35, 48, 504
Truth-values, 502, 519
Two, 135; not mental, 451
Types, logical, 103, 104, 107, 131, 139n., 367, 368, 521, 523–528; min-
imum, 524, 525; mixed, 524, 526; number of, 525; of infinite
order, 525
Types, ordinal, 261, 321
Unequal, 160n.
Unit, 136, 140; material, 468
Unities, 139, 442; infinite, 144, 223n.; organic, 466
Vacuum, 468
Vaihinger, 446n., 456
Vailati, 205, 215, 235, 393n., 394, 395, 413
Validity, 450
Variable, 5, 6, 19, 89–94, 107, 264; apparent and real, 13; range
of, 36, 518; as concept, 86; and generality, 90; in Arithmetic,
90; doesnot vary, 90, 344, 351; restricted, 90; conjunctive and
disjunctive, 92; individuality of, 94; independent, 263
Vectors, 432
Velocity, 473, 482
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Verbs, 20n., 42, 47–52, 106; and relations, 49, 526
Vieta, 157
Vivanti, 203n., 288n., 307n., 308
Volumes, 231, 333, 417, 440, 443
Ward, 474, 489
Weierstrass, 111, 157, 259, 326, 347, 473; on irrationals, 282
Whitehead, vi, viii, 119, 253n., 299n., 307n., 308, 311n., 322, 376n.,
377, 424n., 426
Wholes, 77, 137; distinct from classes as many, 69, 132, 134n.;
and logical priority, 137, 147; two kinds of, 138; distinct from
all their parts, 140, 141, 225; infinite, 143–148, 333, 349; always
either aggregates or unities? 146, 440, 460; collective anddis-
tributive, 348; and enumeration, 360
Zeno, 347ff., 355, 358
Zermelo, 306n.
Zero, 168, 195, 356; Meinong’s theory of, 184, 187; as minimum,
185; of distance, 186; as null-segment, 186, 273; and negation,
186, 187; and existence, 187
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